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Glossary 
ABVO  Antilliaanse Bond Van Overheidspersoneel  
[Antillean union of government employees] 
AT&T   American Telephone and Telegraph Company 
AUCS   AT&T-Unisource Communication Services 
BT   BritishTelecom 
CANTV  Compañia Anónima National Teléfonos de 
Venezuela 
[Venezuelan PTO] 
CEO  Chief Executive Officer 
EC   European Community 
EVUA  European Virtual Users Association 
GATS  General Agreement on Trade in Services 
GSM  Global System for Mobile Communication 
IB   International Business 
IS   International Support 
ISDN   Integrated Services Digital Network 
IT    Information Technology 
ITC  International Trade Centre 
ITU   International Telecommunication Union 
IVPN  International Virtual Private Networks 
JMDP  Joint Management Development Program 
JTS   Joint Training Service 
KDD  Kokusai Denshin Denwa [Japanese PTO] 
KPN   Koninklijke PTT Nederland [Dutch PTO] 
KS   Kamera Sindical [labour union on Curaçao] 
KSO  Kerjasama Operasi [joint operating schemes] 
MTPT  Ministry of Tourism, Post and 
Telecommunication 
NCF  Netherlands Consultancy Foundation for Post 
and Telecom 
NIS  Netherlands International School  
NTT  Nippon Telegraph and Telephone [Japanese 
PTO] 
OPTA  Independent Post and Telecom Authority  
PABX    Private Automated Branch Exchange  
PRX  Private Redial Exchange 
PTO   Public Telecommunication Operator 
PTT   Post, Telegraph and Telephone Administration  
PT TELKOM Telecommunikasi Indonesia [Indonesian PTO] 
PT INDOSAT Indonesia Satellite Corporation 
SETEL  Servisio Di Telekomunikashon [Curaçaoan PTO] 
SPT  Správa Post a Telekomunikací [Czech PTO] 
STET  Societa Finanziaria Telefonica [Italian PTO]  
STTK Sindikato di Trahadornan den Telekomunikashon Korsou [Curaçaoan 
telecom labour union] 
TISA  Telefónica International SA 
TPG  TNT and Post Group 
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UBN   Unisource Business Networks 
WTO   World Trade Organisation  
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Room for St. John of the Cross, 
1983 
Bill Viola 
Video/sound installation 
Collection:  
The Museum of Contemporary Art Los Angeles 
 
A black cubicle stands in the center of a 
large dark space. A small window reveals the 
illuminated interior where a color video 
monitor, a metal pitcher and a glass of water 
sit on a wooden table. A voice quietly 
reciting the poems of St. John of the Cross in 
Spanish can be heard from within. Outside in 
the main room, a large image is projected on 
the wall behind the cubicle showing black-
and-white images of snow covered 
mountains in constant, wild, chaotic motion. 
A loud roaring sound fills the space like a 
storm.  
(Stedelijk Museum Amsterdam, cat. No 829,  
September 1998) 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The study presented in this thesis focuses on the reaction of Dutch Public 
Telecom Operator PTT Telecom to the restructuring of the telecom market and 
concentrates in particular on the strategy of internationalisation. The research 
takes up the period from 1989 to and including 1997 in which the organisation 
was in its first phase of internationalisation. This introduction provides a brief 
outline of the study followed by a discussion of its scientific and social 
relevance. The basic assumptions on which the study is based are first explained 
after which the central research questions are introduced. In order to form 
answers for the latter a research design is used that explores the field of study 
in four stages. At each stage newly collected data are used to select the next 
level of exploration. The motivations for selecting one telecom operator, two 
departments and three cases of cross-cultural cooperation are discussed. 
Finally, the structure of the study is given.  
 
 
1.1 The Death of Distance 
  
In the last decade a wide interest in the fast changing market of 
telecommunications has grown. Almost every week, magazines and newspapers 
report on new strategic alliances, competition, the Internet, huge profits and 
technological inventions. The technology revolutions, the deregulation of 
telecom laws, the privatisation of Public Telecom Operators (PTOs) and the 
demand for cheap international telephony by multinational corporations have 
dramatically changed the context of the domestic telecom operators. For many 
years, national Post, Telephone and Telegraph companies (PTTs) controlled the 
national telecom markets. The closed and static structure of these markets has 
recently been restructured to allow for a more open and dynamic market 
structure. In losing their monopoly, national PTTs have had to compete with 
foreign and new telecom operators and the resulting turbulence in the telecom 
market has created an atmosphere of uncertainty, fear and hope for both Public 
Telecom Operators (PTOs) and customers. 
 The restructuring of the market of telecom operators started in the United 
States of America in the eighties and has since swept across the rest of the 
world. As of 1998, European PTOs no longer hold monopolies in their domestic 
markets but instead compete on data networks, cellular telephony and fixed 
telephone networks. Moreover, it is becoming increasingly difficult to draw 
clear boundaries around the telecom sector. In this study the telecom sector 
includes the telecom companies that offer speech and data carrier services. 
There is now substantial evidence to support the hypothesis that the new 
telecom revolution has radically changed the boundaries and structure of the 
market for telecom operators. Estabrooks (1995) has observed a technological 
convergence of information structure, telecom infrastructure, access media and 
services and The Economist (1995) has made note of the new competition and 
the economic growth of the telecom market. Others focus on the new policies of 
restructuring in the European telecom industry (Crandell and Flamm 1989, Caby 
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and Steinfield 1994, Noam and Kramer 1994, Steinfield, Bauer and Caby 1994, 
Comor 1994). Sussman and Lent (1991) examine the developments of 
telecommunications in the third world, while Smith and Staple (1994) 
concentrate on the growing telecom business in Asia. All of the authors came to 
the conclusion that the market for telecom operators has changed dramatically 
during the last decade and has become one of the major industries. 
 In reaction to the restructuring of the telecom market PTOs have recently 
expanded beyond their traditional national markets, creating dynamic networks 
of cross-border strategic alliances. National European, Latin American, Asian 
and American telecom operators now work together in consortia all over the 
world and have thus transformed into international operators. In this process of 
change, PTOs are confronted with new questions on international business and 
cross-cultural management. One might have the perception that PTOs and their 
employees have little or no international experience and many questions arise 
with regard to how former national government owned PTOs have been 
transformed into commercially operating international companies. How do the 
PTOs deal with cultural diversity? How do they manage strategic alliances and 
local joint ventures? How do they select and train employees for international 
posts? How do the individual strategies of the employees of PTOs support the 
transformation? The aim of this study is to explore the strategies of PTOs and 
their employees as they cope with the cultural complexity of the international 
telecom market focusing mainly on the strategy of internationalisation.  
 
 
1.2 Outlining the Field of Study  
 
In recent years researchers have become increasingly interested in cross-cultural 
management in international business (Schneider and Barsoux 1997). Cross-
cultural management is the comparison between distinct ways of managing 
organisations in different cultures. Differences in national, corporate or 
professional cultures are generally seen as separate factors of risk in 
international business in the same way as local politics and weak currencies are 
regarded (Deresky 1994, Schneider and Barsoux 1997). Cultural differences are 
seen as an important factor in the lack of success of strategic alliances (Lorange 
and Roos 1995, Yoshino and Rangan 1995, Cauley de la Sierra 1995, Hoecklin 
1995, Lewis 1996). Cross-cultural management is frequently studied and 
described from the perspective that views culture as a system of shared values. 
Researchers like Hofstede (1991) and Trompenaars (1993) use a limited number 
of dimensions to describe different national cultures. The dimensions give an 
indication of a potential cultural misfit between two companies of different 
cultures.  
 What do we learn from the growing body of information on cross-cultural 
management? We neither get an insightful perspective on daily experiences nor 
learn much about its connections to political, social and cultural processes. The 
literature on cross-cultural management gives us almost no information on the 
employees’ perspective of cultural differences and their interpretations of cross 
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cultural strategies. Most literature lacks detailed information on cross-cultural 
management as a result of expensive and time-consuming fieldwork and due to 
the lack of access to execute fieldwork within the companies. Till now, little or 
no attention has been given to the cultural complexity of cross-cultural 
management. Hannerz’ (1992) concept of cultural complexity focuses on the 
complex relation of three dimensions of contemporary culture; (1) ideas and 
modes of thought, (2) forms of externalisation and (3) social distribution. 
Researchers of cross-cultural management give the most attention to the first 
dimension, the shared values of people in a social unit (Hoecklin 1995, Lewis 
1996). This is surprising, because while globalisation processes may have 
resulted in technical and economic integration, they have certainly not led to 
cultural integration or, to what might be called a global culture. The studies of 
Featherstone (1990), Hannerz (1992) and Friedman (1994) seem to show that 
contemporary culture has become more complex yet almost no detailed studies 
have been conducted on the cultural complexity in cross-cultural management 
that provide a clear understanding of the ideas and modes of thoughts in 
corporations, the ways in which meanings are made public and the ways in 
which these cultural meanings are distributed. Research on cross-cultural 
cooperation in organisations therefore lacks a historical, processual and 
contextual approach that is focused on actors (Bate 1997).  
 A holistic anthropological approach is applied in this study to support the 
connection of the restructuring of the telecom market, the history of the PTO 
and the change of organisational culture of the PTO with the daily life of PTO 
employees. I support Mansell (1994: 40) who stressed the need to combine the 
analysis of the social, cultural, political and economic constraints that shape 
institutions in order to understand the process of globalisation of the PTOs. 
Behaviour of employees in organisations cannot be understood without our 
knowing the context in which they are situated and cross-cultural management 
cannot be studied separately from organisational cultures. The individual 
employee plays an important role in the reproduction and renewal of 
organisational culture. Tennekes (1995) points at the dynamic character of 
culture, which cannot be separated from social action and therefore, is subjected 
to permanent change. Galjart (1993: 8) also argues that reproduction and change 
of culture have to be at the interaction level. The question is not whether a new 
element will be accepted but whether people can convince each other about 
what is right and what is wrong. In this way, employees try to establish their 
position within the organisation. Changes in the organisational culture depend 
on the power and position of the employees introducing them. The success of 
internationalisation therefore is strongly related to the change in organisational 
culture of the PTOs. 
 To obtain detailed information on cross-cultural cooperation the daily life in 
an organisation is studied. Even if detailed information has been presented on 
cultural complexity as was done by Deresky (1994) and Schneider and Barsoux 
(1997), it is still limited to a mosaic of small cases from a diversity of 
companies, industries and countries. Latour (1988, 1994 and 1997) studied the 
daily world of scientists in laboratories, offices and construction places. He 
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concluded that in the daily practice of technicians, administration workers, 
managers and business developers it is impossible to study the social and 
technical artefacts separately because they are strongly intertwined. In their 
daily practices employees connect social and technical artefacts to different 
levels in and outside the organisation and their exchange does not stop at five 
o’clock. Informal activities in the evening such as sporting events, going to a 
bar, social telephone calls between colleagues and friendships are part and 
parcel of the daily activities of employees. Koot (1995) also noted the 
importance of observing daily life rituals of employees in order to obtain a 
detailed and more accurate picture of the organisational culture and to 
understand the culture through the eyes of the employees. I agree with Bate who 
emphasised that ‘insight always comes from the inside’ (Bate 1997: 1161). 
 Apart from scientific interests, the study presented in this thesis also serves 
public and corporate interests. In recent years, telecommunication users have 
developed a growing interest in the telecom market. The turbulent changes in 
the telecom market, the use of cellular telephony, the spectacular growth of the 
Internet, the profits on international telephone traffic and the rapid technological 
inventions have made the telecom sector a ‘hot’ topic. The restructuring of the 
telecom market has indeed brought about many changes for the users but has not 
always contributed to a clear understanding of the world of telecom technology. 
A clearer perspective of the changing world of telecommunications, the 
technical background and the daily practices of international operating telecom 
employees could however, clarify and add to the public’s knowledge of the 
telecom sector.  
 This study provides more than just analyses of the cross-cultural 
experiences. It contributes to a growing awareness of the importance of cultural 
processes in the international telecom and also gives suggestions for 
improvement.  It is clear that the growth of international business is an 
important pillar for the future success. The evaluations of the cross-cultural 
experiences as presented in this study should assist PTOs in its planning for 
improvement of its international business, cross-cultural preparations of 
employees about to be sent abroad, the management of international joint 
ventures and the mutual understanding between the head office and regional 
offices.  
 The aim of this ethnographical study is to contribute towards a greater 
sensitivity and a better understanding of cross-cultural management by Western 
PTOs when co-operating with foreign partners, especially those in developing 
countries. According to the head of the International Telecommunication Union 
this is necessary if a new ‘colonisation’ of the PTOs in developing countries by 
dominant western PTOs (Newsweek, September 19, 1997) is to be avoided. 
  
 
1.3 Research Questions 
 
The cultural complexity within a PTO can be studied in many different ways. 
The aim of this study is to picture the common life experiences of the PTO 
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employees in connection with the collective strategies of PTOs in the fast 
changing telecom market. Therefore it is necessary to define assumptions and 
starting points on which the research is based.  
⋅ The study is a qualitative research with an interpretative approach because 
the cultural processes in a PTO are for a large part unpredictable and a result 
of social construction of the PTO employees in interaction with others.  
⋅ An ethnographic approach is used to picture the everyday experiences of 
PTO employees.   
⋅ The study is actor centred, which means that cultural processes in the 
telecom sector are understood from the perspective of the PTO employees. 
This is called an emic perspective. 
⋅ It is necessary to have an in-depth study because cultural processes cannot 
be understood without knowledge of the context. Therefore, the study gives 
an adequate description of just one PTO. Within this one PTO however, 
distinct and contrasting cases are chosen. The selection of these cases is 
based upon theoretical presumptions, in this way applying the concept of 
theoretical sampling. 
⋅ The anthropological method of observation and participant observation is 
used. To obtain a detailed picture of the daily practices of the employees by 
means of documents, interviews and surveys is insufficient.  
⋅ The study has a longitudinal component because the research question 
addresses the process of internationalisation from the end of the eighties up 
to and including 1997.  
⋅ The study can be classified as an action research because the feedback of the 
results during the research can lead to changes in the organisation. 
 
The central research questions are:  
 
Which strategies of cross-cultural cooperation have been used by the Public 
Telecom Operator in reaction to the restructuring of the telecom market? 
How do employees deal with these strategies at the individual level? And 
how can these corporate and individual strategies be explained from an 
organisational cultural perspective? 
 
 The research questions, which are general in character, are defined more 
specifically in section 1.4 in the discussion of the selection of organisations and 
cases. But first, the concepts used in the research question need to be explained.  
 In this study, strategies at the collective level refer to the different ways in 
which the PTOs react to the restructuring of the telecom market. These 
strategies include cost reduction, client orientation, changing the organisational 
culture, creating new businesses at the home market, creating international 
alliances and entering new international markets. Although these strategies are 
interconnected and do influence each other, the main focus of this research is 
the strategy of internationalisation of the Public Telecom Operators (PTOs).  
 Public Telecom Operator (PTO) is understood here to be the telecom unit of 
the former state owned Post Telegraph and Telephone (PTT) organisation. PTOs 
  
 6 
share several common characteristics in that many of them are old national 
companies with little international experience. Initially they were fully state-
owned, technically orientated, had strong connections to the national politics 
and were rather bureaucratic. Because the restructuring of national telecom 
markets is governed by national telecom policies PTOs are in various stages of 
transformation. Some of them have been privatised and some, such as American 
AT&T, have even split up into smaller corporations and work in a fully 
liberalised market while others still function in fully protected monopolistic 
markets. 
  Strategies at the individual level are defined here as the different ways in 
which the PTO employees cope with new work related situations. Various 
factors influence the former stable organisation life of the PTO employee such 
as the new organisational strategies, the fear of a big lay-off, the unrest resulting 
from continuous reorganisation, better jobs offered by competitors and cultural 
diversity in new countries. The new cultural environments can be demanding for 
employees working abroad or in international strategic alliances and can create 
feelings of tension, fear and insecurity.  
 Employees are defined as all people working with the PTO in both the 
national and international context. It must be stressed that employees of all 
levels are included in this research, work floor technicians as well as top 
management executives. Although the restructuring affects all of the employees, 
some departments are influenced more and at an earlier stage than others.  
 To answer the central research question a theoretical framework needs to be 
developed that includes theories on cross-cultural management and 
organisational cultures. To develop this framework the next question has been 
formulated: How can the cultural complexity of the telecom market be described 
and analysed? As mentioned earlier, many studies on cross-cultural management 
and organisational cultures lack a historical, processual and contextual approach 
and are not focused on actors. However in this study, a theoretical framework 
that helps the unravelling of cultural complexity by conceptualising different 
levels has been constructed. Chanlat (1994) distinguishes five distinct levels that 
influence the organisational culture: world level, society level, organisational 
level, interaction level and individu concept of theoretical sampling is applied 
by selecting al level. Each level is analytically independent and contains 
elements that are linked to each other in relatively stable relations. There is no 
hierarchy between the different levels; the levels are contingent in nature and 
the relationships can move in any direction. To trace these relationships 
Latour’s (1994) network theory offers a solution. He pleads for an anthropology 
that suits modern societies: the anthropologist has to place himself in the centre 
of an organisation and to describe the micro- and macro processes from a 
holistic perspective, in the same way anthropologists have often done in the case 
of studies focused on  ‘primitive’ societies. This symmetric anthropologist 
follows complex networks in an organisation and by doing so crosses different 
levels. Section 2.5 combines the network theory of Latour and the multi-layer 
model of Chanlat to create a suitable theoretical framework for this study. 
 
  
 7 
 
1.4 Research Design 
 
The research questions are related to different levels of the telecom market: 
Which strategies of cross-cultural cooperation are being used by the Public 
Telecom Operator in reaction to the restructuring of the telecom market? How 
do employees deal with these strategies at the individual level? How can these 
corporate and individual strategies be explained from an organisational cultural 
perspective? To allow for clear and systematic research the field of study is 
explored step by step, starting at world level with the global restructuring of the 
telecom market. At each stage newly collected data are used to select new units 
of research, in other words, the next level of research. In this manner, the multi-
layered cultural complexity is unravelled step by step and, a clearer 
understanding of the context is accomplished (see Figure 1). Wester (1991) calls 
this approach the ‘phased analysis’. In this approach the general research 
question leads to a period of exploration in the field of study, while in later 
periods the gained knowledge is selectively worked out.  
 The first step in the phased approach of this study is an exploration of the 
international telecom market in order to get a broad understanding of the 
restructuring which effects the national telecom markets all over the world. 
Because of the many different phases of restructuring as well as the different 
policies held by various governments, a first selection of national telecom 
markets to be studied is required. In this study the European Community (EC) 
telecom market has been selected for a number of reasons. Firstly, the EC has 
been engaged in restructuring the European telecom markets since the early 
nineties and opened their telecom market for full competition in 1998. 
Secondly, the European PTOs have expanded their markets to former colonies. 
A third reason is simply the better availability and accessibility to and 
knowledge of the European PTOs.  
 The central question in the first step is: What are the causes and 
consequences of the restructuring of the international telecom market? The 
answer to this first question is analytical in nature and strongly related to the 
earlier mentioned world, society and organisational levels. Starting at the world 
level, the purpose of the question is to establish an understanding of the 
relationship between the restructuring of the telecom markets on the one hand, 
and other processes of globalisation and localisation on the other hand.  
 The second step of the phased approach is the selection of a European PTO 
for an N = 1 or case study. In the case of this study, the N = 1 research has been 
chosen because of the explorative and in-depth nature of the study and its 
historical, processual and contextual approach which demands a great deal of 
time to implement  (Bate 1997). The study aims to be a ‘true’ ethnographical 
research with a long-term stay in the organisation instead of a ‘jet-plane’ 
ethnography as Bate (1997: 1150) ironically described contemporary 
organisational ethnography. Hence, the number of PTOs that can be effectively 
studied in this way is limited by this research design to N=1. The selected PTO 
should invariably be representative of the contemporary changes in the 
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European telecom market, have foreign offices, international strategic alliances 
and some cross-cultural experience. The final decision to focus on Dutch PTT 
Telecom was based upon arguments that the organisation: 
⋅ was privatised in 1989 and in 1993 introduced at the stock  market.  
⋅ has followed an active process of change since 1990. 
⋅ has operations in West European, East European and Southeast Asian 
telecom markets.   
⋅ is an initiator and member of the pan-European strategic alliance Unisource.1 
⋅ has met full international competition at the national Dutch telecom market 
since 1995 (cellular telephony) and 1997 (fixed telephony).  
⋅ has long-standing international experiences with the Dutch ex-colonies. 
⋅ is willing to co-operate for the purposes of this study.  
⋅ is familiar to the researcher.2  
 
 The central question in this second step is: What strategies has PTT 
TELECOM used in reaction to the turbulence of the telecom market? In this 
phase of this study the corporate goals, structure, strategy, history and 
organisational culture of PTT Telecom are explored. The central focus of this 
second step is the strategy of internationalisation, the international strategic 
alliances and the cross-cultural strategies used. The research takes up the period 
from 1989, when KPN was privatised, up to and including 1997. 3 The speed of 
developments in the telecom market and in PTT TELECOM has not slowed 
down ever since. As a result, the contemporary situation can differ from the 
described situation in the study presented in this thesis.  
 The third step of the phased approach is the selection of two different 
departments in PTT TELECOM from which a detailed picture of the daily lives 
of the employees can be traced. The selection is necessary because the 
organisation has over 30.000 employees. Choosing two different departments 
makes it possible to compare differences and similarities. The choice for the 
department of International Business (IB) and International Support (IS) was 
based upon the international experiences of the employees and accessibility. 
The department of International Business (70 employees in 1996) is orientated 
towards the expansion of PTT TELECOM in international markets and deals 
with foreign offices and international alliances. The consultants of the 
department of International Support (80 employees in 1996) support the national 
and international projects. For more than two years, from December 1995 till 
January 1998, I participated in the department of International Support.  
                                                        
1 Unisource was the strategic alliance of Dutch KPN, Swiss Telecom, Swedish Telia and Spanish 
Telefónica formed in 1992. Later Unisource founded together with the American AT&T the 
AT&T-Unisource alliance. In this study the AT&T-Unisource group consists of the AT&T-
Unisource strategic alliance and the Unisource strategic alliance. 
2 From 1985 till 1988 I worked with the Centrale WerkPlaats (CWP) department of PTT. From 
1989 till 1994 I worked in a job closely related to KPN (see Curriculum Vitae).  
3 In this study the name of PTT Telecom is being used for the Dutch PTO. From 1989 up till 1997 
PTT Telecom and PTT Post together formed the Koninklijke PTT Nederland (KPN). With the split 
off of PTT Post, PTT Telecom was renamed in KPN and its activities reorganised in KPN Telecom 
and KPN International. 
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 The central question in the third step is: What kind of individual strategies 
do the employees of PTT TELECOM use in reaction to the restructuring of the 
telecom market? The answer to this third question is descriptive in nature and is 
related to the interactional and individual levels of the multi-level model. It 
therefore requires a detailed study of the daily activities of the employees and 
their individual strategies in coping with uncertainty, fear, change and 
turbulence in different cultural contexts.  
 The fourth and last step in the phased approach is to achieve a detailed and 
accurate picture reflecting the daily practice of cross-cultural cooperation of 
PTT TELECOM and its employees.   
 The central question in the fourth step is: What cross-cultural experiences 
do PTT TELECOM and its employees have with international alliance 
partners? To answer this question an analytical approach is needed and thus 
demands an evaluation of the cross-cultural experiences of PTT TELECOM and 
its employees. By selecting distinct cases an understanding of the differences 
and similarities in cross-cultural management is accomplished. Moreover, the 
influence of cultural processes on the process of internationalisation can be 
better understood. The tendency of PTOs to focus on ex-colonial countries in 
particular needs further attention. Do relationships with ex-colonial countries 
favour European PTOs in starting up business overseas? Within this fourth step 
the international experiences of PTO employees and the experiences of the 
international alliance partners are taken into account.  
 A first case for studying cross-cultural cooperation is selected from the 
strategic alliance AT&T-Unisource. PTT TELECOM started Unisource together 
with Swedish Telia in 1992. Later Swiss Telecom, AT&T and Telefónica joined 
the strategic alliance. For five years Unisource was the major strategy of 
internationalisation of PTT TELECOM. The cooperation in the strategic 
alliance AT&T-Unisource however, proved to be very difficult. The AT&T-
Unisource alliance fell apart with the leaving of Telefónica and AT&T and PTT 
TELECOM’s alliance with the American Qwest. The wide cultural diversity and 
the difficult cross-cultural cooperation make the AT&T-Unisource case a must 
for exploring the cross-cultural experiences of PTT TELECOM. Two months 
were used to study cross-cultural cooperation in the Unisource alliance.  
 The second case consists of a comparative study of two strategic alliances 
with PTOs in the Dutch ex-colonies, the Netherlands Antilles and Indonesia. A 
comparison of both experiences could give answer to the question as to whether 
relations with ex-colonies favour in starting up business overseas. The 
acquisition in the Netherlands Antilles occurred in the early 1990s when the 
organisation had almost no experience with cross-cultural cooperation. Cultural 
differences have played an important role in the failure of this acquisition. In the 
contemporary strategy of PTT TELECOM the Netherlands Antilles no longer 
play a role. In contrast, the acquisition of a share in an Indonesian GSM 
operator, which took place in 1995, was a success. For purposes of this study, an 
inside understanding of the daily cross-cultural management was obtained 
through participant observation for a period of three months in both the 
Netherlands Antilles and Indonesia. 
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 With this research strategy, the field research, data collection and data 
analysis are two intertwined processes. In the exploration phase, the field of 
study is firs quickly scanned and subsequently the data are analysed and a 
selection of cases is made. Contrasting cases are chosen, based upon theoretical 
presumptions, in order to allow for the discovery of similarities and differences. 
Soon after starting the exploration, the concepts are developed. This is what 
Wester calls the formulation of central concepts (Wester 1991: 57). The 
research is a cyclic process of ongoing development and control which stops at 
the point where almost no new data can be gathered (Wester 1991: 77). In this 
cyclic process four kinds of research objects can be distinguished: events, 
meanings, products and behaviour (‘t Hart et al.1996: 266). Data in this research 
have been collected by means of the method of triangulation. Triangulation is 
the method of investigating an object from distinct perspectives and distinct 
kinds of perspectives. ‘t Hart et al. distinguish four different perspectives on 
triangulation; theoretical -, data -, methodological- and researchers-triangulation 
(‘t Hart et al. 1996: 270). Several instruments and sources of data are used to 
gain an insight into the field of study. In this research data have been obtained 
through the studying of documents, newspapers, reports, interviews, participant 
observation, open interviews, topic interviews, life history and observations. 
Figure 1.  Approach of the field of research 
 
 The daily activities of employees are a central theme in this study. To collect 
information on their interaction, behaviour and actions, special methods of 
observations are used. Describing daily activities by means of participant 
observation is one of the strongholds of the anthropological tradition (Bate 
1997). The aim of business-anthropology is to give an insight into the daily 
activities of the employees, to give the impression of having ‘been there’ and, to 
describe the connections of these employees with social, historical, cultural, 
political and economic processes from outside the organisation (Koot 1995, 
Bate 1997). I have chosen to investigate the process of internationalisation from 
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within PTT TELECOM. Anthropologists in the scientific tradition have always 
been experts in describing cultural processes from a holistic perspective in 
remote tribal societies. However, on returning home, most anthropologists are 
afraid of doing the same in Western society. Even when they do investigate 
cultural processes in Western society they usually choose to investigate the 
peripheral instead of the central processes. I fully agree with Bate (1997: 1150) 
who voices his frustration with ethnographic studies, claiming that they are 
never focused on the ‘organisational’ but are just studies about marginal groups 
such as football hooligans, cocktail waitresses, girl scouts or punks. Hence with 
this study, I have undertaken the task of presenting a truly ethnographic study 
based on lengthy and intensive fieldwork in a large business and technology 
orientated Public Telecom Operator.   
 
 
1.5 Structuring the Study 
 
The study is structured in four parts and consists of ten chapters. Part one, which 
consists of this introduction and the chapters two and three, deals with the 
theoretical framework and the methodology of studying the deconstruction of 
cultural complexity in the telecom industry. 
 In chapter two a theoretical framework for studying the cultural complexity 
of the telecom industry is developed. To develop this framework theories on 
intercultural management and organisational culture are discussed. Each of the 
debates is discussed briefly in relationship to the object of study. To place the 
internationalisation of the PTOs in a wider theoretical perspective, the debate on 
globalisation is also dealt with in this chapter. Results from these debates show 
the need for a new approach to cultural complexity based upon Latour’s 
network theory (1994) and the multi-layer model of Chanlat (1994).  
 Chapter three expands upon the methodology of the study. The step by step 
research strategy of the approach is made operational and the methodology of 
data collection and analysis of data are presented. Attention is brought to the 
specific problems of anthropological research within organisations that need 
special attention and the ethical questions on the freedom of the researcher and 
the relation of the researcher with the objects of research are thoroughly 
discussed. 
 The second part of the study, the chapters four, five and six, is totally 
dedicated to the exploration of the context of cross-cultural cooperation in the 
telecom sector. The historical, institutional, economical, temporal and personal 
context is unravelled according the multi-layer model.    
 Chapter four explores the world and society levels of the multi-layer model 
and discusses the causes and consequences of the turbulence at the international 
telecom market. The convergence in technology, the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO) agreement and the telecom requirements of multinationals are shown to 
be the primary causes and the consequences for the PTOs and their reactions to 
the restructuring of the telecom market are discussed.  
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 Chapter five explores the society and organisational levels of the multi-layer 
model and discusses the restructuring of the Dutch telecom market and the 
Dutch telecom operator PTT TELECOM. The history of the Dutch telecom 
market and how it is closely related to the history of PTT TELECOM is 
discussed followed by a description of the reorganisation of PTT TELECOM 
and the process of cultural change throughout the last ten years. Finally, the 
strategies of internationalisation and the formal cross-cultural strategies are 
examined.   
 Chapter six explores the interactional and individual levels of the multi-layer 
model and discusses individual strategies of PTT TELECOM employees in 
coping with the new situations. A description of a typical day in the life of an 
International Support and an International Business employee is presented to 
introduce human beings in the study and to show the strategies these employees 
use to cope with insecurity, fear, cultural diversity and fundamental changes.  
 In the third part of the study, chapters seven, eight and nine, the results of the 
study on the cross-cultural experiences of PTT TELECOM are presented. Three 
cases have been studied; (1) the temporary participation of PTT TELECOM in 
the strategic alliance Unisource, (2) the failed acquisition of a minority share in 
the national PTOs of the Netherlands Antilles and (3) the contemporary 
activities of PTT TELECOM in Indonesia.    
 In chapter seven the cross-cultural cooperation within the strategic 
Unisource alliance is discussed. The experiences of PTT TELECOM and Dutch 
AT&T-Unisource employees with their international colleagues are ‘viewed’ 
from the perspective of a Dutch AT&T-Unisource employee. The cultural 
differences in the alliance interact with power related issues among the 
shareholders and the splitting of the Spanish Telefónica and the organisation 
politics are discussed to show the dynamic changes within the AT&T-Unisource 
group. 
 Chapter eight presents the attempt of PTT TELECOM in the early nineties 
to expand their international activities to the Netherlands Antilles. First the 
political, cultural and economic relations of the Netherlands Antilles with the 
Netherlands and the telecom market at the Netherlands Antilles are discussed. 
The results of the cross-cultural experiences are presented by observing a PTT 
TELECOM employee in the contemporary activities of the Netherlands 
Consultancy Foundation (NCF) at Curaçao and discussing his personal 
strategies in coping with cultural differences. These strategies are in turn used to 
explain and discuss the corporate cross-cultural strategies of PTT TELECOM in 
the early nineties in its attempt to acquire a minority share.  
 In chapter nine the cross-cultural strategies of PTT TELECOM and its 
employees in Indonesia are discussed. The history and the context of the 
cooperation between PTT TELECOM and the Indonesian PTOs are first 
presented followed by the individual and corporate strategies of PTT 
TELECOM and its employees to deal with cultural diversity. The personal 
strategies of a PTT TELECOM employee of the Jakarta office are used as the 
basis to discuss different types of strategies used by PTT TELECOM expatriates 
in Jakarta.    
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 Finally, in chapter ten the conclusions are drawn and reflections upon the 
research questions and comparisons between the results of the three cases are 
made. The differences and similarities between the two ex-colonial relationships 
and the advantages and disadvantages of choosing alliance partners from ex-
colonial countries are discussed. The results of the cases are placed into 
theoretical perspective and their consequences for present theories on cross-
cultural cooperation are presented. Finally, the empirical implications of this 
study for PTT TELECOM are presented in the form of a workshop for its 
managers, consultants, expatriates, and project leaders.    
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2 INTERCULTURAL MANAGEMENT, ORGANISATIONAL 
CULTURE AND GLOBALISATION 
 
Chapter two deals with the theoretical frameworkfor studying the cultural 
complexity of the telecom industry. To develop this framework three major 
areas of debate in social science must be discussed: (1) intercultural 
management, (2) organisational culture and (3) globalisation versus 
localisation. Each of the debates is discussed briefly in relationship to the 
object of study. Results from these debates show the need for the introduction of 
a new approach to study cultural complexity in organisations. Hence, a multi-
level model is developed.  
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
To answer the central research questions formulated in this study, it must first 
be determined how the cross-cultural cooperations in the telecom market can be 
explored, described and analysed. In order to do this it is necessary to construct 
a theoretical framework. This study takes into account three major scientific 
debates that took place during the 1980s and 1990s: one on intercultural 
management, one on organisational cultures and a third, on the globalisation of 
trade and services. In section 2.2, the scientific debate on intercultural 
management is discussed and the results of this debate indicate the need for 
including the scientific debate on organisational culture into the theoretical 
framework. The points raised by the discussion on organisational culture in 
section 2.3 show that the restructuring of the telecom industry also exerts 
influence on cross-cultural cooperation and that this restructuring supposes 
knowledge of the scientific debate on the globalisation of trade, services and 
culture.  
 Surprisingly few cross-references linking these debates can be found in 
published literature. The debates were argued separately due to the highly 
specialised nature of each subject and due to the excessive division of labour 
within Western academic culture. I would however argue that linking the three 
debates and transcending the disciplinary boundaries are necessary in order to 
effectively study the cultural complexity in the telecom industry. Since there are 
large bodies of literature available on these debates (e.g. Trice and Beyer (1993) 
on organisational culture, Ruigrok and vanTulder (1995) on globalisation, 
Schneider and Barsoux (1997) on intercultural management), the presentation of 
each of these debates is restricted here to the major points of academic 
discussion. Furthermore, this study will not construct a large theoretical 
framework for studying cultural complexity but concerns itself with providing a 
profound understanding of the daily practices of cross-cultural management in a 
complex cultural context. Untill now, very little literature on cross-cultural 
management is based on extensive and detailed empirical research (Bate 1997). 
The aim of this study is therefore, to collect empirical data to support the debate 
with a detailed case of cross-cultural cooperation that is related to different 
levels of culture.  
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2.2 Debate on Intercultural Management  
 
Two Dutch scientists have dominated the international scientific debate on 
intercultural management with their models of national cultural differences: 
Hofstede and Trompenaars. Both have used bipolar dimensions to analyse 
culture at a national level. Hofstede (1991) uses four value dimensions, i.e. (1) 
low and high power distance, (2) high and low uncertainty avoidance, (3) high 
and low individualism and (4) high and low masculinity. A dimension is an 
aspect from which a culture can be compared with another culture. The first 
value dimension is the level of acceptance by a country of the unequal 
distribution of power. The second value dimension refers to the extent to which 
people in a country feel threatened by ambiguous situations. The third value 
dimension is the level in which people look after themselves and neglect the 
needs of the country. The fourth value dimension refers to the level of dominant 
values such as assertiveness and materialism in a country. To analyse Asian 
values of long term versus short-term orientation, Hofstede (1991) also included 
a fifth value dimension; the Confucian dynamism. These five value dimensions 
can be integrated in seven diagrams with each being a combination of two 
dimensions. Hofstede calls these diagrams the cultural maps of the world in 
which each country can be placed based on their score on the different indexes. 
As a result clusters of countries can be recognised in the diagrams. Within these 
clusters, countries are considered to have a number of cultural similarities. Of 
course, these cultural value dimensions are a generalisation and run the risk of 
being an oversimplification. 
 Trompenaars (1993) uses seven dimensions to describe a culture in a 
country: (1) universalism versus particularism, (2) individualism versus 
collectivism, (3) neutral versus affective relationships, (4) specific versus 
diffuse relationships and (5) achievement versus ascription, (6) attitudes to time 
and (7) attitudes to the environment. In the first set of dimensions universalism 
refers to the view that norms and values can be applied everywhere. 
Particularism in contrast, is said to prevail where the unique context and 
relationships are more important than universal abstract rules. The second set of 
dimensions refers to the level in which people regard themselves as a part of a 
group or society. Trompenaars follows the definition of Hofstede in this 
dimension. The third set of dimensions is related to the way in which emotions 
are generally expressed in a country; people can let themselves go and react 
emotionally or they might instead tend to intellectualise their emotions and 
remain controlled in their responses. The fourth set of dimensions refers to the 
degree of involvement individuals are comfortable with when dealing with other 
people. The fifth set of dimensions deals with how status and power are 
attributed in a country. In achievement-orientated countries the power and status 
of someone depends on the position of employment he has reached in the course 
of his career. In ascription-orientated cultures status is attributed to someone and 
in general independent of a specific task or function. The sixth dimension shows 
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the way in which societies look at time. The seventh dimension deals with the 
attitude of societies with the environment. 
 Both Trompenaars and Hofstede have used research questionnaires for a 
large population and a diversity of countries. Hofstede started with a large 
database of a sample of IBM employees from 50 countries, which led him to 
produce his bipolar dimensions. The findings were based upon data from only 
one company. Trompenaars in contrast, started with dimensions and produced 
questions for a sample of 14.993 managers from different industries in 47 
countries (Trompenaars 1993: 179). Undoubtedly, these two Dutch scientists 
have contributed towards giving cross-cultural studies a prominent place in the 
international management studies and laid the groundwork for later 
multicultural research. These studies have helped us to understand the reasons 
behind cultural differences among countries and to realise how an understanding 
of these differences is crucial in order to know what is appropriate management 
behaviour with regard to specific cultural contexts. However, they have also 
stimulated a rather over-simplified and static perspective on cultural differences. 
Distinguishing value dimensions and the quantification of these dimensions 
with indexes have stimulated the assumption that cultural differences are stable, 
measurable and universal within a given country. It is assumed that cultural 
differences are expressed in a stable and quantified distance between two 
national cultures. Furthermore, it has generated the assumption that cultural 
differences are determined by national cultural differences and can be overcome 
by being aware of the ‘do and do not’ facts of a country. 
 This assumption has stimulated a body of popular and management literature 
on cross-cultural management with a simplistic perspective. The popularity of 
cross-cultural comparisons has also generated public debate in newspapers, 
magazines and management literature. Examples can be found in studies like 
Managing successfully across cultures (Lewis 1996) that deals with the USA, 
Britain, Australia, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Russia, Spain, 
Sweden, the Arab countries, Japan, China and ‘India and South East Asia’ in 
136 pages. The list of books with handy tips on how to do business in countries 
such as Tokyo, Jakarta and Brazil is growing fast. These books do not really 
contribute to a better understanding of intercultural management and the public 
debate should therefore be kept separated from the scientific debate on 
intercultural management for which Hofstede and Trompenaars have laid the 
groundwork.  
 For a number of reasons, a larger part of the studies on intercultural 
management do not deal with the cultural complexity and the dynamic 
environment. Firstly, the simplified perspective of cross-cultural complexity 
offers an attractive impression of strength, control, opportunities and the 
promise of synergy. Consultants generally aim to communicate the message that 
cross-cultural problems can be overcome, utilised and used for competitive 
advantages. A second reason is that studying cross-cultural cooperation from a 
dynamic and holistic perspective is difficult, expensive and time consuming. 
Authors of cross-cultural handbooks are largely part-time or full-time 
consultants. The third reason is that organisations do not need a deep academic 
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insight into cross-cultural situations but need Human Resource Management 
instruments, clear strategies and training programs on cultural awareness. 
Lastly, there is a large market for practical cross-cultural handbooks that offers 
models, training programs and a list of points on ‘what to do’ for managers 
working abroad. The Indonesian based German chamber of commerce employee 
Thomas Brandt interviewed more than 150 managers from nine countries on 
Indonesian management culture and consequently decided to write a 
management handbook instead of a PhD study (Brandt 1997). Needless to say, 
the temptation to produce another pragmatic handbook on cross-cultural 
management is high.  
 
2.2.1 Strategies for Cross-cultural Cooperation  
While the previous section described the influence of national culture on 
business practice and how it might constrain the effectiveness of cooperation, 
this section addresses the different strategies multinationals employ to deal with 
cultural diversity in complex and dynamic environments.4 Four perspectives on 
strategies to handle cross-cultural differences by the following scientists are 
discussed: (1) Adler (1986), (2) Adler and Ghadar (1993), (3) Fung (1995) and 
(4) Schneider and Barsoux (1997). However, before proceeding further it is first 
necessary to define what is meant by strategy.  
 Mintzberg distinguished five definitions of the concept of strategy: (1) 
strategy as a plan of action, (2) strategy as a ploy to competitors, (3) strategy as 
a pattern in a stream of actions, (4) strategy as a position in the environment and 
(5) strategy as an organisational culture (Mintzberg 1987). In the ordinary use 
and in the greater part of management literature, strategy is perceived as a plan 
of action. Organisations are seen as rational thinking ‘machines’, a metaphor 
introduced by Morgan (1987), that execute intentional plans. But strategy needs 
to be seen in a broad and dynamic perspective. A strategy of internationalisation 
can involve an intended plan of action to win advantage over international 
competitors, a positioning in the international business market, a chaotic pattern 
of individual actions or, a cultural transformation to an international 
organisation.  
 The first perspective on cross-cultural strategies concerns Adler (1986) who 
sets out the different forms of cultural adaptation on a continuum. At one end of 
the continuum the strategy of cultural dominance is used. Managers do not 
accept cultural differences but try to avoid these by sticking to their own 
cultural behaviour. Halfway through the continuum, the strategy of cultural 
compromise teaches managers to react in a way that is respectful to another 
culture. The manager monitors his behaviour in specific situations and acts 
according to his own values or in accordance with other cultural values. At the 
other end of the continuum is the strategy of cultural synergy in which elements 
from different cultures are integrated or combined. The manager thus develops a 
new cultural behaviour that is not present in involved cultures. 
                                                        
4 A multinational is a company that has considerable direct investment in more than two foreign 
countries. Furthermore, it is not only concerned with export but has a management that is actively 
involved in its international activities (Bartlett and Ghoshal 1993: 2). 
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 The second perspective on cross-cultural strategies by Adler and Ghadar 
(1993) relates the corporate strategies to the phase of internationalisation. Adler 
and Ghadar (1993: 60) give a cultural perspective on the life cycle of 
international production. In the first phase of this life cycle, the domestic phase, 
the organisation operates from an ethnocentric perspective and uses a ‘one best 
way’ strategy to approach the local market. The processes of planning, 
organising, managing and controlling are developed in the home country and 
distributed to all host countries. Cultural sensitivity is seen as unimportant and 
foreigners have to absorb existing cultural differences. Control in this phase 
takes place by means of a highly centralised organisation in the home country. 
In the second phase, which is called the phase of growth and 
internationalisation, the organisation uses a regiocentric or polycentric strategy 
to handle cultural differences. The organisation rejects a universal approach 
towards management style and perceives the local processes of planning, 
organising, leading and controlling as best. Cultural sensitivity is seen as 
critically important and the home country employees and managers have to 
absorb cultural differences. There are many ways to achieve the corporate 
objectives. Control takes place by means of international divisions and host-
country offices. In the third phase, the phase of multinationalisation, the 
organisation operates from a multinational strategy. The cultural differences are 
perceived as marginally important because price competition forces the 
organisation to minimise the cost of production and control is centralised by 
means of global lines of business. In the fourth phase, the global-multicentric 
phase, the organisation operates from a multi-centric strategy. The organisation 
acknowledges that there should be some institutional rules but these rules 
should respond to the host-country market conditions. Cultural sensitivity is 
very important for both home and host country managers and is essential in 
order to compete in a highly competitive global market in which the activities of 
an organisation are co-ordinated from different local centres rather than from 
one centre.   
 In the third perspective on cross-cultural strategies Fung (1995) explains 
how three strategies in the handling of cultural diversity are related to the 
corporate orientation, culture and its objectives. With the first strategy, the 
ethnocentric strategy, the management tries to impose the headquarters’ world-
view upon locals in foreign subsidiairies while the organisational culture of the 
home country organisation is imposed upon other local offices. In such a 
situation the Western management is regarded as superior and universally 
applicable. The second strategy, the polycentric strategy, is one that assumes 
that the host-country perspective is the most suitable for local business. The 
organisational culture is constructed and reconstructed in a search for a balance 
between the local and the home country demands. Fung (1995) also calls this 
strategy the local ethnocentric strategy. The third strategy, the geocentric 
strategy, tries to find a balance between global co-ordination and local 
adaptation to create synergy.  
 The fourth perspective on cross-cultural strategies concerns Schneider and 
Barsoux (1997: 211) who distinguish three different strategies for managing 
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cultural differences. The first strategy, which is called ignoring, assumes that 
‘business is business’ all over the world. Culture is seen as an irrelevant factor 
for the success of international business because the convergence of 
management practices and the rationality of doing business and earning money 
are assumed. Therefore, headquarters’ bleu-prints are transferred to host country 
organisations. Profits are expected by the standardisation of production, 
financial systems and management control. The headquarters’ management 
dictates the management practices, values and behaviour in order to establish a 
shared organisational culture. The second strategy concerns the minimisation of 
cultural differences. Cultural diversity is seen as a problem that has to be solved 
because it threatens efficiency and communication. The impact of cultural 
differences can be minimised by reducing potential conflicts, creating 
uniformity, isolation, creating segregation, adapting to the local context, the 
developing of a global organisational culture and by allowing autonomy. 
Utilisation of cultural differences in which cultural diversity is seen as a 
potential for competitive advantage and an opportunity to improve business is 
the third strategy. Benefits from innovation and new management practices are 
expected. In the relationship between headquarters and subsidiaries, local 
managers are included in the development of strategic plans. In this way, the 
company hopes to create synergy. 
 
Adler (1986) 
 
Adler and 
Ghadar (1993) 
Fung (1995) Schneider and 
Barsoux (1997) 
Cultural 
Dominance 
Ethnocentrism Ethnocentrism Ignoring 
Cultural 
Compromise 
Regiocentrism Polycentrism Minimisation 
Cultural Synergy Multi-centrism Geocentrism Utilisation 
Figure 2. Types of strategies on cross-cultural management 
 
 The discussed strategies on the handling of cross-cultural differences show a 
great deal of similarities and can be divided into three groups (see Figure 2). 
The first group of strategies concerns ethnocentric strategies that support the 
cultural dominance of home country companies. Unity, control of the head 
quarters or parent company, home country values and home country 
management models characterise this group of strategies. The second group of 
strategies concerns polycentric strategies that stress the importance of host 
country culture. The acceptance of cultural diversity, the relative autonomy of 
local branches and the minimalisation of cultural distance to the local market, 
are all characteristics of this group of strategies. The third group of strategies 
concerns strategies that suggest a combination of the first and second group of 
strategies. Fung (1995) for instance, explains the origin of the three cross-
cultural strategies from a cultural historical perspective and proposes the 
geocentric strategy as an attractive alternative to western and local 
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ethnocentrism. This concept as well as the concepts of the global multi-centric 
strategy (Adler and Ghadar), the utilising strategy (Schneider and Barsoux) and 
the synergy strategy (Adler) are all based on the assumption that cultural 
differences can be overcome or constructively used for competitive advantage. 
Koot (1997: 332) stresses that strategies of tolerance, harmony, interdependence 
and synergy are instruments of the dominant Western companies and states that 
‘harmony is the catchword of those who want to maintain the status quo’. The 
powerful company uses these strategies to ‘manage’ the cultural differences that 
exist between the powerful and the‘inferior’ company. In contrast, the less 
powerful partner is more interested in balancing the differences in power and 
uses its ethnic identity as a source of power in the struggle against the dominant 
company. This concept is further elaborated upon in the next section.    
 
2.2.2 Strategic Use of Ethnicity in Organisations 
Koot and Hogema (1989) connect theories of ethnicity to the studies of 
organisational culture and argue that organisations do have similarities with 
ethnic groups. They use theories on social categorisation to support a critical 
perspective on the static and limited perspective of organisational culture. Their 
theory also exerts influence on the perspective on cultural differences. From 
their perspective it is not so much the dichotomised cultural differences but the 
process of interaction that produces these cultural differences that must be 
studied. Koot (1995, 1997) applies this perspective to two cases. He describes 
the Carinthian employees of a Philips plant in Austria who were successful in 
their competion with the Vianna Philips plant. They used their cultural identity 
as a source of power against the dominant Viennese. The second case is on the 
strategic use of ethnicity in international management practices at the island of 
Curaçao where the oil company Shell operated its refinery till 1985. The 
refinery was then leased to a Venezuelan oil company. In the period under the 
Dutch Shell management the Curaçaoan employees labelled themselves as 
‘Latinos’, stressing upon the cultural elements shared with the neighbouring 
country Venezuela. However, when the Venezuelan oil company took over 
power, the attitude of the Curaçaoan employees on Venezuela changed. The 
Curaçaoan employees then saw and highlighted important cultural differences 
between themselves and the Venezuelans, the period under the Shell 
management was praised to the skies and their identity as Dutch citizens and 
similarities with the Dutch were emphasised (McCreedy 1996). 
 Theories on ethnicity can be helpful in providing a different perspective on 
corporate identity and processes of social identification in organisations. To do 
so it is first necessary to introduce the concept of identity. The concept of social 
identity is defined as the self- and public image of a person constructed in 
interaction with members of distinct social groups. Identity is always a result of 
defining similarities and difference with other individuals and groups (Jenkins 
1997). Identity also provides continuity, safety and stability for both individuals 
and groups. Interaction is seen as a prerequisite for identification (Barth 1969, 
Royce 1982, Jenkins 1997). The identity of a person is constructed of distinct 
social identities. Turner states that a person is ‘a basket of selves which come to 
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the surface at different social moments as appropriate: the basket is the 
individual’s identity’ (Turner in Cohen 1995: 11). In distinct situations a person 
can arrange his social identities differently, which is called the hierarchy of 
social identities (Jenkins 1997). Two of these social identities; the ethnic 
identity and cultural identity are further being worked out here. 
 Culture and identity are strongly related and therefore difficult to distinguish. 
Cultural identities are defined on the basis of social categories, which in their 
turn are based upon cultural differences between groups of people. The external 
categorisation of a group by another more dominant group can result in 
confirmation and acceptance of the group identity in which the dominant group 
has more authority or power. The group identity can also be rejected which can 
result in the struggle for autonomy (Jenkins 1997: 70). Cultural identities are 
therefore important in the contruction of social identity, and therefore a very 
sensitive issue in the struggle for power. Cohen (1995) even speaks of ‘the 
politisation’ of culture: 
In part, therefore, it is a claim to a particular culture, with all that such a 
claim entails. They are rarely neutral. The statement made in Ethiopia, I am 
Oroma (or in Northern Ireland: ‘he is a Prod’), is clearly not merely 
descriptive: it has an added negative or positive value, depending on who is 
speaking and to whom (Cohen 1995: 119). 
 The other social identity that is discussed here is that of ethnical identity 
which is based upon ethnicity. Ethnicity is primarily been seen as a coherence of 
physical and cultural elements that are inextricably connected with a specific 
group of people. This approach of ethnicity, called the ascriptive approach, is 
based on the so-called ‘objective’ social cultural marks that are unprejudiced 
and unbiased. Barth (1969) however, shows in his anthropological work ‘Ethnic 
Groups and Boundaries’ that ethnicity is a social construction which is 
determined by social interaction and interdependence. This approach of 
ethnicity is called the interaction approach. The supporters of this interaction 
approach (e.g. Barth 1969, 1994, Royce 1982, Baud et al. 1994, Jenkins 1997) 
stress that ethnicity is constructed in interaction. Jenkins (1997: 13) gives four 
characteristics of the basic social anthropological model of ethnicity: (1) 
ethnicity is about cultural differentiation, (2) ethnicity is rooted in social 
interaction, (3) ethnicity is not fixed and (4) ethnicity as a social identity is 
collective and individual.  
 Barth (1969) stresses the strategic behaviour of actors in creating and 
maintaining ethnic boundaries. These actors become aware of their ethnicity in 
interaction with other ethnic groups. They use cultural elements to draw clear 
ethnic boundaries and distinguish themselves from the other ethnic groups. 
Ethnic identity is constructed and can be the object as well as the purpose in a 
political struggle. These ethnic boundaries can be newly invented and don’t 
have to be based on communal ancestry or historically justified facts (Barth 
1969, 1994, Baud et al. 1994). According to Royce (1982) Barth concentrates 
too much on the creation of ethnic boundaries. Maintaining ethnic boundaries 
cannot be explained without knowing the cultural elements used by the 
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members of a group. Ethnic groups distinguish themselves from other groups by 
symbols, language, rituals, signs and other outward appearances. Ethnicity can 
be emphasised or concealed and thus be used strategically by individuals or 
groups. Groups can point out shared cultural elements for social or political 
purposes, reinvent non- existent or lost cultural traditions and create new ethnic 
boundaries. This is called the manifest form of ethnicity. Baud et al. indicates 
three conditions for the start of manifest ethnicity (Baud et al. 1994: 129). 
Firstly, there has to be interaction between the distinct ethnic groups. Secondly, 
there has to be limitations of ethnic boundaries from which a sense of 
community can emerge. Thirdly, the life security, the autonomy and the identity 
of one of the involved ethnic groups has to be under the pressure of external 
forces such as foreign occupation. 
 Barth (1994) stresses that the flux of contemporary cultures in the world 
causes difficulties for ethnic groups to distinguish themselves based on cultural 
elements. These endangered ethnic groups sometimes strategically use and over 
estimate the cultural differences between themselves and other cultures. Royce 
(1982) also states that cultural elements are created or invented by members of 
an ethnic group to distinguish themselves from another group. Cultural 
differences can be understood as the result of social interaction that can change 
over time and in situations (Royce 1982, Cohen 1994, Jenkins 1997). It is 
therefore important to understand manifest ethnicity in relation to the ‘the 
politisation’ of culture (Barth 1994, Cohen 1995, Koot 1997). Commenting on 
his own work, Barth (1994) states that:   
We need to recognize that the dichotomized cultural differences thus 
produced are vastly overstated in ethnic discourse and so we can relegate the 
more pernicious myths of deep cultural cleavages to the category where they 
belong: as formative myths that sustain a social organisation of difference, 
but not as descriptions of the actual distribution of cultural stuff (Barth 1994: 
30). 
 In the cross-cultural cooperation between organisations ethnicity can be used 
as an informal source of power. Power is the practised possibility to influence 
behaviour of people in organisations in a desired direction (Pfeffer 1992). An 
organisation has formal and informal sources of power. Examples of formal 
sources of power are finances, know-how, human resource capital and business 
agreements. Examples of informal sources of power are informal networks, 
access to markets, resistance and history. Not all of the business enterprises 
have equal access to all types of resources. Power is exercised through the 
medium of resources, which are defined as the facilities or bases of power that 
someone manipulates to influence the course of action with others. Power is not 
only based on access to physical resources but moreover, on the social forces 
that mobilise, shape and influence its exercise (Fung 1995: 98). In the struggle 
for power between two organisations therefore, ethnicity can be used 
strategically.  
 Koot (1997) addresses the need to expand the current practices of cross-
cultural research serious and sees possibilities for multinationals to stimulate 
  
 26 
ethnic identities for competitive use. To use this ethnic rivalry two conditions 
have to be fulfilled. Firstly, autonomic competitive units have to be created; 
within each unit a distinct ethnic group. Secondly, the manager has to mobilise 
the existing energy by identifying himself with the ethnic ideals. He has to be a 
representative of the ethnic group or perceived as someone who helps with the 
realisation of ethnic ambitions. Koot (1997) thus stresses the importance of the 
impact of ethnic, politic and economic processes in organisations.  
 So far, cross-cultural cooperation has been discussed at three different levels: 
at national level where the national cultural differences exert influence on 
business practice; at corporate level where the distinct corporate strategies 
determine the attitude to cross-cultural differences and; at group level where the 
strategic use of ethnicity and cultural differences demonstrated the dynamic 
aspect of cross-cultural cooperation. In the next section, questions with regard to 
the individual level are addressed.  
 
2.2.3 Human Beings Back in Cross-cultural Studies  
We must remember that the objects of study in cross-cultural cooperation are 
human beings. Human beings that cannot easily be squeezed into simplistic 
models and schemes. Human beings that can act, speak, think, have desires and 
drives, exist in space and time and, are simultaneously the object and subject of 
science (Chanlat 1994). People construct their social reality through their 
actions and in turn, this social reality prescribes the behaviour of the people. 
Human beings always constructing, deconstructing and reconstructing their 
reality from both old and new experiences. Through this process culture is 
reproduced. Strategic behaviour of people can transform social reality because 
culture is constantly being reproduced. Giddens (1990) calls the reflective 
ordering and reordering of social relations that exert influence on the actions of 
individuals: ‘the reflexive monitoring of action’. In their daily activities people 
reflect on their interactions because all human beings routinely keep in touch 
with the ground of what they do as an integral element of doing it (Giddens 
1990: 37). In traditional cultures each new generation honours the past and 
reproduces a larger part of the cultural patrimony of the last generation because 
of a relatively unchanged context. Giddens (1990) states that in modern society 
the daily routines of individuals have much less connection with the traditions 
of the past. As a result, the reflexivity of new knowledge, which is absorbed and 
applied by groups or individuals, is faster. Social practices are constantly being 
reordered by means of incoming information. Because reproduction is based on 
information, reflexivity in modern society is even faster than it was before. 
Modern society is created on reflexive knowledge and generates expert systems 
in which individuals have to trust. These expert systems such as financial and 
technical systems organise the daily reality of individuals. The daily reality of 
human beings therefore needs more attention in the study on cross-cultural 
cooperation.  
 To understand the logic of the daily life behaviour of human beings it is 
necessary to focus on the routine of every day life. In The Logic of Practice, 
Bourdieu (1990) focuses on the habitus. The habitus uses schemes of past 
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experiences to produce individual and collective actions. People are capable of 
generating thoughts, perceptions, actions and expressions that are not limited in 
number and are relatively unpredictable. However, people are also limited in the 
production because of the schemes of past experiences. The habitus therefore 
tends to produce unlimited actions determined by the schemes which, at the 
same time, are limited by the schemes. Bourdieu calls these regulated 
improvisations (1990: 55). These regulated improvisations allow a relationship 
between the individual schemes and the collective common sense. Individual 
history models the individual schemes. The harmonisation of experiences takes 
place by the individuals receiving reinforcement from individual or collective 
activities such as ceremonies. The harmony of practical sense and objectified 
meaning produces a common sense world.  
The practical world that is constituted in the relationship with the habitus, 
acting as a system of cognitive and motivating structures is a world of 
already realised ends paths to take procedures to follow (Bourdieu 1990: 53) 
 Strauss and Quinn (1994) use Bourdieu’s concept of regulated 
improvisations to emphasise the role of social actors and to introduce the 
concept of individual schemes in studying the relationship between individuals 
and their cultural environment in modern societies. They conclude that current 
anthropological theories do not have a strong tradition in explaining the 
relationship of individuals with their cultural environment. While Bourdieu 
(1990) stresses the habits of people, Strauss and Quinn (1994) focus on 
variation and changes in the habits of people. They stress upon the role of 
motivations and emotions in the construction of schemes. The cultural schemes 
are learnt by experiences that remain in the memory and mediate the behaviour 
and actions of an individual. These schemes consist of loose networks of 
associations, which have been learnt by previous experiences. The outcomes of 
these networks of associations are not fixed but can vary in their prescription for 
human behaviour. In this way, individual actions are not directly determined by 
the social-cultural environment but mediated by learnt schemes. Tennekes 
(1995) also points out that the structures are simultanuosly sources as well as 
restrictions of actions. He distinguishes three sources of and conditions for 
action: culture, society and personality. Through their actions people generate 
culture, society and personality at the same time.  Tennekes stresses the 
dialectics of action and structure in which people generate structures by means 
of actions that can lead to new independent structures  (Tennekes 1995: 25). 
 Previously learned patterns of association guide the employee in the process 
of adaptation to new or ambiguous situations in organisations. The environment 
can be demanding or stressful for the employees. Large-scale social changes, 
changes in government regulations and organisational restructuring can lead to 
feelings of tensions, fear and, insecurity with the employees. When government 
regulations were changed towards the American PTO AT&T this resulted in 
13.000 early retirement packages in 1983 and 11.000 positions in 1984. These 
layoffs produced a shock in the AT&T culture (Trice and Beyer 1993: 315). The 
change of cultural environment for an expatriate also creates feelings of tension, 
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fear and insecurity. Employees use different strategies to cope with these 
emotions and to regulate their behaviour. Coping is an informal personal 
evaluation of the resources that one has at one’s disposal to deal with a 
problematic and stressful situation (Skinner 1995). Coping therefore is; 
Constantly changing cognitive and behavioural efforts to manage specific 
external or internal demands that are appraised as taxing or exceeding the 
resources of the person (Lazarus and Folkman 1984: 141).  
 Coping is not just a fixed set of strategies that have to be used whenever they 
are needed but depends on the situation being faced (Lazarus and Lazarus 
1994). In order to be successful, coping needs to be flexible and adapted to the 
requirements of the situation. Coping strategies can be divided into two main 
strategies: coping by finding new solutions and challenges and coping by 
regulating emotions (Lazarus and Folkman 1984). Problem solving strategies 
such as information seeking, observing, escaping and strategizing are 
determined to change the actual situation. In these problem-solving strategies 
the first step is to define the problem then to generate the alternatives and the 
altering of alternatives and finally, to execute the alternatives. Emotion 
regulating strategies such as pessimism, avoidance, reappraisal of personal 
meaning, denial, anxiety, guilt, distancing and self-doubt are not focused on real 
changes but on the creation of a bearable status quo. This happens if a person 
estimates that the given situation is very difficult to change. Emotion regulating 
strategies change the meaning that is given to a certain problematic situation. In 
this way a ‘problematic’ situation can be redefined as ‘non-problematic’. 
 In short, the results of the debate on intercultural management show that 
cross-cultural cooperation is not only connected to national cultures, but also to 
corporate cultures and even to individual coping strategies. To understand the 
complexity of cross-cultural cooperation the debate on organisational culture is 
also included in this chapter. In this way, a more open system research model is 
constructed that includes the dynamic processes of national culture, regional 
culture and organisational culture. There is a need for open systems models of 
cross-cultural management, which view the entire situation as a dynamic, 
interdependent system. Researchers recommend integrating the research and 
development in related fields such as organisation theory and industrial 
organisation into cross-cultural research (Deresky1994: 29).  
 
 
2.3 Debate on Organisational Culture  
 
2.3.1 Controversial Aspects of Organisational Culture  
It was the famous work of Peters and Waterman (1982) on the necessity of 
‘strong’ organisational cultures for the success of a company that attracted wide 
public interest in organisational cultures. The works of Schein (1985) and Deal 
and Kennedy (1982) signified a breakthrough in management literature. 
Managers of Western organisations thought a new key to success was found 
because in that period Japanese companies appeared to be more successful in 
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business than their American counterparts. The Japanese organisational culture 
was seen as an important factor in that success. In the 1990s a large body of 
literature on organisational culture was published in which the concept of 
organisational culture was the object of much academic and non-academic 
discussions. The academic debate on organisational culture is characterised by 
four major controversial aspects: (1) single culture versus multiple cultures, (2) 
rigid versus malleable cultures, (3) distinctive versus universal elements and (4) 
consensus versus dissensus (Trice and Beyer 1993: 13).  
 For a long time, scientists studying organisational culture with the 
assumption that there is only one organisational culture shared by all employees 
have dominated the debate on single culture versus multiple cultures. These 
scientists presume an organisation wide consensus on cultural elements and 
focus primarily on the shared elements of the organisational culture. The 
‘strength’ of a single organisational culture can be measured and classified. A 
‘strong’ organisational culture has many shared cultural elements. Managers and 
scientists have seen this as a competitive advantage (Deal and Kennedy 1982). 
In order to create such a ‘strong’ organisational culture it is necessary that all 
employees share the same values and norms in an organisation. Conflicts are not 
studied and subcultures have no place in this perspective on organisational 
culture. Martin (1992) calls this single culture perspective the integrative 
perspective. The concept of a ‘strong’ organisational culture has grown very 
popular and has frequently been used as a management tool for intervention in 
the organisational culture. In the non-academic debate on organisational culture 
the integrative perspective is still adhered to by managers, consultants and even 
some scholars.  
  In the academic debate on organisational culture however, there has been a 
long tradition of social scientists, in particular anthropologists, with interests in 
abnormalities and subcultures. Already in 1931 the young Harvard professor of 
anthropology Lloyd Warner was asked to join the Hawthorne studies. He used 
the traditional anthropological field research methodology to study the 
community’s culture inside Western Electric (Trice and Beyer 1993: 25). 
William Foot Whyte studied the Cornerville society in 1937 for a housing 
project by means of participant observation. He focused upon the daily life 
experiences of people living in one particular block and distinguished different 
clans within the Cornerville society. He was interested in the cultural values and 
codes of clans such as the Nortons and the Italian Community Club. The 
anthropologist Keesing of the Stanford University explored in the 1950s the 
relation of social anthropology and industry. His working paper on The 
Anthropology and Overseas Business Enterprises (1957) is among the first that 
concerns cross-cultural cooperation in overseas business. Van Maanen (1984) is 
among the first to stress the existence of different subcultures within one 
organisation, after the concept of a ‘strong’ organisational culture had become 
popular, contending that not just one single culture but multiple cultures can 
exist. Koot (1989) also states that the integrative perspective on organisational 
culture and the instruments developed for intervention result in the opinion that 
organisational cultures could be easily modelled. With empirical data from 
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different cases, Koot and Hogema (1989) show that the concept of culture that 
has been used in the integrative perspective is far too simple. The existence of 
multiple cultures, abnormalities and ethnicity processes is slowly gaining more 
attention of social scientists (e.g. Czarniawska 1992, Martin 1992, Koot 1995, 
Tennekes 1995, Koot 1997). They now tend to focus more on the creation of 
subcultures, the use of power, organisation conflicts and organisation politics.  
 It will be made clear that the assumption proposed in this study is that 
multiple cultures are likely to exist in an organisation. An important subculture 
within an organisation is the occupational culture of employees (Trice and 
Beyer 1993). In modern society, people are identified by their occupations and 
are given exclusive rights to perform and control the tasks related to their 
respective occupations. People with the same occupation develop shared ways 
of coping with shared task-related demands and uncertainties. These ideas are 
work related and originate for a larger part from outside the organisation 
through means of occupational socialisation at schools and universities during 
education and training. Occupational socialisation can be both formal and 
informal. Trice and Beyer (1993) give six characteristics of occupational 
cultures. (1) Members identify themselves with their profession. Self-definition 
of members determines the boundaries of occupations. (2) The members of the 
occupational group use each another as point of reference. They seek for 
support and confirmation of the meanings they ascribe to work related events. In 
this manner, they develop shared occupational ideologies. (3) Members of an 
occupational culture use stories, language, myths, taboos and rituals to cope 
with the emotional demands related to their work. (4) Members derive 
favourable self-images and social identities from their respective occupations. 
Three features contribute towards favourable self-image: the personality traits 
that arise in the face of danger, fundemental esoteric skills and socially valuable 
services. (5) Members tend to mix their work life with their private life. In some 
professions such as that of fishermen, international consultants and police 
officers little space is left for a separation between private and work life. (6) 
Occupational cultures stimulate ethnocentrism in particular when they become 
communities. Outsiders are treated with suspicion and ‘our way’ of doing things 
becomes the right and only way. 
 The controversy over rigid versus malleable cultures concerns the 
possibilities of change in an organisational culture. In the integrative 
perspective, the stubborn character of corporate cultures is emphasised (Schein 
1985). By using different layers of culture Schein wanted to demonstrate that 
the deepest layer of the organisational culture is the most difficult layer to 
change. The highest level of culture contains artefacts and constructions such as 
technology, art and visible behaviour patterns. This constructed physical and 
social environment is visible but often not decipherable. The second layer 
comprises the values that people are aware of. For a larger part, the founder of 
the company establishes these values on what ought to be and what is right and 
wrong. The deepest layers are the basic assumptions that are related to the 
environment, human nature, the nature of human activity and the nature of 
human relationships. These are taken for granted and mostly invisible.  
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 The concept of a culture with an unchangeable core is the result of a long 
anthropological tradition. Anthropological studies focused on the core elements 
of tribal cultures and tended to exclude modern influences from outside because 
these were negatively valued. Archer calls this the myth of cultural integration 
(Archer 1988, 1990). She uses distinct arguments to claim there isn’t something 
such as an unchangeable core of a culture. Firstly, the inconsistency of the 
cultural system is denied. The transfer of the cultural system is an active 
interaction instead of a passive transfer. The relation of the cultural system and 
the actor is under exposed in this perspective. Secondly, there is no space left 
for alternative choices of members in a cultural system. In traditional 
communities there are not many alternatives to choose from, resulting in little 
change in the cultural system. Thirdly, there is a failure to see differentiation in 
the cultural unity. Cultural differences can result in changes because members 
of a traditional society have a choice. Fourthly, traditional daily behaviour is not 
shared because of a shared cultural system. Archer states that the daily 
traditional way of living fosters uniformity and continuity in collective patterns 
of behaviour (Archer 1990). Although modern life in organisations offers 
employees many alternative ways to choose from, Archer’s arguments are 
useful. Other scientists have also recognised this. Galjart calls this the myth of 
the unchangeable core (Galjart 1993: 23). These myths prevent social scientists 
from having a more dynamic perspective on cultures.  
 In the controversy over distinctive versus universal elements, researchers on 
organisational cultures discuss two traditions of cultural research: (1) the 
functional tradition and (2) the phenomenological tradition. In the functional 
tradition, culture is seen as a functional element or part of an integrated and 
consistent system. This cultural structure secures individuals in their daily living 
and determines their behaviour patterns. Social facts do have a function within 
the cultural context and can be traced to other social facts. In this approach, the 
collective structures can be discovered by means of objective analyses and 
applied to other cultures (Veenswijk 1995). The macro and micro level are 
connected in the assumption that individuals in an organisation internalise the 
cultural elements. The employee in this approach is nothing more than a passive 
bearer of the collective norms and values (Trice and Beyer 1993).  
 In the phenomenological tradition the concept of an objective reality is 
criticised. In this tradition, members of a culture are human beings who do 
things not only because of external forces but also because of inner motivations. 
Cultural analyses therefore, do not focus on the cultures as systems but on the 
meanings of the context given by the actors. The world of daily human life has 
to be discovered by actors in an intensive relation with their context (Strauss 
and Quinn 1994). Therefore, it is necessary to see the daily world through the 
eyes of the studied subjects, to come to a ‘verstehen’ of the constructed social 
reality. In this tradition culture is a result of processes of meaning giving to 
situations. In processes of interaction meanings are created and reproduced. The 
actor is a dynamic human being with goals and interests, in interaction with 
others and their world of dialy life. In this way, the daily world is socially 
constructed. 
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 A larger part of the contemporary approaches to organisational culture 
originate from the functional and phenomenological approach to culture. 
Although researchers on organisational culture are influenced by both traditions 
and a clear dichotomy is difficult to make, the two approaches can still be 
recognised in contemporary studies on organisational culture. The functional 
perspective on organisational culture is reflected in literature that presumes an 
organisation wide consensus on cultural elements and primarily focuses on the 
shared elements of the organisational culture (e.g. Peters and Waterman 1982, 
Deal and Kennedy 1982). In this perspective the organisational culture is an 
instrument that can be used for organisational change. This instrument 
perspective has three elements that originate from the functional approach of 
culture (Veenswijk 1995: 40). (1) The organisational culture is functional for the 
organisation in order to survive. (2) The organisational culture is reduced to the 
level of behaviour patterns. (3) The research in this tradition is primarily 
focused on basic patterns in organisational cultures. Because of the similarities, 
Veenswijk (1995) connects the functional tradition of cultural research to the 
instrument approach on organisational cultures.  
 Veenswijk also connects the phenomenological tradition of cultural research 
to the interpretative approach of organisational cultures. Veenswijk (1995: 42) 
distinguishes three elements in the interpretative approach. (1) The 
organisational culture is approached analytically. (2) The approach is limited to 
the level of making sense. (3) The approach focuses on the ‘verstehen’ of an 
organisational culture. The analytical concept of organisational culture concerns 
the reconstruction of sense making concepts within an organisation. The daily 
world of the employees is central and social behaviour is not free of values. I 
disagree with Veenswijk in labelling the work of Hofstede as an analytical 
concept of culture. Because Hofstede defines culture as a mental programming 
of individuals in a group I would rather see this as an expression of the 
instrumental approach in which the actor is determined by the cultural system. 
The interpretative approach rejects the idea of causal relations between cultural 
elements because the cultural background of the researcher is always 
influencing the results. The study presented in this thesis uses an interpretative 
approach in which the relation of the researcher with the object of study is 
extensively discussed in section 3.3.  
 In the controversy over consensus versus dissensus scholars discuss the 
question as to whether culture includes a rather fragmented collection of people 
with different, conflicting and situational identities. Some scholars reject the 
universal elements of an organisational culture and focus on questions of 
ambiguity, fragmentation and insecurity. They perceive culture as a dynamic 
flow in which members of an organisation can have different identities at the 
same time such as professional identity, organisational identity, membership of 
a sport club and private identity. The choice for an identity depends on the 
particular circumstances an employee is situated in. There is no such thing as a 
consensus but rather a strong ambiguity in the complex relation of cultural 
elements within an organisation. An organisation is seen as an anarchic chaos in 
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which control is very difficult, decision-making processes are unclear and 
organisational boundaries are vague. Martin explains:  
Ambiguity is perceived when a lack of clarity, high complexity, or a paradox 
makes multiple (rather than single or dichotomous) explanations plausible 
(Martin 1992: 133).    
 A certain level of rationality, control, clear boundaries and shared cultural 
elements are present in an organisation. An increase of complexity in an 
organisation does not however necessarily result in an increase of ambiguity, 
chaos and vagueness. The complexity of an organisation is reduced when the 
focus is on the behaviour of employees in their world of daily life. Employees 
have a strong capacity to absorb information, to order this information and, to 
cope with new situations. Employees organise chaos, new developments that 
cause insecurity to a comprehensive level, in order to control their situation. An 
example is the use of the Internet, where diversity, ambiguity and chaos are 
concentrated. People know how to reduce this complexity to usable proportions. 
Koot (1995) thus criticises post-modernist scientists who see a constant flow of 
change in organisations without noticing the institutional side of these 
organisations. He points out the paradoxical relation between integration and 
differentiation ‘what looks at first glance as chaos, seems to have logic after a 
close inspection’ (Koot 1995: 23). Without integration there is no differentiation 
and without diversity there will be no unity. 
We must always relate the meaning we ascribe to certain acts and words to 
the psychic framework from which they have sprung. In so doing, we can get 
a better grasp of certain behaviours that may seem quite ambiguous, 
paradoxical or even totally irrational at first glance (Chanlat 1994: 180) 
2.3.2 Anthropological Perspective on Organisational Culture 
The discussion on the controversial aspects of organisational culture has shown 
that anthropologists have already studied organisational culture for a long time 
but never have been large in number nor gathered authority on organisational 
culture studies. The famous William Foot Whyte hoped in 1978 that the 
renewed interests in organisational culture would become a major field of study 
for applied anthropologists (Trice and Beyer 1993: 25). Cultural anthropologists 
however, have shown little or no interest in the culture of workplace. It was not 
an anthropologist but a professor of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 
Van Maanen, who first started studying occupational cultures. And it was not an 
anthropologist but an economist, Hofstede, who began studies on cross-cultural 
management. It was only toward the end of the eighties before cultural 
anthropologists showed any interest in organisational cultures (Bate 1997).  
 Not surprisingly, anthropologists such as Koot (1989, 1995, 1997), Chanlat 
(1994) and Tennekes (1995) criticise the existing perspectives on organisational 
cultures that were already developed by scholars of other scientific traditions. 
By then it was necessary to again review the position of the anthropological 
perspective on organisational culture. In the Netherlands, the cultural 
anthropologists Tennekes (1985, 1995) and Koot (1989, 1995, 1997) have done 
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pioneering work to position business anthropology in organisation studies. The 
anthropological perspective on organisations distinguishes itself from other 
organisational perspectives as a method of fieldwork activity (the “doing”), as a 
paradigm (the “thinking”) and as a narrative style (the “writing”) (Bate 1997). 
 The major invention of anthropologist is the “doing” of ethnographic 
fieldwork by means of participant observation. Bate’s (1997: 1151) states that 
there is a very fussy methodology in doing ethnographic research and criticises 
the ‘mystique’ attitude of some anthropologists. The “thinking” of 
anthropologists concerns looking critically at organisations and perceiving the 
organisation as a cultural phenomenon. An organisation is seen as a modern 
‘tribe’ with its own cultural values and norms that prescribe the behaviour of 
employees. Finally, the “writing” of ethnographies by anthroplogists distinguish 
organisational anthropology from other organisational studies in that it can be 
narrative, poetic, fictional, autobiographical and postmodern (Bate 1977).  
 What can be learned from the anthropological perspective on organisations 
for the construction of a theoretical framework needed to study the telecom 
industry? One of the root notions of anthropology is that cross-cultural 
cooperation can only be understood in the context of the telecom sector. To 
understand this context it is necessary to include the debate on globalisation in 
trade and services in the theoretical framework. 
 
 
2.4 Debate on the Globalisation and Localisation of Industries 
 
2.4.1 Globalisation of Trade and Services? 
Theodor Levitt, a Harvard Business School professor and the former director of 
McKinsey Japan, Kenichi Ohmae, were among the first to introduce the 
globalisation thesis. They predicted the rise of a liberal trade regime which 
would result in a world market open to competition for all international 
companies. The supporters of the globalisation thesis suggest that the 
globalisation of trade and services would bring about a new area of international 
business in which national borders would disappear. National cultures would 
converge into one ‘global culture’ dominated by symbols of Coca-Cola, 
McDonald and CNN. It was predicted that Western management practices and 
models would spread all over the world. It was also foeseen that technological 
innovations would lead to the integration of world wide financial markets and 
trade. As a result, national and international companies would expand their 
international activities to become true global players under pressure of possible 
foreign competition. To become a global player at the world market would be 
the only strategy to survive this competition. For a long time, newspaper articles 
and optimistic prognoses of fast growing markets have dominated the debate on 
globalisation. 
 The scientific debate on globalisation is and can be divided into five 
different discussions: (1) the globalisation of finances, (2) the globalisation of 
competition and of companies, (3) the globalisation of technology, (4) the 
political unification of the world and, (5) the globalisation of culture. These 
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different forms of globalisation are interconnected but the debates on the forms 
are discussed more or less separately (Ruigrok and van Tulder 1995: 140).  
 In the first discussion on the globalisation on finances, Lash and Urry (1994) 
show that the capital market has changed into a non-organised hybrid network 
of financial organisations because there is no hegemony. Dezalay (1990) shows 
that the traditional form of professionals dealing with financial matters is no 
longer bound to traditional aristocratic characteristics and the nation state. In the 
financial capitals of the world such as London, Tokyo and New York, enormous 
flows of money are being transferred around the world. Not the banks but the 
financial centres of these cities have become important. Not the money itself but 
its representation on the electronic networks and computer screens has become 
important. In the debate on the globalisation of finances the economic growth is 
no longer based on local financial conditions but on world wide financial flows.   
 The second discussion on globalisation concerns the globalisation of 
competition and of companies. Some important stages can be recognised in the 
recent history of the change in competition. In the 1960s the labour-intensive 
textile and shoe industries were transferred to developing countries. In the 
1970s the capital-intensive shipbuilding and automobile industries followed the 
same path. In the 1980s telecom equipment, computers and consumer 
electronics were relocated to cheap labour countries. Finally in the 1990s 
financial, software and administration services are now located to low cost 
countries such India and Ireland by means of data networking (Esch 1994). 
Companies use strategies of relocation of production to geographical regions 
with cheap labour or to countries with good distribution possibilities to gain 
competitive advantages (Porter 1990, Dunning 1993). 
 The third discussion on the globalisation deals with the globalisation of 
technology. In the study presented in this thesis the globalisation of technology, 
in particular telecom, occupies a major place. The globalisation of technology 
contributes for instance to the use of the Internet. A larger part of the writers on 
the globalisation thesis point out technology as an important force in the 
globalisation process. The access and control over technology has become an 
important factor for companies in international competition. Technology has 
broken the connection of time and place and created numerous possibilities for 
information flows.5  
 The fourth discussion on globalisation discusses the political unification of 
the world. There is much discussion on the possible political unification of the 
nation-states (e.g. Featherstone 1990). On the one hand, the role of the nation-
state is said to become more vague because of transnational problems of natural 
environment, financial crisis and war. The nation-states are very effective 
                                                        
5 An extreme example of the globalisation of technology and the disconnection of time and place is 
the use of satellite telephony. When New Zealand’s experienced mountain climber Rob Hall led his 
expedition in May 1996 to the summit of the Mt. Everest he took along an Imarsat satellite 
telephone. He already climbed the 8848 meter high mountain five times before but this time his 
expedition was caught in a heavy snowstorm unusual for that time of the year. At 8400 meter the 
storm forced him to stay overnight without extra oxygen, tent, sleeping bag, food or drinks. 
Seriously frozen and facing another fatal night outside he phoned his pregnant wife in New 
Zealand. Satellite technology helped him to discuss the name of the unborn child with his wife in 
his last contact with her before he died because there was no way to rescue him.  
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administrative powers that can mobilise economic and social resources and are 
therefore seen as the major force of globalisation. On the other hand, scientists 
warn of the decline of the western hegemony that will result in global 
competition and the western nation states losing power (e.g. Friedman 1994). 
New centres of accumulation of power and wealth can then emerge. This cyclic 
process can be dated back thousands of years (Friedman 1994). Others fear that 
the multinationals might take over the role of the nation-states (Featherstone 
1990). I, however, agree with Giddens (1990) when he states that the 
multinationals cannot compete with nation states because the state has a 
monopoly on armies and multinationals cannot control territory. 
 The fifth discussion of globalisation concerns the globalisation of culture. 
On the one hand, scientists predict the emergence of a global culture or global 
village (e.g. Robertson 1990). Robertson (1990) stresses the construction of a 
common global context by the nation-states and sees this as a historical process 
that has already been going on since 1880. This process leads to the production 
of so-called ‘third cultures’ that exceed national borders. Nowadays a ‘global 
citizen’ can sleep everywhere in the world in identical ‘Best Western’ hotels, eat 
a Big Mac menu in a McDonald’s restaurant, watch the developments in his or 
her favourite soap and keep track of the latest news on CNN. These ‘global 
citizens’ work in international offices in inner parts of world cities, dominate 
financial markets, speak English with their local colleagues and are not 
confronted with local cultural difference. Together with financial markets and 
banks they are creating their own global world (King 1990). Appadurai (1990) 
concentrates on five global cultural forces that produce this ‘third culture’. (1) 
The first one he calls ethnoscapes, which comprise tourists and immigrants who 
travel throughout the world. (2) The second force, technoscapes, is a world wide 
connection of technology through which multinational companies expand their 
business internationally. (3) The third force is finanscapes, which concerns the 
connection of stock markets with banks and financial centres. (4) The fourth 
force is mediascapes, which revolves around the distribution of information by 
film, television and the Internet. (5) The last force, ideoscapes, is centred on the 
spread of ideas on human rights, democracy, liberty, freedom of speech and 
religion. The ‘global citizens’ are a creature of the organisation of diversity in a 
world culture, which results in a ‘third culture’. Hannerz (1992) suggests that 
the so-called ‘third culture’ does not mean that a real cosmopolitan culture 
exists. The real cosmopolitan is never quite at home again and has a feeling of 
detachment. A great deal of the ‘global citizens’ such as diplomats, tourists, 
scientists and expatriates have strong ties with their domestic country and would 
rather not leave their homes.6 
 In these five discussions the term globalisation has been defined differently 
and has regularly been confused with the term internationalisation. By the term 
globalisation I refer to the intensification of world wide social relations which 
                                                        
6 Lash and Urry (1994) separate the world into three parts: (1) the ‘global citizens’ who live 
permanently like tourists, (2) the people that work all year and are tourists in their holidays and (3) 
those who polish the shoes of the tourists. Through this image they want to stress the non-existing 
interaction of those groups. 
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link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events 
occurring many miles away and vice versa (Giddens 1990: 64). By the term 
internationalisation I understand it to mean the evolutionary process of a 
national company developing into a company that operates internationally. By 
localisation I understand and refer to the ways in which external cultural 
elements brought to the periphery are or are not incorporated into already 
existing cultures or organisations (Olwig 1993). Globalisation and localisation 
are two concepts that are intertwined. Without localisation there is no 
globalisation. Globalisation therefore, is about the processes of localisation in 
which cultural elements of a global character are being incorporated. Olwig 
(1993) shows in her study of the West-Indian immigrants from the Caribbean 
islands St.Kitts and Nevis the localisation of Caribbean cultural elements in 
England. With the introduction of the West-Indian carnival in England the 
immigrants strengthen their cultural bindings with St.Kitts and Nevis and their 
own cultural identity. According to the Giddens’ definition of globalisation, 
there is an intensification of world wide social relations that link distant 
localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring 
many miles away and vice versa. 
 Anthropologists have especially criticised the convergence of culture in a 
‘global culture’ (e.g. Featherstone 1990, Hannerz 1992, Friedman 1994, Koot 
1995). They argue that processes of globalisation do not create a ‘global village’ 
but lead to processes of localisation. People become aware of their own culture 
when confronted with global cultural elements. Therefore, the intensification of 
global contacts and the awareness of global systems lead to stronger local ethnic 
identities. Friedman (1994) sees the discussion on the convergence of culture as 
a product of the western academic world at the end of the 20th century. He 
criticises the assumption that cultural elements are easily distributed over the 
world. The fact that the same cultural elements can be found all over the world 
does not say anything about their use or the meaning it has for people. Thus the 
interpretation of and the meaning given to western television soaps by African 
viewers can be totally different from that of the American viewers. Western 
products can become central symbols in the construction of local identities. 
Friedman (1994) gives the example of ‘Le Sape’, which is a Congolese citizen 
who travels to Paris to buy clothes of the latest fashion. On returning home to 
Brazzaville, he parades in his new expensive apparel sometimes even wearing 
the clothes inside out so that others will notice the designer labels. Through this 
concrete manifestation of wealth the position of the local elite is challenged. 
The adopting of French clothing is not seen as a sign of westernisation but as a 
local creation of identity, a direct expression of life-power.  
 The global character of multinationals is also criticised (e.g. Ruigrok and van 
Tulder 1995). The growth of economy and the international expansion of 
companies are said to result in ‘footloose’ corporations whose nationality can no 
longer be traced. Because joint ventures and cross-border alliances are moulding 
the ownership of the multinational companies it would have become 
increasingly difficult to indicate the geographical base of multinational 
companies (e.g. Dunning 1993, Bartlett and Ghoshal 1993). But have 
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multinational companies really become global? The optimistic perspective on 
globalisation does not fit contemporary reality. In spite of footloose global 
corporations, most multinational companies still have their home base in one 
country. The Italian automobile industry Fiat that operates in 52 countries and 
has 290.000 employees with 20% working abroad answers the question as to 
how international they really are.  
In analyzing the international nature of jobs, they found four types of 
managers: transnationals (300) who lived abroad mostly on aeroplanes, 
multinationals (1700) who travelled extensively but lived in Turin, ‘open 
locals’ who received foreigners and locals who had little international 
contact (Schneider and Barsoux 1997: 223) 
 Ruigrok and van Tulder (1995: 175) counted only two foreigners in the 
board of twenty Japanese companies, four foreigners in the boards of fifteen 
German companies, one foreigner in the boards of eight French companies and 
two foreigners in the boards of four Italian companies. Mintzberg (1993: 102) 
found only 13 of the 3,847 top managers of the 150 largest US corporations 
being foreign nationals. They have been transferred from foreign operations to 
their positions at headquarters. The ‘global’ labelled multinational companies 
proved to be firmly rooted in their own national culture. Ruigrok and van Tulder 
(1995: 140) concluded that there is a myth on globalisation because: 
The word globalisation suggests harmony and appeals to the hope that old 
rivalries be overcome between different people. In short, the word 
globalisation carries the promise of a better tomorrow.  
 But isn’t there a fast growing global market? The growth in the volume of 
international trade and financial flows has not changed very much during the 
last eighty years. Ruigrok and van Tulder (1995: 125) show in their study that 
the degree of economic globalisation has not grown in the period from 1913 till 
1950. From 1950 onwards, there has been a growth of international trade but the 
ratio of export and import dependency in different countries has not changed 
much in 80 years. They conclude that in history there always have been periods 
of more intensive global trades. Mansell (1994) criticises the globalisation of the 
telecommunication market and wonders whether the mystified concept of the 
globalisation of economic markets is the driving force behind it. The 
globalisation of the telecom market is extensively discussed in chapter 4.  
 The term globalisation in fact covers only a particular geographical part of 
the world economy. In general it covers the Triad nations - North America, 
Europe and Japan - and Southeast Asia. Latin America, Africa and large parts of 
Asia are not included in the global economy. An astonishing 85-90 per cent of 
all high-tech goods are produced and consumed in the Triad nations, while the 
population of these countries only accounted for 15 per cent of the total world’s 
population in 1987 (Ruigrok and van Tulder 1995: 151). Ruigrok and van 
Tulder therefore suggest, changing the term globalisation into triadisation. 
Mintzberg (1993) also stresses the geographical limitations of the so-called 
global economy.   
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Well, sometimes I think the idea of the globe is a swath that cuts across the 
middle of the Northern hemisphere starting, say in Seattle and continuing 
around to about Vienna, then skipping across to about Hong Kong and 
ending up in Tokyo (Mintzberg 1993: 101). 
  
2.4.2 Four Phases in the Expansion of Internationalisation 
The evolutionary process of a national company that develops into a company 
that operates internationally can be divided into different phases. These different 
phases are discussed based on the models of Adler and Ghadar (1993) and 
Bartlett and Ghoshal (1993). The model of Adler and Ghadar (1993) has four 
phases and interpretets the evolution of a company on the basis of its products. 
In each phase different competitive strategies, products, perspectives, markets 
and the importance of international activities can be distinguished. (1) The first 
phase is the high tech phase in which a company produces a new innovative 
product. The importance of international activities in this phase is marginal. 
New products are only produced for the national market and international sales 
are incidental activities. The international activities are individual initiatives and 
cannot be recognised in the organisational structure. (2) The second phase is the 
phase of the growth of production and internationalisation of sales. In this phase 
the international activities grow in importance. The company recognises the 
necessity to develop a distribution structure for growing international sales. The 
international activities are embedded in an organisational structure by means of 
international divisions. (3) The third phase is the phase of multi-nationalisation 
in which local subsidiaries are opened and production is relocated to local 
markets. In this phase the international activities become dominant and take 
over the importance of the home market activities. The international activities 
however, are still co-ordinated form the home country. (4) The fourth phase is 
the phase of globalisation in which competitive local production is globally co-
ordinated. In this phase the company is continually and completely focused on 
its international activities. The role and responsibilities of the head office in the 
home country is reduced and new centres of co-ordination emerge.  
 Bartlett and Ghoshal (1993) relate the evolution of a national company to an 
international operating company to, the changing motivation of companies in 
the expansion of their activities to international markets. They concluded that 
the importance and the strategic role of international activities changed during 
the international growth of a company. The model of Bartlett and Ghoshal 
distinguishes four phases. (1) In the first phase, the international phase, the 
national company is largely orientated at the home market and has only 
incidental international activities. The new product is manufactured and sold at 
the home market based on home country technology. In this phase the 
international activities are seen as marginal appendixes and the managers sent 
out for these activities are seen as adventurers holding special relationships with 
the specific regions. (2) In the second phase, the multinational phase, the 
importance of the international activities slowly grows to a significant level. In 
this phase strategic alliances and the company’s own subsidaries are founded in 
foreign markets. Technology is shared with foreign subsidaries and production 
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is relocated to local markets. The company now operates using a multinational 
strategy from a local market perspective and is aware of the cultural context. 
Managers of local subsidaries use their knowledge of the regional market to 
create growth and more independence from the head office. (3) In the third 
phase, the mondial phase, the possible low efficiency caused by the production 
in local markets is improved by means of a better co-ordination. If necessary, 
production is relocated to other low cost countries. The international market 
orientation of the company grows and the importance of international activities 
is dominant over national activities. This phase can be characterised by: 
presence in the important markets, international competitive products, global 
sources of production, international marketing and, global competition. (4) 
Finally, in the fourth phase of the evolution of the company, the transnational 
phase, products are no longer homogeneous all over the world market but need 
to be adapted to local demands. In this phase the companies adjust their strategy 
to compensate for the disadvantages of treating the world market as one 
homogeneous market. The location of production is based on strategy, given 
production costs, markets, competitors, external political context and economic 
environment. 
 The discussed phases of internationalisation do not completely reflect 
reality. In the first place, the model is no linear evolution. In his study of the 
strategy of internationalisation of 25 Dutch international companies Vermeulen 
(1999) comes to the conclusion that after a good start all of these companies lost 
ground. Sometimes the foreign activities were even stopped. Experiencing 
adveristy appears necessary for the management of these companies to realise 
that their ethnocentric strategies do not work in foreign subsidiaries. In the 
second place, although some organisations have gone through the first two 
phases few or no organisations at all can be found in the last phase. Ruigrok and 
van Tulder therefore call the perception that a company can easily grow to a 
truly global company the myth of globalisation (Ruigrok and van Tulder 1995: 
152). In the third place, the model suggests that an organisation can choose its 
own phase. Vermeulen (1999) concludes that internationalisation is a long 
drawn out process. Successful strategies of internationalisation depend heavily 
on the unique context of the company and the industrial system involved. In 
their research, Ruigrok and van Tulder (1995) conclude that the world’s most 
internationalised companies tend to originate from small industrial systems in 
regions. Hence, in the third and fourth phase of internationalisation there is no 
real global market or global competition but rather a localisation of markets and 
competition. They call this glocalisation which is based on a geographically 
concentrated inter-company division of labour (Ruigrok and van Tulder 1995: 
181). 
 
2.4.3 Cultural Diversity in International Strategic Alliances 
In the process of expansion to international markets companies use among 
others, two strategies: the ‘going-it-alone’ approach and the strategy of strategic 
alliances. The ‘going-it-alone’ strategy is the expansion of international 
activities by means of a company’s own subsidaries in foreign countries. This 
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strategy offers a clear organisational structure with short lines of decision-
making processes and a strong control of the home country management on the 
international activities. An example of this strategy can be found in the 
expansion of the Swedish IKEA as is described in Bartlett and Ghoshal (1993: 
156). The unfamiliarity with local markets, problems with local acceptance, 
problems with the local cultural context, the fragility in the face of strong 
international companies and the high costs of research and development can be 
seen as the disadvantages of the strategy of ‘going-it-alone’.  
 The strategy of strategic alliances doesn’t have the disadvantages of the 
‘going-it-alone’ strategy. A strategic alliance is a cooperation in which two or 
more partners participate but stay independent. The partners all have their 
benefits, each control the execution of tasks and equally support the joint 
venture at one or more strategic key areas (Yoshino and Rangan 1995: 17). 
According to Glaister and Buckley (1996) the company’s motivations for a 
strategic alliance are: risk sharing, product rationalisation and economies of 
scale, transfer of complementary technology, shaping competition, conforming 
to host government policies and facilitating international expansion. They 
studied motivational factors of UK partners in selecting partners of Western 
Europe, the United States and Japan since 1980 and found, that the linking to a 
market and geographical expansion are the two key motives of international 
strategic alliance formation. This strategy generates benefits, particular so in fast 
changing markets and difficult accessible local markets. Surprisingly, neither 
the advantages of economies of scale nor the reduction of risk with new 
research and development projects seem to be of overriding importance. 
Strategic alliances are therefore designed to shape competition and have become 
very popular with companies in the late eighties and nineties. Dunning therefore 
claims:   
That strategic alliances have to be integrated in the major economic theories 
and to be analysed both within the framework of the internationalisation of 
firm’s activities and of the intra-/intercompany exchanges as well as intra-
/interindustrial exchanges (Dunning 1993: 219).  
 Studies on strategic alliances frequently publish dramatic percentages of 
failed alliances (e.g. Cauley de la Sierra 1995, Spekman et al. 1996). Lorange 
and Roos (1995: 197) however, claim that the problems of managing an 
international joint venture are exaggerated. They state that there is no hard proof 
to show that international strategic alliances fail more often than comparative 
companies owned by one company. Yoshino and Rangan (1995) also criticise 
the pessimistic scientists who focus on the problems of strategic alliances. 
Yoshino and Rangan fail however, to support their positive perspective on 
strategic alliances with supporting hard evidence. They rather speak of 
challenges and consider that there is no real alternative of strategic alliances. 
Nonetheless, many scientists are not very optimistic on the success and survival 
of strategic alliances. Spekman et al. (1996) estimates that nearly 60% of all 
alliances fail. Porter (1990) is also very critical of the stability of a strategic 
alliance and concludes that they are fated to fail. Cauley de la Sierra (1995: 190) 
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studied 26 strategic alliances that had been the object of a 1987 study and found 
that 38.5% of the companies remained in operation, 38.5% of the alliances 
dissolved and the management of 23% of the alliances declined to comment. 
The conclusion that the strategy of cross-border strategic alliances includes big 
risks might thus be justified. 
 Different factors are mentioned for the failure of a strategic alliance. 
Faulkner (1995: 49) gives five reasons. (1) The partners can each have different 
agendas, which can be hidden from each other. (2) When there is inadequate 
mutual reporting by both partners, feelings of distrust can emerge. (3) There is 
always the fear that the partner will be the future competitor. In a fast changing 
telecom market for instance this is a very likely situation. Today’s partner can 
easily be tomorrow’s competitor. (4) When there is a cultural incompatibility at 
corporate and national level the cooperation can be expected to be very difficult. 
(5) When there is a lack of commitment with top and/or middle management the 
strategic alliance slowly but surely dies.  
 Cauley de la Sierra (1995) suggests a number of reasons as to why strategic 
alliances break up. (1) When partners change in strategic objectives or focus it is 
difficult to hold the alliance together. This has also to do with the 
incompatibility of partners’ agendas and unrealistic market expectations of one 
or both partner. For instance, the mythical convergence of telecommunications 
and computers has appeared to be very difficult. (2) On the forefront it is 
necessary for the partners to know each other well. Changes in corporate 
leadership have less influence on the alliance when a larger part of the 
management of both partners are familiar with each other. False expectations 
with regard to partners’ capabilities can be thus avoided. (3) When the partners 
are unable to cope with diverse management styles and cultures the alliance is 
under tension. The strengthening of a company’s presence in Japan by 
establishing a strategic alliance with a Japanese partner for instance can lead to 
cultural problems. (4) Cooperation can sour because 10%-20% of the companies 
uses a strategic alliance to exit the industry. Financial crunch can also force a 
premature exit because the partner fails to contribute to the strategic alliance. (5) 
The partners also can decide to cash at the right time by selling or buying the 
strategic alliance. 
 Lorange and Roos (1995: 198) see five difficulties that have to be addressed. 
(1) It is very hard for a company to give up autonomy and decide everything in 
consultation with the partner. (2) Politicisation of the alliance has to be avoided 
in order to create trust among the partners. (3) There is a danger that the alliance 
slowly dies after the signing of agreements has taken place. The alliance has to 
be kept active and alive, in particular when the progress is becoming dependent 
of the CEOs only. Long term cooperation is needed to keep the alliance vital. 
(4) When the external orientation on customers is overshadowed by internal 
affairs the alliance looses competitiveness. (5) There has to be a positive attitude 
towards mutual learning. 
 Finally, Yoshino and Rangan (1995: 140) also see a number of difficulties in 
alliances. (1) The ambivalent relation of former and possible future competitors 
can result in distrust. There is always a fear that the partner will be a future 
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competitor. (2) The management culture of one of the partners is not prepared 
for a different form of control in an alliance. In particular, in minority 
participation, the desired control of the partners can give problems. (3) The 
mutual relationships of alliances, subsidaries and business relations can produce 
tension. The connection of an individual alliance to the management of a 
network of alliances can result in opposing interests. (4) Attention for small 
details in the cooperation helps to prevent the alliance slowly dying. (5) Giving 
attention to the holistic relations of structure, organisational culture, national 
culture and strategy helps to prevent problems. 
 Faulkner (1995), Cauley de la Sierra (1995), Lorange and Roos (1995) and 
Yoshino and Rangan (1995) frequently mention cultural factors as causes of 
failing. Barkema et al. (1996) concludes that cultural barriers were more 
pronounced when the company had to accommodate both strange corporate and 
national cultures in a joint venture. Cauley de la Sierra (1995: 195) therefore 
claims with reason, that the managing of cultural diversity is ‘one of the greatest 
challenges of alliances’. The managing of cultural diversity however, as has 
been discussed earlier in section 2.2.2, includes the managing of manifest forms 
of ethnicity. Other scientists also recognise the connection of culture and the 
struggle for power in an alliance. Faulkner (1995) states that with the selection 
of a possible partner two major qualities are sought: a strategic and a cultural fit. 
Lorange and Roos (1995: 174) also stress the need of studies on strategic 
intention and cultural diversity when two or more companies want to establish a 
strategic alliance. Both the strategic intention and cultural diversity also have a 
strong influence on the establishing and managing of strategic telecom alliances. 
Cultural differences can be held responsible for the collapse of many outwardly 
logical partnerships set in motion with the best of intentions (Public Network 
Europe 1998, May Issue, pp. 27).  
 The cultural factors mentioned involves different ‘levels’ of culture: 
organisational cultures, industrial culture, management culture and national 
culture. This raises the question as to how cross-cultural cooperation at these 
different levels can be studied. 
 
 
2.5 Model to Unravel Cultural Complexity in Organisations 
 
In the previous sections the debates on intercultural management, organisational 
culture and globalisation have been discussed to construct a theoretical 
framework for studying cross-cultural cooperation in the telecom sector. This 
anthropological framework includes distinct levels of culture. Chanlat (1994) 
points out the necessity of a true anthropology of organisations by focussing on 
human behaviour and at the same time exploring all the relationships within the 
environment that runs through organisation life at different levels.  
The complexity of the problems that confront us both on national and an 
international scale, the importance of cultural elements, the emphasis on 
individual aspirations…all of these influences have, in effect led us to 
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propose models of management that will henceforth be based on a true 
anthropology of organisations (Chanlat 1994: 160).  
  Alvesson and Berg (1992) therefore stress the need to separate these 
different levels involved with organisational studies. They distinguish six levels 
of culture: (1) national cultures, (2) regional and industrial cultures, (3) 
company culture, (4) professional culture, (5) department culture (6) and worker 
culture. Schneider and Barsoux (1997: 47) also distinguish six different cultural 
levels or spheres, which exert influence on business practice. Each sphere of 
influence has its own set of artifacts and behaviours, beliefs and values and, 
underlying assumptions. Schneider and Barsoux stress that it might not be 
useful to argue which sphere is more dominant because the spheres interact in 
complex ways. (1) The first sphere concerns the national cultures. National 
cultural differences have been discussed in the debate on intercultural 
management. (2) The second sphere concerns the regional and community 
cultures. Within national borders strong regional ties can maintain a strong 
sense of regional identity. Regional differences derive from history and 
language. (3) The third sphere focuses on the industry cultures. An industry 
culture is a subculture of a specific industry or sector. For instance, the industry 
culture of the telecom sector differs from the health care sector. Industry 
cultures can rise from the unique activities and problems encountered within 
industries. (4) The fourth sphere deals with organisational cultures. The 
organisational culture has been discussed in the debate on organisational 
culture. (5) The fifth sphere focuses on professional culture. The professional 
culture has also been discussed in the debate on organisational culture. (6) The 
sixth sphere concerns the functional cultures. The nature of the task of the 
different functions such as finances, production, marketing and research & 
development results in different cultures. The complexity and interdependence 
of local and global processes within international organisations makes it also 
necessary to conceptualise different levels, without establishing a hierarchy 
between the different levels.  
 In order to grasp human reality within organisations Chanlat (1994) 
distinguishes five closely linked levels of organisational reality. (1) The first 
level is the individual level, in which Chanlat sees human reality as a subtle 
interaction of the biological, the psychic and the social. At this level individuals 
construct and deconstruct their own reality and cope with conflicts, tensions, 
uncertainties and ambiguities. (2) At the second level, the interactional level, the 
identity of the individual is formed in interaction with others. The interactions, 
both formal and informal, can appear between two different individuals or two 
different groups. (3) The third level, the organisation level, focuses on the 
organisational cultures. (4) The fourth level, the society level, concerns national 
cultures. These national cultures have involved due to geography, history, 
political and economic forces, language and religion. (5) The fifth level, the 
world level, deals with transnational ideologies such as religion, globalisation 
and liberalisation. This model has been successfully applied to the cross-cultural 
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cooperation between three Dutch development organisations and their Bolivian 
counterparts (van Marrewijk 1996a). 
 It is now possible to create a conceptual framework, which can be used to 
explore the complex telecom sector. Chanlat’s framework is used to approach 
the telecom industry starting at world level and to study it level by level in order 
to unravel its cultural complexity. Each level of this multilevel model is 
analytically independent and contains elements that are linked to each other in 
relatively stable relations. Each of the levels is contingent in nature and the 
relationships between the levels could go in any direction (Chanlat 1994: 174). 
This multilevel model helps in the exploration and unraveling of the telecom 
industry. Mansell (1994a) also suggests the integration of macro-, meso- and 
micro-institutional analysis in order to get a complete and more holistic 
understanding of the consequences of the transformation of the telecom sector. 
She also stresses the need to combine the analysis of the social, cultural, 
political and economic constraints which shape institutions in order to 
understand the process of globalisation of the telecom market (Mansell 1994a: 
40). One of the strengths of anthropology is the establishing of links between 
the individual and his social context, the micro and the macro (Bate 1997). This 
however, brings along another problem with regard to how these links can be 
studied? The links of cross-cultural cooperation namely, are connected to all 
levels of the model.  
 To study cross-cultural cooperation the ‘symmetric anthropology’ of Latour 
(1994) is used. The aim of symmetric anthropology is, according to Latour, to 
study the processes of hybridisation from a holistic perspective. Latour (1994) 
concludes that ‘traditional‘ anthropology is not suitable for studying modern 
cultural complexity because of the distinction that has been applied in a 
‘natural’ and a ‘social’ world. This separation is based on the idea that nature 
has always existed as it is while society has been created by people. Latour 
states that nature and natural artefacts are created by human beings and he 
criticises the scientists who construct nature and at the same time ‘discover’ it. 
The exactness and objectiveness of science depends heavily on assumptions and 
negotiations. Facts are interpretations and research is by definition part of a 
construction. For instance, in her research on the ethnography of the immune 
system, the anthropologist Emily Martin (1996) studied the formation and 
interpretation of scientific knowledge in and outside science. She used 
micrographs of the HIV virus, hugely magnified visual representations of 
microscopic biological entities. These microscopic entities are radically 
decontextualised from the context of the body and become open to imagination 
and are free for interpretation. The main thrust of these pictures in science is to 
clinch an argument by revealing visual evidence of what one is claiming. The 
micrographs have been shown to students in the laboratory and to non-
specialists. The findings show a particular and local interpretation of the 
micrographs rather than a global and universal interpretation. This example 
shows that the exactness and objectiveness of the products of natural sciences 
depend heavily on assumptions and negotiations as part of a construction.  
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 Latour (1994) calls these products of the interaction of nature and society 
hybrids. He propounds that the more modern science tries to separate the two 
different zones of nature and society, the larger the production of hybrids will 
be. One of the examples of a hybrid is the Eclipse MV/8000 mini-computer 
described by Latour in his book The Action of Science (1988). The construction 
of the computer prototype was delayed by the close down of the computer chip 
production line, by social problems in the research team, by the debugging 
program and met pressure by the sales department to develop the computer as 
fast as possible. By the time the construction of the mini-computer was it was 
perceived as a black box. Latour claims that the Eclipse MV/8000 computer was 
constructed out of natural artefacts, such as the computer chip and societal 
artefacts, such as the interaction in the team. The computer is thus not a black 
box but a hybrid.  
 The ‘symmetric anthropology’ investigates these hybrids by assuming them 
as networks, which like a railway never goes beyond the local as long as one 
stays on the rail. In this way, large organisations can be studied.  
The organisation of an American company is not like the Kafka organisation. 
It is a basket-work of networks that is embodied by order notes and 
organisation flows, local procedures and specific arrangements that can 
stretch over a continent just on the condition that it does not cover the whole 
continent. One can follow networks in an organisation without ever a change 
of level or without ever discovering a deconstructed rationality (Latour 
1994: 171). 
 The anthropologist follows networks within the organisation and by doing so 
he does not go beyond the local level. As a result the global always stays local. 
The hybrids can be unravelled by means of following the local network of 
connections because macro actors are constructed with micro actors. Latour 
therefore, proposes to follow the construction and production of hybrids. If this 
is done it will become clear that at a specific point the ‘quasi object’ has the 
character of a natural artefact and at another point it assumes the character of a 
societal artefact and at other times it has the character of a social relationship. 
 This theoretical perspective of Latour can be used as a methodology to study 
cross-cultural cooperation in the telecom sector. By following the network of an 
actor different connections can be made. These connections lead to technical 
artefacts, social constructions, national cultures, the restructuring of the telecom 
industry and to personal coping strategies. The network of the actor is 
approached from the actors’ perspective and follows the actions and daily 
activities. The connections are made by free associations and are not restricted 
by presuppositions of its reality. Latour calls the mapping of heterogeneous 
associations ‘sociologica’ (Latour 1988: 261). The connections in the actor’s 
network are always ‘logical’ from the actor’s perspective even when different 
levels within or outside an organisation are being passed. The theoretical 
framework constructed to study the cross-cultural cooperation in the telecom 
sector is thus a combination of Chanlat’s multi-level model and the 
‘sociologica’ of Latour. Chanlat’s framework is used to explore the telecom 
  
 47 
industry. Exploration of the telecom sector is essential in order to comprehend 
the context of PTO employees and their cross-cultural cooperation cannot 
clearly understood without knowing the context. This context can refer to the 
temporal, physical or institutional context (Bate 1997: 1156). The theoretical 
framework thus explores the human reality of the PTO employees from world to 
individual level. Following the exploration of the five different levels, the 
making of ‘free associations’ suggested by Latour (1988, 1994) are used to 
study the cases of cross-cultural cooperation which interact with all of the 
levels. The daily world of the actor is studied by following the connections at 
different levels. The two approaches have been combined in a multilevel model 
to unravel the cultural complexity in the telecom sector (see Figure 3). The 
consequences of the theoretic framework for the research questions and research 
design are then discussed. 
 
Figure 3. Multi-level model for the exploration of cultural complexity 
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3 METHODOLOGICAL REFLECTIONS    
 
This chapter concerns the methodological consequences of the choice to use 
field research as the research design. The research questions are made 
operational for field research by means of a four-step approach of the telecom 
sector. The research design brings about ethical and methodological questions. 
The production of an ethnographic text and the researcher's relationship with 
the field of study is discussed. The chosen role as researcher-consultant for the 
purpose of field research, the considerations accompanying this choice and the 
consequences it has on the results of this study are addressed. The influence of 
financial and logistic support of PTT TELECOM results in ethical questions 
and this is presented along with a short overview of the research experiences in 
the field and the changes in research design.  Finally, the internal validity and 
external validity of this study are dealt with. 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The aim of this chapter is to explore the central research questions and to 
discuss the ethical and methodological consequences of the chosen research 
strategy of field research. In July 1995, I started the ethnographic PhD study on 
the cross-cultural cooperation of PTT TELECOM. In selecting an appropriate 
role in which I could execute the ethnographic study, different elements had to 
be considered. The degree of participation in the field, the choice for a hidden or 
open role, the degree of commitment with the object of study and the choice for 
an actual or created role were the four major selection criteria for the role as a 
researcher (‘t Hart et al. 1996: 279). As a business-anthropologist, I wanted to 
participate in PTT TELECOM in an actual position within the company that 
was directly related to cross-cultural cooperation. These requirements would 
make the access to the organisation not easy, in particular for an anthropologist. 
A number of presentations were needed to interest PTT TELECOM in a 
business-anthropological research on cross-cultural cooperation.  
 The International Support (IS) department of PTT TELECOM was interested 
in co-operating in the study for a number of reasons. Firstly, the department was 
keen in becoming a professional consultant office and therefore wanted up-to-
date information on telecom and organisational studies. Secondly, the transfer of 
knowledge by means of discussions, lectures, relevant literature and articles 
would stimulate employees in their professional careers. Thirdly, the reports on 
the results of the study would attract the attention of the top management. The 
organisation required an agreement to determine what the  ‘spin off’ of the study 
would have for their business, what it would require in terms of their 
cooperation and the terms surrounding confidentiality. The agreements with 
PTT TELECOM on the conditions of the study were negotiated for three 
months and finally agreed upon in a contract that was jointly signed by the Vrije 
Universiteit Amsterdam and PTT TELECOM in December 1995 (see annex I). 
 To meet the corporate demands, and to collect data needed for the study I 
worked as a consultant-researcher within IS. In exchange, I received financial 
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support and obtained free access to the organisation, to corporate information 
and to its international joint ventures. A business-anthropologist is forced to 
negotiate with organisations in order to execute ethnographic research. Because 
the outcomes of these negotiations can exert influence on the results of the study 
and because anthropological organisational studies meet criticism with regard to 
the objectivity of observations (e.g. Hofstede 1991: 308, Bate 1997: 1152) I 
stress the importance of reflection on the methodology used. Preoccupation with 
methodology in social sciences results from the effort of dealing with the 
influence of the researcher on the object and with the consequences of this 
influence for the process of knowing and the knowledge yielded (Ellen 1984). 
 
 
3.2 The Step by Step Exploration of the Telecom Market 
 
A strategy of field research was selected to explore the central research 
question. The concept of fieldwork has a long history in anthropology and has 
been used in both ‘exotic’ and in Western societies (Ellen 1984: 82). Bate 
(1997) sees fieldwork, which he calls the ‘doing’ of ethnography, and especially 
the attitude of ‘suck and see’ as a major characteristic of anthropological 
organisation research (Bate 1997). The definition of field research:  
Field research is a research strategy to describe, to interpret and to explain 
behaviour, meaning and cultural products of persons involved in a general 
limited field by direct data collection of researchers who are physically 
present and disturb this field as little as possible (‘t Hart et al. 1996: 265) 
 The ‘general limited field’ mentioned in the definition above was neither 
very clear nor very well defined at the beginning of the PhD research. Hence, a 
preliminary investigation was conducted from September 1995 till November 
1995 to get a better idea of the field of research. I started with a number of open 
interviews with telecom scientists and employees of PTT TELECOM working 
in the international field of telecommunications. Newspapers and relevant 
literature were also studied in order to gain an overall view of the world-wide 
changes in the telecom market and the new positions of the PTOs. This 
preliminary period helped me to prepare the field research, to gain insight into 
the complexity of the field, and to assess the possibilities and impossibilities of 
doing field research within PTOs.  
 
 Together with the multi-level model of chapter 2 (see Figure 3), the results 
of the preliminary research were used to construct a multi-level research design 
(see annex II). The world and national level of the multi-level model are 
investigated in the first step of the multi-level research design. The 
organisational level is investigated in the second step. The individual level is 
explored in the third step. Finally, in the fourth step the interactional level of the 
multi-level model is examined. At each level a new research question is 
formulated for the exploration of that level. Each research question is worked 
out into topics. Data on these topics are collected and made directly suitable to 
the qualitative computer program for a first analysis. On the strength of this 
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analysis a selection is made of the field of study for the next step. At the next 
level a new research question is formulated. Although the different levels can be 
distinguished analytically, the collection of data is not finished with the 
formulation of a new research question. Hence the time spent on each level of 
research sometimes overlaps. This method has aspects of the cyclic approach as 
described by Wester (1991). In the cyclic approach a topic is studied and with 
the results of the analysis new research questions are formulated, until the topic 
is know thoroughly. 
 Fieldwork for research was carried out from September 1995 till December 
1997 (see annex II). The exploration of the first level revealed that PTT 
TELECOM is one of the European PTOs that is strongly affected by the 
restructuring of the telecom sector. From the findings at the second level, it was 
learnt that PTT TELECOM had selected the strategic alliance Unisource and 
new foreign markets in Europe, Eastern Europe and South East Asia to 
compensate for the decrease of home market revenues. But how do employees 
cope with these changes? PTT TELECOM is an organisation with more than 
30.000 employees and therefore it was necessary to select two departments for a 
more in depth study. In the third step the departments of International Business 
(IB) and International Support (IS) were selected because these departments are 
strongly involved in the process of internationalisation.7 From the analysis of 
data collected in this third step, I learnt that employees are employed all over 
the world but not many have previous international experience or are 
sufficiently prepared. The employees had to be studied in their local context in 
order to get an inside view of the daily practises of cross-cultural cooperation. 
After analysing the collected data of the second and third level a selection of 
three cases was made.    
 
 
3.3 Personal and Ethical Reflections on Anthropological Research in 
Organisations 
 
It is only in recent times that anthropologists are looking seriously at how 
ethnographic texts are produced and presented. The transformation of collected 
facts into ethnographic texts can be seen as a process of translation form one 
cultural context to another (Ellen 1984). This process of translation, or rather  
‘construction’, is highly personal (Bate 1997). Therefore, in this section my 
personal and professional background, my role as researcher/consultant and my 
activities with PTT TELECOM will be presented in order to lend a clearer 
understanding as to the construction of this thesis. However, the presentation of 
the research data is first discussed. 
 
3.3.1 Presentation of an Ethnographic Text 
The presentation of ethnographic study needs a format in which the employees 
come alive, detailed observations are highlighted and all in a way that does 
                                                        
7 The names of the departments, employees and situations have been made anonymous in order to 
avoid recognition.  
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justice to the holistic character of the study. The narrative tradition of presenting 
ethnographic material would appear a plausible form for all these intents and 
purposes. In his book ‘Interpretative Ethnography' Denzin (1997: 33) discusses 
two forms of narrative strategies for ethnographic situations: the modernist and 
the post-modernist strategy. The modernists (also called the realists or 
positivists) believe that the world of real experiences can be represented by 
means of transcription. They use traditional ethnographic methods to produce 
text and do consider themselves as relative outsiders. The post-modernists 
criticise the exclusion of the writer of ethnographic text. They state that the 
qualitative research text is a cultural production that embodies cultural meanings 
based on the interpretation of transcriptions. The text is seen as the product of 
an interactive process between the described and describer (Ellen 1984). The 
describer introduces meaning and morality into the discourse by developing a 
personal style. The post-modernists see the narrative tradition as a scientific 
method in which the ethnographic story is constructed with scientifically 
collected facts. This method is non-biased, discusses underlying values, is a 
description of the reality and, gives a voice to the object of study (Denzin 1997: 
253). 
 Critics of the post-modernists state that their strategy is pure fiction, too 
literary, offers no method of verification, has strong personal biases, presents no 
hard facts, is not valid or reliable, is not objective and gives unrepresentative 
samples. These criticisms are to an extent justified. The line between fiction and 
non-fiction can be very thin and raises questions. Can a scientist reconstruct a 
dialogue between two general managers that has probably taken place but that 
has in fact never been recorded? A writer using the narrative strategy to present 
ethnographic data has to be aware of his personal biases, the object of study and 
also of his audience. It is in these last two aspects that I think the post-modern 
narrative strategy is more applicable to ‘traditional’ ethnographic studies than to 
the ethnographic study of organisations. Of course there are scientists searching 
for new ways of presenting ethnographic data in organisational research. 
Czarniawska (1998) for instance, wants to demonstrate in her book ‘A Narrative 
Approach to Organization Studies’ that narratives are still the main carriers of 
knowledge in all societies. She describes a narrative approach to qualitative 
research in organisations and discusses the process from the collection of data in 
the field to the presentation of the results of the research. This is all very 
interesting, but colleagues of other scientific disciplines on organisational 
studies have almost no experience with narrative texts. These scientists are not 
acquainted with the idea that an organisation can be described from an 
ethnographic perspective. In the study on the internationalisation of the telecom 
operators I have to deal with a multi-disciplinary audience: economists, 
anthropologists, engineers, and scientists on quantitative research of cross-
cultural differences. Therefore, in this study, different strategies of presenting 
the ethnographic data will be used.  
 The first method, public ethnography, is used in this thesis to present a part 
of the research findings. Public ethnography is the merging of journalism and 
social science (Denzin 1997). Public ethnography combines the best aspects of 
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both disciplines: excellent journalism and rich ethnographic details. I have 
indeed found inspiration with writers such as Tom Wolfe, who has himself 
developed a narrative style that brings subcultures to life and clearly depicts 
authentic, bizarre lifestyles, and status rituals of modern America. He focuses on 
symbolism and attempts to probe and reveal profound cultural experiences. In 
his book ‘The Bonfire of Vanities’ Wolfe (1987) portrays in detail the daily 
world of a rich stock market trader and the elite of New York. Wolfe describes 
the protagonist’s cultural shock when confronted with lawyers and the power of 
the black movement after getting involved in a car accident in a ghetto. Wolfe 
constructs the story from facts, among other ways he uses the method of 
participant observation and presents the story through the eyes of the stock 
market trader. Recent Dutch examples of this public ethnography can be found 
in Mak (1997) who uses the narrative method to present the changing social 
cultural conditions in a small Dutch rural village and links stories of individual 
people to meso and macro level. Other Dutch examples of public ethnography 
can be found in a number of corporate biographies on, for instance, the beer-
company Heineken (Metze 1993) and the electronics-company Philips (Metze 
1997).  
 The second method that is used in this thesis is the traditional presentation of 
ethnographic material by means of separate text-blocks with observations, 
participating observations or, extracts of interviews. The text-blocks consist of 
basic research data and can be easily recognised. The combination of different 
styles is not new to enthnographic writing. Bate (1997: 1154) concludes ‘that 
commitment must also stretch to experimentation with different styles’.  
 
3.3.2 Production of an Ethnographic Text 
Ethnographic text is a cultural production that embodies cultural meanings 
based on the interpretation of transcriptions. The author can be seen as a 
performer that has to combine arts, science and craft in order to write 
ethnography (Bate 1997). I have decided not to use the narrative approach as a 
scientific method in which the ethnographic story is constructed from facts that 
are scientifically collected. But I think that the personal motivation and working 
experiences of the researcher need special attention in order to understand his or 
her relation to the object of study. In too many cases the reader doesn’t know 
much about the researcher’s motivation, emotions, background, involvement 
and reflections with regard to the construction of ethnographic text. Similar, 
most organisational studies lack information on the construction of text and on 
the researcher. There is of course a risk that more personal information 
deteriorates into an ‘ego-show’. Therefore, autobio 
+graphical information on motivation and working experiences as a cultural 
anthropologist and as a telecommunication engineer are not include in the 
ethnographic text but is presented as follows:   
 It must have been in the autumn of 1983 that I first met a cultural 
anthropologist. At that time I was working as a telecom engineer and was a 
respondent in, what I later realised, was a life history interview. The 
anthropologist was collecting data on the subculture of young people in a 
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village community of the Westland.8 In his report the anthropologist classified 
me as a member of the group of persons ‘looking for new frontiers’. Indeed, the 
search for new frontiers has been very much part of my personal life. In 1971 at 
the age of 11, I experienced cultural differences for the first time when I went to 
secondary school. Coming from a village community with a small junior single-
sex school headed by a priest, the new school with more than 1100 students in 
The Hague felt completely alien for me. At the new school I was classified as a 
‘Westlander’, which I soon enough understood was not a positive qualification.9 
I had very good memories of my childhood playing and working in the 
greenhouses of my father’s market garden, but then I found myself in a totally 
new situation in which I had to learn a completely new set of values and norms 
in order to cross that first frontier.  
 The second frontier crossing was at the age of 16 when I entered a new 
world of electronics and technology at the College of Technology.10  At that 
time, studying technology seemed to be the only logical choice since, in contrast 
to all of my friends, who would succeed their fathers, I had no desire to succeed 
my father in the agricultural market business. At the College of Technology I 
was introduced to a new subculture of technology and computers. I had to learn 
the values and norms of that new subculture in order to communicate with 
students who, for a larger part, had technological backgrounds. After four years 
of study I mastered the world of electronics, computers and telecommunications 
and entered the occupational subculture of engineers.11 
 The third frontier crossing was at the age of 20 when I literally crossed 
national borders and went to Canada after finishing my studies at the HTS. 
Before that point I had never been out of the Netherlands! I worked for two 
months on a tobacco plantation in Ontario with people of different ethnic 
backgrounds. Afterwards I travelled from Ontario to the west of Canada, then 
south along the West Coast of the USA to Mexico and experienced completely 
different cultures. Ever since, I have loved travelling. Travelling inspires me 
greatly and both generates and feeds my sense of curiosity and interest in the 
world. Ten years of travelling in Central and Latin America and Central Asia 
have enriched me and given me a vivid insight into distinct cultures in 
developing countries. The periods of travelling alternated with working periods 
in the Netherlands, first as field engineer in seismic exploration and later on as a 
telecommunications engineer.   
 On my return from a trip to South America in 1985, an employment agency 
offered me a temporary job at PTT TELECOM, which was a very dull 
government owned company at that time. I worked there as a manager of a 
computer and telecom equipment repair unit of the department called the 
                                                        
8 The Westland is an agricultural region in the west of the Netherlands enclosed by the North Sea 
and the cities of The Hague, Delft and Rotterdam. Local economy is heavily based on market 
gardening of vegetables and flowers in the so-called green houses. 
9 Although the Westland is located near the big cities of The Hague and Rotterdam, it has its own 
culture. A typical ‘Westlander’ is classified as a hard working, business orientated, non-academic, 
beer drinking, coarse, honest, co-operative and conservative person. 
10 In the Netherlands the more practical Hogere Technische School differs from the more 
theoretical Technische Universiteit.  
11 Trice and Beyer (1992) have described the occupational subculture of engineers. 
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Centrale Werk Plaats (CWP). The forthcoming liberalisation of the sales and 
repair of peripheral telecom equipment threatened the continued existence and 
concerns of this department. After three years in a management position I left 
PTT TELECOM in 1988 for a 6-month trip to Central America. My next job 
was with the telecom department of the Rotterdam City police in which I was 
interacted closely with PTT TELECOM, but this time as a client. During these 
two jobs I realised that to be successful in work it is necessary to have a 
thorough understanding of the context one is working in. The so-called ‘soft 
skills’ are a necessary tool engineers need in order to better understand the 
corporate politics, the decision making processes, working attitudes, cultural 
differences and attitudes towards leadership. As a result of these and other 
international experiences, the focus of my work has since slowly shifted from a 
technical towards an organisation-cultural perspective. 
 A fourth frontier crossing came at the age of 29 when I started a part-time 
study on cultural anthropology at the University of Utrecht. A new world of 
science opened for me and I absorbed the literature and loved the field work 
experiences in Guatemala, Ladakh and Bolivia. At the same time, I became 
increasingly involved with organisational changes of the city police of 
Rotterdam and decided to specialise in business anthropology. Anthropology, 
which started as an interesting hobby, has now replaced my technical 
professional interests. This PhD study is thus the ultimate synthesis of my 
accumulated work experience, international experience and interest in business 
anthropology.  
 This double identity as both telecom engineer and cultural anthroplogists is 
indeed a methodological advantage in the ethnographical study of the telecom 
sector. As a telecom engineer it is easy for me to penetrate a PTO and 
participate in the cultural world of PTO employees. I have the same professional 
background and speak the same technical language as the PTO employees and 
do not lose my professional indentity. Czarniawska (1998: 42) gives a personal 
account of losing her professional identity when doing fieldwork in Warsaw and 
concludes that the threat of losing one’s identity is the most painful aspect of 
field organisation studies. In contrast, in the course of my field research I did 
not loose my professional identity but was able to accentuate my technical 
identity over my anthropological identity. When entering the field of research I 
did not experience feelings of ‘being dumb’ and neither did I find myself  
‘continually running up against blank walls’ (Czarniawska 1998: 42). I had 
already undergone enculturation in the ‘alien culture’ of PTT TELECOM. On 
the other hand, as an anthropologist it is easy for me to detach from the PTT 
TELECOM culture. This double identity thus made access to the organisation 
and the execution of the ethnographic research much easier.  
 
3.3.3 Do Anthropologists Fear Studying Commercial Enterprises? 
Isn’t it strange that Western anthropologists take great pains to study the daily 
life and the spiritual world of so-called primitive people, but hardly ever devote 
their energies to the study of the daily life of employees in organisations in their 
own contemporary society? Even when Western society is the topic of study, 
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anthropologists tend to study eccentric sub-cultures and marginal groups such as 
hooligans, girl scouts, punks and dance companies (Ellen 1984: 130, Bate 1997: 
1150) or the like. 
 In the book ‘The Future of Anthropological Knowledge’, effort is invested in 
finding new fields of anthropological research in the contemporary society 
(Moore 1996). In this book, anthropologists explore new fields of research but 
still have a preference to the local and the periphery, without using the holistic 
perspective, as anthropologists would have done with the so-called ‘primitive’ 
societies. One of the few exceptions is Warnier’s (1995) case study on the 
ethnography of a plantation in Cameroon. He connects the business at the 
plantation to the life history of the plantation owners, the local ethnic diversity, 
the historical context of Cameroon, the France development agencies in 
Cameroon and the France development departments in Paris. Latour (1994) 
pleads for the extension of anthropological research to Western society. The 
anthropologist has to make connections between the local and the global by 
portraying the daily life and daily practices of technicians, managers and 
administration employees.  
 It would appear that the anthropologist is apparently afraid of cooperating 
with Western commercial organisations. Where does this fear come from and 
what is it in essence? Is it the ever-existing anthropological fear of capitalism? 
Or is it the fear of being dominated by multinationals? Perhaps it is the fear for 
the abuse of information, as was the case in the Project Camelot in Vietnam.12 
Or is it maybe the fear for the lack of protection of the employees involved in 
the study? Whayever the case might be these fears have led to the evolving of a 
new breed of anthropologists and a new focus for research in the 1970s. 
Increasingly, anthropologists have put their skills at the service of minority 
groups and threatened communities. As a result, a new set of ethics has been 
developed in which the interests of the people studied are protected. Ellen 
(1984: 228) calls this identification with one’s informants ‘studying up’. This 
attitude has affected the relationship between anthropologists and the 
sponsoring agencies such as governments, development agencies and other 
sponsors (Ellen 1984: 136). Bate (1997) explains the lack of interest for true 
ethnography of western organisations from the fact that it takes too much time, 
it results in lenghty articles that are difficult to publish and, it takes the 
researcher away from the academic scene. 
 It would be a pity if these cultural assumptions prevent anthropologists from 
doing research in multinational organisations because so much valuable and 
interesting work can be conducted in international business and development 
cooperation. My personal experiences as researcher and consultant in 
development organisations and international business have shown that there are 
more than enough possibilities for anthropologists to explore. Managers and 
                                                        
12 In 1965 the American government hired American anthropologists to work for the Camelot 
Project. In this project the culture and daily world of Vietnamese tribes were studied. The 
American government used the results of the study to fight the Vietcong in the Vietnam War. The 
American Anthropological Association investigated the relation between anthropologists and 
sponsoring agencies resulting in the establishment of the Committee on Research Problems and 
Ethics (Ellen 1992: 135). 
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consultants with an economic training use anthropological knowledge, 
dominating the contemporary coaching of international projects, cultural 
changes and international acquisitions. This raises the question as to why 
anthropologists with a thorough knowledge of local cultures, cultural processes 
in temporary organisations and international management should not use 
economical knowledge to acquire work and research commissions. That is very 
well possible if anthropologists are willing to profile themselves to become 
relevant for other disciplines and for the practice, and sell their ‘products’ and 
‘services’. 
 
3.3.4 The Researcher/Consultant 
The business anthropologists Olila and Teunissen (1989) see four different roles 
for business anthropologists in organisations. The first role is the intercultural 
specialist who supports the organisation in questions of intercultural 
management. The second role is the ‘parachutist’ who intervenes in actual crisis 
in organisations that need a quick solution. The third role is the expert of 
organisational cultures who diagnoses and discovers cultural strains in the 
organisation. The fourth role is the expert in change management who designs 
and supports corporate strategies for cultural change. Schein (1985: 21) also 
recognises the difference between the ethnographer and the consultant. He 
describes the difference between the ethnographic and the clinical perspective 
on organisational culture. The ethnographer collects data of the organisation out 
of scientific interests by means of participant observation to understand the 
culture from an inner perspective. Whereas the consultant, who is hired by the 
company to investigate or solve a problem, uses a clinical perspective for 
collecting his data by means of a quick scan or a limited number of interviews. 
Schein stresses that these different research perspectives result in a different 
relationship to the object of study and can therefore result in different findings.  
 Olila and Teunissen (1989) point out three differences between the business 
anthropologist and organisation advisors. The first and most important 
difference is related to the question: ‘whom are you working for?’ The business 
anthropologist tends to work with employees on the work floor. In contrast, 
organisation advisors rather work with the top management, which gives more 
status, clearer results and new commissions. The business anthropologist is 
interested in the emic or native view: the view of the employees. The business 
anthropologist can help management to understand cultural processes on the 
‘work-floor’. He or she is more capable of working on the ‘work-floor’ than the 
organisation advisor who is inclined to adopt the management perspective:  
Microstudies are more often than not on the side of the underdogs, be they 
managers or workers and, on the side of the rebellion. By showing how 
macropictures are drawn, microstudies problematize the taken for granted 
(Czarniawska 1998: 49). 
 The second difference between business anthropologists and organisation 
advisors is the time they need for the research. While business anthropologists 
need two years to uncover and unravel the organisational culture, organisation 
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advisors do this in a much shorter period (e.g. Czarniawska 1992, Bate 1997). 
Not only the method of participant observation used by the business 
anthropologist, but also the historical, contextual and process based approach is 
very time-consuming. The third difference between business-anthropologists 
and organisation consultants is located in the presentation of data. The business-
anthropologist tends to include sensitive data in the presentation because of the 
commitment on the ‘work floor’. This presentation concerns the difference of 
rule and reality, shows pitfalls in the way of changes and confronts the 
management with the opinions of the ‘work floor’. The organisation consultant 
in contrast, presents a route to the new desired organisational culture. The 
presentation concerns the desired solutions, the management perspective and, 
the resistance of the ‘work floor’.    
 In summary, the business anthropologist is, according to Olila and Teunissen 
(1989), making a film of the organisational culture rather than a photo. The film 
concerns the cultural process in an organisation and is in sympathy with the 
employees rather than with the management. The organisation consultant in 
contrast, makes a photo that gives a static image of the organisational culture. 
The photo is made from an outsider’s perspective and is framed to suit the 
purposes and needs of the management.  
 This raises the question as to which role the researcher needs to fill in order 
to learn about the employee’s world, to observe their activities and to wander 
around in the organisation at national and international level. To stay 
anonymous, for instance, in a role as a temporary worker, brings along many 
problems. Although it would have been very well possible to find a full time 
‘undercover’ job within the telecom operator because of my professional 
experiences, such a position would not have left enough freedom, time and 
energy for the research. Moreover, I do not think it is ethical to conduct research 
within PTT TELECOM without informing the relevant authorities of 
organisation. Consequently, for the duration of my PhD research I worked as a 
consultant-researcher with the International Support (IS) department of PTT 
TELECOM, mainly as an intercultural specialist who supported the organisation 
in questions of intercultural management.  
 A number of reasons played a part in the decision to assume a formal 
position as consultant-researcher. Firstly, this position would provide an 
excellent starting point for the necessary in-depth research. Detailed 
observations of the daily world of employees are difficult to conduct if one is 
not working in the company itself. Being present each day within the 
organisation itself made it possible to develop an inside perspective. Secondly, 
being open with regard to the research objectives and the formal position in the 
department of International Support would increase both my credibility and 
trustworthiness in the organisation. Thirdly, actual participation in the 
department would stimulate me to work efficiently, to present results, to discuss 
all findings and outcomes with colleagues and to maintain the high tempo of 
work. Finally, the financial support of such a position was a welcome 
supplementary payment to the small university salary and research budget. 
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 Some may find it objectionable to search for financial and logistic support 
from the company being studied but I am of the contrary opinion. 
Anthropologists have always had help from the government, the local military, 
the missionaries, development corporations or even multinationals. Research of 
the Dani people in the Irian Jaya highlands for instance, could not have been 
completed without the financial and logistic support of the former Dutch 
colonial government, the missionaries’ aeroplanes and local protection of the 
Dutch military. In accepting financial and logistic support the researcher does 
run the risk that he might be limited in selecting cases, executing research and 
opens himself to possible criticism. However, in this PhD study, PTT 
TELECOM has given logistic and financial support but has not exerted any 
influence on the research questions, the selection of the cases nor the execution 
of the research. One might however wonder if there have not been any 
limitations placed with regard to the publication of the results of the study.  
 The delicate question of freedom of publicity is further discussed in the 
agreement with PTT TELECOM (see annex I). Within social science, a contract 
is a commonly used form of dealing with the issues of access and financial 
support (Ellen 1984, ‘t Hart et al. 1996). In an interview, a Dutch social scientist 
admits that he nearly always has to negotiate with potential clients. 
Consequently, he collects ‘interesting information’ for the employer while 
simultaneously collecting his own data for scientific research (De Volkskrant, 
August 4, 1997). Latour’s story of the scientist Pierre Kernowicz in ‘A Portrait 
of a Biologist as a Wild Capitalist’ (Latour 1997) is another example of the 
daily commercial practices in other areas of science. Latour portraits science as 
a business: with the power of money, the organisational politics, the importance 
of gaining status, the occupying of new research projects, the snatching of 
talented researchers and the production of publications, in the quest to reach the 
top. The researcher is confronted with a difficult dilemma: on the one hand, 
wanting full freedom to publish all the confidential findings while in the full 
knowledge that it is nearly impossible to find an organisation that will give such 
consent. On the other hand, when the researcher requests the permission of an 
organisation, full freedom of publishing is inevitably again a problem. 
Therefore, it is necessary to negotiate with the organisation over the possibilities 
of studying the daily activities of employees. Consequently, in this PhD study, 
the freedom of publication had to be negotiated and it was agreed upon that a 
selected person would first review the results of the study before the final 
publication (see annex I).  
 To my own surprise, over the four years of conducting research and writing 
articles, the organisation has never blocked my publications (e.g. Marrewijk 
1996b, 1996c, 1997). Because of the fear of the possibility of limitations being 
imposed, I have myself experienced a kind of self-censorship in publishing the 
results of this study. Much of this self-censorship has to do with my 
preoccupation in keeping a good balance between being committed and keeping 
a detached distance to the object of study. Time has also been a friendly factor 
that has allowed me to publish results; often by the time an article was 
published, the actual situation in the company or telecom market had already 
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changed. The freedom of publishing company secrets is of course limited by the 
contract which of course is not a new situation in anthropology (see annex I). In 
recent years, the limitations on traditional anthropology increased because of a 
growing ethnic awareness among the people studied. In the course of 
conducting my anthropological fieldwork on village oracles in a Tibetan 
Buddhist village in Northern Ladakh, I had to ask permission from the head of 
the monastery. I had to promise to confer with him with regard to the results of 
the research before returning home and he appointed a close friend of his own as 
my guide and translator during my field research. The prohibition by an 
American judge of paleo-anthropological research on the ancestors of North-
American Indians only further proves that the future research possibilities of 
traditional anthropologists will be limited. The field situation is now so complex 
that legal consultation at an early stage of project design is required (Ellen 1984: 
146). In summary, although I had expected limitations in the execution of my 
PhD research and the publishing of the results, PTT TELECOM has been very 
open and co-operative. 
 
3.3.1 Involvement and Detachment of the Researcher  
This section focuses on the classical dilemma of how the researcher must 
commit to the object of study while maintaining a degree of detachment (Ellen 
1984: 227). Due to my daily presence in the company for more than two years 
and my experience with PTT TELECOM prior to the period of research, a 
certain degree of commitment to the organisation was to be expected. In 
combination with the active role of consultant, there was even a risk that I 
would ‘go native’.13 An example that clearly illustrates this dilemma is my 
experience of studying the international human resource policies of PTT 
TELECOM. Very soon after the start of the research, it was clear that the human 
resource policies needed improvement in the co-ordination of selection, 
preparation, coaching and repatriation of internationally operating employees. 
From the perspective of a researcher, it was interesting just to observe how the 
co-ordination failed to work. From the perspective of a consultant, these policies 
had to be discussed with the Human Resource Department in order to be 
improved. The dilemma was eventually solved with a presentation of the 
findings to the Human Resource department and by taking note of the various 
efforts towards improvement that were made. 
 My professional experience helped to prevent me from becoming overly 
engaged with PTT TELECOM. In the first place, my identity as professional 
anthropologist, as earlier discussed, was very helpful in helping me to maintain 
an adequate distance between the organisation and myself. In the second place, 
the friction between my own academic and practical interests demanded 
constant attention. While on the one hand, PTT TELECOM was interested in 
                                                        
13 In traditional anthropology the concept of ‘going native’ is used when an anthropologist 
identifies himself too much with the objects of study and turns away from his or her own cultural 
background. The anthropologist who ‘goes native’ takes the cultural values and norms of the host 
country as his or her basic assumptions and rejects his/her own culture.  Ellen (1984: 88) names 
this ‘overengagement’. 
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quick and applicable solutions on the other hand, the Vrije Universiteit 
Amsterdam was interested in scientific results based on time consuming and in-
depth research. Each day I was reminded of the differences between both 
organisations. This manifested itself for instance in the different codes of 
dressing. Going to work at the International Support department required that I 
be neatly attired and well groomed; a clean shave, well ironed shirt and tie, 
matching trousers and polished shoes would be the norm. In contrast, days at the 
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam meant donning black jeans and a jacket.  
 Thirdly, my previous professional experience and background in 
telecommunications and consultancy helped me to manage the different interests 
and the different roles. In a commission in the development sector in Bolivia for 
instance, five different parties claimed my loyalty. The Dutch client claimed me 
because I am Dutch. The local Dutch developing organisation claimed me 
because I had worked there earlier. The anthropologist-director of the Bolivian 
organisation asked for my support because of my anthropological profession. 
The local Indian organisation wanted me to subscribe to their point of view 
because of my political sympathies and finally, the employees of the Bolivian 
development organisation claimed me based on our friendly relations. 
Compared to the Bolivian experience the complexity of the PhD study was 
therefore by far much easier to manage.  
 It can be said that working for the two organisations, PTT TELECOM and 
the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, has in fact had a positive effect and 
stimulated this PhD study. The close relationship between research and the 
practical implementation of the results have been an impetus and a motivating 
factor. The commercial attitude of the International Support department 
stimulated me to keep strictly to planning and maintain a high work rate while 
the enthusiasm and constructive criticism of my university colleagues stimulated 
me to keep focus in my study and to maintain an intellectual detachment. 
 
3.3.2 Interventions by the Consultant in the Organisation 
The combination and simultaneously conducting of research and consultative 
work does give vein to another dilemma. Should the researcher intervene in the 
field of study? According to the definition of ‘pure’ fieldwork an anthropologist 
should interfere as little as possible in the field of study (Ellen 1984: 80). It 
appears that traditional anthropological research veils the impact of the 
researcher. It is of course impossible for an anthropologist to be an ‘invisible’ 
participant without influencing the field of study to some extent. 
Anthropologists have always influenced their objects of study. In many cases, 
the anthropologist has come in the trail of the missionaries to make a 
transcription of so-called ‘primitive’ societies. One might question if an 
anthropologist participating full time in a small Guaraní Indian village in the 
Chaco of Bolivia does not have much more influence on the objects of study 
than an anthropologist in a western organisation with more than 30.000 
employees. In the course of the research I have indeed given feedback of the 
results of my findings to the organisation and sometimes, initiated changes.  
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 To provide feedback to the objects of research is called action research (‘t 
Hart et al. 1996, Swanborn 1987, Ellen 1984). The goal of action research is to 
change a society or organisation by means of helping the involved persons 
develop a process of awareness (‘t Hart et al. 1996: 132). Swanborn (1987: 385) 
puts more emphasis on the coaching aspect of action research. For instance with 
the introduction of a new style of working results are evaluated and feedback is 
given to the company. In the anthropological tradition of fieldwork four variants 
of action anthropology can be distinguished: applied-, partisan-, missionary- and 
salvage-anthropology (Ellen 1984: 80). They vary in their intentions but all are 
directed at developing the solution to a practical problem and all are mostly 
short term. The anthropological study of organisations can be defined as applied 
anthropology. The aim of the PhD study discussed in this thesis is to support the 
process of internationalisation of PTT TELECOM. By bringing in new 
knowledge and helping to evaluate prior experiences, the organisation can be 
transformed into a more internationally orientated organisation. Hence, I did not 
want to stand apart from the organisation, but to participate in an active way and 
to contribute towards helping the organisation in learning to cope with and 
sucessfully manage cross-cultural differences. An illustration of this is when the 
co-ordinator of the project that trains employees called to ask me for support. 
The co-ordinator had neither international experience nor experience with 
intercultural management training and therefore asked a commercial training 
office to send their proposal for cross-cultural training. The coordinator asked 
me to use the results of my study to formulate a list of needs for the training and 
discuss these with the commercial training office.  
 The interventions took place at different levels of PTT TELECOM: the PTT 
TELECOM management, the colleagues of the IS and IB departments, the 
office in Jakarta and the human resource department. The interventions could be 
divided into two groups: the intentional and non-intentional interventions. By 
non-intentional interventions I refer to those incidental interventions that arose 
as a result of my daily presence in the organisation such as the interaction with 
colleagues of the department, the informal lunches etc. Intentional interventions 
would comprise to the planned interventions such as presentations, lectures, the 
sharing of advice and contributions during discussions. To measure the impact 
of the interventions I have used parts of the Delphi research method.14 The 
Delphi method is based on inter-subjectivity that results from discussion with 
experts and persons involved (‘t Hart et al. 1996: 47). The Delphi method was 
not consistently used because there was no official panel group within PTT 
TELECOM. Although feedback was given by means of publications, 
discussions and presentations, only a limited number of people were interviewed 
a second, third and fourth time.  
 The largest impact of the interventions on the studied cases has been on the 
department of International Support (IS) because of the many lectures, personal 
                                                        
14 The Delphi method is based upon the informed opinion of experts and/or participants. In the first 
round the researcher probes for opinions. The results of this first round are presented immediately 
to the participants. With these results, participants can construct their opinions. The participants are 
interviewed for a second, a third and a fourth time. After each round of interviews results are 
presented. In this way a kind of panel discussion is constructed (‘t Hart et al. 1996). 
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discussions and the intensive participation. IS colleagues became more 
interested in the cross-cultural cooperation and managers saw it as a new advice 
product that could be commercialised. An example of successful feedback was a 
discussion with an international manager who had serious problems selecting 
capable local employees for positions in a joint venture. The transformation of 
new technology knowledge from PTT TELECOM to the local PTO was 
explained three times by a Dutch expert without success. By trusting the local 
manager more and by building personal relations with the manager of the 
counterpart, the Dutch manager was able to select people according to local 
standards. A month later this appeared to be a success. But not all of the 
interventions were successful. In the case of the earlier-mentioned coordinator 
for instance, two months after I provided a list of necessary points of attention 
for the cross-cultural component, the cross-cultural training was cancelled due 
to financial cutbacks. The impact on the department of International Business 
was smaller because or irregular contact. Unisource had already been active and 
focused on questions of cross-cultural management. Thus the results of my 
study did not have much impact on that joint venture. The results of the case 
studied in Indonesia however, did have an impact on the management of the 
Jakarta office. As a result, the topic of cross-cultural management drew more 
attention there. On the whole, I have the impression that the feedback of the 
results of my PhD study has no large impact on the organisation.  
3.4 A (re)Construction of the Research Process 
 
3.4.1 Changes in the Research Design 
Writing this dissertation is in a certain way a reconstruction of the 
accomplishment of an empirical study. This can of course be done so that 
everything seems to fit perfectly afterwards. Just as in a photo report of my field 
trip to the highlands of Irian Jaya over Christmas in 1997, in which I 
constructed an ‘authentic’ anthropological view of the Lani tribe by 
concentrating on pig-festival rituals and leaving out pictures on contemporary 
Irian Jaya. In reality some of the rituals were ‘reinvented’ because of my 
interests and I had paid to have them performed. However with regard to this 
study, I would rather give an account of the more realistic process of doing 
explorative research.  
 To explore the field of the telecom business, I conducted a preliminary 
investigation within the PTT TELECOM organisation in the autumn of 1995 
followed by a short field research in the Netherlands Antilles and Venezuela in 
February 1996. Results from the preliminary investigation within PTT 
TELECOM showed that the organisation was interested in supporting the 
research. The company was particularly interested in practical advice on cross-
cultural cooperation, in co-operation in the strategic alliance Unisource, in 
information on minority participation in local strategic alliances and, in 
improvements of the international human resource management. Three 
interesting cases for research on cross-cultural cooperation surfaced in the 
preliminary investigation: the Netherlands Antilles, Indonesia and the strategic 
alliance Unisource.   
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 Preliminary investigation in the Caribbean region showed an interesting 
connection between the ex-colonial relations and the processes of localisation.  I 
was thus eager to compare two cases of cross-cultural co-operation of PTT 
TELECOM in the Netherlands Antilles and Indonesia and two cases of Spanish 
Telefónica in Latin America. At that time both companies were partners in 
Unisource. During the negotiations with PTT TELECOM on the contract and in 
the final subject of study it became clear that it would be difficult to do the same 
in Madrid with Telefónica. Moreover, to get a detailed perspective of the 
process of globalisation and localisation in the telecom business it would be 
necessary to conduct an in-depth study. Because the field research had to be 
finished within 18 months, it would be impossible to study both organisations. 
The choice to drop the comparative design worked out for the best for in April 
1997 Telefónica left the Unisource alliance, which would have made it 
impossible to continue the research after the break up of the alliance. 
 
3.4.2 Evaluation of the Fieldwork Experiences  
The department of International Support (IS) was in fact my ‘home base’ for 
more than three years (after finishing the data collection period I continued 
working there). The manager of this department helped me first with 
introductions to his and other departments. I had full support from the 
department in executing my research. Because of my dual identity as 
anthropologist-engineer and because of my former experience with PTT 
TELECOM it was relatively easy for me to find my way around. More than 
once, I recognised former colleagues, who were not surprised to see me, because 
they did not know I had in fact left the organisation ten years before. Because of 
regular and long term contact, the employees of the IS department became 
actual colleagues. Some of these colleagues have helped facilitate a deeper 
understanding of their personal strategies in coping with the changing context of 
their job. My giving feedback of scientific and practical knowledge on the 
subject of globalisation, cross-cultural management and organisational culture 
helped to support the internationally operating employees of the IS department, 
 Because my office was in the IS department, research in the department of 
International Business was slightly more difficult. Information on the activities 
in the IB department to support the company’s transformation into a competitive 
international telecom operator was difficult to gain access to. I had no official 
role there, which made participant observation more difficult. However, because 
the IB department was located near the IS department I was able to participate 
regularly there.  
 The research at the international strategic alliance Unisource in Hoofddorp 
was more difficult. I didn’t have an official role, which made participant 
observation more difficult. The human resource department was very helpful in 
finding respondents. A major problem in this part of the field research was the 
turbulence in and outside the organisation. During the research, the shareholder 
Telefónica broke with the alliance Unisource in April 1997 and in July 1998 
AT&T announced the splitting of the alliance AT&T-Unisource. 
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 The fieldwork in the Netherlands Antilles, which was necessary to 
investigate a failed acquisition of a Public Telecom Operator (PTO) by PTT 
TELECOM, was conducted very efficiently. The introduction by Prof. Dr. Koot 
to the Curaçao society in February 1996 helped me with the building of personal 
networks and in finding an office at the University of the Netherlands Antilles 
(UNA). In the second period from January till April 1997, I was very fortunate 
to be able to live in a student house of the UNA. The house was located in the 
Otrabanda quarter of Willemstad where Antillian daily life could easily be 
observed. Moreover, the Antillian students gave me feedback and information 
on the Antillian-Dutch relationship at Curaçao. Although promised, participant 
observation in the local PTO Antelecom proved to be impossible because of the 
refusal of the Dutch general manager. My role as consultant-researcher was for 
the general manager, an ex- PTT TELECOM employee, to difficult to accept. 
So in place of participant observation, I conducted more interviews in the PTO 
and took part in more participant observation in the Antillian society to get a 
better understanding of the Dutch-Antillian co-operation. The intensive contacts 
with other Dutch and Antillian anthropologists have been very helpful in 
verifying observations and discussing conclusions.  
 The fieldwork period in Jakarta, which was focused on an investigation of 
the contemporary cross-cultural experiences of PTT TELECOM, was a totally 
different experience from that in the Netherlands Antilles. I was in Jakarta from 
September 1997 till January 1998, a very exiting period with the downfall of the 
rupiah, the economic crisis, the forest fires in Kalimantan and Sumatra, the 
rumours of Suharto’s death, two major aeroplane crashes and, the dismissal of 
Indonesian PTT TELECOM employees. The management of the Jakarta office 
of PTT TELECOM was in need of information on the cross-cultural co-
operation with its Indonesian counterparts and was very helpful in supporting 
my research. Here, my role as consultant-researcher could be used to advantage. 
In exchange for giving information on cross-cultural management, the 
management supported the research with a place in a lodging house and a desk 
at the Jakarta office. Because of earlier experiences, I knew that accommodation 
in a lodging house would have great impact on the study. Selecting the PTT 
guesthouse would mean close contacts with the four or five other PTT 
colleagues and close observation of their activities when not at work. The 
disadvantage would have been the detachment I needed to maintain. I therefore 
selected the very friendly Netherlands-Indonesian Association guesthouse. A 
second methodological problem was the question of how to get in contact with 
the Indonesian telecom employees. The Dutch expatriates’ circle in Jakarta 
attracts newly arrived Dutch employees but once absorbed in the Dutch circle, it 
is difficult to get into contact with Indonesian colleagues. Therefore, I had to be 
very careful no to be absorbed in the Dutch expatriates’ circle. During the 
weekends I travelled by public transport in West-Java to learn about daily rural 
life and to learn Bahasa Indonesia. 
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3.5 Internal and External Validity 
 
After having discussed the course of the research, the question can be raised as 
to whether the research is in fact valid. Have I found out what I wanted to 
know? There are four methodological instruments to guarantee the reliability of 
the research instruments and the internal validity (‘t Hart et al. 1996: 286). 
Firstly, the researcher has to use systematic working methods and the explicit 
reporting for the collection of data (see section 3.2). Secondly, the researcher 
has to use data and methodological triangulation to gain an insight into the field 
of study by using distinct perspectives and distinct kinds of perspectives (see 
section 3.3). Thirdly, a systematic handling of field data helps the researcher to 
develop theoretical concepts. This process is executed systematically and with 
precision, which give a sound theoretical basis for developed concepts. Thus in 
this PhD research I have given much attention to the systematic and precise 
handling of data. During the research, four kinds of field notes were made: (1) 
observational notes, (2) theoretical notes, (3) methodological notes, and (4) 
reflective notes (see annex III). Fourthly, giving feedback to the informants help 
the researcher to check his findings. 
  
 
3.5.1 Feedback of the Results of Study 
The feedback from the research to the informants enables me to improve the 
internal validity. In section 3.3.6 of this chapter, the feedback from the study 
was discussed in connection with the action research and the Delphi method. 
Informants give their opinion on the tentative conclusions. As a result, the 
researcher gets an inter-subjective image of the field situation. However other 
types of feedback can also be used. For this discussion I want to use a model 
taken from ‘t Hart et al. (1996: 329) shows a model for different forms of 
feedback of the results of the study: 
 
Who says What Against who How 
 
The effect 
Researchers Scientific 
Publications 
Scientific 
Forum 
Book, 
Article 
Presentation 
Scientific 
Knowledge 
 Research 
Report 
Principal Report, 
Presentation 
Computer-
program 
 
 Professional 
Publication 
Practical 
Forum 
Book, 
Article 
Presentation 
Practical 
Knowledge 
Journalists 
Advisors 
Publication 
in media 
Media 
Public 
Popular 
scientific 
book 
Newspaper, 
Daily 
Knowledge 
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TV – radio 
  Figure 4. Model for communication on the results of study  
 Firstly, the findings of this study have been used to write this thesis for a 
scientific forum of social scientists. A selected number of PTT TELECOM 
informants have given their opinion on the draft of the thesis. The results of the 
study have also been used for educational purposes at the Vrije Universiteit 
Amsterdam. Furthermore, an article has been published in a scientific journal 
and a presentation has been given for a scientific forum at an international 
seminar on telecommunications (e.g. Marrewijk 1997). Secondly, the results of 
the study have been presented to PTT TELECOM by means of written and 
verbal reports (see annex I). The feedback from these written and verbal reports 
has been used to check the conclusions of the study. Thirdly, the results of this 
study have also been published in magazines in which practical knowledge is 
discussed for a practical forum (e.g. Marrewijk 1996b, 1996c). These articles 
have been given to PTT TELECOM informants who have in turn been asked for 
their opinion. Feedback on these articles has also been used to improve the 
quality of the findings. Finally, in the position of consultant I have given many 
lectures and work shops for PTT TELECOM employees. The feedback from 
these discussions has also been used.  
 
 
 
3.5.2 Levels of Generalisation 
For the study presented in this thesis an explorative design was chosen. First the 
context of the telecom sector was extensively explored to obtain a clear 
perspective on the field of research. Then new cases for further research had to 
be selected on the basis of the theoretical outcomes in the exploration phase. In 
the new case, information was then gathered and compared with earlier findings. 
As a result deeper insight in theoretical concepts and relations between concepts 
could be obtained. The findings of the new case were also compared with the 
outcomes of other cases. On the basis of the comparison of theoretical concepts 
new comparative cases were selected. This is called ‘theoretical sampling’ 
(Wester 1991: 27). As a result of the theoretical sampling method the findings 
of the three cases of cross-cultural co-operation: Unisource, the Netherlands 
Antilles, and Indonesia could then be generalised and compared to other joint 
ventures of PTT TELECOM.  
Can the results on this study of PTT TELECOM be generalised and 
justifiably compared to other PTOs? The idiographic perspective, which 
assumes that each case is unique and isolated, denies the statistical 
generalisation because this study is an N=1 case study (‘t Hart et al. 1996: 288). 
Although I agree on the unique character of this studied case, generalisation 
with respect to the content is possible. The Dutch history, the PTT TELECOM 
organisational culture and the Dutch telecom market are of course unique but, 
other European PTOs such as Deutsche Telekom and France Telecom 
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experience also difficulties in international co-operation. Therefore, the results 
of this study can also be applied to other PTOs if one proceeds with caution. 
 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
 
In Chapter 3 the ethical and methodological consequences of the chosen 
research strategy of field research have been discussed. The preocupation with 
methodology is based upon the negative perception of anthropologic field 
research (e.g. Bate 1997). Autobiographical information presented has informed 
of my identity as both anthropologist and engineer and how this has supported 
the execution of the field research. The access to the organisation and the 
participant observation has proven to be easier when using my identity as 
engineer. Because of my formal position with the IS department, I was able to 
penetrate into different departments of the organisation and its joint ventures. 
The position as consultant also made it possible for interested clients within 
PTT TELECOM to ask for advice or assistance in questions on intercultural 
management. This further offered me the opportunity to gain insight into the 
daily practices of the cross-cultural co-operation. The maintaining of close 
contacts with consultant colleagues allowed for a clearer perspective of their 
personal lives and the strategies they employed in coping with cultural 
differences.  
 I have expressed my fear that the logistic and financial support of PTT 
TELECOM would limit my freedom as a business-anthropologist and it has 
been explained how getting access to the organisation was indeed very difficult. 
However, once working inside the organisation, I was free to execute my 
ethnographic study and to publish the findings. It can therefore be said that 
anthropologists have to be commercially sensitive in the execution of 
ethnographical fieldwork in an organisation. The anthropologist can combine 
consultancy work with the research activities needed to collect ethnographic 
data. Acquiring access and support of an organisation may require much effort 
but that counts for little compared to the rich ethnographic data that can be 
collected. I therefore call on anthropologists to profile and sell their ‘products’ 
and ‘services’. There is so much interesting research work to do for 
anthropologists in contemporary multinational organisations and international 
business. It would be a shame not to use these opportunities.  
 To answer the central research question a multi-level research design was 
developed. This multi-level approach was used to structure the presentation of 
the findings in this thesis. Part II, the chapters 4, 5, and 6, explores the telecom 
sector at five different levels. Chapter 4 starts with the exploration of the 
restructuring of the telecom sector at world and society level. Chapter 5 
concerns the restructuring of the Dutch telecom sector and its consequences for 
PTT TELECOM at the society and organisational level. Finally, chapter 6 
focuses on the PTT TELECOM employees Robert and Ad at the interactional 
and individual level. In part III, the chapters 7, 8, and 9, three cases of cross-
cultural co-operation of PTT TELECOM are presented. The earlier discussed 
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‘free associations’ approach will be used for the presentation of the findings. 
Chapter 7 introduces employee ‘Hans’ and follows his network of associations 
in the strategic alliance AT&T-Unisource. Chapter 8 introduces employee 
‘Niels’ and follows his network of associations in the Netherlands Antilles. 
Lastly, chapter 9 introduces employee ‘Leo’ and follows his network of 
associations in Indonesia.  
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4 THE RESTRUCTURING OF THE TELECOM MARKET: CAUSES 
AND CONSEQUENCES 
 
World Level
Society Level
Organisational Level
Interactional Level
Individual Level
Case 3: Indonesia
Case 1: Unisource 
Case 2: The Netherlands Antilles
In this chapter the world and society 
level of the telecom sector are 
investigated. Developments at these 
levels have caused fundamental 
changes in the telecom sector. 
Institutions like the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO), the 
International Telecommunication 
Union (ITU), the national 
governments and the Public Telecom 
Operators (PTO) are the main 
players in the telecom arena at world level. National governments have 
committed themselves in the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) to 
restructure their national telecom markets according to a specified time 
schedule. The telecom policies, technological innovations and a growing 
awareness that telecommunication is an important aspect of the international 
trade system have caused fundamental changes in the telecom sector. As a 
consequence, each government faces at national level the difficult task of 
dismantling the power of the local, mostly state owned, PTO and opening up the 
home market for new and foreign competitors. In turn, the European PTOs have 
chosen different strategies to strengthen their position at the domestic markets 
and to expand their activities in new markets. In the search for new markets 
PTOs have first expanded their activities in countries with cultural and 
historical relations with the home country. 
 
 
4.1 The Causes of the Telecom Revolution 
 
The changes in the telecom sector in the last decade are best described as a 
revolution. Although Mintzberg (1987) warns against a deflation of terms such 
as revolution, turbulence and hyper-turbulence to describe the changes in the 
context of the organisation, the fundamental changes in the telecom sector 
justify the use of the term revolution. In this study the phrase ‘telecom 
revolution’ or the term ‘revolution’ will be used to express the fundamental 
changes in the telecom sector. Three major causes for this telecom revolution 
can be identified. First are the technological innovations responsible for a 
convergence of different sectors. Second is the growing number of 
multinationals, which has led to an increase in the demand of cheap global 
telecom networks. Third is an ideological wave of free market competition, 
liberalisation, privatisation and deregulation that has changed the telecom 
sector. These three causes are discussed in this section. 
  
 
 
4.1.1 Technological Innovations Stimulate the Convergence of Industries  
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Technological innovations, which are responsible for the radical changes in the 
telecom sector, can be seen as a first cause of the telecom revolution. Since the 
invention of the telegraph in the early 1880's, technological innovations have 
rapidly succeeded each other in the Western Hemisphere. Estabrooks (1995) 
distinguishes seven major innovations: (1) telegraphy, (2) telephony, (3) wire-
less radio, (4) television, (5) computer, (6) satellite communications and (7) 
cellular communications. The number of innovations is of course disputable due 
to many smaller innovations, resulting from the convergence of computers, 
telecommunications, cable television, banking and financial services, consumer 
electronics, publishing, motion picture and entertainment industries. This 
convergence leads to the creation of a heterogeneous network to meet all of the 
information and communications needs of individuals, homes and business 
(Estabrooks 1995: 156): 
 
Figure 5. The universal, intelligent, multimedia communication infrastructure  
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 As a result of the convergence of technology, the borderlines of the 
traditional telephony, cable television, banking, multimedia and publishing 
markets are crumbling. Companies with large traditional business under 
regulatory or technological threat are moving to invest in new areas to 
compensate for the actual or expected decline in their core businesses. Large 
companies have taken a leading role in cross industry investments in multimedia 
content, multimedia distribution, hardware, software and telecommunications 
(ARC Associates overview of world convergence in The Wall Street Journal 
Europe, June 1995). 
 As a result of the convergence new and cheaper technologies for telephony 
emerge in the second half of the nineties. When inhabitants of the Caribbean 
island of Curaçao for instance call their family in Amsterdam they pay US$ 7.00 
for a 5-minute call. If they use one of the USA based call-back centres the price 
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decreases to US$ 3.50.15 But if the computer is used to download software from 
the www.net2phone.com they can call for less than a US$0.50. The American-
Israeli company VocalTec that distributes the program ‘Internet Phone’ has 
introduced Internet-telephony in 1995. Nowadays Netscape delivers the browser 
Communicator with extended phone software and Microsoft has also presented 
telephone software in the Internet Explorer 4.0. The software can also be used 
for sending pictures by which people can talk and see each other. Microsoft and 
Netscape distribute the software for free on the Internet to get marketing 
leadership. The Internet providers offer customers an easy access to the Internet 
telephony by means of a normal telephone. Customers have to call a computer 
and the provider transports the call by means of the Internet to a local computer 
where the connection is made with the local telephone network. Other 
alternatives for Plain Old Telephony (POTS) is offered by the cable companies 
that offer telephony by means of cable networks.  
 These possibilities still lack user- friendly interfaces, connections, quality 
and competitive prices but the convergence has definitely started. In the near 
future all of the telephone traffic will be data and no longer the telephone 
switches such as PABX and AXE are needed.16 A number of routers will be 
sufficient to handle all of the international telephone traffic of a nation.17 
Telecom equipment companies are trying to keep up with the speed of new 
development. Lucent for instance, has developed a computer for voice traffic on 
the Internet (NRC Handelsblad, May 22, 1997). PTOs have in turn developed 
new technologies such as ASDL technology that compress information through 
copper wired telephone infrastructure to compete with the fast Internet access by 
cable. How long the traditional telephone infrastructure can compete with the 
computer-based infrastructure is however still in question.  
 
4.1.2 The Growing Demand of Cheap Global Telecom Services  
A second cause of the ‘telecom revolution’ is the growing telecommunication 
demands of Western multinationals. Since as far back as in the 1970s, 
multinationals have been unhappy with the tariffs and the services of the 
monopolistic national PTOs. Multinationals wanted cheap and easy to reach 
international services, reliable service, local presence and just one provider to 
deal with, a service called ‘one-stop-shopping’. PTOs have not managed to meet 
these needs for a long time, which led multinationals to invest huge budgets to 
                                                        
15 Call-back services are telephone services of foreign, mostly American, telecom companies with 
low international tariffs to America and Europe. Because of different tariff agreements customers 
can call cheaper via these American telecom operators than direct to the country of their 
destination. The user calls a number in the USA and also gives the number of destination. The user 
waits for the computer to pick up the line, lays down the telephone and waits to be called back. The 
computer now has made a telephone connection to the number of destination. 
16 Traditional telephone traffic is handled by the automatic telephone exchange, which is an 
exchange or telephone switch that route calls automatically to make the connections requested by 
calling parties without the intervention of an operator at an exchange. 
17 A router is equipment that connects a data communication network at one location to outside 
services and networks and to networks at different locations. A gateway enable devices attached to 
a network to communicate across networks, such as public packet switched networks with other 
computers within a corporate data centre that does not use the same communication protocols or 
procedures. 
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create their own global private networks. The telecom requirements of 
multinationals however, constitute a very lucrative market segment. In order to 
tempt multinationals back to the public network, PTOs have offered services 
such as IVPN (International Virtual Private Network).18 New international 
strategic alliances were formed to build these IVPNs. In the beginning the 
cooperation appeared to be troublesome and multinationals with strong 
influence in different countries were sometimes more successful than PTOs in 
building an IVPN.  
 The growing importance of telecommunication has resulted in multinationals 
paying much more attention to the quality and costs of the telecom networks. 
Telecommunication is responsible for bridging time and place and is therefore 
seen as an important force behind the globalisation of economy and technology. 
Furthermore, telecommunication supports the transport of cultural elements of 
social systems, organisational structures and economic systems to the periphery 
(Crandall and Flamm 1989, Featherstone 1990, Lash and Urry 1994, Noam and 
Kramer 1994, Estabrook 1995). Therefore, multinationals have put much 
emphasis in the development of a high quality networks.  
 Next to services the tariffs were also subject of lengthy discussions between 
the multinationals and the PTOs. In Europe, the fifty largest multinationals that 
united to form the European Virtual Users Association (EVUA) negotiated with 
PTOs on discounts on tariffs for international telecom traffic. Although the 
members of the EVUA claimed the need for one-stop-shopping, they use the 
concept of dual outsourcing as bargaining power. The negotiations of the EVUA 
forced the telecom providers to drop their international tariffs for the 
multinationals. 
 Although the 800 largest multinationals in the world spent US$ 8-9 billion of 
the total telecom market of US$ 325 billion their influence on the business 
strategies of PTOs is large (Financial Economic Time, February 3, 1996). The 
PTOs had little or no international experience and found themselves confronted 
by demands for high quality by the big business customers. PTOs assumed that 
if they could deliver the international services to multinationals they were better 
prepared for the other customers such as small and medium businesses and 
private businesses. Furthermore, by accompanying the multinationals to foreign 
markets PTOs had the advantage of acquiring positions in these new telecom 
markets. The priority that PTOs have given to multinationals has been a driving 
force behind the restructuring of the telecom market. 
 
4.1.3 An Ideological Wave of Free Market Politics Engulfs the World   
An ideological wave of free market competition, liberalisation, privatisation and 
deregulation can be seen as a third cause of the ‘telecom revolution’. The 
ideological wave has spread all over the world, starting in the eighties in the 
                                                        
18 This service included the construction of virtual telecom networks for large multinationals based 
upon public infrastructure, leased lines and multiplexers. VPN is a network using virtual circuits in 
a packet switching network where messages share links between various nodes using some form of 
multiplexing. There is no access path associated with each call to provide an end-to-end connection 
for the duration of the call. Messages are transmitted as a number of small packets of binary 
information. 
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USA with the splitting of AT&T in local networks companies: the 'baby Bells'. 
The closest European ally of the USA, the United Kingdom, opened their 
telecom market in 1981 for the private owned Mercury Communications 
(Crandall and Flamm 1989). In 1985 the British government sold 50.8% of its 
stake in British Telecom. Japan followed in 1985 with the liberalisation of the 
Japanese telecom market. By 1987 more than ten carriers of transmission 
facilities were operating in competition with the Nippon Telegraph and 
Telephone (NTT). Competition on the international market dominated by 
Kokusai Denshin Denwa Corporation (KDD) started after 1985. In 1987, the 
Japanese government sold 35% of NTT in the biggest private securities offering 
in Japanese history (Crandall and Flamm 1989, Estabrooks 1995).  
 After nearly three years of extended negotiations in the WTO, a total of 71 
governments signed February 1997 the agreement on Basic Telecommunication 
in the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). The markets of the 71 
participants accounted for more than 91% of global telecommunications 
revenues in 1995 (Report of the Group on Basic Telecommunications, WTO, 
February 15, 1997 and Fourth Protocol to the GATS, WTO Report, WTO, 
1996). The monopolistic character of basic telecommunications has for a long 
time been a point of conflict amongst the members of the WTO. Basic telecom 
services encompass local, long distance and international services for public and 
non-public use. This may be provided on a facilities-basis or by resale of 
services through any means of technology: all kinds of cable, wireless and 
satellites. The services include voice telephony, data transmission, telex, 
telegraph, facsimile, private leased circuit services, fixed and mobile satellite 
systems and services, cellular telephony, mobile data services, paging and 
personal communications systems (Newsletter January 16, 1997, Group on 
Basic Telecommunications, WTO).  
 The official implementation of the WTO agreement was January 1998 but 
the actual dates of implementation specified in the respective country schedules 
were varied. The GATS formally consists of 29 articles, 8 annexes and 130 
schedules of commitments on specific services or service sectors (Newsletter of 
the Negotiation Group of Basic Telecommunication of the WTO, February 15, 
1997). Each schedule contains agreements on market access, treatment of the 
national PTO amongst other things. The additional commitments make it 
possible for a country to exclude certain parts of the telecom sector. The WTO 
had to find a balance between the needs of users for fair terms of access and the 
needs of regulators and PTOs to maintain a system that works and that meets 
public service objectives. The cornerstone of the agreement is the most favoured 
nation treatment: the prohibition of members to discriminate against other 
countries, rules of fair play for regulations, rules on monopolies and exclusive 
service providers and rules on restrictive business practices.  
 Each of the countries has used different strategies for the restructuring of the 
national telecom markets. Noam and Kramer (1994) identify eleven 
fundamental building blocks of national strategies for telecommunications. (1) 
Liberalisation, (2) devolution, (3) consolidation and (4) deregulation are 
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strategies to restructure and to reform the telecom sector.19 (5) Corporatisation 
and (6) privatisation deal with the question of ownership and control of the 
PTOs.20 (7) Transnationalisation, (8) international alliances and (9) 
harmonisation are strategies towards international collaboration.21 (10) Vertical 
integration and (11) industrial policy are a set of strategies used by local 
governments to support national technology. The employed strategies differ 
from country to country due to the historical processes in the development of 
the liberalisation, variations in the structure and function of regulatory authority, 
the status of the PTO, the degree of extension of competition and the 
authorisation of competitive infrastructures (Caby and Steinfield 1994). Prof. 
Dr. J.A. Arnbak, the Danish educated engineer and head of the Dutch regulatory 
authority OPTA (Independent Post and Telecom Authority), sees the European 
differences resulting from cultural differences. He explains it in this way:  
The liberal telecom countries Sweden, Denmark, Finland and Great-Britain 
are situated at the edges of the European Union. These countries have a 
different history. There has been an attitude of stimulating technological 
innovation. Furthermore, the long distances in a greater part of these 
countries favoured a quick acceptance of cellular telephony (Interview with 
Prof. Dr.J.A. Arnbak of the OPTA in: NRC Handelsblad, October 24, 1998). 
 
4.2 The Consequences of the Telecom Revolution for PTOs: In Search 
for New Markets 
 
                                                        
19 Liberalisation should not be confused with deregulation. One may have a deregulated monopoly 
or a tightly regulated multi-carrier system. The replacement of a century old monopoly has proved 
to be very difficult by means of deregulation. Instead of fewer regulations, governments have 
recognised that a strong regulation is needed for the restructuring of the telecom market.  
Devolution is the opposite of consolidation and is a policy of dismantling a single monolithic 
structure into several units of which AT&T is a prime example of. Consolidation has been used 
where a country’s telecom has been divided into international and national providers, as in 
Denmark, Indonesia and the Netherlands Antilles. 
20Corporatisation is the transformation of the PTT into an autonomous unity with its own 
responsibility and managerial functions separated from the state. With privatisation the national 
governments brought the state-owned PTTs to the international stock markets or/and sold a share to 
international consortia. In this way governments have collected enormous amounts of money. 
Because corporatisation and privatisation loosens direct administrative controls, it is usually 
accompanied by the creation or strengthening of a government regulatory mechanism (Noam and 
Kramer 1994, Crandall and Flamm 1989). The formation of regulatory institutions clearly shows 
the political character of the deregulation. Because of the fragile position of the regulatory 
institutions Public Network Europe (PNE) gives ten rules for European regulators (PNE October 
1995: 61-63): (1) A maximum distance is needed between the regulator and the government. (2) 
Outsiders are needed for the jobs in the regulators. (3) In-house telecom experts are needed for 
backing up these outsiders. (4) A simple framework has to be designed for control and enforcement 
of regulations. (5) Regulators need mechanisms to estimate and verify costs borne by network 
operators. (6) The former national PTT is the primary concern of the regulator. (7) The goal of the 
regulator has to be the consumer. (8) Valuable assets should be taken care of. (9) The regulator has 
to think international to cut international tariffs. (10) National regulators should do more than the 
EC has decided upon.  
21 PTOs have used the strategy of transnationalisation and international alliances to expand beyond 
home markets. These strategies are discussed throughout later on in this chapter. International 
organisations like the WTO, ITU and EC have used the strategy of harmonisation to co-ordinate 
telecom policies among countries. 
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The discussion on the causes of the revolution in the telecom market show that 
the context for the PTOs has changed dramatically. New technological 
innovations, the convergence of technology, the growing demands of 
international telecom facilities and the new telecom policies have changed the 
telecom market. What are the consequences of this restructuring for the PTOs? 
To answer this question the competition at the national and international 
telecom market is discussed along with the consequences of the changes for the 
turnover and profits of the PTOs.  
 
4.2.1 The Emergence of World-Wide Competition for PTOs 
The new telecom policies suggest the creation of a fully competitive 
marketplace where all companies have access. Section 2.4 discussed the 
idealistic character of globalisation and concluded that ‘true global’ companies 
do not exist. Mansell (1994) states that the globalisation paradigm has mystified 
the analysis on the determinants of change in the telecom sector and resulted in 
the assumption of an ‘idealistic model’ of change. This ‘idealistic model’ 
assumes a fully competitive marketplace where the combined forces of 
technological innovation and competition will erode monopolistic control of the 
PTOs. All actors in this model have equal access and knowledge, sufficient 
resources and control over networks. The idealistic vision of globalisation 
envisages an open telematics network system and effective competitive markets 
(Mansell 1993, 1994, Mansell et al.1995).22 
An idealist model of telecommunication development would be reflected in 
trends toward a fully competitive marketplace with a large number of sellers 
and buyers, i.e. a ‘perfect’ market, where all actors have sufficient resources 
and knowledge to engage in informed choices with respect to the production 
and consumption of telecommunication products (Mansell et al. 1995: 26). 
 Mansell et al. (1995) suggest a more realistic perspective on the 
restructuring in the ‘realistic model’. In contrast with the idealistic model, the 
strategic model gives a more realistic view on the development of organisations 
and markets. In this model there is continuous rivalry among a relatively small 
number of dominant companies. Rivalry, monopolisation and institutional 
restructuring do not serve all market participants equally well. The strategic 
model of telecom network development forecasts increasing segmentation and 
lends doubt to the effectiveness of the markets. 
A strategic model would be reflected in trends towards imperfectly 
competitive markets, various forms of monopolisation of markets and 
oligopolistic rivalry expressed through a variety of technical and non-
technical barriers to entry by producers and consumers in the marketplace 
(Mansell et al. 1995: 26). 
                                                        
22 Telematics services are services that combine electronic technology for collecting, storing, 
processing and communicating information. Such technologies may process information, such as 
computer systems, or they may disseminate information, such as a telecommunication network. 
  
 78 
 From an idealistic model perspective the costs and qualities of the company 
telecom networks are a critical aspect in the success of multinational operations. 
Companies that are able to integrate the use of advanced telecom services within 
their overall business strategy are widely believed to have a greater likelihood of 
achieving sustainable competitive advantage in the market place. Examples of 
the competitive advantages of telecom networks can be found all over the 
world. In India, companies are doing on-line back-office work for airlines, 
banks and insurance companies. Australian firms control systems that monitor 
the air-conditioning, lighting, lifts and security in office blocks in Singapore, 
Malaysia, Sri Lanka, Indonesia and Taiwan (The Economist 1995).  
 From a strategic perspective however, neither competition nor markets are 
perfect. The global character of the ‘global market’ can be questioned. Section 
2.4.1 showed that most of the trade is within the Triad nations. The telecom 
market is not ‘global’ but in fact can be divided into different regional markets 
such as the North American, the South American, the West and East European 
and the Asian telecom markets.23 Within these regional markets telecom 
operators are connected in loose strategic alliances which compete with other 
international alliances.  
 The American telecom market was among the first to be restructured. This 
restructuring in 1984 resulted in its splitting into a local and a long distance 
telephone traffic operator. In this long distance market new telephone operators 
such as MCI, GTE, WorldCom and Sprint forces AT&T, “ma Bell”, reduced the 
international telephone tariffs in order to increase customer services. The new 
long distance operators have acquired a position in the American telecom 
market, developed an aggressive attitude and a strong market orientation. Seven 
subsidaries of AT&T, the so-called “baby Bells”, handled local telephone 
traffic: BellSouth, US West, Nynex, Bell Atlantic, Ameritech, Pacific Telesis 
and SBC Communications. These “baby Bells” have since slowly grown to 
“adolescent Bells”. The hegemony on local traffic by these telecom operators 
and the hegemony on long distance telephone traffic have been intensively 
discussed in USA politics resulting in a new telecom law. The replacement of 
the old Telecommunications Act from 1934 with a new one in February 1996 
has opened the American local telephone market for AT&T, MCI, Sprint and 
hundreds of small long-distance companies. As a result of this act the long 
distance traffic is now also open to the former “baby Bells”. This stimulated the 
merging of former regional operators: Nynex merged with Bell Atlantic and 
Pacific Telesis with SBC Communications. In a contrary move, AT&T have 
split into three companies: Lucent Technologies Inc., AT&T Wireless Services 
and AT&T International. This restructuring of the former monopoly AT&T has 
not been executed without great pains. In 1996 the organisation announced the 
loss of 40.000 out of 300.000 jobs, which were mostly managerial positions. 
                                                        
23 An example of this can be found in the creation of a Pan-American strategic alliance with 
Telefónica España, Telecom Portugal, MCI and BT. This Iberian, British and American link create 
a powerful group in the Americas with strong positions at national telecom markets from Canada to 
Chile. 
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 Deregulation and privatisation trends engulfing Latin America in the last 
decade have also changed the Latin American and Central American telecom 
market. After decades of dominant political dictatorships the political climate 
changed towards the end of the 1980s towards a more democratic system with a 
need for economic restructuring and foreign investment.24 The privatisation of 
state owned companies, like mining, oil and gas, banks, water supply and the 
telecom industry generated money needed to develop local economy. Chile 
(1988), Argentina (1990), Mexico (1990), Venezuela (1991) have been among 
the first countries to privatise their telecom operators and invite foreign 
investors. Later on the interesting telecom markets of Argentina and Brazil 
(1997) were opened for foreign investors.  
 Unlike in America, the Latin American PTOs needed foreign investors to 
expand the number of telephone lines and to improve the quality of the 
telephone network. Long waiting lists of people wanting a telephone connection 
have been quite common in developing countries. In most of Latin American 
countries less than 10% of the population have a telephone line and the quality 
of the network has traditionally been poor (ITU Report 1996). Foreign PTOs 
were invited to invest capital and knowledge to improve the telephone networks 
and to support the restructuring of the state-owned PTOs. Political influence and 
local management practices resulted in the inefficient management of PTOs.25 
 For a long time only American operators like GTE, AT&T, MCI and the 
Spanish Telefónica International S.A. (TISA) have given attention to the 
opening of the telecom markets in Latin America. Without any doubt TISA is 
the dominant foreign operator in Latin America. This operator has been very 
successful in the acquisition of shares of local telecom operators in Latin 
America. TlSA controls 43% in CTC 19% in Telefónica de Argentina, 31% of 
ENTEL Peru, 79% of TLD Puerto Rico and 30,65 % of COCELCO in 
Columbia. Furthermore they have a small share of the consortium Venworld 
with GTE (General Telephone Company) and AT&T in the national telecom 
operator CANTV. In 1997 the Brazilian PTO Telebras was privatised and TISA 
was the first foreign group to take an operating stake in a Brazilian public 
telephony buying 35% of the CRT operator in the southern state of Rio Grando 
do Sur. The consortium has exceeded an international consortium led by STET 
Italia. As a result of the restructuring of the Latin American telecom markets, 
local Latin American operators are looking for international partnerships. 
 For a long time, western PTOs perceived the Asian telecom market as a gold 
mine of opportunities. The fast growing economies in Asia and the low density 
of telephone connections attracted many foreign PTOs and investors. The Asian 
                                                        
24 Three key trade agreements between Latin American countries that have stimulated economic 
regional growth are NAFTA (Mexico, USA and Canada), the Andean Pact (Colombia, Venezuela, 
Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia) and Mercosur (Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay). 
25 The strong connections of political parties and employees of the Latin-American PTOs resulted 
in a dismissal of a larger part of the employees after the installation of each new government. The 
supporters of the new government were appointed for the open positions in the PTOs. The 
continuation and quality of the PTOs were thus under pressure. Furthermore, practices such as 
‘moonlighting’ adversely affected the motivation and efficiency of employees. Many employees 
have another job in the evening apart from their official telecom job to help compensate and 
maintain a reasonable income. 
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telecom market can be divided into the Indian, the Chinese and the Southeast 
Asian markets. The Chinese market is without doubt, potentially the largest and 
fastest growing telecom market in Asia. The estimated growth of 20 million 
lines in 1992 to 140 million in 2000 will not be enough to cover the demand of 
new lines. Already, China Telecom, a subsidiary of the Ministry of Post and 
Telecommunications, is the world’s largest mobile telephone operator.  
 The Asian governments have been very interested in foreign investments in 
telecommunication infrastructure, but have also been reserved in their 
participation in order to avoid too much foreign control. In the WTO 
agreements, the Asian countries such as Japan and Indonesia have limited 
foreign participation in a local PTO to 25%. Asian governments are slowly 
opening up their telecom markets and restructuring their PTOs. The Japanese 
government plans to separate NTT in three companies: NTT east, NTT west and 
NTT Long Distance. Each of these companies has full access to the local and 
long distance markets. Some Asian operators such as Singapore Telecom and 
NTT have become major players in other international telecom markets in 
Europe, USA and Asia. NTT expand their activities to the international market 
in 1997 but chose to enter the market independently rather than as part of a 
global telecom alliance like Singapore Telecom. 
 The European Community initiated and managed the restructuring of the 
European telecom market. The 15 EC countries, Switzerland and Norway 
participate with just one commitment because the liberalisation trend was 
already initiated in 1987 by the European Community (EC) with a ‘green paper’ 
in which the creation of one single competitive European marketplace for 
telecommunication equipment and services is suggested.26 In July 1993, the 
European Commission on Telecommunication agreed to fully liberalise the 
telephony services on January 1998. However, Spain, Portugal, Greece and 
Ireland have not as yet participated in this liberalisation although they have to 
liberalise telecommunications before 2003. The independent position of the EC 
trade commissioner on telecommunications greatly helped the process of 
restructuring. He had no direct political responsibility to the European 
Parliament and was therefore more or less autonomous in tackling telecom 
monopolies speedily and thus able to curtail the power of PTOs (Caby and 
Steinfield 1994, Estabrooks 1995). Competition in the European home markets 
is introduced in two different phases. In the first phase a small number of 
competitors is given access to the domestic market to protect the local PTO 
from radical attacks and give the organisation time to reduce costs, improve 
quality and change their organisational culture. In the second phase a greater 
number of competitors is allowed into the domestic market.  
 The competition in the regional telecom markets does not only come from 
other European PTOs but also from new telecom operators and new competitors 
from cross-industries. The convergence of technology has resulted in new 
                                                        
26 In 1983, the British government allowed a second operator, Mercury, at the telecom market. In 
1984 BT was privatised and employment reduced by more than 160.000 employees. The Office of 
Telecom (OFTEL) was also created in 1984.  After seven years of duopolicy the system was 
reviewed and extended with other competitors. More than 60 licences have been given to operators.  
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competitors on telephone traffic from other industries. The American 
Communications Act of 1996 has torn down the walls between telephone 
companies, cable television companies and publishers. Cable television 
companies are allowed to offer telephone services on their network and 
telephone companies can sell television products. Chairman Gerard Levin of 
Time Warner, the world’s biggest media concern and owner of the New York 
cable company, predicts that his company, will in the year 2000 earn one 
milliard billion dollar on telephony. The new law enables the convergence of 
computer, telephone and television. As a result, the Internet is a fierce 
competitor of the traditional Plain Old Telephone Service (POTS) because 
software giants have developed software for Internet telephony. What is the 
consequence of this competition for the business and profits of the PTOs? 
 
4.2.2 Cross Subsidising, Tariffs and Profits Under Pressure 
As a result of the emergence of competition at national and international 
telecom market tariffs are under pressure. PTOs have lowered their prices of 
international telephone calls under competition of call-back services, small re-
sellers, call cards and Internet telephony. At fully liberalised markets such as 
Sweden, the UK and USA, the long-distance prices have decreased as much as 
40% or more as a result of competition. And competition has just begun in a 
larger part of these countries. Telecom providers hire huge transcontinental 
telephone capacity and resell their capacity for very low prices. Prices of 
telephone traffic to developing countries however, are fixed by international 
interconnection tariff agreements.27  The USA has fiercely discussed these 
agreements in the WTO to lower the interconnection tariffs. International calls 
are relatively expensive because developing countries demand high 
interconnection tariffs for the passing of the telephone traffic. This is ironically 
called ‘development aid’ by Western PTOs. The USA has not succeeded in their 
attempt to agree upon a new maximum interconnection tariff in the new WTO 
agreement.  
 New competitors concentrate on the highly profitable segments of the 
markets such as international telephone traffic, which results in heavy 
competition. These newcomers can offer low international tariffs because of 
strategic alliances with foreign operators. As a general rule, capital and know-
how of foreign network operators back these newcomers and give access to 
international networks. The decrease of international tariffs has hurt the PTOs 
greatly because the profitability of these calls ranges from 50% to 200% and 
contributes for a larger part to the profits of the operator. The decrease of 
international profits is partly compensated with a growth of international 
telephone traffic. Dutch PTT TELECOM for instance lost more than 10% 
income from international calls, although the growth of international telephone 
traffic was 9% (Annual Report 1997 PTT TELECOM). The decrease of income 
from international traffic is very painful for the PTOs and has to be seen as one 
                                                        
27 Interconnection tariffs have been a point of discussion between AT&T and TISA. AT&T wanted 
to use its connections with Latin American countries to reduce the international phone tariffs while 
TISA having large stakes in Latin American PTOs wanted to sustain the high price level. 
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of the most important consequences of the telecom revolution.  The profits 
on international telephony could no longer be used for cross subsidising. The 
new regulations on the prohibition of cross subsidising have been related to two 
different fields. Within the traditional PTTs the losses of the Post department 
have been compensated with profits from the Telecom department. To stop this 
cross subsidising the PTTs have been split into separate financial units: Post and 
Telecom. The Telecom units have been renamed as Public Telecommunication 
Operators (PTOs). The second form of cross subsidising has had more impact 
on the telecom tariffs. Traditionally, the low profitability of national telephone 
traffic has been compensated with the high profits of long-distance traffic (see 
Figure 6). National telephone networks have a low profitability because the 
investments are high and the tariffs are low. Furthermore, national PTOs are 
obliged to guarantee universal telephone service for every citizen, even for the 
most poor and remote people. In the Netherlands, this kind of customer is called 
‘de weduwe in Appelscha’.28 The profitability of international telephone traffic 
has been enormous because the investments for international networks are 
relatively low and the tariffs are high. For a long time the profits from 
international calls have been used to upgrade the national telephone 
infrastructure. Business customers are likely to save the most because 
international tariffs decrease fast, while local tariffs do not. In contrast, as a 
result of competition and the prohibition of cross-subsidising customers have to 
pay higher local tariffs. The local customers now have to pay the high costs of 
the local network while the international customers make profit over the low 
cost international networks. The higher costs for local telephony can go together 
with lower local tariffs. In the Netherlands the regulatory institute OPTA forced 
PTT TELECOM in 1998 to raise the prices of connection by 40% while the 
tariffs of local telephone traffic had to be decreased. Although everybody 
involved in the fast growing telecom industry talks about the digital multimedia 
future, the technologic possibilities and the advantages for customers, nobody 
really knows what the customer is going to pay for these services. The legal 
barriers might have been cut, but huge technological and financial barriers have 
still to be surmounted. Until recently, the European PTOs have as institutions 
benefited from the reforms, restructuring and the growth of global telecom 
industry (Noam and Kramer 1994, Hulsink and Davies 1997).29 
                                                        
28 The expression ‘the widow in Appelscha’ (de weduwe in Appelscha) has been used for the first 
time in 1984 by Prof. Dr. J.C.Arnbak of the Delft Technical University. The widow symbolises the 
poor, the social oppressed, the social isolated, in short those who should have a telephone 
connection but cannot afford it. Appelscha is a tiny country village in the very north of the 
Netherlands and symbolise the remoteness of the telephone connection. The expression is used in 
the discussion on the obligation for PTOs to guaranty non-profitable connections access to services. 
29 The European telecommunications market is expected to grow to a $ 204 milliard in 1998.  73% 
of this market is voice traffic of which 58% is fixed and 15% is mobile (Financial Economic Time, 
February 3, 1996). 
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4.3 European PTOs 
Forced to Cross 
Borders in 
Search of New Telecom Markets 
 
The telecom revolution has fundamentally changed the context for the PTOs. 
PTOs are no longer monopolies. The opening of domestic telecom markets 
confronts PTOs with competition. Competition with other PTOs, new telecom 
operators, competitors from other sectors and international strategic alliances 
has lowered international telecom rates. As a consequence PTOs face serious 
risks of decline in turnover and profits. Cross subsidising can no longer help to 
finance local telecom networks. European PTOs have used different strategies to 
prepare themselves for the new competitive European telecom market. The 
national diversity in Europe presents a wide variety of nine distinct strategies 
chosen by European PTOs. Seven of these strategies are focussed on the 
national markets (see annex III). Two of these strategies concentrate on the 
internationalisation of business.  
 The first strategy is the search of PTOs for cooperation with other European 
PTOs to strengthen their position at the European telecom market. European 
PTOs engage in co-operative partnerships with other European PTOs in order to 
launch new services. Originally designed to meet the requirements of 
multinationals of one-stop-shopping, cooperation with other partners later 
resulted into the acquisition of positions in new telecom markets. As a result a 
hectic network of telecom operators are linked into clusters. 
 The second strategy is the expansion of PTOs to new emerging 
telecommunication markets to compensate the loss of turnover at home markets. 
European PTOs are participating in PTO’s of new emerging telecom markets. 
The PTO’s of new telecom markets are still at the dawn of transformation. To 
raise the shareholders value of these local PTO’s the European PTO’s support 
their process of transformation into world class telecom operators. This process 
of transformation has generally three objectives: (1) the expansion of the 
number of telephone-lines, (2) the modernisation or digitalisation of the 
infrastructure and (3) the change of the organisational culture. These European 
PTO’s want to generate a large part of their turnover at these new emerging 
telecom markets. For instance, by the end of this century almost a quarter of the 
turnover of Dutch KPN has to be generated at the international market. Some of 
the European PTO’s such as France Telecom, Deutsche Telekom and Telefónica 
have adopted this international strategy while their national markets are still 
protected from competition. These PTO’s have especially benefited from the 
growth of the telecom industry. Still the turnover of international business is 
very small for a larger part of the European PTO’s. An exception is the Spanish 
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TISA that increasingly contributes the profits in Telefónica (Annual Report 
Telefónica 1996). Other PTOs have goals to generate 10-25% of their turnover 
abroad by the year 2000.  
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 In summary, two trends can be analysed (see Figure 7). First, a larger part of 
the European PTOs expand their business from national markets to international 
telecom markets. Home markets are still important, but the strategic position in 
the international telecom 
market and new emerging 
markets are equally 
important. Second, PTOs 
expand their traditional 
business, the transport of 
telephone traffic, to other 
telecom related services that 
add value to the traditional 
business. 
 
 
Figure 7. Strategies of Survival 
of European PTOs 
 
4.3.1 Strategies of Internationalisation of European PTOs  
It is necessary to have an understanding of the strategies discussed in order to 
better understand the fundamental character of the restructuring of the telecom 
sector. The strategies used by PTOs differ from country to country and 
sometimes, various strategies are used simultaneously. This study concentrates 
mainly on the earlier discussed two strategies: PTOs search for cooperation with 
other European PTOs and PTOs expand to new emerging telecom markets. The 
internationalisation of the former national monopolists is executed along two 
different paths. First, forced by a decrease in turnover at the domestic market, 
the PTOs search for turnover in new telecom markets. Here, two strategies of 
internationalisation for the European PTOs can be distinguished: (1) the ‘going 
it alone’ approach and (2) the creation of strategic alliances. Both have been 
discussed in section 2.4.3.  
 In the first strategy of internationalisation subsidaries of national operators 
are opened in other European countries. KPN for instance, has opened offices in 
Brussels, Milan, Germany, Budapest, Kiev, Jakarta, New York, Tokyo, 
Chicago, San Francisco, Washington and Houston. BT has also opened offices 
throughout the European continent, in the USA, in and Japan. Local presence in 
foreign telecom markets is important for the national PTO to look for new 
opportunities, to be available to their international clients and to try to attract 
local clients. For the same reasons non-European operators like the American 
AT&T and the Japanese NTT also opened offices in Europe. NTT openly 
declared that they choose the ‘go it alone’ approach because of expected 
difficulties in cooperation with foreign PTOs.  
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 In the second strategy of internationalisation PTOs are engaged in 
cooperation with other PTOs to offer new border crossing services to 
international customers. The formation of these strategic alliances in the 
European telecom market has attracted a lot of public attention in the last 
decade. In an attempt to meet the telecom needs of large multinationals, as 
discussed in section 4.1.2, PTOs created strategic alliances to offer one-stop-
shopping services. Initial motivation of PTOs to create these strategic alliances 
concerned the telecom needs of multinationals. Later on, the transfer of 
complementary technology among the partners of the strategic alliance, 
economy of scale, shaping competition and facilitation of international 
expansion also became motivations to strengthen and expand the strategic 
alliances. 
 A larger part of the European PTOs have used both strategies but a larger 
part of the international acquisitions have been conducted together with other 
PTOs since the financial and managerial consequences are more easily borne 
when shared with another PTO. The market however is not stable. In each new 
telecom market other coalitions are formed. The partners in one country can be 
the competitors in another country. Therefore strategic alliances such as 
Unisource, Global One and Concert have been formed to compete at the 
European telecom market.30   
 Dutch KPN and Swedish Telia for instance have founded the Unisource 
alliance in 1992. The objectives of Unisource have been defined as defending 
the home markets, generating new international revenues and sharing the cost of 
international development. In January 1993 all services on data networks of 
Dutch KPN were transferred to Unisource ‘daughter’ Unisource Business 
Networks Netherlands (UBN NL). In the same period Swiss Telecom joined 
Unisource as a third partner. In May 1993 Unisource joined World Partners in 
which many big PTOs co-operate (see Figure 8). The fourth parent, Spanish 
Telefónica joined Unisource in July 1994 but left the alliance again in 1997. In 
December 1994 Unisource (60%) and AT&T (40%) announced the 
establishment of a new strategic alliance named Uniworld. In May 1996, AT&T 
and Unisource announced a closer cooperation in the new strategic alliance 
AT&T-Unisource Services. AT&T-Unisource employed 2000 people, was 
present and active in 17 countries and was serving 390 of the world’s leading 
international companies. Although the study ended in December 1997 some 
important developments have occurred since then. In the spring of 1998 AT&T 
announced a new alliance with BT and their break up with Unisource. KPN 
announced the end of the Unisource alliance by announcing a strategic alliance 
of KPN and the American cable company Qwest in November 1998. 
 
4.3.2 Old Colonial Bonds Used for New Telecom markets 
It is remarkable that the European PTOs have started their expansion of business 
in countries that already have cultural, political and historical connections with 
                                                        
30 Global One was a consortium of French Telecom, the German Telecom and the American Sprint. 
Global One was formally launched in January 1996. Concert was the alliance of MCI, BT and 
recently Telefónica. Concert started their activities in 1995. 
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the domestic countries of the PTOs. Of course, a larger part of the European 
PTOs have opened subsidaries in the important telecom markets in the Triad 
nations. But the distribution of offices and commercial activities of PTOs 
reflects the historical connections with former colonies. The European PTOs 
have been interested in the PTOs of the former colonies and in their telecom 
markets. The best example is that of the Spanish Telefónica International S.A. 
(TISA) that has activities in all of the former Spanish colonies in Latin America 
and Central America. Starting in Argentina, Chile, Columbia, Venezuela and 
Puerto Rico, TISA is now the major foreign operator in the Latin American 
region. Their presence is felt so strongly in the telecom market that local 
newspapers have named the advance of TISA ‘the second Spanish conquista’ of 
Latin America. The traditional division of Latin America in Spanish and 
Portuguese territory can still be seen nowadays. Although Portugal Telecom is 
mainly focused on the Portuguese telecom market, they were the first to have 
international activities in the former Portuguese colony Brazil. The Iberian 
operators Portugal Telecom and Telefónica are now working together to form a 
stronghold in Latin America. In April 1997 Portugal Telecom and TISA 
swapped shares that also opened possibilities for TISA to enter the Brazilian 
market. Telefónica and Portugal Telecom also have plans to jointly penetrate 
neighbouring Northern Africa. Finally, Portugal Telecom owns a 28% stake in 
Telefónica de Macau in the former Portuguese colony of Macau.  
 French Telecom has activities in the French speaking quarter of the 
Caribbean islands and in the former French colonies of Lebanon and Vietnam. 
French Telecom is serving the national and international telecom carriers in 
Polynesia and has a long-standing partnership with the government of the 
islands of Vanuatu. Through its subsidiary France Cables and Radio (FCR) 
France Telecom is also present in the former French colonies Central African 
Republic, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, 
Mauritius and Senegal. Partnering with carriers in a number of other African 
countries, France Telecom assists in the development of local and international 
telecommunications network in a region in which France has traditionally strong 
colonial ties. This helped France Telecom to a 51% stake in the telecom 
operator in the Ivory Coast (The Financial Times, January 9, 1997). 
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Figure 8. The complex of organisations in the strategic alliances WorldPartners (source: 
Ovum Ltd.) 
  British Telecom has offices in their former colonies USA, Australia, Hong 
Kong, India, Singapore, Malaysia, Sri Lanka, Thailand and the Caribbean 
Islands. In January 1997, British Telecom moved significantly into the Indian 
telecom market taking a 22.5 % share in India’s largest mobile phone operator 
Bharti Cellular (BCL). The deal was concluded during the British Prime 
Minister’s tour of India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. The BT chairman was among 
the 60 business leaders accompanying the British Prime Minister.  
 Dutch KPN has in the early 1990s also explored possibilities of expanding 
business to ex-colonial territories of the Netherlands. Participation in local 
telecom operators has been sought in the former Dutch colonies Surinam, 
Indonesia, South Africa and the Netherlands Antilles. Although the Netherlands 
Antilles is officially not an ex-colony because it is still an autonomous part of 
the Dutch Kingdom, in this study it is perceived as an ex-colony.  
 The European PTOs have used not only colonial relations but also other 
historical and political connections to expand their international activities. Telia 
Sweden for instance, has strongholds in the Nordic region because of Sweden’s 
traditionally strong political dominance. Telia Sweden has fully owned 
subsidaries in Norway, Finland and Denmark. In the Telia Annual Report of 
1996 the international activities are divided in and outside the Nordic region. 
Outside the Nordic region the Baltic Region is the most important region. 
Activities in Estonia, Latvia Lutania, the St. Petersburg region and Poland are 
chiefly based on partnership with Nordic and local partners. Furthermore, the 
Swedish company has expanded into the telecom markets of the sea-going 
nations such as the UK and Ireland. This has resulted in participation in Eireann 
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Telecom. The non-European activities in India, Sri Lanka, China, Namibia and 
Ecuador have been classified in Telia as ‘Overseas’ (Telia Annual Report 1996). 
Deutsche Telekom traditionally has strong ties with the Eastern European 
countries. Therefore Deutsche Telekom can be found in Ukraine, Hungary, 
Poland and Russia. Swiss Telecom has business in the central European 
countries the Czech Republic and Hungary (Annual Report 1996 PTT 
Switzerland). 
 The international expansion of telecom business by means of traditional 
cultural relations can also be observed in other continents, such as Asia. The 
Chinese market is a glittering diamond for foreign PTOs. By the year 2000 
China might have 140 million telephone lines, nearly as many as the USA. A 
larger part of the foreign companies hope to wire a couple of these millions of 
telephone lines. Hong Kong companies use their cultural bindings with 
Mainland China to compete with foreign companies. Peter Chang, the managing 
director of New Worlds Telephone, runs one of Hong Kong’s new fixed line 
telephony operators. He hopes that his Chinese cultural identity and his 
experience with the Communist Party since 1978 will help his company with the 
acquisition of assignments from the Chinese government. In an interview with 
The Economist he says about the Chinese authorities: “They look after their old 
friends”. Mr. Tsang has already won many contracts because “he says with a 
twinkle, he is a ‘Chinese patriot’”. He further claims that “New Worlds 
Telephone has a greater sensitivity to Chinese concerns and an ability to act 
more flexibly than other foreign investors”. The final argument Peter Chang 
uses is that the transfer of sovereignty will mean that Hong Kong companies 
will probably be treated as local Chinese companies (The Economist, February 
3, 1996).   
 These examples show the close relation of European PTOs with local 
telecom markets in ex-colonial countries and raises questions as to why 
European PTOs have used colonial ties to expand their business. The European 
PTOs have had next to no other international experiences. Their cross-cultural 
strategies therefore, are mainly based upon these first international connections. 
 
4.3.3 Early Cross-cultural Experiences of European PTOs 
The expansion of the telecom business of European PTOs in the markets of its 
ex-colonies can be said to be based upon six main reasons.   
 Firstly, the PTOs of the former colonies have been dependent on foreign 
loans and aid to maintain and modernise their local telecom infrastructure. 
Formal and informal governmental relations between the former colonies and 
the European countries resulted in mutual agreements on loans for telecom 
investments. For these investments European national telecom-equipment 
industries have prevailed over foreign competitors thus giving the European 
PTOs of the former colonial power opportunity to form connections with the 
PTO of the ex-colony.   
 Secondly, the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) has always 
been active in stimulating exchange of knowledge between PTTs of developed 
and developing countries. PTT employees from developed countries with 
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technological knowledge that was needed in less-developed countries were sent 
to PTTs in developing countries. Salaries were paid by the ITU and the jobs 
varied from between one week to three years. The qualifications needed 
included technological knowledge and language skills. The host-country PTT 
made the final selection. If for instance Telebras Brazil needed an AXE expert 
to train local employees in the Amazon region, an AXE expert of Portugal 
Telecom would have more chance applying for the job than a non-Portuguese 
speaking employee of France Telecom. Consequently, employees former 
colonial powers visited ex-colonial PTTs. 
 Thirdly, the telecom technological staff from developing countries had 
traditionally studied at the European technological universities. After the former 
colonies gained their independence, the formal technological education of the 
ex-colonies was for greater part handicapped and thus ‘forced’ students to 
choose for European or American Universities. These telecom students later 
became the new leaders in the local telecom industry. European PTOs recognise 
the power of these educational ties. Telia Sweden for instance has educated 
more than 500 telecom managers from 60 countries at the Telia Academy in 
Kalmar, Sweden. Dutch KPN has the Netherlands International 
Telecommunication Training Centre (NITTC) for training and exchange of 
expertise in telecommunication. 
 Fourthly, the international telephone traffic between the former colonial 
power and the ex-colony is of particular interest to the European PTO because 
of the many immigrants, which has significantly increased the international 
telephone traffic between the former colonies and the European countries. The 
comparing of routes of international telephony traffic is called Tele-Geography. 
The larger number of tourists and amount of business in the former colony 
makes the international traffic interesting for the European PTO.  
 Fifthly, PTOs in developing countries have been in need of up to date 
technological knowledge. European telecom equipment industries are also in 
need of qualified telecom support for their business at telecom markets in 
developing countries. Both asked for assistance from the European PTOs. The 
European PTOs offered employees temporary projects, ‘independent’ advice 
and acted as consultants. Swedtel, of Swedish Telia, for instance carried out 
projects in 60 countries of which Poland, India, Sri Lanka and Philippines were 
the largest accounts. The Netherlands Consultancy Foundation (NCF) of Dutch 
KPN has projects in the Caribbean region, Latin America, Eastern Europe, 
Africa and Asia. Because the bureaucratic PTOs did not suit the flexible support 
of expatriates, special organisations were formed within the PTO. Initially 
organisations such as these were non-profit, but after the privatisation of 
European PTOs their goals changed. These organisations are now seen as 
explorers of potentially promising emerging telecom markets.   
 Sixthly, European PTOs perceive existing cultural knowledge of the local 
PTO and the local telecom market as an advantage in doing business. European 
PTOs therefore see the expansion of business to their former colonies or to their 
cultural neighbours as a first step towards the rest of the world. Some of the 
European PTOs have succeeded in this strategy. Spanish Telefónica appears to 
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be very successful in Latin America. It is clear that the Spanish PTO is far more 
successful in Latin America than the Americans PTOs. Despite many attempts, 
AT&T has not been successful in establishing a major joint venture, while 
Telefónica International has strategic alliances all over Latin America. Cultural 
factors are important in the success or failure of strategic alliances because 
partners make strategic use of language, culture and history. I witnessed an 
example of this during a recent visit to the Venezuelan telephone company 
Companía Anónomia Nacional Teléfonos de Venezuela (CANTV).  
I was waiting in one of the rooms of the immense CANTV building in 
Caracas for an interview with a Telefónica manager. Next to me, an 
American GTE manager and his Venezuelan assistant were waiting for 
another CANTV manager. The American, who did not speak Spanish, said 
he was furious at the CANTV manager for not showing up at the meeting the 
day before. The American asked the Venezuelan to explain this to the 
CANTV manager, which the latter promised to do. When the door of the 
CANTV manager’s office opened the Venezuelans hugged each other 
cordially. The Venezuelan told the CANTV manger that the American had 
lost its temper. “Pero no te preocupes, son Americanos, no saben nada de 
nuestra cultura! [But don't worry, you know the Americans, they do not 
understand a thing about our culture]”, said the Venezuelan.  
 These findings show strong cultural, technological, financial and educational 
links between European PTOs with PTOs from the former colonies. This 
cooperation can be seen as the first cross-cultural experiences of European 
PTOs. It can thus be expected that because of the ex-colonial relationships the 
first cross-cultural strategies of European PTOs have been ethnocentric (Adler 
1993, Fung 1995) and/or their approach, one of cultural dominance (Adler 
1986). The internationalisation of western PTOs therefore poses the danger of 
unequal development and cultural domination.  
 Pekka Tarjanne, the General Director of International Telecommunication 
Union (ITU), warned of a new form of imperialism in the developing countries 
(De Volkskrant, October 3, 1995). It is obvious that for the time being the 
telecommunication giants in the developed world are dominating the telecom 
markets. Now and in the near future they shall also operate at the world's fastest 
growing telecom markets in the developing world. The telecom market in the 
developing world is a golden opportunity for the developed world 
telecommunication operators. A very low percentage of the population in 
developing countries have telephone services and the operators in developing 
countries still worry about their endless waiting lists. But the question is if this 
contemporary expansion of the telecom operators will lead to a global market 
and global competition. 
 The one-direction expansion of the telecommunication market can be 
temporary, as competitive operators from emerging developing markets capture 
the market. Specific regions, which are favourable in terms of physical position, 
local labour force, history or local entrepreneurs, can become new centres (Lash 
and Urry 1994). It might be that the peripheral companies of today will be 
tomorrow’s new telecommunication operators. Already telecom giants such as 
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Singapore Telecom operate at the European telecom market. And if some global 
giants emerge from the newly developed and prospering countries, might they 
not grow their own? Already China makes many of the world's telephones. By 
the late 2020's, might it not handle many of the calls too? (The Economist, 
September 30, 1995: 39). 
 
 
4.4 Conclusions 
 
This chapter has explored the telecommunication sector at world and society 
level. It is evident that the causes of the telecom revolution can be found in 
technological innovation, the multinationals growing demand of telecom 
requirements and an ideological transformation of the telecom market. As a 
consequence of the telecom revolution the positions of the traditional PTOs 
have changed dramatically during the restructuring of the telecom markets. In 
the new liberalised telecom markets the PTOs are privatised and no longer 
monopolist. The competition at the traditional home markets reduces the 
international tariffs and raises pressure on profits and the profits on international 
telephone traffic can no longer compensate the losses made on local telephony.  
 In order to provide a clearer understanding of the fundamental character of 
the restructuring of the telecom sector, the different strategies employed by 
European PTOs to cope with the new environment have been discussed. 
European PTOs used different strategies to prepare themselves for full 
competition; retaining their national identity, using the public infrastructure as a 
strategic resource, adopting an aggressive business strategy, expanding to 
related industries, co-operating with other European PTOs and expanding to 
new emerging telecom markets. In the strategies of internationalisation and 
cooperation with other PTOs a larger part of the European PTOs have formed 
strategic alliances and expanded their international activities to ex-colonial 
territories.  
 Due to these strategies of internationalisation the European PTOs have found 
themselves confronted by a new dimension of doing business: cultural diversity. 
In cooperation with other PTOs in strategic alliances and in international 
activities in emerging markets PTOs had to cope with cultural differences. The 
European PTOs have cultural knowledge of the ex-colonial territories because 
for many years the European PTO have supplied telecom equipment, technical 
assistance and training possibilities to their former colonies. They perceived the 
cultural knowledge of the ex-colonial territories as an advantage in doing 
business in these territories. In a highly competitive market, knowledge of the 
cultural environment can be a competitive advantage.  
 Mansell et al. (1995) warned against this myth of the globalised fully 
competitive telecom market. In its processes of internationalisation of activities 
PTOs tend to believe in this myth and forget about rivalry, cultural, political and 
historical barriers or, for that matter, competitive advantages. There is no global 
telecom market where all actors have sufficient resources and knowledge and 
can compete without barriers. PTOs with narrow perspectives on 
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internationalisation that exclude cultural, political and historical factors run the 
risk of failure.    
 With this in mind, the national (Dutch) and organisational level (KPN) of the 
telecom sector are explored in the next chapter. How did the restructuring of the 
telecom market work in the Dutch context? 
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5 DUTCH KPN CROSSES INTERNATIONAL BORDERS  
 
World Level
Society Level
Organisational Level
Interactional Level
Individual Level
Case 3: Indonesia
Case 1: Unisource 
Case 2: The Netherlands Antilles
This chapter explores the society and 
organisational level of the telecom 
market and thus focuses on the 
Dutch telecom market in which KPN 
is the dominant party. The particular 
consequences of the ‘telecom 
revolution’ for the Dutch telecom 
market are discussed. The Dutch 
government was among the first in 
Europe to reform its national PTO. 
The relation of KPN and the Dutch 
government is discussed from a historical perspective. KPN has used distinct 
strategies to deal with the restructuring of the domestic telecom market. The 
initiatives to change the organisational structure and culture are given and the 
question is answered to what extend the organisational culture has changed. 
The strategy of internationalisation is discussed thoroughly. In this strategy a 
wide diversity of paths have been taken to expand the commercial activities 
across national boarders. These strategies will be explained from a historical 
and cultural perspective and in relation to the organisation units involved. 
Finally, the strategies employed in cross-cultural cooperation are discussed 
since the diversity of international strategic alliances emphasises the need for 
cross-cultural strategies.  
 
 
5.1 The Restructuring of the Dutch Telecom Market 
 
The world wide restructuring of the telecom market also had its consequences 
for the Dutch telecom sector. The Dutch government, member of the EC, was a 
full supporter of the restructuring of the Dutch telecom sector and the 
introduction of full competition. Consequently, the Dutch government privatised 
the state owned PTO and introduced competition. In order to understand the 
contemporary organisation of KPN and the Dutch telecom market it is necessary 
to have a closer look at KPN’s strongly intertwined history with and the 
development of the Dutch telecom market.  
 
5.1.1 A Short History of the Dutch Telecom Market and KPN 
In the beginning of the 20th century, it was the private owned telephone 
companies that developed the local and inter-local telecommunication networks 
in the Netherlands. The first telecom network in the Netherlands was a telegraph 
network and was constructed in 1847 by means of private initiative. The 
government was only interested in telegraphy services because it was afraid that 
the competition would reduce their important resource of postal income and 
therefore regulated requests for new concessions. Only after the first networks 
were successfully exploited did the Dutch government decide to operate the 
network. There were three distinguishable reasons for this decision 
(Hogesteeger 1989): (1) the universal service obligation to make telephony 
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possible for all Dutch citizens, (2) the small Dutch telecom market and (3) the 
refusal of the neighbouring Pruisen to deal with private Dutch companies in the 
area of international communication. The exploitation of the telegraph network 
was not very successful: in 1866 the telegraph services had to be integrated into 
the one office of the Post services to cut costs. 
 In 1881, the introduction of the first telephone networks in the Netherlands 
showed the same pattern as the introduction of the telegraphy. The privately 
owned company the Nederlandse Bell Telephoon-Maatschappy obtained a 
concession for a local telephone network in Amsterdam. After this start other 
private telephone companies also obtained concessions to operate local 
telephone networks in diverse Dutch cities. The government issued the 
concessions including agreements on the protection of the government owned 
telegraph services. The uncertainty as to whether the government would extend 
the concession drove the private telephone companies to make as much profit as 
was possible within the given concession period. In contrast to the local 
networks, only one private company obtained a concession for the 
communication between the different local networks and it was this inter-local 
telephone network that the government was first interested in exploiting. From 
1895 till 1914, the telephone networks was transformed from private to state 
owned control (Bierman and Dijst, 1990). Government control could be 
distinguished in three different sectors: the international telephony, the inter-
local telephony and the local telephony. Private companies and local 
government agencies exploited local networks for a long time up till September 
1940 when the German occupiers absorbed the local networks of Amsterdam, 
The Hague and Rotterdam in the telephone network of PTT (Hogesteeger 1989).  
 The public need for new telephone lines and the organisation’s need for 
resources to finance the expansion of the infrastructure have played an 
important role in the history of Dutch telecommunications. During World War I 
a larger part of the infrastructure have been destroyed, resulting in a shortage of 
telephone lines. The concept of leased telephone lines finds its origin in this 
period, because waiting times for telephone calls of up to ten hours or more 
were normal.31 The demand for telephone lines grew after First World War, 
resulting in 1928, in the addition of telephony in the name Staatsbedrijf der 
Posterijen, Telegrafie en Telefonie (PTT). The telephone traffic increased 
slowly till the outbreak of World War II. The period after the latter was 
characterised by the rebuilding of a great part of the infrastructure, which had 
been damaged during the war. The financial exigencies for this were partly 
relieved by the economical growth in the early sixties. But the demand for new 
telephone lines increased considerably resulting in huge numbers of potential 
customers waiting for the connection of telephone lines. In 1979, more than 150 
000 people were still on the waiting list (Hogesteeger 1989: 193). Apart from 
capacity problems, the recruiting of capable employees also faltered due to 
                                                        
31 For the companies this situation was destroying their business. Therefore, the ‘Müller-line’ was 
introduced, named after the first company that hired a telephone line for 24 hours a day 
(Hoogsteeger 1989: 151). This concept of leased lines would be an enormous source of income for 
KPN for many years. Later on, lines with different capacities could be hired, such as 2 Mb lines, to 
support data backbones or private networks.  
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better work prospective offered by private companies. In addition, the work 
efficiency quickly declined as a result of rising costs and prices. A decrease in 
the turnover forced PTT to increase tariffs and cut services, which in turn 
stimulate public discussion on the autonomy of the organisation.   
 From the inception of telecommunications in the Netherlands, the status and 
the autonomy of telecommunication activities have been a point of discussion. 
As far back as 1893, the government came to the conclusion that the 
independent telegraphy and postal activities differed from other governmental 
departments. Hence, a director-general reporting directly to the minister was 
appointed to head the autonomous Administration of Post and Telegraphy 
(P&T). The business profile of P&T on the one hand, and the political and 
public interests on the other have resulted in many conflicts. P&T needed 
managerial freedom to determine their own business policy but the government 
dominated and overruled P&T for its own political objectives. With the 
introduction of the telephone the administration was renamed Administration of 
Post, Telegraphy and Telephone (PTT). PTT was also obligated to contribute to 
compensate for the shortages in the government’s budget. In stead of using 
telecom profits for the expansion of the telecom infrastructure, the profits had to 
be ceded to the Ministry of Treasury. As a result, the management of PTT 
tended to create more distance in relation to the government and operate more as 
an enterprise. Therefore, it is not surprising that PTT management used the 
circumstances rendered by the Second World War to take its chance to establish 
and secure a more autonomous status and an independent position in relation to 
the Dutch government. The Dutch post-war government however, did not accept 
this construction and in 1955, PTT again became a fully state owned company. 
However, after a few years the new status of PTT was again a point of 
discussion because of financial requirements for investments in the 
infrastructure. Instead of having direct access to the capital market, PTT had to 
write investment plans that had to be formally approved by government. A 
strong decline of the profits, a cut in services and an increase of tariffs resulted 
in new discussions on the status. Several commissions, such as the commission 
Goedhart, have produced contradictory reports on the autonomy of PTT in the 
sixties and seventies. 
 The earlier discussed developments in technology resulted in new 
commissions, Swarttouw in 1979 and Steenbergen in 1984, which were to 
investigate the consequences of the developments of information and 
telecommunication technology. These commissions concluded that PTT should 
have a more autonomous status to adapt to new developments and concentrate 
on the construction and maintenance of telecommunication infrastructure, which 
PTT would monopolise. To execute this objective new investments had to be 
made. The Ministry of Treasury did not want to enter the capital market because 
of high interests and high government debts. This resulted in the conclusion that 
PTT needed freedom to obtain finances. At the same time ideological changes 
stimulated the withdrawal of the government from telecom business. The earlier 
discussed restructuring of the telecom market resulted in the transformation of 
PTT into the Koninklijke PTT Nederland NV (KPN). With this transformation 
  
 96 
three objectives could be reached: (1) The organisation could obtain loans at the 
capital market as an independent company. (2) The autonomy would guaranty 
equal treatment in regard to future competitors. (3) The organisation could 
create new and better conditions of employment that would be competitive to 
other companies.  
 With the new situation at the telecom market telecom networks in the 
Netherlands are now, after 55 years of government ownership, again being 
exploited by private companies (Bierman and Dijst 1990). KPN is able to act 
more flexibly and commercially, to attract financial resources and to recruit new 
qualified employees at competitive conditions. Hogesteeger (1989: 297) comes 
to the conclusion that the transformation has been strongly influenced by 
developments on ideological grounds. An ideological change of the Dutch 
government resulted in the tendency towards deregulation, privatisation and de-
monopolisation of government tasks. After nearly hundred years of struggle for 
autonomy the Dutch PTO has finally achieved her desired status due to the 
restructuring of the international telecom market. 
 
5.1.2 Dutch Government versus KPN   
In reply to the European Green Paper on Telecommunications in 1987, the 
Dutch government adopted pace-setting measures to liberalise and privatise the 
telecom sector in the Netherlands. The Netherlands was the second country in 
Europe to privatise its national PTO and to liberalise the market for telephone 
equipment and value-added services in 1989. With the restructuring of the 
telecom market the Dutch government wanted to meet three objectives. (1) To 
promote innovation of and investments in infrastructure in order to realise the 
concept of ‘the Netherlands as the electronic gateway to Europe’. (2) To ensure 
adequate price controls and universal service obligations. (3) To ensure that 
clear arrangements exist for the interconnection of networks and for open access 
to physical interfaces in networks, non-discrimination with respect to 
numbering, spectrum availability, cross-ownership rules and prevention of 
cross-subsidisation between monopoly and competitive activities (Mansell et al. 
1995).  
 In 1989 the activities of the state owned telecommunication and postal 
company was placed in the new private holding, KPN. PTT Telecom and PTT 
Post operate as independent working units, thus preventing the former cross-
subsidisation of post activities with telecom finances. For the first five years, the 
Dutch government owned the stocks of KPN. In June 1994, 30% of the 40 
million shares were floating on the Amsterdam Stock Exchange. The shares 
have been sold on the stock market with regulatory authority vested in the 
Ministry of Transport and Public Works. In October 1995, a second floatation of 
shares reduced the participation of the government to 44%. With the 
privatisation and the sales of its shares the government loosened its direct 
influence on KPN. Nonetheless, this stimulated the telecom policy debate 
because the Dutch parliament was afraid of losing control.  
 In 1992, the Ministry of Transport and Public Works stimulated 
liberalisation with the introduction of competition in public data bearer services. 
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Competition in business data services was already permitted in 1990. In 1993, 
the government also dropped the opinion that too much competition would lead 
to a wasteful duplication of facilities and decided to stimulate competition rather 
than wait for competitors to arrive. By then it was clear that newcomers on the 
Dutch telecom market would have little chance to compete against the former 
monopolist (Mansell et al. 1995). In 1994, satellite communication was 
liberalised. The liberalisation of cable-television networks in 1995 resulted in 
the forced sale of KPN’s shares in the cable-company Casema. Competition at 
the fixed telephony market was introduced in 1996 when the government 
allowed alternative infrastructures to be used for telecommunication purposes.32 
In July 1997 the public telephony market for fixed telephone lines was fully 
liberalised. In each of these sectors competitors have prepared themselves to 
acquire a position at the telecom market.33 
 In interviews, public speeches and official publications the management 
complains of unjust political measures to decrease the power of KPN. At the 
same time they have repeatedly emphasised the fact that it has always welcomed 
the introduction of competition and the restructuring of the market: 
KPN is looking forward to face real competitors in the market because 
captive clients are almost impossible to satisfy (Speech of Mr Wim Dik, 
March 1, 1995). 
 Observers of the restructuring of the Dutch telecom market come to the 
conclusion that after a quick start the process of restructuring has slowed down 
(Mansell et al. 1995, Hulsink and Davies 1997). According to the Yankee 
Group, The Netherlands was 7th on the list of most liberalised European 
countries in 1997 (Elsevier, July 5, 1997). This ranking depends on the number 
of concessions in the markets of public voice, data, private networks and 
mobiles. The establishing of an independent supervisor has also been included 
in the ranking. According to the new Telecom Law, enforced in May 1997 by 
the Dutch parliament, two independent regulatory institutes have been installed 
to control the competition. The first institute is the Netherlands Authority of 
Competition of the Ministry of Economic Affairs (NMA). The second institute 
is the OPTA (Independent Post and Telecom Authority) of the Ministry of 
Traffic and Public Work. The OPTA has to act as an arbitrator in conflicts and 
supervise telecom tariffs. 
                                                        
32 In 1995, the government invited the Dutch Railways (NS), the Dutch cable operators and the 
Dutch utilities to found a joint venture. The invited organisations could combine their existing 
networks into a second national fixed network. Due to strategic and organisation cultural 
differences this cooperation collapsed. The NS established the strategic alliance Telfort with British 
Telecom. The electricity utilities and cable operators established the strategic alliance Enertel. 
33 Five kinds of competitors have appeared at the Dutch telecom market. (1) New operators with an 
alternative infrastructure in the Netherlands such as the NS (Telfort), the energy utilities and cable 
operators (Enertel, A2000). (2) Foreign PTOs such as France Telecom and British Telecom. (3) 
International alliances such as Global One and Concert. (4) New operators that do not have a 
domestic market, such as Esprit Telecom and WordCom, who have their own digital pan-European 
network. (5) Operators that offer call-back services, wholesale customers that resell capacity for 
low international tariffs and other international discount offices. 
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 With the privatisation the difficult relationship between the Dutch 
government and KPN, as discussed earlier, has not reached an end. The Dutch 
government, who still owns 44% of the shares, wants to create a competitive 
market and does everything to break down the power and influence of the 
former monopolist. The more the deregulation and liberalisation of the telecom 
market the more rules and institutions are needed by the government to address 
the power of KPN and guide the process of restructuring. The top management 
is opposed this government strategy: 
(eerste citaat weghalen ) This is de-privatising, ten years back in time. The 
government is determining prices and markets again (CEO of KPN Mr. Dik 
at the presentation of the Annual Report, April 9, 1998).  
 This information on the laborious relation of KPN with the Dutch 
government is necessary to understand its need of fundamental reforms in the 
structure and organisational culture. 
 
  
5.2 From National Operator to International Provider 
 
To adapt to the restructuring of the international telecom market KPN had to 
reformulate their strategy policy and mission. With the corporatisation of KPN 
in 1989, the management already expected a full liberalisation of the Dutch 
Telecom market. Given the difficult history behind the autonomy of KPN, the 
top management warmly welcomed the change of their status, the new 
managerial freedom and the huge financial resources, which allowed it to adapt 
to the new developments in the telecom market. Quite logically the newly 
recruited top management wanted to go ahead with the new competition. After 
so many years of being blocked by governmental politics finally, there was now 
a chance to transform the PTO into a commerical company.  
The choice for growth is not fuelled by fear, but because we believe in 
ourselves. We have the organisation, we have the people and we have the 
support of KPN and of our partners to fulfil that huge ambition to grow. It 
would be a mortal sin to let the challenging possibilities, that we have now 
and may not have again, fade away. That will always give a feeling of 
‘sorrow for that one huge missed chance’ (Vision and Strategy, KPN 1996). 
 Therefore, the new top management opted for a very ambitious strategy. The 
mission was: 
To be supplier of telecommunication services and products for the consumer 
and business customers. The Netherlands is our home market; as partner in 
Unisource and Uniworld we belong to the world leading companies in 
telecommunication. We offer our customers quality, user friendliness and 
good quality in proportion to the price (Company Vision KPN, May 15, 
1995).  
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 The mission has changed over time but the content remained the same; KPN 
says it wants to be a ‘global player’ with a leading position in the European 
telecom market and a strong position at the domestic market. The ambition is 
translated clearly in terms of its objectives: reaching a yearly growth of the 
turnover of 8% and reaching a 25% of the turnover coming from non-domestic 
markets by the year 2000. To achieve these ambitions KPN has defined three 
different strategies (Vision and Strategy, KPN 1996): (1) to build an excellent 
relationship with the customers, (2) to have access to efficient networks and (3) 
to expand beyond Western Europe and other countries. In the first strategy, the 
building of excellent customer relations is the central point of attention because 
in a liberalised telecom market customers can choose from service providers.34 
New services have been introduced to attract customer and to stimulate 
telephone traffic revenues.35 All of these new services and products have to find 
their way to the customer. To reach out more effectively to customers, the new 
products and services are distributed by means of multi channel marketing such 
as Primafoon shops, Business Centres, HI shops and outlets of franchising 
shops.  
 In the second strategy the access of efficient networks is an important 
issue.36 The new services have to be offered at minimum costs. Other 
competitors do not have the huge costs of the KPN organisation but operate in 
small flexible enterprises. The third strategy is the expansion through the region 
of Western Europe and other countries. This strategy is motivated on one hand, 
by customers who want international services across borders of uniform quality 
and price and on the other hand, KPN is looking for compensation of the fall in 
turnover at the domestic market.  
                                                        
34 The organisation says it want to take good care of its customers; ‘We make our customers loyal 
so customers like to come back to us. We are always there for our customers’ (Business Vision 
PTT Telecom, June 1995). New concepts and priorities have been proclaimed to satisfy customers 
and thus keep them loyal to the organisation. The concept of Customer Care for instance, takes care 
of the individual’s telecom needs. Companies as well as individuals do want optimal services and 
solutions for their specific needs. The use of information on markets, companies and even 
individual customers will help to optimise services for customers. Prices and tariffs will be made 
flexible to adapt the needs of customers, for instance with the introduction of the flexible telephone 
subscriptions BelBasis, BelPlus and BelBudget. 
35 Services such as *21, *5, Voicemail, Call Waiting and Calling line identification expand the 
services. Inventions or the combination of different technology also stimulates the introduction of 
new services. The enormous growth of the number of ISDN lines (Integrated Services Digital 
Network) shows the potential at domestic market. The introduction of the Chipcard, another major 
innovation, has started at lower pace but is already part of services. The introduction of the concept 
‘the Net’, a national variant of The Internet, is another example of a combination of different 
technologies. The cheap subscription of ‘the Net’ offers the customers mail services and 
connections with the Internet. The introduction of ‘the Snelnet’ allows the clients to download 
video clips, daily news programs at a high quality and fast speed. With this technology delayed 
television is possible in which the server stores TV programs for 24 hours. These new services 
mark the trend towards a diversification of products. 
36 KPN manages different infrastructures in which the Universal Transport Net (UTN) is the base 
for all transport of voice and data by means of fixed telephone network, mobile network and radio 
and television signals by means of cable networks. To lower the costs and to increase the 
management of the UTN a new structure of the organisation has been introduced. Unisource 
Carrier Services (UCS) administers the international network of the Unisource partners constructed 
from national networks and not the network itself but the services that are provided by means of 
these telecom networks therefore add to the profit. 
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 To execute these strategies and to reach the earlier mentioned objectives the 
organisation has put much effort in changing its structure in the period of 1989 
till 1997. In that period, different steps have been taken to reorganise the 
structure in order to change the former bureaucratic, cumbersome, monopolistic 
government owned company into an efficient and flexible client and market 
orientated competitor. As a result the organisational structure has changed. The 
national and international activities are managed separately. KPN International 
structures the international activities to cater to three different regions: (1) West-
Europe/America/Africa, (2) Asia, (3) Central Europe/East Europe/Ireland. KPN 
International wants to become a global player, with the main focus to Europe, 
but also expanding its activities throughout the world. The reorganisation has 
altered the structure of the organisation, but to what extent has the 
organisational culture changed? The Chairman of the Executive Board of KPN, 
Mr Wim Dik is optimistic about the new culture: 
Some of the employees have embraced the new culture and enjoy it others to 
a lesser extent. And of course there are also employees who do not want to 
or cannot change. But I think that the course of the mammoth-tanker is 
changed definitively and that the process of change has now become 
irreversible (Dik 1998: 121). 
5.2.1 The Cultural Legacy of KPN 
Three major human resource tools have been used to exert influence on the 
organisational culture. Firstly, a management development trajectory was 
introduced to stimulate organisational change. Young talented employees were 
directly recruited at universities and offered competitive conditions and career 
opportunities. The employees were selected for qualities such as sociability, 
initiative and representative, entrepreneurial and organising capabilities. 
Secondly, experienced management from outside the company had to inject new 
management styles and new efficiency attitudes. Among them were the 
Chairman of the Executive Board of KPN, Mr Wim Dik and the former CEO, 
Mr Ben Verwaaijen who became CEO in 1988 when only being 38-years-old. 
Coming from commercial telecom equipment company ITT, he was instructed 
to reshape the organisation and prepare the organisation for full competition. 
During his ten years of presidency he left his hallmark on the organisation by 
introducing his action orientated style of management. When he left the 
organisation in 1998, the Chairman of the Board of KPN succeeded him. 
Thirdly, employees have been subjected to an intensive training programme. A 
development system for employees with potential within the organisation was 
introduced to monitor qualified staff and support them in their career. At the 
same time the public image of the KPN was changed through a successful 
campaign from a dusty, sluggish, low-salaried government owned department to 
a hot, international and career orientated organisation. This made the 
recruitment of new employees easier. 
 KPN has furthermore put much effort in the empowerment of its employees. 
Diverse forms of communication have been used to inculcate and develop the 
new attitude towards clients, competition, a sense of entrepreneurial attitude and 
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work efficiency. One of these projects was an electronic discussion among 
employees in 1996 named Telecom OverMorgen (TOM). In this discussion the 
CEO asked for response and feedback on five subjects: (1) how to come in a 
closer contact with the customers, (2) how to become more commercially 
viable, (3) how to reduce costs, (4) how to increase the volume of telephone 
traffic and (5) how to become a multinational. More than 2500 reactions and 
new ideas and suggestions for improvement were offered and the results of this 
discussion pointed out the need for better knowledge management, the need for 
the decentralisation of responsibility and the need for more possibilities to act 
and take initiative as an entrepreneur. 
 From the earlier discussed history it is evident that the KPN’s organisational 
culture is strongly influenced by the political bureaucracy. Although the former 
PTT has had a rather independent and business like position within the Ministry 
of Traffic and Public Work, the PTT can be characterised as a bureaucracy. 
When I started working with the Centrale WerkPlaats in 1985 the PTT Telecom 
organisation was strongly focused on procedures. The procedure of the repair of 
old telephones was more important than the question as to whether it was still 
necessary or cost effective. The process was emphasised rather than the results 
or the output. Deviation from the internal procedures or norms was seen as one 
of the greatest sins: risks had to be avoided at all terms. Because the government 
was the employer at that time the social conditions for the employees were 
excellent. The rights of the employees were protected and lifetime employment 
guarantied. At that time one opted for a career with PTT Telecom because of the 
protected working environment and/or because one’s family was working there. 
People were proud to be with the PTT “family” and had a strong loyalty towards 
the organisation. The collective responsibility made it easy to mask individual 
performances. Taking up added responsibility was not something one aspired to. 
When I entered the organisation by means of an employment agency the unit I 
worked in had no manager. Showing some initiative made me the manager 
within three weeks. The strong hierarchy was symbolically represented by a 
specially raised platform on which the manager of a repair unit was seated 
overlooking the employees. I was surprised to be confronted with an 
organisation that was focused on maintaining high quality and that this focus on 
excellence had been imposed not by the customers or market but by themselves. 
The KPN culture before the privatisation is characterised in the words of Mr 
Wim Dik: 
Within this rigid structure employees had almost no freedom for taking 
initiative and responsibilities. This resulted in risk avoiding behaviour. The 
PTT offered lifetime employment and careers were based upon the number 
of years worked and only partly on performance. Customers were 
subscribers. Their wishes were only partly taken into account. The internal 
processes constituted the point of departure for the organisation (Dik 1998: 
116).  
 With privatisation it became quite clear that the organisation needed a 
dramatic change in the organisational culture. Therefore, the new management 
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defined the desired characteristics of what the new KPN culture should be: risk 
taking, entrepreneurial attitudes, active participation, taking of responsibility, 
competition, customer satisfaction and, a more client-based service and result 
orientated focus. In their personal columns in the KPN Nieuwsblad, Mr Ben 
Verwaaijen and Mr Wim Dik regularly communicated these desired 
characteristics to the employees. The business policy also indicates these 
concepts: 
We are comrades and help each other to serve our customers, we are 
encouraged by the management to take responsibilities, to work more 
autonomously.  PTT Telecom is one company full of diversity. Finally, the 
employees and managers are open and honest. We are open and honest about 
mistakes because improvement starts where mistakes stop. We learn by 
means of co-operating, being critical and business-minded. The more we 
learn the better our services will be. Our objective is therefore; to learn faster 
then our competitor (business policy KPN, 1995). 
 In her study on the change of the KPN culture Van Schie (1995) selected 
four dimensions of organisational culture: (1) process orientated versus result 
orientated culture, (2) human orientated versus work orientated culture, (3) 
organisation loyalty versus professional loyalty and (4) internal orientated 
versus external orientated culture. These dimensions are taken from the value 
dimensions that Hofstede (1991) has formulated to describe an organisational 
culture. Van Schie concluded that the desired organisation culture was result 
orientated, work orientated and externally orientated. To achieve this the 
organisational culture should change from being process orientated to result 
orientated, humanly orientated to work orientated and internally to externally 
orientated (van Schie 1995: 45). By investigating two departments of KPN she 
came to the conclusion that the organisational culture in 1995, for a greater part, 
overlapped the desired culture in the result orientated, organisation loyalty and 
external orientated dimensions. Only in the dimension of organisation loyalty 
versus profession loyalty, did the respondents score more in loyalty to their 
profession. 
 In her study, van den Berk (1994) has come to a less optimistic conclusion. 
She investigated the cooperation between two different departments and 
concluded that the employees were mainly work and internally orientated in 
both their own departments. In contrast with van Schie (1995) she came to the 
conclusion that both groups were orientated towards formal positions and were 
focussed on the discussion of the taking of responsibility rather than the 
engaging of activities motivated by corporate interests. In contrast with 
Nijenhuis (1992) and van Schie (1995), van den Berk found no orientation 
towards costs and profits and no awareness of competition but discerned a 
strong focus on personal relations (van den Berk 1994: 58).  
The newly introduced ‘organisational culture’ with the concept of client 
orientation, quality, internal cooperation and the norms and values of PTT 
Telecom do not cancel the historically developed departmental shafts (van 
den Berk 1994: 83)  
  
 103 
 The findings of the study show that new employees entering KPN find it 
hard to understand the strange political power plays, the unwritten rules and the 
powerful informal networks. These people still have to be “sprayed green”; 
green being traditionally the colour of KPN Telecom. Until the splitting of the 
KPN group it could be divided into three different work units, each with its own 
subculture: KPN staff, KPN Telecom and the TNT&Post Group. Each of the 
work units could be recognised by its own colour: blue (KPN staff), green (KPN 
Telecom) and red (the TNT & Post Group). These colours were visible in the 
logo of KPN and formed symbols of identity for the different units. News in the 
KPN Nieuwsblad was always marked by the colour of the unit involved. These 
colours were evident in almost everything: the company cars, the commercials, 
the logo, pencils, pieces of scrap paper and even ring binders.  
 It is difficult to speak of the KPN culture. Differences between head office 
versus district offices, between management versus work-floor, between 
regional cultural diversity, between new and old Telecommers, between units 
and between professions result in a wide diversity of subcultures. Distinct 
subcultures can be distinguished such as “bouwers” (network employees), the 
“controllers” (financial department), the “techneutenclub” (network 
employees), the “glimpiepers” (new employees) and the “Voorlindenaren” (old 
management). The images of respective units support their individual identities 
within the organisation (van den Berk 1994: 63). The question is how do 
employees perceive their organisation? 
 In the spring of 1998, in order to get an impression of the individual 
perspectives on the organisation, during the course of four workshops I asked 
employees to draw metaphors showing how they perceived KPN.37 Out of the 
41 drawings four main groups of metaphors could be identified: (1) metaphors 
that represented the cultural diversity in the organisation (12x), (2) metaphors 
that reflected the competitive context (12x), (3) metaphors that reflected the 
cumbersome nature of the organisation (7x) and (4) a miscellaneous group of 
metaphors (10x). 
  In the first group the metaphor of the fleet of ships (5x) showed a large 
group of small vessels derived from and under control of the super-tanker 
(KPN) all heading more or less in the same direction. Some drawings also 
showed submarines (the competitors) attacking the fleet. Other metaphors used 
included islands separated by large quantities of water, castles surrounded by 
canals of water, rings of different colours, thick walls separating different 
                                                        
37 The participants were asked for their perception of the organisational culture of KPN. Morgan’s 
metaphors were used to look with a different perspective to the organisation (Morgan 1987). 
Metaphors help to discover unconscious perceptions of the organisation and its context. According 
to Morgan (1987) organisations can be perceived as machines, organism, brains, culture, political 
systems, psychic prisons, flux and instruments of suppression. After this explanation, the 
participants were given ten minutes to draw their own colourful metaphor of KPN in relation to the 
international telecom market. The drawings were then collected, hung on the wall and discussed 
with the group in order to understand and clarify the different perceptions of the participants and to 
discuss the organisational culture of KPN and the personal experiences of the participants. The 
professional diversity of the workplace, the subcultures at the different departments, the 
irrationality of decision-making processes and the political character of the organisation were 
thoroughly discussed. 
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departments and pieces of a jigsaw puzzle. Sometimes a very small customer 
was drawn on the side of the fragmented organisation. This metaphor was also 
popular in the IS department where their establishment of an independent 
consultancy group was compared with a life saving boat that was about to be 
launched because the ship was in trouble at the moment. 
 In the second group the metaphor of the octopus (4x) dominated. The 
octopus was under attack of the government, OPTA, the national competitors 
and the international PTOs. In the drawings the octopus does not look 
impressive but rather frightened because his attackers cut off, eat or bind each of 
his eight arms. Another metaphor showed the strip character Dogbert Duck 
sitting on his money while being attacked by a group of people. In another 
drawing showed a lion watching other smaller animals. These animals could be 
his game but also his pursuers given the fear in his eyes. The metaphor of a tiger 
was also used to reflect the strength of the organisation. However, the tiger had 
many cubs to take care of thus leaving her less strong for the hunt. In the other 
metaphors water and sea played an important role. With the lowering of the sea 
level (telecom market) two persons on an airbed were not careful to avoid the 
coral (the competitors) and thus their airbed began to leak. In the another picture 
a sailing yacht was seen leaving the harbour for international seas while its 
important crew remained on shore waving goodbye. A limited perspective of the 
telecom market was reflected in the drawing of an aquarium full of fish and one 
of a swimming pool filled with inflatable tubes. If one of the tubes grew bigger, 
the others automatically got smaller. A typical Dutch metaphor, a bike, was used 
showing the organisation as a platoon instead of as the front runners. 
 The third group of metaphors reflects the cumbersome character of the 
organisation. In one drawing the metaphor of thick sour apple syrup flowing out 
of a bottle was used to indicate the slow process of organisational change on the 
one hand, and the cohesion of employees on the other. The metaphor of a hot-air 
balloon was used to show that the wind (the market) determines the direction of 
the organisation and it is a slow way of transport. Other metaphors illustrating 
this same point include that of a snail at a cross-road deciding which way to go. 
Another drawing showed an elephant with little ants running around his body. 
Finally, there was an old fashioned cart with many people seated in it 
representing the slow rate of change. Only a few people were pulling the cart 
along the bumpy road and some even tried to stop the car. This was also 
reflected in the metaphor of a person trying to reach for a sack of money but 
was pulled back by a huge stone, which symbolised the organisational culture. 
 The fourth group consisted of metaphors like walls and pyramids that 
crumble off at the fundaments but not at the top. One drawing showed a lioness 
with her youngsters (joint ventures) that have to mature. The metaphor of a 
circus was used twice. Everybody was watching the artists but no paying 
spectators showed up. Finally, the metaphors of the crab and sea anemone are 
interesting to discuss. The crab is an animal with a hard shell that can only walk 
sideways and once caught it does not release its prey from its big pincers. The 
well-protected crab feeds itself and spits out what is left. The sea anemone 
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moves with the tides of the ocean, absorbs and spits out ocean water holding 
back small fish and food. 
 These metaphors show the different perceptions of an image of a large 
company with many distinct units and departments, which do not always co-
operate efficiently. This large company is under attack by competitors at the 
telecom market and by regulation authorities. Not only the context of the 
organisation has changed but in the perception of the IS employees, the 
organisation itself has changed and become less massive. The justifiable 
conclusion is that the IS employees know well what is going on in the telecom 
market and the consequences for that will have for the organisation. More 
information on the organisational culture is given presented in chapter 6. But 
first the different paths of internationalisation are given. 
 
  
5.3 Different Paths of Internationalisation  
 
With the competitors at the domestic market KPN risked being downgraded to 
being a supplier of bulk capacity to other global operators. Although the choice 
to become an efficient competitive local operator could be interesting for a 
foreign take-over and could be justified from a shareholder’s perspective, it is 
clear that the top-management had no such intentions of going in that direction. 
The choice for an aggressive and expanding strategy was simply explained:  
As a service provider in the field of post and telecommunications in the 
Netherlands, one has, to put it simply, two choices: either one is satisfied 
with being a local distributor of mail or manager of lines, or one has 
ambitions that extend beyond national borders and are based on clearly 
defined objectives and a corresponding strategy. KPN belongs to the latter 
category, because that is the one that makes sense (Speech Mr. Wim Dik, 
March 1, 1995) 
 To expand the activities across borders three major strategies of 
internationalisation have been used: (1) the establishing of the strategic alliance 
Unisource, (2) the expansion of activities to other European countries and (3) 
the expansion of activities to non-European countries. The Unisource alliance 
has been an important tool in the strategy of internationalisation. KPN 
recognised the need for cooperation to compete in the European telecom market. 
The cooperation between the more or less equal sized PTOs Dutch KPN, 
Swedish Telia and Swiss PTT was therefore a strategic move in acquiring a 
share of the telecom market of multinationals.38 The three equal shareholders 
have established Unisource as an independent pan-European telecom provider. 
Unisource provides seamless international services with a pan-European and 
global reach. The three objectives of Unisource have been defined as follows: 
(1) to defend the domestic markets of the parent companies, (2) to generate new 
international revenues and (3) to share the costs of Emerging Markets. 
Unisource’s net revenue amounted to NLG 1,316 million in 1995 and it employs 
                                                        
38 Telia AB was first named Televerket and SwissCom first named Swiss Telecom. 
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2,229 people in 16 countries (Annual Report Unisource1995). The Unisource 
alliance has strengthened its position on the international telecom market in 
cooperation with the American AT&T. Together with AT&T (40%) Unisource 
(60%) has established the joint venture AUCS (AT&T-Unisource 
Communication Services). This alliance makes it possible for AT&T to operate 
at the European market by means of a local telecom provider that knows the 
local conditions. Apart from providing services by means of AUCS, Unisource 
also provides capacity for other telecom operators at their pan-European 
network. The Unisource partners merged their international operations, forming 
a new organisation named Unisource Carrier Services (UCS), which will be 
based in Zurich. Unisource has outlets all over Europe through their partner 
companies in the Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland in the form of 
distribution agreements, its own marketing offices and joint ventures. 
 Although Unisource has been the most important international player for 
KPN, the strategy of finding participation in new telecom markets has slowly 
grown in importance. The aim of generating 25% of the turnover from foreign 
participation within five years is very challenging for an organisation without 
any international experience. To gain international experience and to reach the 
objectives, KPN not only wants to invest in interesting PTOs but also wants to 
participate in the management of that local PTO. By means of this kind of 
participation the invested money can be controlled and the quality of the local 
PTO can at the same time be improved. Knowledge of the transformation 
process in the Netherlands is being used to transform the local PTO into a 
world-class operator. In employing this strategy the long-term relationship with 
the local PTO is of importance. The organisation has opted for minority 
participation in local PTOs. The participation in a new market is therefore 
primarily acquired together with an interested Unisource partner. In this way 
KPT Telecom participates with Telia in Ireland and with Swiss Telecom in the 
Czech Republic and Hungary (plaatje erbij??) 
 The strategy for the participation in new European telecom markets is 
focused upon interesting telecom markets such as Portugal, Austria, Belgium 
and Ireland. Less clear is the third strategy, for non-European emerging markets. 
The broad definition of this market forces the organisation to select regions or 
countries. The East European countries and the Asian countries have been 
selected for future investments and possible participation. Eastern Europe is a 
well-defined region that is small enough to overview, to follow the 
developments and large enough to select interesting partner organisations. 
We have mainly concentrated ourselves on countries like Czech-Slovakia 
and Hungary because these have, to a certain extent, most in common with 
the Netherlands. To the Czechs and the Hungarians the Netherlands is a 
relatively small country, with a similar number of inhabitants, and that 
knows how to survive in the presence of superpowers (manager KPN 
Hongary in: ’t hoofdkantoor KPN jr3, nr 5, 1991) 
 The Asian strategy is less well defined. To cover all of Asia is time 
consuming and therefore concentration of resources is necessary. The focus of 
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the Asian strategy will be on the Southeast Asian countries or better defined as 
the ASEAN countries. The major participation in this region is in Indonesia, 
although interesting markets such as China, Taiwan and India are also parts of 
the Asian strategy. 
 To structure the relation between the head office in The Hague and the local 
alliance the concept of back-office has been introduced. In the head office the 
back-office takes care of the internal communication to and from the alliance. A 
small back-office in The Hague consisting of two senior project managers and 
an office manager co-ordinate the project resource management of the 
shareholder organisation to guarantee the smooth execution of the projects. The 
back office is responsible for the co-ordination of all contributions and 
deliveries on behalf of KPN. The back office informs and interests KPN 
employees for working abroad. Another task is to support the KPN board 
members on all matters relevant. Finally, the back office is responsible for the 
first line financial control of the participation. The contacts with the back-
offices of the other Unisource partners stimulate a better understanding and 
communication between the partners. 
 
5.3.1 Developing International Business 
At the end of the eighties, a group of Telecom managers anticipated the 
restructuring of the telecom market. The department, International Business (IB) 
was formed in 1988 with 80 employees in the ‘Stichthage’ office to explore 
international possibilities. During this period contacts were established with 
potential partners and offices were opened in new markets.39 The opening of 
these offices was a clear message to the market to show the presence and 
ambitions of the organisation. The beginning of the IB department was 
characterised by its ‘cowboy’ mentality. Employees flocked the world looking 
for business opportunities and came back with news on developments and new 
bids. A clear strategy that focused on single regions did not yet exist. An interest 
and focus on learning and exploring have been emphasised in this first period. 
Not so much the profitability of a project but the experience it provided was 
deemed as important.  
 In 1992, IB reformulated their objectives and stressed the importance of 
participation in foreign telecom operators. By then the department International 
Telephony had grown to as many as 200 employees. It was an active young 
group; more than 55% were below 34 years old (IT’s news, KPN, jr. 4, nr. 11, 
December 1992). Due to the young and dynamic character of the department, 
employees did not work for a long time at the same post. In 1992, 55% of the 
people had worked less than two years in the department. Working in this 
                                                        
39 In 1990, KPN inaugurated the first foreign office in Brussels. The office at the Avenue Louise in 
downtown Brussels was intended to explore the Belgium telecom market and to lobby in the 
political arena of the European Parliament. New offices in London and New York, on the 22nd floor 
of the Rockefeller Centre in Central Manhattan, succeeded the Brussels office in January 1991. On 
the 23rd of October 1991, the Dutch Crown Prince Willem Alexander inaugurated the new office 
of KPN in Tokyo by opening a barrel of sake. Other offices in Milan, Budapest, Frankfurt, Kiev, 
Jakarta and Prague followed in 1992. In some cases the offices were simple rented suites in hotels, 
such as the temporary Telecom office in Kiev, but in general, prestigious offices have been 
occupied. 
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department also meant dealing with a high level of frustrations. Enthusiastic 
about new business opportunities, young executives returned from foreign 
markets finding their management being very wary about acquiring new 
participation outside Europe. But in the world of telecom there is no time for 
doubt because a larger part of the other foreign telecom investors are interested 
in new telecom markets around the world. 
 In the beginning the IB department concentrated on the search for other 
European PTOs for a possible strategic alliance. From the beginning it was very 
clear to the management that KPN would be too small to opt for the “going it 
alone” approach. The small home market did not generate sufficient turnover to 
finance networks in all of the European countries needed for the international 
customers. Establishing a strategic alliance with other similar sized European 
PTOs would be more realistic in constructing a European network. The search 
started in the neighbouring Benelux countries Belgium and Luxembourg, but 
the Belgium PTO was quite old-fashioned at that time and the Luxembourg 
PTO too small to be an alliance partner. The contacts with France Telecom and 
Deutsche Telekom proved to be more interesting. In July 1989, KPN and France 
Telecom signed an agreement on mutual cooperation in the sales of services and 
telematica. As a small partner KPN saw possibilities to play an important role 
between the German and French telecom giants. In spite of the promising start 
and the good prospects, the Dutch management became irritated by the arrogant 
French treatment. The superior attitude of the French and their desire to 
dominate alerted the Dutch management. This experience resulted in the 
conclusion that a strategic alliance with a telecom giant would be dangerous. A 
manager used the metaphor of a dragon to express the danger of co-operating 
with a big partner:  
As a small partner you have protection as if you are at the tail of a dragon. 
But when another dragon attacks your protector wags his tail and forgets 
about you (interview with KPN manager). 
 The French-German-Dutch collaboration was thus abandoned and new 
possibilities were explored further away in Western Europe with more 
commensurate partners. A new business partner was found in Sweden. The 
Swedish Telia already had informal relations with KPN but formalised this in 
1991 with the announcement of the joint venture Unicom. After a year of 
contacts the strategic alliance Unisource was established the 24 April 1992. In 
January 1993, all services on data networks of KPN were transferred to the 
Unisource ‘daughter’ company Unisource Business Networks Netherlands 
(UBN NL). In the same period Swiss Telecom joined Unisource as a third 
partner. In May 1993 Unisource joined the international cooperation 
WorldPartners along with many large international PTOs such as AT&T, 
Singapore Telecom, KDD, Telecom New Zealand and Telstra. The cooperation 
in WorldPartners connected KPN by means of Unisource to the global players 
in the international telecom market. 
 Apart from the search for new partners new markets have also been 
explored. In the first period IB was driven strongly by opportunity. One of these 
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opportunities was the restructuring of the telecom sector in the Netherlands 
Antilles. In 1989, KPN was asked by the government of the Netherlands 
Antilles to help with the restructuring of the telecom operator Telem at the 
island of St. Maarten. The government planned to decentralise the Antillian 
international traffic operator distributing control between the five Antillian 
islands and subsequently integrating these in the island operators. KPN showed 
interests in the financial and managerial participation in the local PTOs. 
Meanwhile on the mainland of South America a stone’s throw away from the 
Netherlands Antilles, different international consortia showed their interests in 
participation in CANTV, the national PTO of Venezuela. KPN was interested in 
participating in one of these consortia to obtain a strategic position in the 
Netherlands Antilles and Venezuela. This further supports the hypothesis that 
the internationalisation took place by means of old colonial contacts. The 
Netherlands has a historical relation with Venezuela due to the location of the 
Netherlands Antilles on the coastline of Venezuela. Dutch pirates traded with 
Venezuelan coastal cities offering them more independence from their Spanish 
rulers. When the freedom fighter Bolivar intended to free Venezuela he 
stationed his fleet at Curaçao. The other parent companies however, did not 
show any interest in the small Dutch PTO and the participation in the 
Netherlands Antilles did not work out successfully.  
 Meanwhile a group of IB employees travelled regularly to the west and 
another group travelled regularly east to Indonesia. Dutch telecom specialists 
had in fact for many years, been working temporarily in Indonesia to support the 
national PT Telkom in maintaining and expanding their infrastructure. These 
employees had established personal and business networks with the government 
and telecom offices. Partly as a result of these contacts IB was able to acquire a 
participation in the Indonesian GSM operator Telkomsel. March 1996, the CEO 
of KPN Mr Ben Verwaaijen signed the contract for Telekomsel in Jakarta. In his 
speech at the inauguration Verwaaijen commented:  
We are here with commitment and money in the true understanding of taking 
and giving. When I, five years ago, came to Indonesia I walked into the 
office of the minister and asked him; “ what do we have to do to be on the 
Indonesian telecommunication market?” And minister Joop Ave looked at 
me- in that very intense way that he can look at you- and he said to me: “I 
will take care of the market, and I will take care of the conditions. You bring 
your commitment and your money. That is the recipe”. Today is the day of 
delivery. It has been a professional process, open and international - my 
compliments for this.  We brought our money, and we will also bring our 
commitment and resources to make a splendid success out of Telkomsel. 
(Video of signing ceremony, Shangri La Hotel, Jakarta, March 11, 1996). 
 The collapse of the Berlin Wall and the opening of the former communist 
countries made the telecom markets in Eastern Europe accessible to foreign 
investors. After the opening the PTOs in Central and East-Europe were in need 
of new finances to re-new and expand their telecom infrastructure. The 
tremendous growth potential and the increasing demand of telecom facilities for 
expanding multinationals resulted in the participation of Western PTOs in these 
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telecom markets. KPN employees’ contacts in the region date back to the 
communist period in which Dutch specialists were asked for technological 
support. These specialists were sent abroad by The Netherlands Consultancy 
Foundation for Post and Telecommunication NCF. NCF has played an 
important role in the expansion of the KPN activities in East European telecom 
markets. As a result of these NCF contacts KPN was able to penetrate telecom 
markets such as Russia, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovenia. 
 All of the international activities of KPN merged in 1995 to form the 
department, International Business. IB grew to a professional department with 
its own strategy and policy that reports directly to the board of KPN. The 
approximately 120 employees worked in five different units: Finance, 
Acquisitions, Operations, Dutch Participation and Southeast Asia before it was 
splitt off from national activities and fitted in KPN International in 1998. 
 
5.3.2 Experiences of the Netherlands Consultancy Foundation  
The Netherlands Consultancy Foundation (NCF) occupied a special position in 
KPN. Since its foundation in 1981 NCF has executed projects in Africa, Asia, 
Central and Eastern Europe and Latin America. NCF was created to channel and 
apply telecom expertise for the benefit of foreign countries and is operating 
independently of private trade and industry. NCF shares experience and the 
know-how of telecommunications, the postal sector, training, logistics and 
management support with organisations abroad by providing consultancy 
services, supervising projects, co-ordinating different telecommunication and 
postal systems. Hundreds of KPN employees have been sent abroad for short or 
long term consultancy in NCF in Africa, Asia, Latin America and Eastern 
Europe. Although some of the employees have permanent contracts, a larger 
part of the employees serve NCF on a temporary basis and returned after 
completing their specific projects or assigned attachments. NCF had branches in 
Brussels, Indonesia, the Netherlands Antilles, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, France, 
Ghana and agencies in Jordan, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Sierra Leone, Swaziland 
and Zimbabwe. In 1998, with the splitting of PTT Post and PTT Telecom, NCF 
was also splitted into two parts and fitted in KPN and the TNT Post group. 
 The consultancy work was formerly conducted from an idealistic 
perspective. The Dutch government used budgets of Development Aid to 
support telecom projects in Africa and Asia. However, the activities in Eastern 
Europe have since changed the nature of the NCF. In Eastern Europe there was 
a need for technical and managerial support to improve the local PTOs. Instead 
of drawing from development aid budgets, new commercial activities were 
initiated to support development. In Prague for instance, NCF established a joint 
venture with SPT, the Czech PTO, for consultation activities. KPN became 
interested in participating in SPT and took over the activities of NCF in the 
Czech Republic. Presently, the new role of NCF is to explore new telecom (and 
post) markets in less developed countries marked by different phases. In the first 
stage, the receiving country asks for technical assistance, consultation or 
training. In the second stage a relationship with the local PTO is established and 
knowledge on local cultural practices, networks, politics and markets is 
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gathered. Interesting news on developments in the liberalisation of the local 
telecom market is passed on to KPN. In the third stage KPN shows its interests 
in participation in the local market and NCF intensifies its networking and 
lobbying activities in the local political arena. In the fourth stage the KPN 
establishes a local office and NCF withdraws from the local market. 
 Consequently, NCF has become a source of know-how on local 
circumstances in the recipient countries. Networks have been established during 
years of technical support and consultancy work. Due to the non-commercial 
objectives and due to the concepts of training and transfer of technology, the 
organisation has quite a positive image in the recipient countries. In Indonesia 
NCF is as well known as KPN. In a larger part of the cases in developing 
markets NCF is seen as one and the same as KPN.  
 While KPN can and does use NCF contacts to develop commercial activities 
and acquire participation in local operators, the relationship between KPN and 
NCF is quite problematic. There is an agreement between the two departments 
on the conducting of international activities. As a rule NCF has to leave a 
country when KPN shows commercial interests in the local market. This 
demands a flexible attitude on the part of NCF because commercial activities 
sometimes interfere with consultancy activities. From the perspective of the 
Emerging Markets department the employees of NCF have no professional 
commercial experience, have low qualifications and are characterised as 
‘development workers’. Although the department is acquiring its own projects 
now, it still has the image as the developmental branch within KPN. On the 
other hand, the employees of the Emerging Markets department are perceived as 
arrogant, not having any knowledge of the local context, purely business driven 
and are characterised as ‘trendy boys’. The deployment of scarce resources such 
as mobile telecom specialists by NCF is also a source of irritation. A better co-
ordination of both international activities could stimulate the internationalisation 
of the organisation. Some of the employees report positive experiences with 
each other at local level, but in general there is neither exchange of knowledge 
nor a mutual use of local networks. 
 
5.3.3 Supporting International Operations    
International Spport is a consultancy department of KPN that employs 80 
professionals in national and international projects. There is no formal relation 
between the NCF and International Support (IS). IS offers consultants in various 
specialist areas to support processes of organisational change and the design of 
new organisations. The growing internal demand for flexible project leaders and 
organisation consultants led to the establishment of the consultancy group in 
1994. However, the establishment of the group is a contradiction in itself. On 
one hand, as a matter of strategic concern, KPN wants to keep the knowledge of 
products and process-management within the company. On the other hand, the 
company wants advises at competitive tariffs. This tension has stimulated IS to 
operate commercially and quite independently from other parts of the 
organisation. The aim of IS is to become a professional office of organisational 
consultancy, business consultancy and managerial flow of information. 
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 International Support consists mainly of professionals in organisational 
processes, business consultancy, project management and organisational 
change. These employees have been working with KPN for some years, know 
the organisation, the internal processes of decision-making, the organisational 
culture and have their personal networks throughout the organisation. The 
products they provide are: advice on strategic questions, translation of strategic 
policy to organisational concepts, the design of new organisational structures, 
organisational change, advice on questions of information flow, implementation 
support, project-management and the design of administrative organisations. 
These products are sold to KPN and its international alliances. 
 To take steps towards developing into a professional consultancy office the 
IS department merged in 1997 with two other consultancy groups which dealt 
with different areas of expertise such as information technology and 
telecommunication. The new division has more than 250 professional 
consultants divided in ten different units and offers consultancy services over 
telecommunication infrastructure, information technology and organisation. The 
clients of the IS department are KPN and their alliance partners and also to a 
growing extent, external clients. With the introduction of the new KPN structure 
in December 1998 the IS department was terminated and the IS employees were 
divided among the different business units. Together with some of my 
colleagues I was transferred to KPN International. 
 
 
5.4 Formal Cross-Cultural Strategies  
 
In general, KPN has a minority participation in a host-country PTO due to 
financial and strategic reasons. As KPN has a policy against acquiring shares 
just as a financial holding, the operational objectives of the shareholder are: (1) 
Creating a good working relationship with respect to the strategic contributions. 
(2) Delivery and monitoring of the quality of the contributions. (3) Creating 
strong bonds between the national PTO on the one hand, and the alliance on the 
other. (4) Establishing of a long-term relationship. Almost all of the alliances 
have the objective to change the host-country PTO into a world class telecom 
operator.40 As a result the invested money will return as high market shares. The 
problem however, is how to change the PTO? The methods of initiating change 
processes within national PTOs depends heavily on the power of the alliance. 
As a result of the minority participation only a few strategic management 
positions can be claimed within the PTO such as Chief Finance Officer or Vice-
President.  
 The Spanish Telefónica in contrast, has been very successful in the Latin 
American region with a rather unified model. After the process of change with 
the national PTO had been agreed upon, a team of highly qualified Spanish 
managers with knowledge of the Latin American culture took over all of the top 
                                                        
40 In general, shareholders have four objectives for a host-country PTO. (1) The extension of the 
number of telephone lines. (2) Digitalisation of the telephone network. (3) The extension of 
services to the customers. (4) Changing of the organisational culture of the PTO.  
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management and strategic positions. Within a short period they introduced new 
processes, new working methods, new finance systems and a new management 
culture. As a result of the unified team, no internal differences during the 
implementation of the transformation occurred. After finishing the restructuring 
of the organisation, the Telefónica managers transferred responsibility to local 
managers again leaving behind some strategic positions.  
The situation in Venezuela is the most difficult for Telefónica because of our 
minority participation. Here we deal with Americans in the top management 
and the Venezuelans. In the rest of Latin America it is ‘us’ versus the Latin 
American culture. And we speak the language, understand the mentality of 
the people and know the cultural context (Interview with Spanish CEO 
Nacional Servicios Especiales of CANTV) 
 In the execution of the objectives KPN is confronted with host-country PTOs 
that might have different objectives, a different organisational culture, different 
national culture and different perspectives. Differences in power are in these 
cases strongly related to cultural differences. KPN brings along financial 
resources, technological know-how and management experiences but has only a 
minority position in the host-country PTO. The host-country PTO has 
knowledge of the local telecom market, local culture and political context. The 
success of cooperation therefore depends heavily on how KPN deals with these 
new questions of intercultural management.  
 To achieve the earlier mentioned objectives KPN has used different methods 
such as sending Dutch expatriates and specialists, offering training for host-
country PTO management, establishing twin relations between Dutch and host-
country departments. Because KPN did not have much experience with 
international cooperation it was not very long before the organisation found out 
that a cultural training was necessary to prepare the expatriates for the 
international context. One of the training procedures employed was that run by 
the department Culture, Management & Development of the Koninklijke 
Instituut voor de Tropen (KIT). Trompenaars, Hofstede and the KIT are the 
three market leaders in the Netherlands with cross-cultural training. In Indonesia 
the American trainer Farid Elashmawi of Global Success was used. The training 
for Dutch expatriates is conducted by the head office of The Hague as well as in 
the local strategic alliances and last for two days. The program which was held 
in October 1996 in the training centre Voorlinden included an introduction to 
national and organisational cultural differences, simulations of situations, case 
studies and management differences in Asia, Central Europe and the USA. The 
trainees’ objectives of this training are: 
⋅ To obtain awareness of intercultural cooperation  
⋅ To integrate new knowledge in daily practises  
⋅ To learn to signal diversity and avoid cultural pitfalls. 
⋅ To understand cultural backgrounds. 
⋅ To recognise their own values and norms. 
⋅ To adapt behaviour to new working conditions. 
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 The focus of this training is on the transfer of knowledge on cross-cultural 
cooperation and not so much on the changing of attitudes towards cultural 
diversity. A very interesting program developed for the strategic alliance 
Unisource in 1993 by the management development departments of KPN and 
Telia, the Joint Management Development Programme (JMDP), was designed 
to achieve more than just the transfer of knowledge. The JMDP had five 
objectives. (1) To acquire a common knowledge of the mission and vision of the 
shareholder companies of Unisource and of the purpose of the alliance in the 
current business environment. (2) To establish a set of shared values, using each 
other’s strengths that would become the basis for doing business together. (3) 
To learn and experience an understanding of the dynamics of cross-cultural 
relationships and how they can be used in a multicultural business environment. 
(4) To create common concepts and perceptions for future work between the 
allied companies and individuals within them. (5) To formulate a platform for 
mutual personal experience and international networking. The programme was 
run for five years and has been attended by approximately 350 senior managers 
within the allied companies and Unisource in order to accelerate the process of 
making the strategic alliance more efficient and profitable.  
 In an evaluation of this program Oving (1996) came to the conclusion that 
the knowledge of the mission and vision of the shareholder companies, 
Unisource and the purpose of the alliance (1) increased. The effect of the JMDP 
program on the establishing of international personal networks (5) and the 
improvement of cross- cultural communication (3) was also positive. No effect 
of the program on the establishing of shared values (2) and the creation of 
common concepts and perceptions for future work (4) was found. After the 
running of the program large differences in interpretations of the goals and 
expectations of the outcomes of the alliance were still evident. Oving concluded 
that cultural factors at national and organisational level had a substantial 
influence on the cognitive outcomes, the necessary actions, the perceived 
similarity of cultures and the international cooperation. Interestingly the 
perceptions of the participants on effectiveness, profundity and solidity of the 
alliance decreased during the program. Oving (1996: 63) comes to the 
conclusion that ‘it even seems that differences between countries are 
accentuated by contact, because when confronted with other cultures people 
become aware again of their own identity’. That leads her to draw the 
conclusion that ‘while convergence affects organisations at structural level, it 
does not do so at the ‘soft’ level’ (Oving 1996: 64). She further states that the 
contacts between the employees of the different parent organisations may even 
have resulted in a reinforcement or weakening of deeply rooted stereotypes 
people have’ (Oving 1996: 66). Finally, she concluded that the programme 
achieves especially cognitive outcomes and not so much affective outcomes.  
 The outcomes of this evaluation indicate an interesting connection between 
cultural differences and cultural identity in the strategic alliance Unisource and 
its shareholder organisations. In chapter 7 the cross-cultural experiences of KPN 
in the strategic alliance Unisource are thoroughly discussed.  
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5.5 Conclusions 
 
Chapter 5 explored the context of the telecommunication industry at society and 
organisational level by focusing on the Dutch telecom market and KPN. The 
findings of the exploration show that the Dutch government restructured the 
Dutch telecom market step by step. In 1989, the state-owned PTT was 
transformed into KPN and given an autonomous status. In 1994, KPN was 
privatised and introduced to the Dutch stock market. New competitors on data 
transmission, mobile telephony and fixed telephony were gradually allowed in 
and in July 1997 the telecom market was fully liberalised. The restructuring of 
the Dutch telecom market has completely changed the environment of KPN. 
Competition has resulted in a decrease of income from international and 
national telephone traffic. The Dutch PTO was forced to restructure its 
organisation and reduce its costs in order to survive. Distinct reorganisations 
were initiated to improve the relations with the customers, to build the networks 
and organisation more efficiently and to make the costs more visible. The 
reorganisation has resulted in a new organisational structure in which the 
national and international activities are separated organised.  
 But a lean and mean organisation was not enough to survive. To compensate 
the loss of turn over at the Dutch telecom market KPN expanded their activities 
to international markets. The ambition in 1995 was to generate 25% of the 
turnover from international activities by the year 2000. From 1989 on, the 
organisation put a lot of effort into stimulating international operations by 
opening foreign offices, forming the strategic alliance Unisource and acquiring 
shareholders positions in telecom markets in Eastern Europe and Southeast 
Asia. In 1998 in order to manage the foreign investments, all of the international 
activities were concentrated in KPN International. 
 The change in the organisational structure has been accompanied by efforts 
to change the organisational culture from a bureaucracy to a business culture in 
which employees become entrepreneurs, take risks, act commercially, take 
responsibility, are competitive and are service orientated. Although the 
organisation was able to change its public image, studies discussing the subject 
of organisation culture (e.g. Nijehuis 1992, van den Berk 1994, van Schie 1995, 
Dik 1998) do not agree to on the extent of how the bureaucratic culture has 
transformed in the new business culture. The metaphors of KPN given by its 
employees however, indicate that the bureaucratic character, the importance of 
personal networks, the political arena and the fear of taking risks are still very 
important in the organisation. Chapter 6 will explore the organisational culture 
of KPN by focusing on the daily life of two employees.  
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6 THE INDIVIDUAL STRATEGIES OF KPN EMPLOYEES IN 
COPING WITH RADICAL ORGANISATIONAL CHANGES 
 
World Level
Society Level
Organisational Level
Interactional Level
Individual Level
Case 3: Indonesia
Case 1: Unisource 
Case 2: The Netherlands Antilles
Chapter 4 and 5 explored the 
fundamental changes in the national 
and international telecom markets 
and its consequences for KPN. This 
chapter explores the interactional 
and individual level of the context. 
The fundamental changes within the 
telecom market and KPN have 
influenced the daily activities and 
daily rituals of its employees. How 
do the employees cope with these 
new circumstances? What are the threats and the challenges perceived? To 
what extent has the organisational culture of KPN changed? To answer these 
questions a typical day of an International Support and an International 
Business employee are described. This gives an in depth perspective of an 
employee who is confronted with daily business, tensions, uncertainties, 
frustrations and challenges. The coping strategies used by the employees are 
distinguished by emotion regulating strategies and problem solving strategies. 
Finally, with the conclusion of the chapter ends the exploration phase of this 
thesis. 
 
 
6.1 Coping With New Situations in KPN 
 
By now we know all about the fundamental restructuring of the international 
telecom sector, the Dutch telecom market and KPN but what about the 
employees? What do they think and feel? How do they cope with the radical 
changes in their work environment? It is apparent that the restructuring of the 
telecom market has changed the work environment of the employees? The wave 
of reorganisation since 1989 has affected a greater part of the organisation. The 
former government employees have had to adjust to being commercial workers. 
Lifetime employment was no longer guaranteed, although the management has 
always maintained that it does not retrench people. New systems of rewards 
have connected performance to benefits. And due to cost reducing measures the 
employees are starting to feel more directly the consequences of the 
restructuring of the telecom market. The future of employees is no longer secure 
nor are their locations of work or job descriptions.  
Everything is unsure, that is for sure (KPN manager in ‘t hoofdkantoor, PTT 
telecom, nr. 3, 1992) 
Changing, altering your work, no longer doing things according to routine, 
signifies a lot of stress and fear…. You don’t have to be a social scientist to 
suspect that not all of the people are enthusiastic (Dik 1998: 119). 
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 By exploring the behaviour of KPN employees more information is also 
obtained on the organisational culture. Section 2.2.3 shows that the constant 
reordering of social practises by employees are limited by schemes of past 
experiences (e.g. Bourdieu 1990, Strauss and Quinn 1994, Chanlat 1994). 
Previous learned patterns of association therefore guide the employees in their 
process of coping with the radical changes in KPN. This is of importance 
because individual coping strategies of employees contribute to the success of 
the collective strategies.  
 In the next sections two employees will be introduced: Robert (International 
Support) and Ad (International Business). We learn to know Robert and Ad by 
exploring a typical day in their daily lives. The descriptions of these typical days 
illustrate the impact of the changes of the telecom market on Robert and Ad and 
show the strategies they used to cope with these changes and how these are 
connected to the coping strategies of KPN the organisation culture. 
 
 
6.2 A Typical Day in the Life of an International Support Employee 
 
6.2.1 The International Support Office in The Hague 
Biography of Robert 
Robert is a 39-years-old KPN employee. He 
has worked with the International Support 
Department for three years. Robert has 
studied Mathematics-Computer Science at 
the Delft University and started to work 
with KPN Research in 1984. He switched 
over to KPN and changed jobs four times. 
Recently he started working in change-
management projects. Robert works four 
days a week because he likes to enjoy his 
spare time. Robert likes traveling and the 
international aspect of his work. During the 
week he works abroad, in the weekend he is 
at home. He lives in Leiden together with 
his partner. 
It is 7.15, Monday morning, when Robert’s alarm clock wakes him up. It is 
cold, dark and the rain taps on the bedroom window. He gets out of bed, takes a 
shower, dresses and packs his small suitcase with clean clothing, CDs and a 
novel. In his other case he has packed his notebook, some reports, the newest 
KPN Nieuwsblad and some 
other papers to read. Robert 
makes strong coffee while his 
partner gets out of bed and 
hurries to prepare and leave 
for her work at 7.55 am. They 
make an appointment for the 
evening before kissing 
goodbye. At 8.10 am Robert 
straps his luggage onto his 
bicycle and rides to Delft 
Central train station to get his 
8.21 train to The Hague. The 
dark grey sky indicates more 
rain or perhaps even snow 
later that day. It is busy and 
the train rolls in five minutes 
too late. Robert will first go to 
the International Support 
office in The Hague before he continues his passage to Schiphol in the 
afternoon. Today Robert flies again to Prague for another week of work with 
SPT Telecom. 
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 The train is full of people who have no place to sit and their newspapers. 
Robert arrives at the station of the Laan van Nieuw Oost Indië at 8.45 am. On 
the left side of the train the offices of the Nationale Nederlanden, Siemens and 
the Ministry of Social Affairs appear. The slender green tower and the huge 
round telecommunication tower indicate the presence of KPN. At the train 
station the passengers, most of whom are office employees, get off and descend 
the small staircase through the pedestrian tunnel. Slowly the mass of people 
transforms into a long line that passes in single file through the small exit door. 
Robert accelerates his steps to arrive at the door while the door is still open 
before it shuts. Outside, a larger number of office workers enter the Ministry of 
Social Affairs. These workers are dressed casually with only the incidental male 
employee wearing a tie and most female employees wearing colourful clothing. 
The other office workers turn to the left where a large artistic installation in 
neon lights attracts their attention. The 30-meter long wide neon piece of art 
represents the surface of the earth with an exotic volcano and a metropolis at the 
left side and another metropolis on the other side of a sea. An aeroplane flies 
above the sea in the sky and every 15 seconds the bright sun transforms into a 
blue moon. The neon art in blue, red, yellow and green is located at the KPN 
mobile network services building and symbolises the international character of 
telecommunications. A smaller part of the office crowd enter this building, 
others continue to the Siemens building or even further on to the Nationale 
Nederlanden office. Those who are heading for the AA tower or for other KPN 
offices follow the turn in the road. Robert never waits for the green pedestrian 
light to cross the busy street but instead tries to find a break in the row of cars to 
cross. This saves him some time. He can also cut across the corner of an empty 
piece of ground opposite the green tower. A path in the vegetation indicates that 
the office workers frequently use this route. Robert then arrives at the Prinses 
Beatrixlaan also nicknamed “the PTT allee [PTT Avenue]” because of the many 
telecom buildings located here such as the AA, AB, AC, ASL, PB, KS, SK, 
FGH and MBL building. Close relations with the Dutch government centre have 
determined the location of the KPN buildings in The Hague. A greater part of 
the head offices are located in the Dutch governmental city of The Hague near 
the ministerial departments. Due to the spreading of governmental 
administration to the north of the Netherlands in the eighties another part of the 
head office has been located in Groningen. The spread of the many buildings 
has stimulated the fragmentation instead of the integration of the various units. 
 The employees entering the prestigious AA building are generally dressed in 
dark suits. They wear light raincoats and carry black attaché cases. Here is 
where the top management is located. On the 18th floor is the office of the Board 
of Directors, on the 17th is the board of KPN Telecom, the TPG Group is on the 
16th and on the 15th to the 7th is the TPG Group. KPN Telecom has its offices 
from the 1st to the 7th floor. Robert continues to the low AB building where a 
security officer checks passes for entry. He doesn’t have to use his entrance pass 
because another employee has already opened the door. He greets the security 
officer and takes the stairs to the second floor. It is 9.00 am when Robert looks 
at his watch. The clock in the hall indicates 10.23 am but Robert does not notice 
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this because it has not been working for the last two years. He walks straight to 
the secretary at the end of the hall where he collects his mail. He takes a little 
time to chat with the secretaries, because he has not been here for some weeks. 
They are pleased to see him and ask about his experiences and “adventures” in 
Prague. For a larger part of the Dutch colleagues working abroad is like having 
holiday, unless your post is in Kiev or some other Eastern European city. One of 
the secretaries will be spending her holidays in Prague next summer and asks 
about the highlights of the city. She will be visiting Robert and his KPN 
colleagues in Prague. He informs them that he is leaving again for Prague later 
that same day. They agree to send office mail to his home address in the 
Netherlands since he will be abroad for the next two weeks. Robert takes a free 
cup of coffee from one of the coffee tables in the hall while on the way to his 
own office just as Jonathan comes in. He greets Robert enthusiastically and asks 
him how he is doing in Prague. They haven’t seen each other for a long time. 
They exchange work experiences, personal developments and news over the 
latest steps in reorganisation. Other colleagues also inquire on Robert’s 
experiences in the Czech Republic. 
 Finally Robert finishes the conversation and goes to his room because he has 
to finish a report that he must take to Prague. The room that he shares with four 
other people contains three desks, two monitors and one printer. He takes out 
his notebook, connects it to the network, printer and monitor and gives his 
password to gain access to his mailbox. When a colleague comes in to discuss 
some private matters, Robert stands up and closes the door. The hall is a public 
area where employees can meet each other. It is also possible to walk into a 
room when the door is open but when a door is closed you have to knock and 
wait before entering. In contrast to Robert, who is dressed casually because of 
his travel arrangements, the colleague is dressed in suit and tie because he has 
an appointment with a customer later. While employees are generally free to 
choose their own clothing, there are certain dress codes in the International 
Support department, which must be observed. The consultant has to be dressed 
formally if he/she is visiting a customer, but if he/she is working in the office no 
tie or suit is needed. Sandals, socks made of goat wool, earrings on men, torn 
clothing, shorts and long beards are absolutely forbidden. The dress code has 
changed since the end of the eighties; much more attention is now paid to 
clothing details and presentation.  
 It is 9.45 am when Robert returns to the writing of the report, which proves 
to be more difficult than he thought it would be. It is not so much the subject of 
the report that he struggles with but that it has to be written in English. He 
already learned English in high school and at the Leiden University where he 
studied Mathematics and speaking English is therefore not so much of a 
problem. But writing reports in English is certainly somewhat more demanding.  
 An IS colleague from Prague calls Robert in panic on his mobile telephone. 
The report they have been working in Prague on has been lost in the course of a 
colleague suddenly returning home. The problem is being solved but this call 
reminds Robert of his flight that afternoon and he calls the Business Travel 
service in Schiphol using the office telephone. He will fly Amsterdam-Prague 
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on the non-stop KLM flight KL 259 at 14.15 pm. He was initially scheduled to 
fly on Monday morning at 9.45 am as he usually does so he has to check 
whether the necessary change has been made and that the ticket is ready to be 
picked up at Schiphol.  
 The door of Robert’s room is open. In the hall a colleague asks the IS 
manager: ‘are you going to that meeting yet? I have to go to the same meeting’. 
‘Well yes’ responds the manager, ’ then I will be sure to be there in advance so I 
can speak with Hans’, he waits for a moment and groans, ‘nobody knows that 
Hans and I have been to a musical together in London’ (observation in IS 
department). That is one of the reasons Robert shows his face every now and 
then in the IS office in the Netherlands. When working abroad it is difficult to 
maintain personal networks in the organisation. And personal networks are 
important within KPN.41 These networks are vital for obtaining information, in 
cases of emergency, for asking for favours, getting things done and for 
obtaining new jobs.42 
I knew Hans very well. He was also working in Amsterdam. He went with 
the third wave to Prague. That was in 1995. He was very positive. So, one 
thing leads to another. He wanted me to come and have a look here. I visited 
him for two days and I liked it (interview with KPN employee in Prague). 
 It is 11 am when a colleague invites Robert to the secretary’s room: “Come, 
we are getting pastry!”. That morning the head of the IS department celebrates 
his birthday in the secretaries’ room with traditional pastry. He is congratulated 
where he stands next to the tea trolley with the silver coffee-pot and the white 
teapot. The room is filled with IS employees talking with each other in small 
groups while the secretaries continue their jobs. The celebration of the 
employees’ birthdays is one of the office rituals at IS and is generally paid 
                                                        
41 One of the well-known personal networks within KPN is the network of  the “Voorlindenaren”. 
These networks date back to the period of 1950 up to 1974 when young PTT employees were 
trained for their leading positions in the organisation at the estate Voorlinden in Wassenaar. Every 
year 30 to 40 candidates passed the two- year course for Hoger Personeel Exploitatieve Dienst 
(HPED) or the three-year course for Hoger Personeel Technische Dienst (HPTD). The training 
included accommodation in Voorlinden. In their third year the HPED candidates stayed on the 
estate. During these “lodging” periods networks were created which still function within KPN 
today. Although many of these managers have been replaced with new external management, 122 
“Voorlindenaren” still hold influential middle management positions. Although the influence of 
these old networks in contemporary KPN organisation has decreased their presence is still 
remarkable:  
The 122 Voorlindenaren who are still working with PTT Telecom have generally developed 
themselves within the bureaucratic culture or they have been able to survive by means of a very 
strong social network (van der Putten, 1996: 76). 
42 The existence of personal networks is related to another important value within KPN: loyalty. 
Being loyal to the organisation has been the best strategy for the employees during the pre-
privatisation period. Loyalty was then honoured with lifetime employment and promotion and is 
still important within the organisation.  
Loyalty is number one in the organisation. If you are not loyal to the organisation you can forget 
about your career. Of course my financial gains will be assessed at the end of the year. They asses 
every cent of it. Loyalty can therefore not easily be materialised. You do not use your networks for 
daily business but only in emergency cases -if something special happens. Then they will treat you 
will special priority. In return I will help my colleagues if help is needed from my department 
(Interview with ‘Voorlindenenaar’). 
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attention to by the management. Sometimes employees are reminded in advance 
of their own birthday since it is the person celebrating his/her birthday who 
must buy the pastry. For some of the employees presents such as ties and books 
are given. Once, three IS employees celebrated their birthday in an unusual way 
by serving Dutch pea soup with bread and bacon at noon. Although everybody 
liked it very much, it was clear that the party of more than twenty IS employees 
in the hall caused a negative image. When one of the members of the top 
management passed the group he commented: “Now I understand why the 
tariffs of you consultants have been raised!”. 
 Other modern office rituals that take place within the IS department are the 
rituals of integration that serve to integrate the individual consultants working in 
the IS department. In these rituals values and norms are also discussed and set. 
Examples of these rituals are regular meetings, readings, informal dinners and 
an annual workers’ party. The rituals of departure are diverse. If somebody 
leaves the organisation a small farewell party is given in the office so everybody 
can say goodbye to their colleague. With the merging of the old IS unit and the 
new IS group in the summer of 1997 a departure ritual was held at the beach in 
Scheveningen with a beach volleyball competition, barbecue, dance party and 
campfire. The employees received caps with the name of the unit and the dates 
1995-1997 on it. On special celebrations like the dissolution party, the annual 
employees’ party and the unit’s New Year party the use of cabaret is very 
popular. Sketches and songs are written and performed by IS employees. In 
these performances it is allowed to criticise the management in public. The 
usual hierarchy is turned upside down for one evening. 
 Robert joins in the birthday celebrations for only 10 minutes before returning 
to his office to continue working on his report. It is 11.55 am when a few 
colleagues drop in and ask him to join them for lunch. Every day small groups 
of International Support employees go to the 7th floor of the AB building where 
the company restaurant is located. Lunching before 12 am saves some waiting 
time since the lunch crowd has not yet arrived. Different kinds of bread, milk, 
warm snacks and even full meals can be obtained. Today Robert takes a slice of 
bread and ham with fried egg, a half litre of buttermilk, a salad and yoghurt, 
which in total costs him Dfl 5.50. Robert waits for his colleagues before 
walking to one of the free tables in the crowded restaurant. They usually take a 
seat at one of the round non-smoking tables near the corridor. More than five 
people would not fit the table and five is just enough to catch up on daily news, 
company gossip, holiday experiences and projects in progress.  
 That day the discussion is on the changes in the organisation. Stories are told 
about how many employees will be fired and all kinds of estimated figures 
ranging from 0 to 15 000 are put on the table but nobody really knows. It is 
uncertain as to what extent competition reduces the turnover. The future of the 
IS department is also uncertain due to political decisions and internal cost 
reductions. A 55-year-old experienced employee tells: ‘I have seen many 
reorganisations during my life with KPN. I will also survive this one. Besides, 
with only 3 years more to go I can already retire’. He can opt for the 55+ clause 
that makes it attractive for older employees to leave the organisation. His 
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colleague, a couple of years younger, is not so sure about his pension. “I do 
have to worry because you don’t know if this clause will stay in effect. There is 
still a good possibility that it will, but I don’t know”, he says. The other 
participants are joking about what their next professions might be. The IS 
manager asks if he is licensed to drive trailers so he can work with the postal 
services during the Christmas season. ‘They are always in need of workers then’ 
says the IS manager. The colleague answers: ‘I don’t mind driving around in 
such a red car [TPG Group. AvM] or with a trailer to Italy’.  
 From the nature of the discussion it can be concluded that the turbulence in 
the international telecom market has certainly affected the IS employees. The 
employees don’t have to fear dismissal but they do have to be flexible in 
adapting to new jobs within the organisation. The new job could be at another 
location in the Netherlands, within a different unit and with different colleagues. 
A larger part of IS employees are willing to adapt but the perspective of these 
employees on the role of the organisation has changed from: ‘the company that 
takes care of you and will find another job for you’ to:‘you have to take care of 
yourself’. 
 
 (citaat weggehaald) 
 
6.2.2 In the Afternoon to the Office in Prague 
It is 1 pm when Robert hurries out of his office and travels by train to Schiphol 
airport where he flies with the KL 259 to Prague. First he goes to the Business 
Service counter where he is pleasantly surprised to find his ticket. More than 
once the ticket has not been available and telephone calls had to be made for a 
last moment solution. Robert passes the customers and runs to the departure gate 
were he is just in time to get the 2.15 pm flight to Prague. Check in has already 
started but he has made it! In the plane he meets an IS colleague. It is not 
crowded so they sit next to each other in the economy class. Taking the 9.45 
flight on Monday morning to Prague or the Friday afternoon flight at 2.45 pm or 
5 pm back to Amsterdam he generally meets more colleagues. Robert talks with 
his colleague, reads his report, looks out of the window and eats the light lunch. 
The KL 259 arrives at 3.45 pm at Prague. Both men have only hand luggage so 
they go directly through customs to the automatic bank machine in the hall of 
the airport to obtain 3000 Czech Krones (US$ 100). Outside they take a taxi and 
drive along the Moldou River to the TelSource project office that is located at 
Delnická 12.43 It is busy in Prague and they only arrive there at 4.15 pm. 
 The old and grey SPT office cannot be recognised from outside. No sign 
indicates the existence of a telecom operator. The national operator Správa Post 
a Telekomunikací (SPT) (Post and Telecommunication Administration) was 
founded in January 1994. In order to meet the new challenges of the 
international telecom market SPT Telecom set out to maintain its leading 
position in the Czech Republic and become one of the leading telecom operators 
on an international scale. In addition it sought to meet the requirements of its 
                                                        
43 Telsource is the strategic alliance of KPN (51%) and Swiss Telecom (49%) that owns 27% in the 
Czech operator SPT Telecom. 
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national customers, to satisfy its shareholders and to create a good working 
environment for the employees (Company Profile 1996). These ambitions 
demanded radical and fundamental changes in the structure and culture of the 
company. For the necessary financial and managerial support SPT Telecom 
selected the strategic alliance TelSource as partner. The transformation of SPT 
Telecom into a world class operator was and is currently being carried out in the 
following ways: 
⋅ The deployment of foreign managers from the stakeholders companies on 
strategic positions in SPT Telecom. 
⋅ The recruitment of new management from other Czech industries. 
⋅ The establishment of a Telsource back-office in the stakeholders’ companies.  
⋅ Training of the SPT management. 
⋅ Twin relation programs with districts in the Netherlands. 
⋅ Study tours for the SPT management to the Netherlands  
⋅ The Kontroly project in which a new system is introduced to control the 
telecommunication network.  
 
 Robert has been temporarily hired to work in the Kontroly project. At the 
end of the project he can return to a new project in the Netherlands. He likes this 
arrangement because it enables him to choose to work in the Netherlands 
whenever he does not want to work abroad anymore or his partner prefers that 
he works only in the Netherlands. The objective of this project is to get control 
of the operations and maintenance activities of SPT Telecom, which results in 
better telecommunication services on all levels. The project which began in 
February 1996 and was to be implemented over a course of three to five years. 
The projects symbol is a funny owl with an SPT Telecom hat saying “Nejdíve 
získáme kontroly nad sítí” (First we get control of the network). 
 The security officer who wears a blue uniform, a cap and a pair of Adidas 
sports shoes, steps aside when Robert and his colleague greet him with “Dóbry 
Den” (good afternoon) and show their passes. They also greet the Czech SPT 
employees when entering the lift. In the lift music is played from a Czech radio 
station. They stop at the seventh floor where the project Kontroly (Control) is 
located. In the corridor Robert meets a Czech colleague wearing slippers with 
white socks. Robert is just in time for a meeting with his Dutch project leader 
and his Czech colleague, František to explain the report he has written. After the 
introduction of his report František commends Robert’s report. By means of 
checking and contra-checking, ideas and opinions are exchanged in the English 
language. Every once in a while Robert asks František: ‘so if I do understand 
you well, you mean this..’. Sometimes Robert explains the difference of the use 
of a verb and a noun to František. František regularly interrupts the conversation 
to ask something or to explain his point of view; ‘it is different/slower here in 
Czech Republic’. He makes a point of the danger and the difficulty of 
centralising the network operations. More than 256 directors and managers will 
loose their jobs if the new plans are introduced. Not more than 5% can be 
transferred to other jobs in a Czech organisation. The implementation of the 
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project therefore needs to be conducted with close cooperation with the HRM 
department.  
 The meeting finishes at 5.15 pm and Robert walks to the secretary’s room at 
the beginning of the hall to collect his mail. There he reads on the lunch roster 
that the next day is his turn to prepare the lunch. The lunches are prepared by 
one of the participants of the lunch group and takes place in the secretaries’ 
room. He or she has to collect some money from the pot in which every 
participant puts around five Dutch guilders (2,5 US$) for every lunch. The 
lunches generally take place around 1 pm and include 8 to 15 people. Only 
Dutch people participate in the lunch group. Apart from this group there is also 
a group of Dutch people who bring their own food. The person who prepares the 
lunch has to calculate how many people will have lunch and goes to the Delvita 
supermarket at the corner of the street to buy bread, orange juice, milk, cheese, 
pâté, salads, yoghurt and fruits. The table then has to be prepared and colleagues 
summoned to lunch. During the meal the employees sit in different “rings”. The 
first ring consists of chairs around the table where the Dutch employees are 
seated. The second ring is by the windowsill where the Swiss colleagues are 
seated. Lastly there are Czech secretariat employees who stay behind their 
desks. After the lunch, the table is cleaned by the one who is in charge of 
organising the lunch and the dishes are returned to the kitchen. Sometimes the 
Czech secretariat employees take what is left behind.  
 At 5.30 pm, a Czech teacher comes in for Czech language classes. For one 
and a half hours every week Robert and his colleague have language classes. A 
larger part of the KPN employees learn the Czech language when they intend to 
stay for more than a year. The company provides these employees with a Czech 
teacher who gives classes at the office in small groups after working hours. Like 
his colleagues Robert finds it interesting but also difficult to learn and time 
consuming. He knows he will leave the Czech Republic again to work maybe in 
another country and will therefore stop with these lessons soon. The teacher 
uses a part of the lessons to explain cultural and historical aspects of the Czech 
culture. It is this part Robert is really interested in.  
 As part of the preparations for the project, team members attend a one day 
cross-cultural training in the Netherlands in which they are introduced to the 
political history, the business culture, Czech literature, comparison between 
western and Czech culture and case material which is discussed. Emphasis is 
made on the history of the Czech Republic and its people. Attention is paid to 
the importance of developing the right working attitude: not being arrogant, 
respecting people, fitting in with and discerning how one can help the 
organisation. The training also creates a common frame of reference. 
We now can explain each other’s experience. That is very helpful, because a 
foreign culture is different from ours. You notice that especially in small 
things. When you can explain these experiences, you also can handle them 
better (Internal Project Report, February 24, 1997).  
 Robert has learned to check on the opinions of his Czech colleagues before 
starting a meeting. The meeting can then be more effective because he already 
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knows everybody’s opinion. Roberts’ eagerness to learn more about the Czech 
context puts him in a dilemma. The more he wants to learn from his Czech 
colleagues and about the Czech culture the more he distances himself from his 
own Dutch project team. If he only concentrates on his project order, the linking 
of the project with the organisational context is in danger. A much better impact 
can be achieved when he solves problems of linking the project to the 
organisation by consulting Czech SPT Telecom employees. But this path is 
politically and culturally sensitive, more difficult to progress in and time 
consuming. Furthermore, it is difficult to recruit SPT employees that are well 
qualified according to Dutch standards. KPN will judge Robert’s performance 
on the progress of his project. Therefore, he chooses to concentrate on his 
project:  
When it comes down to it you need them [Dutch colleagues]. If you want to 
be successful in your work you need them. There are a few people who can 
hinder me work and they are in the project. If the Czechs are not satisfied I 
can change that perspective. But if my project-manager is not satisfied with 
me than I don’t have any protection any more and I am out of the running. 
 Time pressure forces the Dutch project leader of Kontroly to work faster and 
more efficiently. Working with Czech colleagues is far more difficult and time 
consuming. Given the situation the option to obtain more Dutch colleagues is 
far more attractive. As a result a decreasing number of Czech SPT employees 
and a growing number of Dutch employees are working on the project. In the 
first phase of the Kontroly project this is not so much of a problem because KPN 
is designing and implementing new procedures. But in the implementation 
phase the lack of Czech employees will make the implementation more difficult. 
Czech employees have to work with these new procedures. It will be difficult to 
implement a Dutch solution in a Czech organisation.  
Here in the Czech Republic it is hard to get information on the details of the 
process. You don’t speak the language, you don’t know enough about the 
mentality. So it is difficult to describe that detailed level, but the Czechs 
expect this from us (interview with KPN employee). 
 Robert has also learned that investing in personal relations with Czech 
colleagues is an important strategy to be successful in work. He shows pictures 
of his family back home in the Netherlands to his Czech colleagues and is 
interested in the personal lives of his direct colleagues. Robert has learned that 
he is dependent of the commitment that he gets from his Czech counterparts. He 
realises that the resistance of the Czech SPT employees has to do with his own 
behaviour. When he imagines himself in the situation of his Czech colleagues 
he realises he would probably react in the same way. Robert’s strategy has 
resulted in some successful cooperation and adaptation to the Czech culture. 
We first tried to transform the idea of a knowledge centre to the Czech 
counterpart by means of a Dutch expert. The presentation was translated into 
Czech but I didn’t like it that way. It didn’t make sense, the people didn’t 
understand what it was all about. This was repeated three times. Then we 
  
 126 
decided to ask the new Czech project leader to make a presentation. He had 
to learn the material and methodology, but it was a success. The sheets were 
maybe not very presentable, with too much information and there were too 
many sheets but it made sense to the people in the hall. And that was the 
point, since then, the project really started (interview with KPN employee).  
6.2.3 Private and Work Identities Melting Together 
At 7 pm Robert and three of his colleagues leave the office and head for the 
Alfons Mujer restaurant on the west bank of Prague. They take the SPT project 
car because none of them have a car in Prague. All of them travel by public 
transport. The restaurant is beautifully restored and displays paintings of the 
Prague born Alfons Mujer. It is empty in the restaurant. It is 8 pm Robert when 
orders soup, goulash with pieces of bread and sauce and a dessert for 250 
kronen (4 US dollars). For these prices it is not worth making your own meal, 
hence they go out to eat. At 9.30 pm the dinner is finished and everybody 
returns home. Robert accompanies two of his colleagues to their home. One is 
living in the Alta Praha hotel in which KPN has hired a vast amount of rooms. 
The hotel is a walking distance away from the project office. Robert goes to a 
pub with the other two. Not so much the cross- cultural differences as much as 
the internal tension within the Dutch expatriates group surprises the employees. 
The Dutch group in Prague is far from homogenous. Four kinds of employees 
can be distinguished: (1) visitors (2) consultants (3) TelSource employees and 
(4) expatriates. 
 Within these four groups of employees experienced Dutch workers 
distinguish themselves from the newcomers. In the perspective of the 
experienced project workers the newcomers are energetic, highly motivated, 
come in with plenty of new plans, want to turn the project around 180 degrees 
and to introduce new internal procedures. They keep the experienced workers 
from working, think they know what is right and wrong but have no connections 
with the Czech organisation at all. The constant renewal of Dutch people tires 
the experienced Dutch employees.  
I notice that the elasticity decreases, and that may sound negative but if I 
may say so, in the beginning I had more elbowroom, I could handle the 
things that happened better. In the beginning I thought, gosh, ok, that is the 
way it is. But at a certain point something started to wring at personal level. 
Too much is being asked at a social level: too much adaptation, and too fast 
(interview with KPN employee). 
 The lack of social networks in Prague radically changes and affects work and 
private relations.  People that use to be colleagues in the Netherlands now 
become social friends. While most of the employees have a clearly divided 
personal and work life here in Prague, the borders are vague. Every now and 
then a group of 15 Dutch KPN employees gather in one of the employees’ 
apartments and cook a meal together. Most of the project members like Robert 
regularly return to the Netherlands for the weekends. On Thursdays and Fridays, 
rituals of departure are played out at the secretariat where people sign up for the 
2 pm or 3.15 pm flights at the airport. The Dutch employees hurry to finish their 
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work, print their reports, pack their notebooks, take their luggage, say goodbye 
to the Czech secretary and run for their taxis. The social life of these employees 
is constructed around their work. 
I notice that I interact much more with my colleagues. So much so that it is 
almost extreme. We do everything together. We play tennis, have dinner, 
talk about work. It is very difficult not to talk about your work (Interview 
with KPN employee). 
 Not only the absence of social networks of friends and family is felt but also 
the lack of personal possessions in the living quarters. It is difficult to replace 
the intimate relations and living conditions back home. Robert notices that the 
mourning process of the death of a good friend of his in the Netherlands stops 
when he is in Prague. Not being in a familiar context and with nobody to talk to 
that has also known his friend makes it difficult for him to resolve his feelings. 
Of course friends and family pass by for a weekend or a week’s visit but when 
something serious happens he feels far away from home and wants to return as 
soon as possible. Personal relationships in the Netherlands also start being 
perceived in a different way.  
Last time I made an appointment with a friend in Amsterdam on Friday 
evening, we went to a restaurant, talked the whole evening, got drunk and by 
the time we returned home it was already 5 am The whole weekend my 
partner and I were out of sync and that was not nice. I want to see other 
people but I don’t think I will do that anymore (interview with Robert). 
6.2.4 Coping Strategies to Solve Problems  
While a rather small part of the IS employees perceive the changes in the 
organisation as threats the majority view these as new challenges. The IS 
employees employ different coping strategies to deal with the changed 
organisational context. A small number of employees have started their own 
consultancy agency with guaranteed orders for two years. Looking for another 
position in or outside the organisation is a popular coping strategy.   
One of the colleagues tells that he is returning to his former unit. He has 
been working there for ten years before coming to the IS department four 
years ago. Another colleague brings to his attention that he has left his 
former unit because he did not like it and he said that he would never go 
back again. He admits that not so much the transformation in the new IS 
department but the uncertainty of what is going to happen has played an 
important role in his decision to return to his former unit (Participation 
during a small farewell party of three IS employees, May 1996). 
 The most popular strategy is that of job hopping within KPN itself. This 
strategy combines the best of both worlds: the protection of the organisation and 
the option to choose one’s own job. KPN offers the advantage of this choice. 
Consequently, employees are able to participate in a range and variety of 
interesting projects and do in fact change jobs quite frequently. This increases 
their possibilities of change in career. Young academic employees change 
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position every 1.3 years while Voorlindenaren employees change only every 4.2 
years. Experienced management executives change jobs every 1.9-year (van der 
Putten 1996). 
 In 1996 Robert applied for a project in Prague. He likes the challenge of 
working abroad: ‘I am still young enough. If I do not do it right now, I will 
never do it’. The possibility of developing a higher financial income is another 
motivation. The IS employees rather choose a professional rather than a general 
managerial position. Becoming a manager is not seen as a wise survival strategy 
due to reorganisation in the middle management.  
 The changes at the telecom market open up new career possibilities with the 
competitors. All kinds of technicians are in demand by national and 
international competitors, which offer competitive salaries and working 
conditions. This offers the employees possibilities of escape when the pressure 
of uncertainty is perceived as too high. Although people do usually indicate that 
they are thinking of leaving the organisation if the uncertainty is too high, the 
loyalty to KPN is still strong enough to prevent most from leaving. 
 The majority of the IS employees have remained with the organisation and 
have themselves taken the initiative to find new jobs or new activities instead of 
waiting for instructions. One of KPN’s leading strategic advisers has taken the 
initiative to form a group of 30 young marketing managers to stimulate new 
ways of thinking, working and communicating within the organisation. This 
group has chosen to publish atypical publication leaflets such as Work-Out-Site, 
United we stand, divided we fall and Back on the Track in which they stimulate 
head office employees to radically change their work perspective.  
You have to believe that it does not matter whether you stay or leave KPN. If 
you are really good you don’t have to worry. In the long term a more 
independent attitude is much better for the company. Fear of dismissal with 
all the negative impact is therefore not necessary (interview with KPN 
employee). 
 Small-scale initiatives are based upon personal enterprises and stimulate and 
transform their direct context. What these people have in common is that they 
try to transform negative attitudes and threats into positive undertakings and 
new possibilities. The messages are positive; look for satisfaction and fun in 
your job, create your own small virtual business, no longer criticise your context 
but take initiative and do things differently, spread the seed of new thoughts 
throughout the organisation. Quite a number of IS employees choose this 
strategy. The top management of KPN supported this internal change but the 
initiatives were also met by criticisms from other employees because of the 
“religious” nature of the “movement”.  
 
(citaat weggehaald) 
 
6.2.5 Coping Strategies to Regulate Emotions 
Apart from individual strategies that are used in attempt to relieve the stress and 
anxiety of uncertainty various strategies are also used to regulate emotions. 
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These strategies are employed in order to cope with situations that are as such 
impossible to solve. A large number of the IS employees cope with the new 
situation by simply waiting for whatever might come them way. They try to 
speculate as to which which changes will occur and where. Only if these affect 
their personal situation is action really seen as necessary. Because many of these 
employees have already experienced reorganisation they have come to the 
conclusion that they can survive the next reorganisation by staying calm and not 
panicking. This strategy is quite popular with the IS employees who are 
experienced, highly educated workers and therefore have enough possibilities 
for other jobs in KPN or in other organisations. Only a small group of 
employees seriously worry about the future of their job and their company. 
Instead of looking for new challenges these worries result in a passive attitude 
towards changes and the future of the company. They let it happen as it happens 
and only start to get seriously concerned if their daily routines change.  
 The creation of taboos is another way of regulating emotions within KPN. 
The concept of taboos comes from the Polynesian word tapu and signifies the 
sacred, the forbidden with supernatural sanctions. Within organisations taboos 
are used to prescribe or proscribe certain behaviours that help to manage shared 
anxieties (Trice and Beyer 1993: 107). Organisational taboos are behaviours 
that are compulsively avoided and viewed by the members of an organisation as 
prohibited. A taboo is usually unspoken and unwritten and, points out a 
problematic or weak element in the organisation and can be seen as a negative 
ritual. They are taken for granted and apparently emerge from historical 
coincidences that brought feared events and the prohibited behaviour into 
association with each other. Trice and Beyer (1993: 109) give some examples of 
organisational taboos such as the open discussion of the actual amount of salary 
or stock options one receives, the expression of one’s true feelings and 
emotions, or mentioning unthinkable corporate disasters. Even in rationalised 
settings like workplaces people resort to non-rational behaviour to manage their 
anxieties and conflicts and dissipate their uncertainties. By doing as the culture 
prescribes people hope to avoid what they most fear (Trice and Beyer 1993: 
109). 
 In an IS workshop on product development employees surprisingly 
mentioned a lot of behaviour that is prohibited. Hence another session was held 
with a group of 15 employees to discuss the existence of taboos. The discussion 
was an attempt to explore the taboos and the situation that has lead to these 
taboos. It could then be seen how strategies, which are generally used to 
regulate emotion can be transformed into problem solving strategies. From those 
two sessions a list of behaviours that is compulsively avoided and viewed by the 
employees as prohibited was drawn up. This list can be clustered in five distinct 
groups of behaviour. 
 Each group of behaviour reflects one underlying taboo. (1) The behaviour in 
the first group is focused on avoiding criticism of the management. The ending 
of a project by an IS employee, refusing a new project, questioning the boss’ 
decisions, airing personal and honest opinions and, entering into open conflict 
are kinds of behaviour that are avoided by the IS employees. Such behaviour 
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reflects the taboo that an employee must not show disloyalty to the company. 
(2) The behaviour in the second group is focused on the avoidance of deviancy. 
This behaviour denies the democratic and harmonious character of the 
organisation in which all of the employees are equal. The showing of deviant 
ambitions and the expression of deviant opinions are also avoided by IS 
employees. This behaviour reflects the taboo that the harmony within the 
organisation must not be threatened. (3) The third group comprises types of 
behaviour that avoid the showing of vulnerability. By making decisions, taking 
risks, showing responsibility and initiating a project without the approval of the 
boss an employee makes him/herself vulnerablefor failure. When loosening the 
control over a project, skipping procedures and asking for assistance or help an 
employee runs the risk of being punished. This behaviour reflects the taboo that 
an employee must not show vulnerability. (4) With the behaviour in the fourth 
group IS employees hope to avoid emotional outbursts. Getting angry or 
annoyed, crying, the sharing of deep worries are emotions that are only shown 
behind closed doors in the organisation. This behaviour reflects the taboo that 
an employee does not show his emotions at the workplace.  
 
Acting Emotionality Showing Diversity 
Emotions have to be kept behind 
closed doors 
Getting angry, annoyed, cursing and 
swearing 
Show understanding for resistance of 
employees 
Taking care of each other 
Sharing your worries  
Not everybody is equal 
The organisation is not democratic 
and not harmonious 
Deviant behaviour 
Deviant ambitions 
Deviant opinions 
Discussing uniformity 
Diversity of house style and names 
Showing Vulnerability Being Critical 
Making decisions, taking risks 
Taking responsibility 
Less control and procedures 
Starting projects without the 
approval of your boss 
Not being able to do something  
Wait instead of intervene 
Asking for help or assistance 
Learning from others 
Appeal on errors made by others 
Preference of personal objectives 
Employee is ending a project 
Refusing a new project Not doing 
what is asked for 
Asking for clear assignments 
Questioning the boss’ decisions 
Being not loyal 
Openly using power to reach 
objectives 
Entering open conflicts  
Airing personal and honest opinions 
Other Taboos  
Abolishing the Telecom districts 
Moving the Board to The Hague  
Firing people 
Talk about costs 
 
Figure 9. List of taboos  
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 To ease their own uncertainty and frustration, employees air their criticisms 
by cracking jokes, gossiping, singing songs and in cabaret. Many jokes are 
made within the IS department about what has gone wrong in the organisation. 
The best way to pass criticism is by means of cabaret sketches, which is 
acceptable and is even stimulated. Being named in one of the songs or sketches 
ironically raises the status of the involved manager. Not naming the manager is 
a greater insult than giving him/her the most criticism. Cabaret sketches are also 
used during department gatherings to critise the management: 
 
High Larry, look up high Larry / Higher lures another job, Larry /  
Silly, silly Larry / Bye Larry, silly, silly Larry 
Is now with CBN / Where he does not know anybody yet /  
But is now closer to Uncle Ben 
High Larry, look up high Larry / because the top entices there 
(Farewell song for a KPN manager by IS employees) 
 
 Other coping strategies include the viewing of work as a game in which 
players can either loose or win, the maintaining and establishing of personal 
networks and the showing of resistance. Although the IS employees are 
relatively flexible these same employees also show resistance. When the old IS 
unit merged with other units to form the new IS departments the new manager 
came to explain the new organisation. After the manager had left, intensive 
discussion started on how the new cooperation felt like a take-over instead of a 
merger. These discussions were based upon fear of a change of focus from the 
internal to the external market, fear of the style of working and fear for their 
respective positions within the new organisation. 
   
 
6.3 A typical Day in the Life of an International Business Employee 
 
6.3.1 A Day at The International Business Office  
It is 6.15 am in the morning when Ad gets out of bed and prepares himself for 
the day. He leaves his house in Amsterdam at 7 am. By that time his wife and 
three children are awake and preparing for school. Ad has to leave that early in 
order to avoid the heavy 8 am traffic jam on the way to The Hague. The IB 
employees have two distinct kinds of workdays: a day at the home office or a 
day abroad. A typical day at the office usually means either a day during a 
project or a day between two projects. During the course of a project, such as 
the possible acquisition of a share in a telecom operator in another country, Ad’s 
working hours are chaotic starting at 7 am and continuing late into the night.  
 When there is no project running Ad’s working day starts in his car on his 
way from Amsterdam to The Hague with several telephone calls to Hong Kong, 
China and Jakarta. Due to the time window, it is best for Ad to contact people in 
the Far East early morning and it is a productive way of spending time if he 
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does get caught in the traffic jam.44 This morning the traffic jam is only a few 
kilometres long so Ad arrives at the KPN building, that is referred to as ARC, as 
early as 8 am. The ARC building situated just aside the busy motorway to the 
centre of The Hague is a striking example of modern architecture. In the 
evenings bright lamps illuminate the white building in the colours green, purple 
and yellow. Ad uses his parking pass to enter the parking garage. These passes 
are only available to employees with PAO status.45 Other IB colleagues have to 
find a parking spot outside the building.  
 Ad enters the glass entrance of the ARC building says good morning to the 
security employees and uses his identification card to open the door. Ad’s office 
is on the 10th floor, overlooking a part of The Hague and the crowded highway 
below. At the secretary’s room, he collects his mail and faxes. The office rooms 
are spacious and furnished with newly designed desks. Only the presence of a 
few maps of countries in the rooms reflects the international character of this 
department. Ad first reads his list of telephone messages taking note of the calls 
he must return. He goes back to his own room and logs into the computer 
network to check his electronic mail. In his mail he finds faxes and e-mails with 
several leads on new investing possibilities in the Far East telecom market. Ad 
is responsible for a selected group of new emerging telecom markets in Eastern 
Europe and East Asia. Every week he receives two or three requests for 
participation. Some of them have come from consultants in the emerging 
markets, others from bankers and some directly from telecom operators. The 
leads give information on interesting possibilities of participation in telecom 
operators and possibilities for selling products and services.  
Biography of Ad 
Ad is a 40-year-old KPN employee who 
has worked with the International 
Business department for four years. After 
studying social geography at the 
University of Utrecht he did his MBA. 
Ad started in 1985 with KPN in the 
marketing sector. Since 1990 he has been 
working in international telephony. Ad 
has grown up in a family of 
entrepreneurs. His father had a trade 
company with international business 
contacts. This background stimulated Ad 
to choose an international business 
career. He lives in Utrecht together with 
is girlfriend. They have no children.                                                      
 Ad starts by filling in his travel declarations of last week’s foreign visits. He 
has learned to do this as soon, 
as is possible after his trips so 
that he will not forget to do it 
and because it takes some time 
before the money is deposited 
into his bank account. This 
morning he has to write a 
report on the results of his visit 
to Eastern Europe the week 
before. Ad usually uses the 
mornings to make contact with 
the Far East to discuss the 
latest developments and news 
with his host-country partners 
and, to reply to e-mails, 
telephone calls and faxes of 
   
44 The time window is the time period in which the headquarters is able to communicate with its 
subsidiLeos. The offices in Jakarta for instance open at 3 pm Dutch standard time while the Dutch 
office closes at 5.00 pm.  The time in which the office of both headquarters and subsidiLeos are 
open, in this example from 3 pm to 5 pm is called the time window.    
45 PAO stands for the Persoonlijke Arbeids Overeenkomst [Personal Employment Agreement]. 
This agreement is only for high qualified personal of KPN. 
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colleagues based in Singapore and Hong Kong. By 11 am most of his Asian 
counterparts have already left for the evening and closed their offices due to the 
6 hour time difference and it is then time to direct his attention to immediate 
matters in the IB department. 
 At 11.15 am Ad has a meeting with his manager and discusses some of the 
interesting leads that Ad has selected this morning. The manager instructs Ad to 
find out more about the leads that fit the Asian strategy, are interesting and does 
not interfere with the Unisource strategy. The offices in the Far East are closed 
by now so he has to wait the next day to get in contact with his foreign business 
partners. Ad thus consults his own colleagues to dicuss the leads. He also 
telephones a colleague from NCF who has been working in the region for over 
five years. The latter contact originates from an informal network built up in the 
time Ad and the NCF-employee were working in the same department. In 
contrast to his colleagues Ad does not see NCF employees as “KPN employees 
with 20 years of technical experience that have to wait out a few years abroad 
for their retirement”. Every now and then Ad consults this colleague to ask for 
information on local politics, personal networks and information on the telecom 
operator he is interested in. This information helps Ad prepare his visit to 
whatever region he is investigating. Together with the regional KPN office or 
the local consultant, who generally is native to the specific region, he prepares 
an official acknowledgement of the interests of KPN. A visit to the region is 
used to collate the information on the situation and the financial consequences 
of the participation. Having gathered all the necessary information Ad then 
returns to The Hague to prepare the bid.  
 Ad and his colleagues generally see this external part of the acquisition 
process as the easiest stage of the process. The internal co-ordination necessary 
in putting the participation into actual effect is more difficult and far more time 
consuming. In the first stage the head of the IB department assesses the prepared 
bid: Does this project fit the chosen strategy in the region? Is there a local 
partner or a Unisource partner interested in participation? This is the point 
where it is decided whether to carry out further specification and preparation to 
be presented to the board of KPN, or whether to abandon the process of 
acquisition. The lead is pursued if it is deemed interesting enough but if 
information at that point is still insufficient and a prospective partner has yet to 
be found no decision can or will be made just then.  In practice this means that 
Ad has to keep in touch with his foreign partner, foreign offices and consultants 
without giving any promise of agreement. It is this part of the acquisition 
process that Ad does not really like because this process can last for months. He 
has to wait and keep updating the foreign counterparts till KPN actually makes a 
decision. 
 When a decision to go ahead is made, Ad starts out on two parallel paths. 
The first path is the official co-ordination of the process in which various 
personnel are required to investigate the project. These people come from 
technical units such as GSM specialists and people from the Juridical 
Department. At the same time Unisource partners are contacted to see if they are 
interested in participating. The second path is the informal lobbying in the 
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organisation to promote the project and to attract attention from the top 
management. The larger the deal the more easy it is for Ad to get attention and 
to find people who want to support the project. For smaller projects however, 
Ad has to sometimes fight against the prejudices held against a country and its 
culture. Ad’s success in attracting the attention of the management depends 
heavily on a strong personal drive, local contacts in the region and personal 
cultural interest in the many non-European countries relatively unknown to the 
top management. It is sometimes necessary to invite some of the top managers 
for an informal visit to the country. Ad needs his personal networks within KPN 
to arrange everything. The better his personal networks are the more chance he 
has to succeed with his project. It is also very wise to involve people from 
Financial Control at an early stage of the process because their opinion weighs 
heavily in the final decision of the Board of Directors. 
 Once all the internal and the external preparations have been made, the bid 
can be presented to the board of KPN, which has to make a final decision on the 
investment plans. This is the most important moment of a new acquisition. “No” 
signifies disappointed IB employees, “yes” means further preparation for the 
final bid in competition with other competitors. Hence a team of skilled 
professionals is set up to investigate the local situation and prepare for the 
competition. There are two ways of obtaining participation in a operator: the 
beauty contest and the added value method. In the first method all of the 
interested companies present their best sides, lining up their respective 
advantages and assets while the host-country government selects the most 
attractive offer. The other method is to search for a special offer that fits the 
local telecom operator. Therefore an insight into politics and culture is needed. 
Different questions have to be answered in this phase of the project: Who are 
the players in the telecom market? Which instruments of power do these players 
have? Where are the informal networks? How are these players related to 
political parties? How do the centres of power change over time? 
 Formal and informal networks in the country of interest are used to present 
KPN and the Unisource partner as interesting partners. At this stage trust is a 
very important issue. The financial part of the bid is of course one of the most 
important deciding factors for the local PTO and the government in deciding 
upon their international partner. But trust in the new partner, cultural bindings, 
historical relations and inter personal relations do play an important role in the 
final decision of the local government. It is therefore very helpful for the 
process if the KPN management and the PTO management fit well together. 
  
6.3.2 Guiding New Projects Trough the Political Arena  
At 1 pm Ad and three of his colleagues go the restaurant on the ground floor to 
have lunch. Most of the tables in the restaurant are occupied. By the wall are 
small tables for two, tables by the window seat four and in the middle are large 
oval tables for bigger groups. Some of the employees, especially the secretaries, 
come to collect packed lunches and return with their paper bags to their 
respective offices. A larger part of the people in the restaurant are dressed 
smartly. Women wear suits and only the quality of their handbags betray their 
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status. Men wear expensive suits in dark colours and blue or white shirts. Ad 
and his colleagues have put on their coats to dine in the restaurant. They find a 
place near the window with a nice view of the rest of the restaurant. Over the 
lunch they make jokes about their work, exchange the latest gossip and 
complain about the slow process of decision making. Ad’s lunches are usually 
very irregular in terms of time and length. If he is together with colleagues and 
they discuss organisational topics the lunch can take up to an hour as 
frustrations and emotions run high. 
 Although he has worked with KPN since 1985, the internal politics still 
frustrates Ad. He compares the organisation with a sponge that takes its old 
form after it has been squeezed. He likes to see his efforts leading to concrete 
results and hates having to participate in political games to reach his goals. His 
colleagues are quite new in the organisation. One of them is from a Dutch 
multinational with international experience and the other two colleagues are 
young academics. In the management of KPN three different “blood groups” 
can be distinguished: (1) young academic employees, (2) Voorlindenaren and 
(3) experienced management. The young academic employees have been 
recruited as a result of the new management’s development programs after 
privatisation. These employees are called the “glimpiepers” or “young dogs” 
because of the characteristics for which they were selected: young, aggressive, 
career orientated, commercial, conforming, ambitious, driven to compete and 
mobile. These are seen as the most important factors for success in a 
management career. The managers in the third group come from other industries 
and companies in the Netherlands such as Shell, Coopers & Lybrand, Boskalis, 
Unilever and ITT.  
 The experienced management and the young academics have been loaded 
with the difficult task of transforming the management culture. From a historical 
perspective it is easy to understand the political character of the organisation. 
But with privatisation it became necessary for this political character to change. 
The message in the early stages of the privatisation was very clear. 
Probably many people still put a lot of energy in what is called internal 
politics. To the “if and how” question. Such as: ‘yes, that is a problem, but 
shall we talk about it and if so, then how?’ It becomes even more awkward if 
you have to act in such a way that ensures that nobody is hurt, that you do 
not interfere in someone’s business, or give the impression that you have 
criticisms. In short, to act defensively, not openly, keeping everything in 
balance, avoiding conflicts. Because, that is the message: Don’t be the 
messenger of bad news. I was astonished……. We have to end this once and 
for all (Column of Mr Ben Verwaaijen, CEO of KPN in: ‘t hoofdkantoor, 
PTT Telecom, jr. 4, nr1, 1992). 
 The new management consisting of young academics (409) and experienced 
management (467) easily outnumbered the earlier discussed Voorlindenaren 
(122) (van der Putten 1996: 42). The task to change the political culture 
however was not very easy to execute. The management and employees in IB 
coming from outside KPN experience difficulties in understanding the internal 
politics and internal networks. 
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KPN is a very political organisation. When I came here in 1989 I thought 
after a few months: my God, what am I doing here! But fortunately a lot has 
been changed with the coming of a critical mass of new people. Out of our 
group of new employees, who still meet, 20 out of 22 people have stayed  
(interview with new experienced manager working with KPN). 
 Not so much the content of the project as much as the position in the 
political arena is of overriding importance for a project. Personal networks are 
therefore still important for guiding new projects through the organisation. 
Examples of these personal networks are the “Voorlindenaren”, groups of new 
employees who joined KPN in the early 1990s and people who have been in the 
same management development trajectory. In using these personal networks 
special rules have to be observed.   
It is important not to take all of the profits, and not to begrudge somebody 
else of his/her own profit. You have to step aside every once in a while so 
somebody can pass in order to continue. You will always meet each other in 
the organisation so you do not completely finish off someone. You let him 
go and will not take the complete profit. Later on, you might need this 
person, to fight together for something else, or just for a little competition 
(interview with Voorlindenaar). 
6.3.3 An Evening Flight to Madrid 
In the day at the office, 5 pm till 7 pm are the most productive hours. Ad likes 
this part of the day because then the office is more or less empty, the telephones 
have stopped ringing and there is time to write the necessary reports to support 
international projects. However this particular evening he has no time to use his 
productive hours because he has to catch a flight to Madrid. At 5 pm Ad stops 
writing his report and packs his notebook, papers and project information. 
Although it is only 40 minutes to Schiphol International Airport he has to leave 
early to avoid the traffic jams. Ad leaves the empty building, gets in his car and 
drives through the traffic jam. He calls his colleague to discuss strategies and 
plans for the day after. At this time of the day informal calls are made to inform 
each other of the latest developments of the project. A telephone from the 
investment banker in America comes in just before he reaches Schiphol. It is 
just after lunch in New York. 
 At Schiphol, he meets an external consultant hired to support this project. 
Together they fly to Madrid where he has a meeting with Telefónica de España, 
the Unisource partner. In the aeroplane Ad prepares the meeting with the 
consultant who is flying first class. Ad is in business class due to KPN’s recent 
cut back on travel costs. The aeroplane is delayed for an hour.  Ad reads the 
project information over again. They arrive at 10.30 pm in hotel Michel Angelo 
in Madrid, check in and drink a beer or two at the hotel’s bar. To discuss the 
final position of KPN Ad and the consultant have to contact the CEO, Mr Ben 
Verwaaijen. It is not easy to reach Ben Verwaaijen because he is at that moment 
in Jersey from where he has just departed by helicopter. It is not sooner than 
midnight before they are able to get into contact with the director and send him 
a fax through his secretary. By then it is bedtime.  
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 Ad likes the international nature of his job. He would like to obtain a 
position in one of the foreign offices. It is not so much for the financial or career 
prospects that both Ad and his partner would like to work abroad. Having 
studied social geography, Ad has always been interested in working abroad but 
he is also selective and critical of the posts offered. A job offer in the Ukraine is 
neither interesting for him or his partner because life conditions are perceived as 
harsh. Although many employees aspire to work abroad, it is difficult to find 
experienced and qualified people for the 200 to 300 international positions. In a 
stimulating article in the KPN Nieuwsblad the head of the IB department 
complains of the meagre reaction to an advertisement for four positions in 
Hungary, Czech Republic and Ukraine.  
Much of the new talent has chosen KPN as their employer because of the 
company’s international activities. But when they are offered the chance to 
get internationally involved there is a shower of excuses as to why they 
cannot change their newly bought house for a year in a house in Kiev, 
Budapest or somewhere else in the world (KPN Nieuwsblad, August7, 1997, 
no. 184, pp.3). 
 Why is it difficult to find qualified employees to work abroad? One might 
think that it is because employees do not want to work abroad but this is not the 
case. When in 1995 a personal announcement was made to 4000 employees for 
positions in the Czech republic nearly 20% showed interest. Furthermore, in the 
internal Telecom OverMorgen [the future of telecom] discussion many 
employees showed interest in working abroad and wondered how they could 
obtain such a position. Some of the 30.000 employees have personal and 
cultural historical relations with countries such as the Czech Republic, 
Indonesia and Ireland.  
 Is it perhaps the partners of the male employees who do not want to work 
abroad? The national newspapers picked up the question, which was addressed 
in the KPN Nieuwsblad of 7 August 1997. The public discussion came to the 
conclusion that the career of the partner is a significant obstacle in the path of 
male employees with the potential for an international position (NRC 
Handelsblad, August 15, 1997). The growing participation of women in the 
Dutch employment market and the changing mentality towards issues of gender 
and child raising has led to female partners of the employees being less willing 
to give up their own positions to accompany their partners abroad. Consequently 
the living conditions in the host country determines their willingness to move 
abroad. Positions in Paris, New York or Jakarta are more easily filled up than 
positions in Eastern Europe. The missing of a dual career policy however, is just 
one of the causes of the difficulty of finding qualified people.  
 An important factor causing difficulties in finding qualified employees to 
work abroad has to do with the lack of fine-tuning of the process of recruiting, 
sending employees abroad and their re-entry. Recruitment is determined by the 
available supply of employees rather than the demand for skilled personnel. 
This results in a large number of willing candidates: young academics, 
adventurers and people whose careers and/or personal lives have run aground. 
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The fear of losing their jobs as a result of internal reorganisation forces people 
to look for jobs abroad. But this group of candidates does not include the ‘hot 
shots’ or talented and experienced young employees ready for their second or 
third move in their career. The selected candidates for the foreign posts are 
therefore, not the most talented or experienced employees.  
The Dutch managers that I have met, while I have been abroad, were unable 
to adapt to international cultures. They are unable to recognise that they have 
tot become part of it….Dutch bring Dutch mentality into their foreing 
countries. I will give an example. The Thai language is tonal three words can 
sound the same to you and me, but have totally different meanings. If you 
consider a soft language like Thai and put a very aggressive Scheveninger or 
Groninger as a manager, the Thais just don’t know how to deal with that. 
What I am saying is: learn to be sensitive. And sensitivity has never been 
exhibited as far as I have seen anyway. And I have been to a lot of KPN 
offices (interview with non-Dutch AT&T-Unisource manager). 
 The HRM department has recently acknowledged this and a pool of 
internationally experienced expatriates has been established to fill in 
international positions. The candidates are selected based on their technological 
knowledge, their experience, their willingness and their flexibility. In the 
beginning of the process of internationalisation mainly young candidates were 
selected and sent abroad. Due to complaints of the foreign partners over the lack 
of their experience and seniority of these young candidates more senior 
employees are now selected. A larger part of the candidates do not have 
international experience. Therefore candidates vying for foreign posts have to 
sit for a test the results of which determine whether the candidate will fit into 
the cultural context of the host country. The outcome of this test, also called a 
culture check, does not however determine the final selection of the candidates. 
In a larger part of the cases the selection has to be done within a very short time 
period that does not allow extended preparation or tests. In the final phase of the 
selection procedure the candidate’s curriculum vitae is sent to the foreign 
partner organisation concerned. As a result much time is needed for the 
recruiting and selection of candidates. The wide recruitment of candidates has 
therefore resulted in questions and complaints by the candidates themselves.  
 After the selection the successful candidate is prepared for the position in the 
host-country. If a contract is for longer than a year the candidate has to learn the 
local language and immediately starts with a language course in the 
Netherlands. A two-day cultural training at a specialised institution is also part 
of the training. The pressure of time and the lack of information with regards to 
the host-country do not stimulate the exchange of experience between the 
candidates and international colleagues. KPN has started to centralise the 
international experiences of its employees for a better exchange of experiences. 
 The selected candidate is sent abroad on conditions that meet the industrial 
standards which are centrally co-ordinated within and by the organisation. Each 
of the candidates however, tries to arrange a separate personal set of agreements 
with the new employer. For instance the number of paid air flights home, the 
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living conditions to be provided and other essential necessities for family life in 
the host country are subjects that are negotiated.  
 The eventual re-entry of international employees into the home organisation 
is a serious problem. For a larger part of the employees returning means having 
to find new employment within the organisation which has changed 
dramatically during their absence. Returning expatriate workers soon discover 
that ex-colleagues have since changed positions leaving their former personal 
networks altered. To support the employees in their return a special program has 
been developed to help them acclimatise and adjust to the new and changed 
organisation. The employees are placed in either the districts or in the national 
organisation. It is therefore extremely important for employees abroad to 
maintain their personal networks in the mother organisation in the Netherlands. 
These networks are needed for information on new positions when one is 
planning to return. Expatriates do spend time to visit their networks in the 
Netherlands even when located abroad.   
 No special importance is given to international experiences or newly learned 
skills and as a result international experience does not support the building of a 
career. Employees with expectations of promotion in salary and rank can thus 
feel disappointed on returning to the organisation. They are generally perceived 
by others as employees who have been on some kind of a holiday. The stories 
told by the expatriates of the lovely climate, the perfect living conditions, the 
adventurous weekends, the strange culture and, the beautiful women stimulate 
this perception. The expatriate thus finds that the experience abroad does not in 
fact make much difference on his curriculum vitae. It is therefore far better for 
your career to stay in the neighbourhood of the AA tower, the headquarters. It is 
even worse for employees whose careers have already been in a deadlock before 
being sent abroad. To re-place these employees is an even bigger problem 
because of their expectations of being rewarded with a better position. The 
stories told by the returning employees to their colleagues have created the myth 
that being sent abroad has a negative impact on your career. These colleagues in 
turn spread the ‘sending myth’ through their own personal networks and within 
no time at all everybody in the organisation has learnt about the negative impact 
of an international experience on one’s career. Consequently employees, 
especially whose careers are not on a dead end track have minimal interest in 
taking up international positions. 
Yes, of course there is sometimes some grumbling. Sometimes things go 
wrong. But a lot of the grumbling is based on myth, I think. There would be 
little appreciation for what people have done abroad. That is of course 
absolutely nonsense (Manager in KPN Nieuwblad May 29, 1997). 
6.3.4 Copings Strategies to Solve Problems 
The things Ad likes about his job are the establishing of international networks, 
trading, the achieving of concrete results, learning about other cultures and the 
starting of new projects. He has learned to be successful by persevering with a 
project he really believes in. To cope with the demands of the internal and the 
external networks IB employees have become office nomads. Such a person 
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carries a suitcase containing a notebook, modem, printer, various kinds of 
foreign currency, airline tickets, toilet articles and some clothing. At home he 
has a fax, an Internet mailbox, telephone and is always reachable by cellular 
phone. This kind of nomad is available 24 hours a day when an 
agreement/project is near completion.  
 To cope with the stress and frustration Ad and a larger part of his colleagues 
view the international business as a game in which the content of the 
proposition is less important than the process of successfully passing the 
proposition through the political arena in the organisation. In this game Ad has 
to observe the internal moves, the formation of coalitions and, make note of 
personal attitudes. He is constantly asking questions and studying the situation: 
Who benefits from the proposition? Who is making decisions? What is the 
perspective of the executive management of the involved country? Does it still 
fit the official strategy? Have I informed all of the people involved? Ad 
compares this game of international business with a game of chess; you have to 
think carefully a number of moves ahead.  
I have learned to stay calm. It is a political process in which you have to 
keep an eye on who is taking what decision and where (interview with IB 
employee). 
 Although Ad and quite a large number of his IB colleagues do not like the 
internal political game of chess, a small group of IB employees see it as a 
necessary tool to reach their objectives. They like the internal lobby and are not 
interested in the way the decision is formally executed. They use a book to note 
all of the names, telephone numbers, conversations, events that occur in and 
around a project and their strategic impacts on the project. Decisive action and 
telephone calls are planned on the basis of the information in the book. To be 
successful in the execution of a project it is very important to involve the right 
people in the organisation. People that can make the right decisions, have 
knowledge of the project, know the formal and informal internal organisation 
and, have personal networks themselves. Long term experience in the 
organisation helps considerably.  
I can phone everybody, Verwaaijen, Ploegmakers. I have good contacts and I 
inform them frequently - that is very important to be successful. If you do 
not inform people well in this organisation people become suspicious. As a 
result, when it comes to a point of having to make decisions they find it hard 
to trust you and make another decision (interview with IB employee). 
6.3.5 Copings Strategies to Regulate Emotions 
IB employees work in difficult and stressful situations. On the one hand, they 
have to stay in close contact with the international telecom market and with the 
countries, which fall within the scope of KPN which means they have to travel 
intensively, build up networks and, learn about the cultural and political context. 
But on the other hand, it is far more important to stay in close contact with the 
headquarters in The Hague in order to operate successfully. The time consuming 
political process involved in guiding an international project in the organisation 
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leads to frustration for a majority of the employees. This frustration is 
sometimes expressed in anger: 
I am fed up with not being taken seriously when coming back from a country 
with good leads or business opportunities (interview with IB employee). 
 Ad himself feels sometimes insecure as to whether or not he has the 
commitment of the management when negotiating with a prospective foreign 
partner. The structure of decision making in The Hague is not very clear so 
much so that there are always risks when Ad makes commitments to a foreign 
country that he cannot later honour. Together with many of his colleagues he 
has learned to be more careful, not clearly committing to a project is a way of 
dealing with this kind of uncertainty and prevents frustration on returning home.   
 A very popular coping strategy IB employees use to cope with emotional 
frustrations is that of hanging jobs. The young employees leave the department 
for other departments. The more experienced employees look for positions with 
other international companies. Consequently, the fast turnover of employees 
does not stimulate an increase of international knowledge within the 
organisation. Furthermore, the absence of a clear regional strategy makes it 
difficult to build up regional knowledge and personal networks. New employees 
recognise the lack of networks in the organisation and put a lot of effort in the 
building of personal networks in the organisation. This costs time and energy 
because people who are already participating in networks want to know whether 
these newcomers are temporary passers-by or permanent workers. 
People are thinking: “ what can I do with him in the short term and long term 
- say 5 to 10 years” (interview with IB employee). 
 
6.4 Conclusions 
 
The descriptions of a typical day in the lives of Robert and Ad show two 
employees, two individual people who have their own motivations, 
expectations, emotions, frustrations and strategies to cope with change. 
Individual experiences, motivations and emotions determine the behaviour, 
actions and perceptions of each in his daily work (see Strauss and Quinn 1994). 
We learn that Robert is seriously interested in working abroad, learns the Czech 
language and sympathises with the Czech PTO. Robert is sent abroad to 
implement Dutch solutions in the Czech PTO and finds himself confronted with 
questions of loyalty to KPN and adaptation to Czech culture and organisational 
politics. The harmonisation of experiences (Bourdieu 1990) of Robert and his 
colleagues takes place in collective activities such as beach parties, birthday 
parties, lunches, department gatherings and sporting activities. We learn that Ad 
is an entrepreneur who likes to do business abroad, takes initiative and risks. In 
his work the political character of KPN frustrates Ad. For Ad it is more 
important to spend his energy in internal affairs than in the cultural context of 
the local market in order to be successful in his work. His personal schemes are 
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learnt from previous experiences with organisational politics and he mediates 
his behaviour according to the context. 
 The question as to what kind of individual strategies the employees have 
used in reaction of the changing working context has been answered. Robert 
(IS) and Ad (IB) both use emotion regulating and problem solving strategies 
(see Figure 10). The emotion regulating strategies are used when the given 
situation is too difficult to change. For instance if the struggle is with the 
organisation politics it is seen as better to modify ones own attitude and 
strategy. These kinds of changes in attitude can result in taboos as has been 
shown (see Figure 9).  
 The typical day descriptions of Robert and Ad furthermore, show that the 
organisational culture has not changed much. Steps taken to change the 
organisational culture from a bureaucracy to a business culture in which 
employees become entrepreneurs, take risks, act commercially, take 
responsibility, are competitive and are service orientated have only partly been 
successful. Still the political arena and the personal networks play an important 
role in the organisation. Political awareness, personal networks and loyalty are 
still important for success in the organisation. The list of taboos within the IS 
department reflects the difficulties within KPN: being critical, showing 
diversity, showing vulnerability and acting emotionally. As a result the process 
of internationalisation is difficult. The existence of the myth about going abroad 
makes it hard to find qualified employees for international posts. The causes of 
this myth can be found in the problematic connection between the recruitment, 
the selecting, the sending abroad of employees and their return. The 
international experiences of the employees do not positively contribute to their 
careers. The cases of the problematic return of expatriates are told in the 
organisation and dissuade potential employees who have international 
ambitions. Furthermore, is it difficult for individual employees to persuade their 
partners to join an international position abroad. As a result not always the best 
nor even suitable employees are given foreign positions. 
 
Employees in the IS department Employees in the IB department 
Changing of position within KPN 
Looking for a international position 
or possibilities abroad within KPN 
Creating new positions 
Being flexible 
Developing new business 
Transforming threats into new 
possibilities 
Looking for a position outside KPN  
Waiting and seeing what will happen 
Creation of taboos 
Expressing frustration and critics 
Establishing and maintaining 
personal relations in the organisation 
Being sensitive for organisation 
politics 
Lobby to support a project 
Using personal networks 
Becoming flexible 
Expressing anger and frustrations 
Being carefully in foreign 
negotiations 
Changing jobs 
Using local agents 
Establishing local networks 
Using NCF personal networks 
Working long days during a 
acquisitions 
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Showing resistance 
Learning local languages 
Establishing personal relations in 
local context 
Avoiding organisational politics 
Using organisational politics to reach 
a goal 
Collecting informal information on 
organisation politics in a journal 
 Figure 10. The strategies of IB and IS employees to cope with organisational culture 
 With this third and last chapter of Part II the context of the cross-cultural 
cooperation of KPN has been explored at the five different levels. The necessary 
historical, political, economical and personal context of the organisation and its 
employees is clear to understand the cases in Part III. In Part III the cross-
cultural cooperation of KPN in the three cases of the multilevel model (see  
); the strategic alliance Unisource, the Netherlands Antilles and Indonesia is 
investigated.  
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7 LABORIOUS CROSS-CULTURAL COOPERATION IN THE AT&T-
UNISOURCE GROUP: STRUGGLE FOR POWER 
 
World Level
Society Level
Organisational Level
Interactional Level
Individual Level
Case 3: Indonesia
Case 1: Unisource 
Case 2: The Netherlands Antilles
This chapter deals with the first case 
of cross-cultural cooperation of KPN. 
The strategic alliance Unisource was 
formed in 1992. Unisource was the 
main instrument of internationa-
lisation of KPN up to the spring of 
1998, when the strategic alliance fell 
apart. Unisource was the first serious 
international setting in which KPN 
had to learn to cope with cultural 
diversity. At the height of its activity 
the AT&T-Unisource group consisted 
of five telecom operators from five different nations; Swiss Telecom, Swedish 
Telia, Dutch KPN, Spanish Telefónica and American AT&T. The experiences of 
KPN and Dutch AT&T-Unisource employees with their international colleagues 
are first discussed followed by the cross-cultural strategies of the management 
of the AT&T-Unisource group in coping with cultural diversity. Next, the 
execution of these cross-cultural strategies in daily practice is presented 
through the eyes of a Dutch AT&T-Unisource employee. How the cultural 
differences interact with power related issues among the shareholders during 
the growth of the alliance is also discussed. Finally, the splitting of the Spanish 
Telefónica and the organisation politics are examined to show the dynamic 
changes within the AT&T-Unisource group. 46  
 
 
7.1 The Birth of the First European Telecom Strategic Alliance 
 
It is a windy day in March 1997 when Hans arrives at the Unisource building in 
Hoofddorp. At the entrance of the Penta building the Dutch, Swedish, Swiss and 
Spanish flags flap in the strong western wind. The indigo-blue Unisource flag 
with its name in white stands apart from the four national flags of the 
shareholders. Hans walks through the car park which is half full of dark 
coloured BMWs, Audis, Volvos, Opels and VWs. The parking places closest to 
the entrance are marked and reserved for employees of specific departments 
such as ‘Management 1’. Apart from one British license plate all of the cars 
have Dutch license plates. Hans enters the building through the right door with 
the sign ‘employees only’. Visitors must enter through the left door and report 
first to the reception. The hall is dominated by a work of art on the wall, which 
symbolises the cooperation between the shareholders. It is a transparent 
fibreglass map of Europe mounted on four chrome bars, on which iron tubes 
connect wooden knobs representing the national European capital cities. The 
text on the map states: ‘Unisource: the First Truly Pan-European 
                                                        
46 Because of the quite complicated structure of the strategic alliance, in this study the AT&T-
Unisource group refers to the AT&T-Unisource strategic alliance and the Unisource strategic 
alliance. 
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Telecommunication Provider’. Hans goes upstairs to the first level where he 
greets a colleague in the corridor. He gets himself a cup of coffee from the 
coffee corner which he takes with him to his desk. Two KPN posters hang on 
the wall of his room. One is a picture of a traditional Dutch windmill which says 
‘KPN for tourists’. The other poster is a picture of an enormous satellite antenna 
dish with the text: ‘KPN for our customers’. These posters express the core 
business of the unit Hans is working in: Satellite Communications. 
Biography of Hans  
Hans is a 32-year-old employee of 
Unisource. Hans studied economics at the 
Erasmus University in Rotterdam. After 
graduating he started his carrier with KPN in 
1990 and was placed in a Management 
Development trajectory. Thereafter he 
worked in different regional departments. 
Hans likes travelling and was interested in 
the international aspect and prospect of 
work. This led him to apply for a job with 
Unisource in 1995 where he has been 
working in the same department for nearly 
three years.  
Hans lives with his girlfriend in Rotterdam. 
They have no children. He speaks English 
and is currently learning Spanish.  
 The department of Satellite Communications originates from Vesatel, the 
first international joint venture of Dutch KPN and Swedish Telia. By 1990, 
KPN had already spent several years looking for an international partner47. The 
top-management of KPN 
had long since realised that 
international competitors 
would decrease the turnover 
and profits of the Dutch 
telecom market and the 
international meetings of 
the Board of Infonet in Los 
Angeles provided them the 
opportunity to meet with 
potential partners.48 It was 
through contacts established 
at meetings that Swedish 
Telia invited KPN in 1988 
to co-operate in a project 
called ‘Eurostream’. This 
project centered around the 
introduction of a fixed 2 
Mb connection between 
Stockholm and Amsterdam 
and would realise Telia’s wish to use Amsterdam as a hub to handle the 
Swedish international traffic in Europe. The development of the strong Swedish 
presence in Europe in turn inspired new ideas and possibilities for KPN with 
regard to international traffic.  
 In the late autumn of 1988 a number of top managers of the International 
Business (IB) department gathered in the ‘Voorlinden’ estate to discuss the 
possibilities of international cooperation with other European PTOs. This 
meeting resulted in a strategic alliance plan with Cable and Wireless, Swiss 
Telecom and Portugal Telecom. In the meantime, the relationship with Telia 
                                                        
47 At the 1987 Telecom fair in Geneva, KPN announced the cooperation with the American Nynex. 
This announcement did not result in a productive cooperation, but the new strategy of international 
cooperation was outlined. 
48 Infonet was established to handle the international traffic of multinational corporations. Their 
members meet eachother four times a year. Among the members are telecom managers such as 
Viesturs Vucins of the Swedish Telia, Josef Nanson of Swiss Telecom, Francisco Ross of 
Telefónica and representatives of Deutsche Telecom, France Telecom, Singapore Telecom and the 
Japanese KDD 
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was intensified through the  ‘Eurostream’ project. When the cooperation within 
Infonet became more and more difficult because of the competitive behaviour of 
its members, the directors of international business of Telia and KPN decided to 
combine interests and form an alliance. 
We have known each other for some time, we had a joint enemy and we had 
much in common. Therefore we said to each other: why should we not 
dismiss our pride and not maintain that we have to do it on our own? Why 
don’t we do something together? (interview with member of board of 
directors of KPN). 
 This led to the establishing of small joint venture named Vesatel 1990 in 
which both KPN and Telia each had 50% participation. In that period, Vesatel 
was located at Amstelveen and offered commercial satellite communications 
services in Sweden and the Netherlands. More serious exchange followed  
which eventually led to the first official meeting in the Hilton Airport Hotel in 
Hoofddorp in April 1991. Subsequently, Dutch manager Kippens worked out a 
plan for intensive cooperation that was presented at the first official meeting 
attended by CEO Ben Verwaayen and CEO Tony Hagström on the 17th level of 
KPN headquarters, in the so called ‘green tower’ in The Hague. This memorable 
meeting took place in August 1991 and is still referred to as the ‘broodjes 
(sandwiches) lunch’. During the lunch Tony Hagström and the Swedish 
delegation were served sandwiches and milk. Sandwiches with salmon, cheese, 
ham and buttermilk, fresh milk and orange juice are the customary lunch menu 
for KPN managers if they meet over lunch. The story goes that during the 
‘sandwiches lunch’ Tony Hagström looked at the glass of milk that was put in 
front of him and asked: ‘Isn’t there any Heineken beer served here?’ which was 
a clear indication that the ice was broken. The older, fatherly Tony Hagström 
and the young and assertive Ben Verwaaijen quickly developed a personal 
rapport and that day in August 1991, they signed a Memory of Understanding 
that was thereafter worked out into a business plan.  
 One early morning in September 1991, a strong and competent KPN 
delegation flew to Stockholm. Among them were CEO Verwaaijen, Director of 
International Telephony, Van Moorsel, Director of International Business, 
Kippers, Member of the Board, Van Velzen and NCF Director, Biezen. The 
morning and the afternoon were spent discussing the business plan after which 
the Dutch guests were treated to a cruise through Stockholm on the boat, 
‘Archipel’. Refreshments were served and the atmosphere was generally 
relaxed. The boat was moored to the jetty of a little island in front of the coast of 
Stockholm providing the passengers with a view of Stockholm’s coastline in the 
sunset? When darkness fell, the boat and its passengers returned to the city 
where the Swedish and Dutch delegations toasted to the cooperation agreement. 
The cultural similarities between the Swedish and the Dutch were highlighted 
by one of the speakers that evening. It appeared evident that a new, promising, 
strategic alliance between two telecom operators had just been formed. 
 KPN and Telia named this strategic alliance Unisource and in October 1991 
this first strategic alliance of European PTOs was announced at the Telecom ’91 
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fair in Geneva.49 The strategic intention of the founders was to use the alliance 
for international expansion and to position the alliance in the European telecom 
market. These key motivations support the findings of Glaister and Buckly 
(1996) who state that linking to a market and geographical expansion are the 
key motives of international strategic alliance formation. When journalists asked 
Hagström whether the cooperation would lead to a merging of both companies 
he replied: ‘an engaged couple does not say that they will not marry, only time 
will tell whether they will marry’ (NRC Handelsblad, October 7, 1991).  
 In April 1992, KPN and Telia signed the final agreements on the strategic 
alliance Unisource and in June 9 1992, Unisource began to build its operations 
from scratch: 
I can still remember that we were on Aruba and talking about the 
cooperation. How it had to be set up and other things. Then we were told: we 
will just start and you have to do it. There was nothing. Only air and paper, 
and a group of people that had to understand each other and their cultures 
(KPN manager in UBN Notes, June 1997, jr.5, nr. 6).  
 Recent developments in the AT&T-Unisource group have revealed that the 
‘engaged’ couple did not marry at all and are in fact no longer ‘in love’. The 
importance of the alliance for the international strategy of KPN has decreased 
with the establishment of its strategic alliance with the American Qwest in 
November 1998. Telefónica had in fact left the alliance earlier, in December 
1997, to join the BT-MCI alliance. In July 1998, AT&T and BT announced the 
merging of their international activities and in November 1998 the parent 
companies announced their willingness to sell stakes to financial investors. It 
was decided that Unisource and AT&T would dissolve their alliance in 2000. It 
appears that in long run the strategic alliance AT&T-Unisource failed to live up 
to expectations. In the following sections, the discussion is aimed at providing 
an understanding of the rise and fall of the cross-cultural cooperation of the 
AT&T-Unisource group. 
 
 
7.2 Managing Cultural Diversity in the AT&T-Unisource Group 
 
Dealing with the cultural differences and communication problems due to the 
large number of nationalities has been a major issue within the AT&T-
Unisource family. The changing market, political tensions, chaos and 
frustrations have made it that much more difficult to operate in a multi-cultural 
context. To understand the cross-cultural cooperation within the AT&T-
Unisource group it is necessary to explore the relationships of the parent 
companies involved. The relationships between AT&T, Unisource and the 
shareholders have become rather confused over time. With the fast changes and 
                                                        
49 The strategic alliance Unisource was first name Unicom. Unicom started operating in the spring 
of 1992. On 10 June 1992 the name Unicom was changed to Unisource because the name Unicom 
appeared to be under protection. KPN had claimed the name Unisource for another strategic 
alliance that was at that moment stranded. Frankfurt was chosen as the first office outside the 
partner countries. 
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developments of the telecom market and the developing of technology, even 
employees such as Hans have been unsure of how it all fits together. In fact, not 
only Hans but most of the employees have not clearly understood how the 
different parts of the AT&T-Unisource group contribute towards success. 
In a survey conducted at the end of January 1997 51% of 637 employees 
located at sites in the Netherlands, United Kingdom, Sweden, Belgium and 
Germany asked for more corporate information from the management on 
direction, strategy and business planning and more interdepartmental and 
cross-departmental information. Furthermore, they called for an 
improvement in overall management style and a clear understanding of how 
employees fit in with the overall objectives of the organisation (Gateway, 
Issue 2, April 2, 1997).  
 In order to gain a clear understanding of the AT&T-Unisource family it is 
necessary to examine the structure in which Hans operated with his 45 
colleagues of Satellite Communications, Mobile Services and Card Services, 
which are fully owned by Unisource. Together with the 1700 employees of the 
national Unisource subsidiaries they form the Unisource alliance under four 
parent organisations. The Unisource parents, the Unisource national subsidiaries  
and AT&T established the AT&T-Unisource Group clustered around 
Communication Services, Electronic Commerce and Solutions which in their 
turn were clustered around Unisource Carrier Services (UCS). Since its 
formation, Unisource Carrier Services (UCS) has tried to merge the 
shareholders networks into an upgraded and cost-effective European backbone 
network and has taken a central position in the structure of the AT&T-
Unisource group, which was not always very clear to customers and employees. 
50 
If we try to look at ourselves as separate, isolate entities, or in terms of 
percentage ownership of this or that, or as a hierarchy, then I agree that we 
will continue to confuse our customers, others and ourselves. We are all part 
of a networked group. It is this aspect which gives us our real strength (Paul 
Smits in Gateway, Issue 1, February 1997). 
                                                        
50 By the end of 1997, the network was the largest backbone network in Europe, covering twenty-
six countries. The merging of the respective international carrier units into Unisource Carrier 
Services (UCS) finally took place on the first of January 1998. UCS, which was based in 
Wallisellen/Zürich Switzerland, was now the central heart of the AT&T-Unisource alliance group 
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Unisource
Carrier
Services
Figure 11. The AT&T-Unisource group of companies (source: Gateway, Issue 1 February 
1997)  
 
7.2.1 The AT&T-Unisource ‘Tribe’ 
When Hans and his colleagues talk about the structure of the AT&T-Unisource 
group the metaphor of a family is frequently used. The anthropological concept 
of a tribe can be used to describe the AT&T-Unisource family.51 The AT&T-
Unisource tribe consists of different moieties.52 Within the AT&T-Unisource 
tribe the moieties consists of the shareholder companies, also called ‘parent’ 
companies. Each moiety is represented in the AT&T-Unisource buildings and in 
many ritual contexts the moieties have important and complementary roles. The 
former CEO of Telia, Tony Hagström, spoke in 1991 of an ‘engagement’ and a 
possible ‘marriage’ of the moieties KPN and Telia. Unisource is seen as the 
‘daughter’ of that union.  
Unisource is a daughter of four mothers, or fathers depending on how you 
like to see it. But the daughter decides what the parents have to do. That 
causes tension. The parents are like grandparents who live with their 
daughter and have to listen to her (interview with a Dutch KPN manager). 
                                                        
51 A tribe is defined here as a small-scale society characterised by a distinctive culture 
52 A moiety is a division of a society in different social categories of groups according to descent 
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 This ‘daughter’ grew up in turbulent circumstances and the relationship 
between the parents and their child were not always very clear. She wanted to 
have more power to make her own decisions about her own life but her parents 
have not been very indulgent and have avoided giving more autonomy to their 
daughter. In fact, each of the four parent companies actually wanted their 
daughter to live in their own respective moiety. Furthermore, the parents found 
it very difficult to surrender their own individual Dutch, Spanish, Swiss and 
Swedish identities. Consequently, while the moieties co-operated in their 
struggle to conquer new European markets ethnic rivalry within the tribe was 
also common. In these new markets, two of the moieties, the Dutch and Swedish 
combined strengths and their ‘union’ led to the formation of other children in 
foreign markets such as Ireland. The Dutch and Swiss moieties also united to 
form a ‘child’ in the Czech Republic. The interests of these cousins have 
sometimes interfered with those of ‘daughter’ Unisource. The potential fission 
between the moieties in the tribe is thus bound together by webs of 
intermarriage and common interests. 
 The ‘daughter’ Unisource was officially engaged with an American partner 
AT&T and while she felt protected by her big and powerful fiancé was also a 
little intimidated by him. They produced their own children called AUCS 
(AT&T-Unisource Communication Services) and announced that their wedding 
would take place in the near future. This gave rise to new tensions within the 
tribe. By marrying Unisource the American partner hoped to include the 
Spanish moiety and benefit from the latter’s relationship to the Latin American 
market. However, in 1997, the Spanish parent committed ‘adultery’ with the 
BT-MCI tribe who already had a very strong presence in the Latin American 
market. This directly led to it being disowned by the other parents (see section 
7.3.1). After the Spanish moiety had left the tribe, the ‘young couple’ decided to 
get married but this marriage was not to last for long. In the spring of 1998 
AT&T divorced his bride and left the tribe, raising questions as to what led to 
this separation and how the AT&T-Unisource group managed the cooperation 
between the moieties. 
 
7.2.2 Corporate Strategies to Manage Cultural Diversity  
From the start, the management of AT&T-Unisource was very much aware of 
its multi-cultural character and stimulated the establishing of a multi-cultural 
family. However it also recognised how this cultural diversity was both a 
potential threat as much as it was a competitive advantage. Thus in order to be 
competitive the management tried to create the organisation’s own corporate 
identity based on this multi-cultural family feeling.  
PTT Netherlands hopes to fashion a truly international combination that isn’t 
identified with a single country or culture. ‘We have the advantage of not 
being German, not being French and not being English’ says Ben 
Verwaaijen, president and chief executive officer of PTT Telecom BV. ‘We 
are willing to sacrifice part of our identity’ he says, ‘the continuation of the 
corporation is the prime goal’ (The wall Street Journal, June 18, 1992). 
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 In order to create synergy within the alliance the management used different 
instruments. Five of these instruments are discussed here. (1) The first and most 
important instrument was the concept of ‘One Telecom Country’. This concept 
focused on the cooperation between the shareholders and Unisource. More than 
200 shareholder-employees were involved in projects aimed at obtaining 
substantial cost reduction, reducing marketing time and increasing innovation. 
The concept was focused on five different areas: Marketing and Services, 
Networks, IT, Research & Development and Purchase. Every group had its own 
board and the suggestions of these boards were incorporated in the plans of the 
parent companies. 
 (2) The second instrument used was the concept of training and 
development. In 1997 it was the portfolio of the Human Resource department to 
offer training options on different languages and on cultural awareness. The 
different workshops on technical and management subjects were organised in 
endeavor to use AT&T-Unisource’s cultural diversity. All programmes were to 
include participants from a variety of cultural backgrounds who had worked in 
different corporate settings.  
Clearly, this company has at its disposal, one of the richest and most fertile 
learning grounds in the telecoms industry. Through the sharing of 
experiences and ideas, managers can test their mental models and learn from 
one another (In AT&T Unisource Management Development Programme 
‘95-’96, June 1995, Hoofddorp, The Netherlands). 
 (3) A third instrument was the earlier discussed Joint Management 
Development Programme (JMDP). This program was set up by the four parent 
companies of Unisource to promote understanding of cross-cultural 
relationships and to create a common cultural platform for the organisation 
drawing on the cultural strengths of the parents. More than 350 delegates from 
the four parent organisations joined this programme since its start in 1993. 
 (4) The fourth strategy employed was that of the human resource policy. 
This policy supported the active recruitment and selection of internationally 
orientated employees by Dutch managers in attempt to create a good balance of 
Dutch and non-Dutch employees. In addition, this policy actively promoted the 
organisation of cross-functional teams and teambuilding events which harnessed 
cultural diversity. 
 (5) The fifth strategy was the organising of formal and informal 
communication through various means such as the corporate magazine 
‘Gateway’, informal gatherings, sport events and company days such as the 
Summer Event where employees and their families could interact in an informal 
setting. Another initiative was the setting up of the AT&T-Unisource 
Communications Services Fun Club that co-ordinated and supported activities 
organised sporting events and cultural activities for employees. 
 In summary, it can be concluded that all of the formal cross-cultural 
strategies focused on combining the cultural strengths of the parent 
organisations in ways that would support a successful cooperation. Some might 
assume that the synergy the management wanted to create would have been 
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more easily achieved between companies that are culturally similar.  In order to 
answer this question the experiences of Dutch employees in the AT&T-
Unisource group in co-operating with the partner organisations are discussed in 
the next section. 
 
 
7.3 The Experiences of Dutch Employees with the Alliance Partners  
 
This section explores the Dutch experiences in the cooperation with the four 
AT&T-Unisource parent companies Telia, Swiss Telecom, Telefónica and 
AT&T. To discover whether synergy is better achieved between partner 
organisations with similar cultural backgrounds the findings are compared with 
the cultural distances between the national cultures of the parent companies 
according to Hofstede (1991) and Trompenaars (1993).  
 
7.3.1 Cultural Similarities Do Not Result in Harmony 
From the historical overview it can be learned that the management of KPN and 
Telia perceived a small cultural distance between both PTOs. This perception 
stimulated the establishing of the first strategic alliance of European PTOs and 
is supported by the study of Hofstede (1991) that shows a small cultural 
distance between the Dutch and Swedish culture in almost all of the researched 
value dimensions (seeTable 1). Trompenaars’ (1993) seven sets of dimensions 
also indicates that the Swedish and Dutch cultures have many similarities.53 
Both the Dutch and Swedish cultures are universalistic, individualistic, 
achievement-orientated, specific-orientated and neutral. Based on these 
findings, one might expect that the cooperation between Swedish Telia and 
Dutch KPN was in effect very positive. To discover how these cultural 
similarities influenced the daily practices within the Unisource alliance in actual 
fact the daily life experiences of Hans and his Dutch AT&T-Unisource 
colleagues have been observed and recorded. 
Value Dimension Score of the Netherlands Score of Sweden 
Power distance 38 (No. 40 at the list) 31 (No. 47/48 at the list) 
Individuality 80 (No. 4/5 at the list) 71 (No. 10/11 at the list) 
Uncertainty avoidance 53 (No. 35 at the list) 29 (No. 49/50 at the list) 
Masculinity 14 (No. 51 at the list) 5 (No. 53 at the list) 
Table 1. Cultural distance between Dutch and Swedish cultures according to Hofstede 
(1991)  
 On a personal level Hans himself has had positive experiences with his 
Swedish colleagues. At the time this research was conducted he had been 
working with Unisource for nearly three years and had become familiar with 
some of his Swedish colleagues at Telia Satellite Communications. He likes the 
Swedish because they have the same kind of humour, they are easy to 
                                                        
53 Compare the used figures and the practical tips for recognising the dimensions on page 45 for the 
universalist-particularist dimension, page 61 for the individualism-collectivism dimension, page 71 
for the neutral-affective dimension, page 89 for the specificity-diffuseness dimension and page 105 
for the achievement-ascription dimension. 
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communicate with and they are able to communicate competently in English. 
Not only Hans, but most of the KPN employees have positive first impressions 
of the Swedish Telia employees. The history of the cooperation is full of stories 
about personal relationships and over the course of the first contacts between 
KPN and Dutch AT&T-Unisource it was clear that employees experienced and 
even enjoyed cultural similarities with their Swedish colleagues. A surprisingly 
large majority of these employees co-operating with Swedish Telia employees 
were even familiar with literature on the cultural similarities and made reference 
to these studies. 
 
‘One can have good personal relations with our Swedish colleagues’. 
‘They are very informal’. 
‘Very social people that put a lot of effort in their social relations’. 
‘The Swedish speak good English’. 
‘From my experience with European cooperation I get along the best with 
Swedish and English people’.  
‘The Swedish have experience with competition and liberalised markets’. 
‘Telia employees switch easy from the general to the specific level’. 
‘As persons, I like them most, we have the same jokes, the same mindset’. 
(Fragments of interviews with Dutch employees of KPN, Unisource and 
AT&T-Unisource). 
 
 The perceived cultural similarities however, appears to overlap less when 
power and organisation politics are involved in the daily cooperation between 
the Dutch and Swedish. While a majority of the Dutch employees seem to have 
enjoyed their personal contacts with the Telia employees, only a minority of the 
employees are positive with regard to their business relations with Telia. 
 
In the beginning we thought that we would get on very well with the 
Swedish. I have said it myself on the boat trip in Sweden. But now you hear 
many stories in the organisation on conflicts and problems with the Swedish 
(interview with KPN manager). 
Traditionally we work together with the Swedish. We always get along with 
them very well. But when real business has to be done cultural differences 
do play an important role (interview with KPN manager). 
 
  It seems clear from research findings that when power and commercial 
interests are involved KPN employees perceive significantly less similarity with 
their Telia counterparts. A larger part of the KPN employees and Dutch AT&T-
Unisource employees experience difficulties in the daily cooperation with 
Swedish colleagues noting the exchange as often being ‘laborious’ and ‘time 
consuming’. The difficulties described can be categorised in three groups. (1) 
The first group of problems cited is related to the decision-making processes: 
 
‘They do not react or take a decision directly but discuss the matters in 
Sweden think about it and will react a couple of weeks later. This results in 
long processes of negotiations’. 
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‘If a Swedish manager says yes, he actually means to say; yes I have heard it, 
but I go home to think about it and discuss it with my colleagues’. 
‘We Dutch know what a consensus culture is, but the Swedish are much 
worse. Everybody participates until a final decision has been made’. 
‘They have a much weaker hierarchic organisation. The autonomy of the 
Swedish districts results in an urge for consensus in Telia. The influence of 
the top management therefore is weak in Telia’. 
(Fragments of interviews with Dutch employees of KPN, Unisource and 
AT&T-Unisource). 
 
(2) The second group of problems is related to what is perceived as Telia’s 
dominance: 
 
‘The Swedish are dominant in cooperation. They have always dominated the 
northern European region’. 
‘The Swedish are similar to the Dutch but cannot be trusted. They are very 
political and sometimes move to the left while you agreed upon going to the 
right’. 
‘They are more competitive and commercial than we are’. 
‘In the alliance in Ireland a larger part of the top management positions are 
occupied by Swedish’.  
‘I have worked with the Swedish for more than ten years now but it is always 
the same. The Swedish are the Germans of the north; they are arrogant and 
always know better’.  
(Fragments of interviews with Dutch employees of KPN, Unisource and 
AT&T-Unisource). 
 
(3) The third group of problems is related to Telia’s organisational pragmatism:  
 
‘Friends are more important than work, if you are not in their networks you 
can forget it’. 
‘They are very commercial, they only put energy in projects if money can be 
earned’ 
‘The Swedish do have another agenda within Unisource, a political one’. 
‘Managers of my age are groomed with the idea of neutrality being the 
cultural inheritance that has to be defended in which cooperation has no 
place’.  
(Fragments of interviews with Dutch employees of KPN, Unisource and 
AT&T-Unisource) 
 
 These findings show that although the Swedish and Dutch cultures are 
perceived as similar and KPN and Telia are equal in their sources of power, the 
cross-cultural cooperation between the two organisations in Unisource is seen as 
arduous. It is therefore not surprising that competition and the struggle for 
power between the two companies resulted in rivalry. One example of this 
struggle was the implementation of the Unisource services in the home-country 
markets of the Netherlands and Sweden where the Dutch wanted to integrate 
UBN Netherland in Unisource while the Swedish pushed for the integration of 
UBN Sweden in Telia. 
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 In this rivalry cultural differences were strategically used to influence the 
balance of power between the two operators. KPN employees experienced 
cultural differences with Telia employees in commercial activities, in strategic 
questions and in the decision making processes. These findings are further 
supported by a study by Fahlgren and Kvist of the Upssale University on the 
cultural differences of KPN and Telia. Fahlgren and Kvist (1993: 42) give fair 
warning: 
As the two cultures are very similar there might be a risk that they become 
rivals. An atmosphere of competition… will make cooperation between the 
two parties very hard and therefore put the success of the joint venture at 
risk. 
 Having observed that the cultural similarities of KPN and Telia have shown 
no guarantee of successful cross-cultural cooperation, one is curious to discover 
the nature of business relations with other Unisource shareholders where larger 
existing cultural differences might to expected.  
 
7.3.2 The Absence of the Swiss Employees 
At the Telecom ’91 Fair in Geneva, KPN’s CEO Mr Ben Verwaaijen announced 
that Unisource was open for the participation of other European PTOs and that 
cooperation was sought with an American operator. At that time Sprint was a 
serious potential candidate. Sprint delivered the fast packet switches for the 
building of a pan-European network that enabled connection to their network in 
the United States. The contracts for 20 % participation by Sprint were ready for 
signing in 1992 however the agreement was canceled at the last moment. 
Meanwhile, via existing contacts, Swiss Telecom made clear its interest in 
participating. The Swiss hoped to catch up with the other European PTOs that 
had already chosen the strategy of internationalisation to strengthen their future 
position. Swiss Telecom did not have much international experiences when it 
joined Unisource in 1993.  
 The co-operation between Dutch and Swiss employees was not very 
extensive. Only a few Swiss employees worked in the Unisource head office in 
Hoofddorp. In the joint venture TelSource, an alliance of KPN and Swiss 
Telecom in the Czech Republic, only a few Swiss were employed. Findings 
show that only a small percentage of young Swiss Telecom employees actually 
want to work abroad. 
Maybe I am a little bit special, because my colleagues in Switzerland are 
international. One is Scottish and the other is English. My office colleague, 
with whom I share the office, is English. He also does a lot of travelling so, 
that… makes me think that I should do something, like go international, see 
other people, also improve my English. To improve everything, that is for 
me the most important. But maybe I am not a typical Swiss (interview with 
Swiss Telecom employee working in TelSource, Prague). 
 The image the Dutch AT&T Unisource and KPN employees have of their 
Swiss Telecom colleagues reflects the low degree of interaction between the two 
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groups. The majority of the interviewed Dutch employees perceived a distance 
between themselves and their Swiss counterparts. 
 
‘They are not very internationally orientated’. 
‘Swiss Telecom employees do not like to work abroad’. 
‘Swiss employees are very detailed in their work’.   
‘They are backwards in technological and organisational developments’. 
 ‘They are nationalistic, very much nationally bounded, and have no 
international experience.’ 
‘Very formal and hierarchic, everything has to be written in black and white 
and signed with ten signatures’. 
‘The Swiss Telecom employees are very carefully in doing business’. 
‘Cooperation is ok as long as it is not within their borders’. 
‘The Swiss find it hard to move abroad. Isn’t it strange that almost no Swiss 
employees work here in Hoofddorp?’ 
‘You think that the Swiss are nice and open but then they will do something 
that astonishes you’. 
(Fragments of interviews with Dutch employees of KPN, Unisource and 
AT&T-Unisource). 
 
 It might be expected that because of the evident cultural differences between 
the Dutch and Swiss employees that the cross-cultural cooperation between 
KPN and Swiss Telecom would be even more difficult than that with Swedish. 
Research shows that Swiss culture differs in two of the four cultural value 
dimensions (Hofstede 1991) with the differences in masculinity being especially 
significant (see Table 2). Trompenaars’ (1993) seven dimensions also indicates 
that the Swiss and Dutch cultures have similarities. Both the Dutch and Swiss 
are universalistic, achievement-orientated, specific-orientated and neutral in 
culture.  
Value Dimension Score of the Netherlands Score of Switzerland 
Power distance 38 (No. 40 at the list) 34 (No. 45 at the list) 
Individuality 80 (No. 4/5 at the list) 68 (No. 14 at the list) 
Uncertainty avoidance 53 (No. 35 at the list) 58 (No. 33 at the list) 
Masculinity 14 (No. 51 at the list) 70 (No. 4/5 at the list) 
Table 2. Cultural distance between Dutch and Swiss cultures according to Hofstede (1991) 
 However, interestingly enough Dutch employees did not perceive cultural 
differences in their daily business dealings with the Swiss as being problematic. 
In fact, on the contrary, they perceived the cooperation with the Swiss 
employees as positive. 
 
‘Once a decision has been made, it will also be executed’. 
‘From the Dutch perspective the Swiss are the easiest to work with. They are 
maybe formal, but if you know how to deal with that that than you can work 
very well with them’ (interview with Dutch Unisource employee) 
‘The relations between the Swiss and Dutch are a very good combination 
because the Swiss are by far more conservative, punctual and follow 
procedures. They only confirm something once the official figures are added 
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and the relevant persons have signed the paper’ (interview with KPN 
manager). 
 
 In summary, although the cultural differences between Dutch and Swiss 
employees appear to be larger than between the Dutch and Swedish employees 
the cooperation with the Swiss has apparently been more successful than it was 
with the Swedish. Furthermore, the cooperation did not result in ethnic rivalry 
because the Dutch and Swiss employees complemented each other very well.  
My agenda is full from the early morning till the late evening. When I heard 
something important in the Czech Republic I called my Swiss colleague to 
ask him what we should do. That made him very nervous. He asked me: 
‘what kind of meeting you have been?’ I told him there was no official 
meeting. Then he wanted to make appointments for regular meetings. But 
there was nothing to discuss in those regular meetings. When I phoned him 
again the next day with new information I had heard the Swiss colleague had 
started to get irritated. He wanted to prepare himself for important questions, 
so I should not raid him. I changed my strategy and met him every two 
weeks to give information on what I have heard. He prepared himself very 
punctual, wrote everything down in letters and made schemes with topics 
and the opinions of KPN and Swiss Telecom on the topics. Finally, he also 
included the solutions. After that we went for a dinner. The new strategy 
works very good (Interview with KPN manager). 
7.3.3 Spanish Conquistadors of Telefónica 
In his daily work, since July 1994, Hans has had close contact with employees 
of Telefónica de España.54 At that time Unisource was looking for a fourth 
powerful partner in Southern Europe and Telefónica was searching for 
European partners to strengthen its position in the international telecom market. 
Telefónica was by then already very experienced in international business and 
was a shareholder in Venezuela, Colombia, Chile, Argentina, Puerto Rico and 
Peru. Unisource and Telefónica decided to merge their units’ international 
satellite business.  
Now we are everywhere, in the North and the South and in the East and the 
West (Chairman of Unisource in NRC Handelsblad, December 14, 1994). 
 In January 1997, the new unit was officially opened. Since then, Hans has 
had a Spanish manager who had a fixed monthly schedule: one week in 
Hoofddorp and three weeks in Madrid. The Spanish manager is internationally 
orientated, speaks English and has worked in Latin America for some years. 
Hans distinguishes two kinds of Spanish employees: those who have lived 
abroad for some years and those who have not. The employees with 
international experience are pleasant to work with. Those who have no 
international experience do not speak English and it is therefore difficult to 
communicate with them. In the beginning Hans thought that the Spanish were 
                                                        
54 The Spanish participation ended at the end of April 1997 during the execution of my research.  
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backward in their technology and management practices but after a while he had 
to change this opinion.  
 Based on the known research findings of Hofstede (1991), it might be 
expected that cultural differences between the Dutch and Spanish culture hinder 
the cooperation between KPN and Telefónica employees. The Dutch and 
Spanish national cultures differ in all of the five dimensions of Hofstede (1991) 
(seeTable 3). Trompenaars’ (1993) seven sets of dimensions also indicate large 
differences between the Spanish and Dutch cultures. In contrast to the Dutch 
culture, the Spanish culture can be classified as particularistic, diffuse-
orientated, ascribed-orientated and affective. According to Trompenaars’ figures 
the Spanish culture is also classified as individualistic (see p.48, p.52 and p.54). 
Based on these findings, one might expect the co-operation between Spanish 
Telefónica and Dutch KPN to be fraught with difficulty and would certainly be 
curious as to the experience of their daily dealings within the Unisource 
alliance.  
Value Dimension Score of the Netherlands Score of Spain 
Power distance 38 (No. 40 at the list) 57 (No. 31 at the list) 
Individuality 80 (No. 4/5 at the list) 51 (No. 20 at the list) 
Uncertainty avoidance 53 (No. 35 at the list) 86 (No. 10/15 at the list) 
Masculinity 14 (No. 51 at the list) 42 (No. 37/38 at the list) 
Table 3. Cultural distance between Dutch and Spanish cultures according to Hofstede 
(1991)  
 Telefónica only joined Unisource in 1996 and therefore the majority of the 
KPN and Dutch AT&T-Unisource employees did not have much experience 
with their Spanish colleagues. In general, KPN and Dutch AT&T-Unisource 
employees had a positive image of the Spanish colleagues, appreciated the 
technological knowledge, the commercial attitude and the international 
experience of their Spanish colleagues. 
 
‘The Spanish have really good technicians. They are technically superior to 
us’. 
‘Who would have thought that of the Spanish, who at European level are 
behind in technology and in the development of the Spanish infrastructure? 
They are ten times better in doing international business than we are.’ 
‘Very experienced and successful in international business especially in 
Latin America.’ 
‘They are internationally orientated. Although Telefónica has joined 
Unisource for just one year I have seen more Spanish than Swiss colleagues 
here in Hoofddorp’. 
‘Do not speak English.’ 
(Fragments of interviews with Dutch employees of KPN, Unisource and 
AT&T-Unisource). 
 
 The majority of the KPN and Dutch AT&T-Unisource employees who are 
involved in projects with Telefónica experience large cultural differences 
between the Spanish and Dutch ways of working. Although large cultural 
differences are cited, the Dutch like the cooperation with their Spanish 
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colleagues. There seems to be a willingness among the Dutch employees 
involved to co-operate and to learn from their Spanish colleagues.   
 
‘I personally like to work with the Spanish. They have a commercial mind 
and judge the success of the Unisource alliance at the financial results 
(interview with Dutch Unisource employee). 
‘We Dutch probably do have more in common with the Spanish whom are 
traditionally a seagoing nation and also trade goods’ (interview with Dutch 
Unisource employee).  
‘Last week we visited Telefónica de Argentina. We went there quite tired 
and had an attitude of ‘do we really have to go?’.  We returned deeply 
impressed. President Menez gave a perfect speech on the telecom sector in 
Argentina. Telefónica gets their things done well abroad. Where others have 
failed in the chaos of the country they acquired access and moreover, made 
profits. Who had thought that of those Spanish who at European level are 
lacking behind in technology and in the development of the Spanish 
infrastructure? They are ten times better in doing international business than 
we are’ (interview with KPN manager). 
 
 Dutch AT&T-Unisource employees have a high regard for the Spanish 
Telefónica employees. They are surprised to discover are highly qualified 
technical experts, commercial in attitude and internationally experienced. There 
is a clear willingness to co-operate with the Spanish and cultural differences are 
therefore not perceived as problematic. 
 
7.3.4 American Influences in the Alliance 
After Telefónica joined the European strategic alliance Unisource, no other 
European partner was sought after. KPN’s CEO Mr Ben Verwaaijen said in an 
interview that ‘there will be no more partners, we are not the United Nations’ 
(NRC Handelsblad, December 14, 1994). But Unisource did not have an 
American partner which would enable it to compete the other international 
strategic alliances Global One and Concert at the European market. As far back 
as in 1992 Unisource had sought for an alliance with the American Sprint, 
which did not turn out successfully. Then the American AT&T, formally seen as 
a competitor at the European market showed interest in an alliance and in 1995.  
AT&T and Unisource announced the establishing of a joint venture in which 
Unisource participated at 60% and AT&T at 40%. The objective of this joint 
venture was to offer telecom services for large international companies in 
Europe. The joint venture was first named ‘Uniworld’ before it was renamed 
AT&T-Unisource. With the change of the name the majority of the activities of 
Unisource were transferred to the AT&T-Unisource alliance.  
 The American influence in the AT&T-Unisource alliance was considerable, 
not only because of AT&T’s participation but also because of independent 
American consultants that came to work in Europe. These consultants with as 
much as ten years of experience in the American telecom market used the latter 
as a model for Europe. Steinfield (1994) however, warns against using the 
telecom developments in America as a model for the European situation. It 
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would be a mistake he argues, to assume that European telecommunications will 
closely reassemble the United States situation in the near future: 
We must be careful not to make light of the fact that even within the 
European Community, the 12 countries have very different cultures, 
economic conditions and geography and this serves as an opposing force to 
the centrifugal tendencies originating in the EC. Thus there is little 
justification for assuming that telecommunications could and should be 
offered in a homogeneous fashion across such a diverse context (Steinfield 
1994: 15). 
 Steinfield (1994) stated that national diversity could be at right angles to 
international uniformity and universal services. This could also be noticed in the 
AT&T-Unisource group that wanted to offer pan-European services and 
solutions. Given the monopolistic history of PTOs, the preference for 
international uniformity of the AT&T-Unisource group can be understood. The 
cultural diversity of the European customers moreover, forces the strategic 
alliance to adapt its business to national cultures. 
Even though you are enforcing pan-European solutions, the business is still 
national. We were going to set up these procedures everywhere, all of them a 
bit the same… and then, after a while, you realise no, it has to be national. 
You have to understand that there is a difference in how you do things in 
Spain and in Greece and in Belgium and so on… (interview with European 
AT&T-Unisource employee). 
 This gives rise to the question regarding what the differences in the national 
cultures of the USA and the Netherlands might in fact be. In three of the cultural 
value dimensions of Hofstede (1991) the national cultures of the USA and the 
Netherlands are in fact quite similar. Only the value dimensions of masculinity 
differs in both cultures. Trompenaars’ (1993) seven dimensions indicates that 
the American and Dutch cultures are similar. Both the Dutch and American 
culture are universalistic, individualistic, achievement-orientated, specific-
orientated and neutral cultures. These findings suggest an easy cooperation 
between AT&T and Dutch KPN.  
 
Value Dimension Score of the Netherlands Score of USA 
Power distance 38 (No. 40 at the list) 40 (No. 38 at the list) 
Individuality 80 (No. 4/5 at the list) 91 (No. 1 at the list) 
Uncertainty avoidance 53 (No. 35 at the list) 46 (No. 43 at the list) 
Masculinity 14 (No. 51 at the list) 62 (No. 15 at the list) 
Table 4. Cultural distance between Dutch and American cultures according to Hofstede 
(1991)  
 Although one might have expected a more or less problem-free cooperation, 
the Dutch Unisource, AT&T-Unisource and KPN employees do not have a very 
positive image of the cooperation with AT&T employees: 
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‘Everywhere in the world the screw has to be mounted in the wall in the 
same way. The regional managers are nothing more than co-ordinators’. 
‘They come from different parts of the world, travel all over the whole world 
and are very difficult to work with’. 
‘The Americans want to use American organisation models within the 
European situation. But that does not work’. 
‘They don’t think they just act. If you call them on Friday afternoon at four 
o’clock to say they have to go to Stockholm, they go directly to the airport, 
without even thinking if there will be anybody in Sweden who will attend a 
meeting on Friday evening’. 
‘Americans have a work attitude that is too optimistic’. 
‘The most difficult to work with of all our international colleagues are the 
Americans!’. 
(Fragments of interviews with Dutch employees of KPN, Unisource and 
AT&T-Unisource). 
 
 Although there are large cultural similarities between the Dutch and 
American employees, according to Hofstede, there is a sort of rivalry among the 
Dutch and the Americans as was evident in the case of the cooperation between 
the Swedish and Dutch employees. Competition and a struggle for power 
between AT&T and KPN have resulted in rivalry in which cultural differences 
are strategically used to influence the balance of power between the two 
operators. The success of the cultural synergy strategy in the AT&T-Unisource 
group is not so much related to the cultural closeness between the partner 
organisations, but to the struggle for power. The next section further explores 
the daily practice of cross-cultural cooperation. 
 
 
 
 
7.4 The Daily Practice of Cross-Cultural Cooperation: The ‘Tribe’ is 
Falling Apart 
 
7.4.1 Daily Cross-Cultural Experiences in the AT&T-Unisource Group 
It is Saturday, 1.30 pm. Rain is pouring down from the grey sky above 
Amsterdam. Hans parks his car on the empty parking place near the circus tent. 
At the four corners of the tent the flags of AT&T-Unisource have been 
mounted. The entrance of the parking place is also decorated with a huge 
corporate flag. Hans takes out his umbrella and walks to the entrance of a giant 
tennis hall that has been transformed into a party-centre for the 1997 Unisource 
and AT&T Unisource Summer Event. The hall is full with tables. Hans is just in 
time to join the lunch-buffet. Actually, he is quite late. His girl friend with 
whom he has lived together for more than four years did not want to accompany 
him. He has made an appointment with some of his colleagues to be here today. 
A lady at the entrance asks for his wallet. ‘Sorry, my wallet?’ asks Hans. ‘I 
mean your coat, sir’ she corrects herself. Hans walks into the hall looking for 
some of his colleagues. The AT&T Unisource flags decorate the roof of the hall. 
The greater part of the hall, which has a capacity of 500 people, is empty. Hans 
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easily finds the table where one of his colleagues is seated with his wife and two 
children. Their other colleagues have not shown up. On the podium a band has 
just finished playing. A guest speaker announces the start of the Circus Royal. 
All of the AT&T-Unisource children walk with their parents to the circus tent 
next to the hall. Hans walks together with his colleague and children. The 
children have got a little flashlight and now they are treated to a big candyfloss. 
A little portable organ plays. The benches in the circus tent are filled with 
children. Almost 100 children are waiting for the start of the Circus Royal. Hans 
greets some of the persons he knows, but the majority of the participants are 
strangers to him. Few people have shown up today. Meanwhile the children 
enjoy the Circus Royal with dogs, horses, clowns, elephants and acrobats. The 
circus ringmaster starts the show in English but slowly, more and more, Dutch 
words and sentences slip into his speech. During the break the children are 
given ice creams and a jazz band plays in the hall. Once the second part of the 
Circus Royal is finished most of the employees leave for home. A big band 
plays in the hall for the remaining people. Hans decides to go home.  
 Only a minority of the employees have joined in the gathering. This might 
have been due to the bad weather. But AT&T-Unisource employees have spent 
enough time at work with their colleagues and would rather share their free time 
with friends and family. The organisation is growing and changing so fast that 
the initial ‘family’ feeling is fading away. Most of the employees, especially 
those who have their own families and personal networks of friends and 
relatives are not in need of contact with their colleagues outside working hours 
with whom they already spend as much as 40, 50, some even 60 hours a week at 
the office. When parties or activities are held amongst employees it is rather on 
a personal basis than on company level. Based upon this observation and based 
upon interviews it can be concluded that AT&T-Unisource employees did not 
have a strong commitment with the organisation but rather, experienced the 
organisation as a complex political arena. This is discussed later in this chapter. 
 Not only family days but also department meetings to improve mutual 
cooperation were organised in the AT&T-Unisource group. In the spring of 
1997 Hans and all of the employees of Satellite Communications from Sweden, 
Spain and the Netherlands spent an informal weekend together in a hotel south 
of Paris. Together with the partners and children the group numbered more than 
100 people. An assessment trainer was hired to conduct a workshop on the 
concept of trust within the group. The trainer used different exercises to explore 
the dynamics of trust amongst the employees of different nations. Hans had to 
guide a Spanish colleague who is blindfolded with a cloth along an obstacle 
path. In another exercise the same Spanish colleague had to stand behind Hans 
who was blindfolded. Hans had to then let himself fall ‘trusting’ fully that his 
colleague would catch him. Although it was very friendly and relaxed the 
groups did not really interact with each other. The Dutch stayed together at their 
tables. The Swedish on the other hand, sat down to dinner with other 
nationalities and their attitude was very social. The Spanish employees stayed 
together. Hans introduced himself to one of his Spanish colleagues. The 
conversation around the table was in English. Most of the partners of the 
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Spanish employees do not speak English and thus the Spanish employees made 
it a point to stay by them. Hans spoke in Spanish with the wife of his colleague.  
 When the cooperation with the Spanish Telefónica was announced, Hans 
was ready and willing to learn Spanish. Other Dutch AT&T-Unisource 
colleagues were also enthusiastic. They tried to organise a language course once 
a week from 5 to 6 pm in the office in Hoofddorp. Although there was more 
than enough motivation, it appeared to be impossible to find an evening 
everybody which suited everyone. Furthermore, some already spoke Spanish 
and the level of fluency was so varied that they needed to form many small 
groups which did not prove to be cost-effective and the attempt to organise a 
common language course at corporate level failed. If he wanted, Hans could go 
to the Easy Learn Centre in the Spicalaan Building, where the Human Resource 
Department had set up a learning room with five computers to learn Spanish, 
Dutch and other European languages, but Hans was in fact too busy to take time 
off to learn Spanish or to follow any other course for that matter.  
 At the Erasmus University where he studied Economics, Hans had attended a 
Spanish language course for two years. This was enough to be able to speak and 
understand Spanish at a basic level. The advantage of speaking the language 
was made evident to him while he was preparing the merger of the Dutch and 
Spanish Satellite Communications departments in which very few of the 
Spanish employees spoke English. In one of his first meetings, Hans found 
himself with Spanish colleagues who used an English-Spanish dictionary to 
communicate with him. Every now and then it had to be verified that all the 
participants clearly understood the main points and significant details subject to 
agreement in the discussion. This slowed down the process of communication 
and Hans found the communication far easier when he switched to speaking 
Spanish.  
 Cultural and language problems can cause much of a time delay in daily 
operations. When Hans was in Sarajevo for business the satellite connection 
between Sarajevo & Madrid broke down. This connection was the only reliable 
means of communication between the United Nations Developing Program with 
the United Nations and EC headquarters in Geneva and Brussels. Late that 
night, employees of the United Nations Developing Program phoned the 
Spanish network management centre in Madrid to report the break down of the 
line. At that time no English-speaking staff member was in the network centre 
thus it was not realised that there was an emergency and that the line had been 
broken. A Dutch KPN employee flew over to Sarajevo to repair the satellite 
connection and contacted Madrid via a ground-station in Brussels. ‘I am calling 
via the satellite in Brussels from Sarajevo for a test of the line’ he said to the 
Spanish centre because the line had to be tested from the centre in Madrid. ‘No 
that is not possible, the line with Sarajevo is down’ replies the Spanish centre in 
broken English. ‘Yes, but I am calling from Sarajevo, via Brussels’, tried the 
KPN employee again. It took some time before they understood each other. This 
caused a day long delay in the repair of the line.  
 The standard written language in the AT&T-Unisource alliance and 
Unisource is English but at local level the ‘family members’ use their respective 
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national language. In Hans’ team in Hoofddorp a kind of ‘Euro English’ is used. 
This business language has evolved as a result of employees of different 
nationalities speaking English. New words and expressions are constantly being 
introduced, discussed and agreed upon. Hans has learned the importance of 
explaining very carefully his intentions and expectations with regard to work-
related issues such as deadlines, planning, initiatives and meetings. Even if 
everybody speaks English, the different cultural context of each person makes it 
necessary to clearly define and clarify what each one means. Hence, the 
meetings within the AT&T-Unisource group are far more frequent and are 
longer than what Hans is accustomed to at KPN.  
  In his first meeting with his Spanish counterparts in The Hague Hans has 
chosen to serve a lunch of sandwiches in the meeting room with only a half-
hour lunch break. He was aware of the Spanish custom of lunching in a 
restaurant in the city, but decides to observe his own ‘professional’ values and 
wants to set the norms for co-operation. These norms are: stay close to your 
own- values, be professional, work hard and be efficient. Consequently, Hans’ 
first meeting in Madrid was conducted in typical Spanish tradition: a meeting 
from 9 am till 1.30 pm, followed by a good lunch in a restaurant in Madrid 
where they remained eating till 4 pm before returning to their offices. In Hans’ 
opinion, this is wasted time while for the Spanish host this is an opportunity for 
Hans to learn more about his colleagues and to build both professional and 
personal relationships with them. Hans feels he has the best results with 
international project teams with clear objectives who work together intensively 
for three or four days from early in the morning till late at night, having lunch 
and dinner together as they work in a location away from office.  
 Not all of the employees like this intensive style of working. Hans generally 
does not call the Swedish office after 4 pm. Hans’ perception is that his Swedish 
colleagues work only till 4 pm during summer to allow themselves time to enjoy 
the beautiful weather so as to compensate for these lost hours in wintertime 
when they work 45 hours a week. Hans tells a little joke about the Swedish: ‘if 
you want to conquer Sweden you have to do that in the month of June or July, 
then nobody is present in Sweden. You just can descend upon Sweden and take 
over the country’. Hans has learned to cope with cultural diversity in the AT&T-
Unisource alliance by stereotyping.  
 Hans’ cross-cultural experience applies to the majority of the KPN and 
Dutch AT&T-Unisource employees interviewed. They show a willingness to 
learn foreign languages, to work in an international context and to co-operate 
with the parent organisations. A greater part of the Dutch KPN, AT&T-
Unisource and Unisource employees have learned to cope with cultural 
differences themselves, while some have attended the Joint Management 
Development Program (JMDP). In an earlier discussed evaluation of the JMDP 
the results showed an increase of the knowledge on cross-cultural cooperation 
while the perception of shared values decreased (Olving 1996: 64). She notes 
that the intellectual willingness of employees to co-operate and to learn about 
each other leads to cognitive learning and that the confrontation with colleagues 
of other cultural backgrounds evidently stimulates employees to reflect on their 
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own cultural identity. Olving (1996) further concludes that employees adhere to 
their cultural identity and thus the readiness to change habits and affective 
learning decreases. The study presented in this thesis also shows that some of 
the partner organisations adhere to their cultural identity. 
 
7.4.2 American-Dutch Dominance and Strategies of Resistance 
Of the five partner organisations in the AT&T-Unisource group, American 
AT&T and Dutch KPN culturally dominate the strategic alliance. In section 
7.3.4 the American influences of AT&T employees and American consultants in 
the strategic alliance have already been partly discussed. As a result of the 
participation; 
We saw since AT&T joined the consortium a lot of American influences. 
And this is what I am saying, more informal and more open, a log of 
American influences. But I would not say too much, because I would not say 
AT&T-Unisource is a typical American organisation (interview with non-
Dutch AT&T-Unisource employee).  
 The American influence in the company is clearly observable for instance in 
the use of first names. When Hans meets with his superior on the fourth floor 
where the AT&T-Unisource top management is located he calls him John and 
not ‘Mr. Brisbane’. Even the CEO of AUCS is called Jim Cosgrow and nobody 
dares to call him Mr. Cosgrow as that would be considered ridiculous and he 
would no doubt laugh. Some blame this strong American influence for the slow 
progress in the strategic alliance:   
The Americans are too dominant in the AT&T-Unisource group. The have 
joined Unisource too early in our development process. We should have 
gained power first with our own four Unisource partners and become 
accustomed to each other before including AT&T. The including of AT&T 
has damaged the alliance’s progress in development (interview with Dutch 
AT&T-Unisource employee).  
 Apart from the growing influence of AT&T, the Unisource alliance slowly 
started to become less international and more Dutch.  
In the beginning it was very internationally orientated, the whole philosophy, 
everything. But our department grew from four to fourteen people. And now 
it is only me who is really international (interview with AT&T-Unisource 
employee). 
 Different causes can be held responsible for the growing influence of Dutch 
culture within AT&T-Unisource. Firstly, the AT&T-Unisource headquarters had 
always been based in the Netherlands. The nationality of most new employees 
was hence likely to be Dutch since Dutch employees cost less to employ than 
Swedish, Spanish, American or Swiss expatriates. Suggestions to move the 
headquarters to Frankfurt or Brussels in order not to be in one of the mother 
countries were never acted upon. As a result a large number of Dutch employees 
have been recruited for the office in Hoofddorp.  
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The headquarters are here in Hoofddorp, all of the meetings are held here. 
There are a lot of these kinds of issues. This creates an overall message, 
which says that the Dutch, and occasion wise Hoofddorp, are the centre of 
the Universe and anybody else just falls in line. This is dangerous for the 
success of the alliance (interview with non-Dutch AT&T-Unisource 
employee). 
 Secondly, a significant percentage of the non-Dutch employees recruited 
were near permanent residents in the Netherlands married to Dutch partners and 
/or had no intentions of leaving the country and had adapted to the Dutch 
culture. Thirdly, changes in the strategies of Telefónica in December 1997 
decreased its influence in the alliance. At an earlier stage Telia established Telia 
International for their international activities thereby indicating that Unisource 
was not seen as their most important instrument for international expansion. 
Fourthly, personal networks used to recruit new management from KPN brought 
along new Dutch employees from the organisation.  
That makes that Unisource is getting more and more Dutch. It is an easy and 
quiet process. Everybody is telling: no more Dutch please. Ok, there is a 
relatively high number of Americans coming in from AT&T, which is good 
for the headquarters to a certain extend. But now its becoming more and 
more an American-Dutch company (interview with non-Dutch AT&T- 
Unisource employee). 
 Fifthly, it was easier to work with ex-KPN employees. In times of stress and 
action it is easier to co-operate with colleagues of your own corporate and 
national culture. 
Yes, of course frustration and chaos can happen, especially when people are 
under stress when things have to be done. Then you tend to stress your ways 
of how to do things much stronger. So sometimes it creates a lot of 
disturbances and unnecessary discussions because you just misunderstood 
each other (interview with AT&T-Unisource employee). 
 As a result Unisource began more and more to be perceived as a Dutch 
organisation. 
I don’t know if Unisource is typical of other Dutch companies and I use the 
word Dutch, because it is not Dutch, but there is a large Dutch influence. 
And the Dutch influence is increasing as time is gone up with Unisource 
(interview with non-Dutch AT&T-Unisource employee). 
 The strong American presence in the AT&T-Unisource alliance and the 
growing influence of the Dutch culture has resulted in a strong Dutch-American 
cultural mix.  
If you look at the AT&T-Unisource management team, it is highly American 
and Dutch. I think the Dutch and Americans tend to get along better, because 
they are more direct in their approach. In a business meeting an American 
tendency would be to say: ‘ok does everybody agree?’ ‘Yes we all agree’ 
and the Dutch if they don’t agree those will say: ‘I don’t agree, I want to do 
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this, yes I want this done’. Then the American will say, ‘well well, ok, what 
do you think, yes ok, we know all now’, and then agree (interview with 
American AT&T-Unisource employee). 
 There is a possibility that American action-oriented behaviour in effect 
strengthens the Dutch arrogance and the combined effect leaving little space for 
the other participants of the alliance.  
I observed the executive committee working on a problem. Of the five, the 
Americans and Dutch were dominating the situation, while other people in 
the room didn’t say a thing. They may have very strong views but they 
didn’t say anything because certain people even within the Dutch and the 
American groupings were dominating the situation. And sometimes this has 
to do with language, a sense of people’s language abilities aren’t as good as 
others and therefore they are less vocal but definite the Dutch are more likely 
to have a view whether or not their language ability is that good. They just 
have a view and tell you their view. It is your job to understand it (interview 
with AT&T-Unisource employee). 
 The dominant presence of AT&T and KPN in the strategic alliance has 
undoubtedly influenced the co-operation with the other parent companies 
Telefónica, Telia and Swiss Telecom.  
AT&T-Unisource is chaotic which is sometimes very frustrating but the lack 
of personal discipline belongs to the Dutch I think. And also it belongs to the 
Americans because we always know it better. Therefore Dutch and 
American can work well together in the alliance (interview with American 
AT&T-Unisource employee). 
 These parent companies have used distinct strategies to restore the balance 
of power with its American-Dutch partners. In the following section three of 
these counter-strategies will be discussed. The first strategy focuses on the 
strategic move of Telefónica’s leaving of the AT&T-Unisource group while the 
second strategy concerns the use of organisation politics to influence the 
decision-making processes in the AT&T-Unisource group. Finally, the third 
strategy is about the strategies of foreign expatriates working in the AT&T-
Unisource group. 
 
The Strategic Move of Telefónica to Latin America 
It is May 1997. A month before Hans was confronted with the splitting up of the 
Spanish Telefónica and the AT&T-Unisource family. For more than two years 
Hans has invested energy, time and resources in introducing himself to his 
Spanish colleagues, studying Spanish and helping with the merger of the 
Spanish and Dutch Satellite Communications units. However, less than a year 
into the job, the Telefónica chairman Mr. Villalonga drastically changed 
strategy and Telefónica was consequently suddenly headed for a split with the 
AT&T-Unisource group. Mr. Villalonga came to power when his close friend 
Mr. José Maria Aznar became the new Prime Minister of Spain. In 1996 the 
general elections in Spain brought the centre-right Popular Party into power 
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after a long period of domination by the Socialist Party. According to the 
traditional Spanish system of political clientalism, the chairmen of important 
government related offices such as Telefónica were replaced with new chairmen 
loyal to the current political party in power. Since the agreement with Unisource 
had in fact been initiated by the former Socialist chairman and handed over to 
Mr. Villalonga, who was originally from the Spanish office of an American 
investment bank, the new chairman did not feel particularly bound to 
maintaining the agreement.  
 The agreement with Unisource included the selling of equity of Telefonica 
International (TISA). Telefonica’s CEO Villalonga however, wanted all of 
TISA for Telefónica because it contributed 4,6 billion guilders, which amounted 
to almost 20% of Telefónica’s revenues.55 Thanks to TISA, profits of Telefónica 
increased in the first quarter of 1997 with 16% to 7 billion guilders (Telegraaf, 
May 15, 1997). TISA was and is also by far the most important international 
provider of the Latin American market.56 This interest in the Latin American 
market was however, not shared with the Unisource ‘parents’, who were mainly 
focused on the European market. Negative experiences in Venezuela and the 
Netherlands Antilles (see chapter 8) had prevented the management of KPN 
from focusing on the Latin American market and consequently led KPN to 
concentrate on new telecom markets in Eastern Europe and South East Asia. 
 Telefonica itself has no traditional relationship with the rest of Europe and 
the telecommunication needs of Spanish multinationals with business interests 
in Europe are low.57 The political isolation during the Franco regime had cut 
Spain off from the rest of Europe for more than 30 years and although the 
economic developments of Spain in the last ten years had put the country on the 
European economic map again, the economic, cultural and political orientation 
of Spain in Latin America for over 500 years still presides. It was thus only 
natural that the other Unisource partners had to acknowledge that they had 
under estimated the importance of the Latin American telecom market for 
Telefónica’s:  
We thought that the face of Telefónica was aimed at Europe. That was a 
mistake. Telefónica turns its back on Europe and aims their face toward 
Latin America (interview with Verwaaijen in NRC Handelsblad, April 21, 
1997).  
 On the other hand, the participation of Telefónica was one of the reasons for 
AT&T participating in the AT&T-Unisource group as they hoped to gain access 
to the Latin American market via Telefónica. AT&T‘s interest in the Latin 
                                                        
55 The Spanish government was owner of 23.8 per cent of TISA. The Spanish government 
disrupted the plans by seeking the maximum price for its 23.8 per cent holding in Tisa.  
56 The Latin-American telecom market yields 36 billion dollars per annum and this figure is 
expected to double by the year 2000. Meanwhile Telefónica is seeking a North American partner to 
gain privileged access to the some 40 million Spanish speakers in the United States. A share-swap 
agreement between Telefónica and Portugal Telecom SA in April 1997 made it clear that the 
organisation is clearly focused on the Latin American market. The agreement has allowed 
Telefónica to gain a foothold in the huge Brazilian telecom market.  
57 Even the satellite network of Telefónica is not orientated at Europe but at the Iberian Peninsula 
and the Canarian Islands. 
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American telecom market is further proven by the fact that in July 1997, very 
shortly after Telefónica’s parting from the Unisource alliance in April 1997, 
AT&T immediately established a strategic partnership with STET Italiain in a 
joint investment in Latin America. The cultural cooperation between the 
American and Spanish operators did not however, work out very well. In the 
strategic alliance Venworld in Venezuela, AT&T and Telefónica worked 
together but AT&T was not considered the perfect partner to help Telefónica 
strengthen its position in the Latin American market. On the contrary, Tisa and 
AT&T had rather conflicting interests in Latin America. AT&T was pushing for 
lower accounting rates in South America, while in contrast, most of the Latin 
American PTOs were fighting to keep international rates high to maintain high 
profits from the substantial revenues on incoming calls.58 Hence the prospect of 
a cooperation with the BT-MCI alliance appeared more attractive for 
Telefónica. As has been explained in section 4.2.1, the activities of BT and MCI 
in Central and Latin America had been a threat for Telefónica thus an alliance 
with BT-MCI would automatically make Telefónica the indisputable leader in 
the Spanish speaking world and support the dream of Mr. Villalonga to promote 
Telefónica from the ninth-largest in terms of revenue to the fifth-largest operator 
in the world. The decision to join the BT-MCI alliance brought Telefónica in 
conflict with the AT&T Unisource group which consequently and promptly 
terminated its cooperation with the Spanish operator.  
Unisource’s partner, Telefonica of Spain, is announcing today, a strategic 
partnership with BT/MCI, which makes their continued participation in 
Unisource impossible. The other three shareholders of Unisource consider 
this new alliance incompatible with Telefonica’s shareholding in Unisource 
and have asked them to leave. AT&T strongly support this position (Note to 
all AT&T-Unisource employees, April 18 1997) 
 In summary, Telefónica had itself misjudged the potential of AT&T-
Unisource’s power in Latin America. Neither KPN nor AT&T was what it 
considered to be a suitable strategic partner that would help in its objective to 
acquire a dominant position in the Latin American market. This, coupled with 
the changes in the Spanish political context prompted Telefónica to initiate the 
joint venture with BT-MCI. Unfortunately Telefónica’s motivations and the 
chain events that led to this decision were, at the time, not fully grasped by 
KPN.  
 
The Political Arena in the AT&T-Unisource group 
In order to influence the balance of power in the AT&T-Unisource group the 
parent organisations used organisation politics which is the practical use of 
power in an organisation by means of actions, rituals, symbols and procedures 
(Pfeffer 1992). This use of power can be either formal such as in the practice of 
                                                        
58 The term accounting rate refers to communications traffic between zones controlled by different 
PTOs. It is used for the establishment of international accounts and is expresses as a charge per 
traffic unit. The accounting rate differs from the collection rate, which is the charge to the telecom 
service user that is made by the PTO (Noam and Kramer 1994). 
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business policy or informal, such as in the influence of personal networks. An 
example of this is the way in which the Swedish managed to influence the 
Dutch initiatives. As has been earlier discussed the decision making process of 
Swedish Telia prescribed extensive debate within the AT&T-Unisource group 
before final decisions were made. This entailed that decisions made in 
Hoofddorp be taken back to the Telia head office in Sweden to be intensively 
discussed before a consensus could be reached which meant that it was 
sometimes a week or two before the Swedish delegates returned to Hoofddorp 
with their report and feedback. In the meantime the Dutch delegates would 
already have been busy executing the decisions made in the first meeting.  
We talked about the positioning of the UBN’s in the mother countries in 
Switserland with the Swedish and the Swiss. We thought that we were united 
in our vision on the relationship and the position of UBN and the partner 
organisation. But to our surprise Telia told us that they would integrate this 
part and that part of UBN Sweden back in their organsation. We told that 
that was not possible, but you can’t bring them to court. So they did it 
(interview with Dutch AT&T-Unisource employee).  
 Another way to evade the Dutch-American dominance was by refraining 
from joining the AT&T-Unisource alliance in Hoofddorp as was the case with 
Hans’ department. The AT&T-Unisource family comprised a diverse range 
employees from more than 17 nations such as Mexico, United States, Britain, 
France, Australia and the Netherlands yet none of Hans’ departmental 
colleagues came from one of the three other parent companies. There are several 
reasons for this. The Spanish employees had obviously left the organisation 
since Telefónica had separated from Unisource. The Swedish employees all 
worked with Telia in Sweden while the two Swiss colleagues who had come to 
Hoofddorp to support the sales of services in Switzerland had returned home not 
long after their arrival. While the Swiss market comprises a large number of 
international clients in Switzerland such as the UNDP and the UN, organisations 
in need of satellite communications to remote regions, they appeared to be 
unwilling to open their own national market for Unisource Satellite 
Communications. It is thus not surprising that the difficult merging of the 
activities of the individual parents has been a point of intense discussion 
throughout the history of Unisource. For a long time the question as to whether 
Unisource policies or shareholder policies should have the highest priority and 
whether the parents should surrender their own identity if the shareholders 
would merge into Unisource has been debated. From the start KPN was aware 
that co-operating in the strategic alliance would change the position of the 
partner organisation, which could result in a merging of the partner 
organisations in Unisource. ‘We are willing to sacrifice part of our identity’, 
said CEO Mr Ben Verwaaijen at the start of the alliance (The Wall Street 
Journal, June 18, 1992). However, in reality each of the partners continued to 
adhere to their respective identities. The shareholders remained independent and 
strongly involved in the daily management of the alliance and their involvement 
resulted in the slowing down of the decision-making processes.  
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There is exaggerating compassion of the partners’ opinions and of 
participation in decision-making processes. But that does not work. After 
two years we are still implementing Unisource. Until now we have not been 
able to operationalise in a structural way the decisions made. There are still 
quarrels on what to do and how, while slowly the time passes. That is 
frustrating (interview with Dutch AT&T-Unisource employee).  
 It seems clearly evident that the shareholders were very much involved in the 
decision-making processes in the AT&T-Unisource group. The next example 
shows the involvement of partner organisations in managing the alliance. 
The shareholders representatives met in the conference room across the 
corridor from Hans’ office and he has noted that the video camera and screen 
are usually installed which would imply that these important meetings are 
very likely to be videoconferences. The representatives are all dressed in 
white shirts, most of them in short sleeves and all with ties of inconspicuous 
colours. Every now and then a door opens and a Swedish, Dutch, American, 
or Swiss representative comes out of the room to answer a mobile phone call 
or call their own national headquarters. They pace the corridor, loudly 
discussing in their own respective languages. The Dutch representative talks 
with his manager who appears to be somewhere in another time zone where 
it is still early in the morning while it is already 2:00 pm in the Netherlands. 
The Dutch representative consults him on political issues raised in the 
meeting. The discussion on the mobile telephone seems to become rather 
heated and the representative appears to be angry with regards to a third 
party involvement. They finish the conversation with a joke and the 
representative returns to the meeting room (observation in the AT&T 
Unisource building). 
 It is indisputable that in Unisource, the relationship with the shareholder is 
still of great importance. When Hans applied for a job with Unisource they were 
in need of an experienced person who knew how to find his way within KPN. 
The communication with the parent organisation is of importance because KPN 
delivered the needed product and services. The success of KPN’s own satellite 
communication unit resulted in the offering of the same products and services in 
the same market as Unisource did. Hans does not enjoy this kind of internal 
struggle very much.  
 The influence of the decision-making processes, the use of personal 
networks in the partner organisation, the making coalitions, the stressing of the 
importance of national identity and the integration of Unisource services in the 
parent organisations are all examples of organisational politics that are used by 
the parent organisations to influence the power balance in the AT&T-Unisource 
group. This has resulted in a political arena in which it is difficult to conduct 
business.  
It is quite difficult here, it is like walking around landmines. You can walk 
on one side but not on the other side. You can be very direct but …you never 
know when you might be speaking too openly with someone. You don’t 
know to who or where the conversation is passed on. It is of course the same 
in each organisation but here some of the people have known each other for 
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a long time already. You never know exactly how these networks are… 
(interview with Unisource employee).  
 
Non-Dutch Employees in the AT&T-Unisource Group  
An interesting question to raise is that with regard to how expatriates experience 
and perceive the American-Dutch cultural dominance in the AT&T-Unisource. 
For some of the non-Dutch employees with Unisource and AT&T-Unisource 
their introduction into the Dutch culture has been a shock. The use of the 
‘strippenkaart’, instructions in Dutch, finding their way around, trying to learn 
the Dutch language, paying taxes, coping with the Dutch mentality and learning 
to understand the Dutch culture pose a significant challenge. People come from 
Australia, the USA, Sweden, Mexico, England, Italy, Switzerland, France and 
eight other nations. The minority have been living in the Netherlands for a time 
and is thus used to the Dutch way of life while the majority have arrived only 
recently and need to start both a new corporate and a new private life. The 
employees who have come with their families have to find schools for their 
children and jobs for their partners. For many of the employees, the 
international character of AT&T-Unisource and the possibility of living in 
Amsterdam are factors that have motivated them to find work with the AT&T-
Unisource group. However, for the majority of the international telecom 
employees, the Netherlands is not their first choice of country. 
Let’s be honest about it. The Netherlands is not really a good place for 
international careers, because it is too small to have an international career. 
And your children can go to the international school but they have to study 
Dutch in order to play with other children in the street. And learning Dutch 
isn’t very useful for an international career (interview with AT&T-Unisource 
employee).  
 Learning Dutch is very difficult for most of the non-Dutch employees. The 
language is not easy to learn, employees have little time and energy to learn 
Dutch and the language is not very useful outside the Netherlands. Furthermore, 
there is no daily practice of speaking the language in work related situations and 
most Dutch people speak English. It is therefore not unusual that people who 
have been living in the Netherlands for as long as three years to be hardly able 
to speak or read Dutch. For them Dutch is the secret language of parties, gossip, 
informal meetings and of the corridor conversations of Dutch AT&T-Unisource 
employees. While the Dutch employees have the impression of themselves as 
fluent speakers of English for the native English speakers this ‘pidgin’ English 
or ‘steenkolen’ English is hard to understand. Hence in meetings, the native 
English speakers tend to speak slowly, articulate and use their knowledge of the 
language to support the communication of non-native speakers. 
I find we are in a meeting, you are translating, the person can’t find the 
word, you guess what the word is and then he turns to somebody else. Which 
is quite an odd situation to be in when you are all speaking the same 
language (interview with native English speaking AT&T-Unisource 
employee). 
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 The business hours in Unisource and AT&T-Unisource are flexible. At 7.30 
am the first employees come in, by 9 am most of them have arrived. For some of 
the international employees, such as the Swiss, this is a new experience. In 
Switzerland the employees start working at 7.30 or 8 am and meetings will also 
commence around that time. Meetings in AT&T-Unisource do not usually start 
before 9.30 or 10 am and tend to start after a five or ten minute delay. Lunch 
times are adapted to the Dutch culture. Between 12 and 1.30 pm, employees 
take half an hour off for lunch. A large part of the non-Dutch employees are 
astonished at the Dutch lunch rituals. The Dutch employees do not take a real 
break for lunch and do not eat a warm meal. Some even bring packed lunches, 
usually self-made sandwiches from home, which they eat in their offices. The 
nearest restaurant is a few kilometers away so the canteen is the only place to 
have lunch.  
What I found down in the canteen is a lot of fried food such as a croquette. 
In wintertime I can understand that. The only thing you can get is bread with 
ham and cheese, at most a slice of bread and ham and cheese with a fried egg 
on top. I would like to eat a nice dish and a salad, some pasta, maybe a wine 
(interview with Italian AT&T-Unisource employee). 
 The Dutch employees are perceived as open, direct, arrogant and dominant. 
They take initiative and are likely to share their views whether or not their 
command of the language is good. Dutch employees don’t really mind when 
they are proved to be wrong and can admit their mistakes. But at the beginning 
of a project Dutch employees in general like to start directly, take initiative, 
move ahead and find it hard to listen to others. They are open, direct and in 
general honest but not very diplomatic and sometimes even rude. The direct 
style of communication of the Dutch is offensive for most of the non-Dutch 
AT&T-Unisource employees.   
I am still offended in a large part of cases. I think there is a certain level of 
diplomacy that you can have and you can bring a story across in many 
different ways. I frequently find that the Dutch cross the line into being rude 
(interview with American AT&T-Unisource employee). 
 To cope with the dominant Dutch cultural behaviour, non-Dutch have 
learned to be more open, more direct and more assertive. They learned to take 
more initiative, to speak with their Dutch manager and say exactly what they 
want instead of waiting politely and diplomatically for the right situation. For 
some of them adapting to the Dutch culture has been a slower process than it 
has been for others.  
If for instance I am working with a Dutch person I am much more direct. 
And I have noticed that because I am working in Holland, for the last couple 
of years, I am much more honest to the person. I would say,’ I don’t like it’. I 
would have never done that before (interview with English AT&T-
Unisource employee).  
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I had to say to myself; ok, I then have to really get my point across here and 
I really got have to challenge the question. Because if I don’t, then he won’t 
listen and therefore I won’t get what I want and I will end up doing 
everything that is suggested and often that is not right because it is coming 
from a different perspective (interview with English AT&T-Unisource 
employee). 
 The work attitude of the Dutch has surprised some of the non-Dutch 
employees. Not that the Dutch do not work hard or have no commitment, but on 
a long expected first summer day in the Netherlands a manager can expect 
phone calls in the morning at 9 am from employees who have decided to take 
the day off. It is noted that holidays are really ‘holy’ days to the Dutch. The 
American or British manager who is used to only two weeks of holiday every 
year will find it very curious to see his whole department leave for a three or 
four week holiday in August. Furthermore, it is impossible for managers to have 
a group meeting on Friday afternoon at 4.30 pm. Private and work life is strictly 
separate for most of the Dutch employees. The separation of private from work 
life makes it difficult for the non-Dutch employees to establish informal 
relations with their Dutch colleagues. Dutch managers therefore have to be alert 
and look after the well being of their non-Dutch employees which is not always 
easy. 
I can not invite them home for dinner every evening, but they do need more 
attention than Dutch employees do. Therefore we organise informal 
gatherings such as barbecues and sporting activities (interview with Dutch 
AT&T-Unisource manager).  
 In summary, for foreign expatriates in the AT&T-Unisource group 
acculturation to the Dutch cultural setting is a difficult process. Foreign 
expatriates feel compelled to learn to behave more like the Dutch in order to be 
successful and are sometimes frustrated by the fact that Dutch AT&T-Unisource 
employees do not recognise this. 
 
7.4.3 The End of the AT&T-Unisource Group  
After the Spanish manager left the organisation in April, a new Dutch KPN 
manager was appointed in Hans’ department. The manager brought along two 
other Dutch KPN employees with him to fill up the vacancies left by Telefónica 
employees. Until then, only two Dutch ex-KPN employees had worked with the 
Satellite Communications since the former manager was someone from outside 
the company with no personal relations with any one of the parent companies.  
 Telefónica’s departure was a draw back for Hans who had at that point been 
involved in the cooperation for more than two years. Although Hans very much 
enjoyed the dynamic and international part of his job, the sudden split was a big 
disappointment and was in fact a frustrating experience for all of the employees 
engaged in the cooperation with the Spanish operator. For three years the 
employees of Unisource, AT&T-Unisource and the shareholders KPN, Swiss 
Telecom and Telia had invested much energy in establishing personal networks, 
creating new commercial possibilities, changing positions and some had even 
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moved to Spain together with their families. While the employees were and are 
always aware that the telecom sector is not stable they do not like these kind of 
radical changes. Furthermore, their loyalty to the company comes under 
pressure.  
 Hans liked working in the Unisource alliance because it was an 
entrepreneurial company in which targets, markets and structures have to 
change to adapt to new developments in the international telecom market. He 
liked the international character of the company and the freedom to explore new 
opportunities and by that time, had already worked for three years with the same 
unit. The majority of Hans’ colleagues had worked with Satellite Services for 
two or three years. In Hans’ opinion, after three years it is time to change jobs. 
Since Hans liked the international character of his job he therefore did not want 
to return to KPN. Three years on the same job is in fact quite long considering 
the relatively high turnover rate of employees within AT&T-Unisource due to 
the fast growth. Hans knew most of his colleagues when he first began at his 
job.  
I used to know everybody a few years ago. But the organisation is changing 
very fast. Lately, when I returned after being home for four months because 
of the birth of my child, I saw new faces in the restaurant everywhere 
(interview with AT&T-Unisource employee). 
 When Hans started three years before neither his tasks nor his targets were 
clearly established. In his job as sales representative he took up whatever 
opportunities were offered in the Dutch and international market. In the 
beginning the informal contacts within the alliance were enough to work on.  
Later, because AT&T-Unisource had grown rapidly, new structures were 
introduced to organise the work. Hans then became responsible for the foreign 
sales channels, supporting national sales offices and the acquisition of foreign 
customers. Hans is strongly driven by opportunities that present themselves but 
it has not always been clear to him what Unisource goals, targets, policies and 
relations with other companies are. Not only for Hans but also the other 
employees have experienced a strong need for communication within Unisource 
and AT&T-Unisource and their degree of frustration was reflected in a survey 
held in the spring of 1997. The employee satisfaction survey showed that AT&t-
Unisource employees had written down all kinds of extra comments to tell the 
management how to improve the company. The director of the research institute 
involved with the survey noted:  
The amount of verbatim input which was hand-written by employees was 
more than we have ever experienced in a survey of this type (Gateway, Issue 
2, April 1997). 
 This commitment to the organisation is also observed from the high work 
ethic within the AT&T Unisource alliance. The car park of the AT&T-
Unisource building is full from as early as 7 am till 7 pm. Although through the 
eyes of the foreigners, especially American and British employees, the long 
summer holiday in the Netherlands and the work-attitude of the Dutch is seen as 
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a counter balance to this work pressure, the Dutch see themselves as hard 
workers. For some of Hans’ colleagues the combination of the fast changing 
business context, the political moves within the alliance, the changes in 
structure, the changes of management, the competitive marketplace, the cultural 
diversity and the incredibly high work stress results in ‘burn out’. Those who 
are ‘burnt out’ express a cynical attitude towards the alliance.  
I acknowledge the frustrations which often lie below the surface in many of 
our people and that those frustrations can easily turn into cynicism (CEO 
Smits in Gateway, Issue 1, February 1997). 
 
7.5 Conclusions 
 
The first case of cross-cultural cooperation of KPN concerns the strategic 
alliance Unisource. In 1992 Unisource was KPN’s most important strategic 
instrument of internationalisation. However, six years later, the strategic alliance 
was abandoned by the shareholders. The findings in this study show that the 
perceived cultural overlap between Swedish Telia and Dutch KPN and the 
positive personal relationship between the CEOs of the two PTOs stimulated the 
establishing of the strategic alliance Unisource. The management of both PTOs 
expected that the cultural overlap would support a positive cross-cultural 
cooperation in the strategic alliance. This perspective is supported by the studies 
of Hofstede (1991) and Trompenaars (1993) which show a small cultural 
distance between the Dutch and Swedish culture. In the daily practices of the 
alliance however, things turned out quite differently. KPN experienced a 
laborious cooperation with Telia and the small cultural distance between both 
cultures resulted to some extent in rivalry.  
 The same process could be observed in the cooperation between KPN and 
American AT&T. Although the studies of Hofstede (1991) and Trompenaars 
(1993) show a small cultural distance between the Dutch and American culture, 
the cooperation with the Americans was perceived as very laborious by the 
Dutch employees. This has to be understood in relation to the struggle for power 
in the AT&T-Unisource family between AT&T and KPN. From this perspective 
it is not surprising that the cooperation with the Swiss Telecom and Telefónica 
was viewed positively by the KPN and Dutch AT&T-Unisource employees. The 
combination of the careful Swiss Telecom employees and dominant Dutch 
employees worked out well in daily cooperation in the alliance because there 
was no struggle for power between Swiss Telecom and KPN. In summary, it can 
be concluded that successful cooperation in a strategic alliance is not guaranteed 
by the cultural overlap between involved partners. The struggle for power 
between both partners is an intervening variable in successful cross-cultural 
cooperation. 
 The formal cross-cultural strategy of the AT&T-Unisource group concerned 
the creation of a corporate family in which all of the members would contribute 
to a synergy. The management and employees of the AT&T-Unisource alliance 
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formally understood the competitive advantage of the cultural diversity. To turn 
this cultural diversity into a competitive advantage different instruments of 
training and selection were used. These instruments could not prevent the 
laborious cross-cultural cooperation among the AT&T-Unisource employees. 
The combination of the large number of shareholders, the shareholders’ politics, 
the pressure of work and the chaotic daily context frustrated the cross-cultural 
cooperation. Dutch employees of the AT&T-Unisource group used distinct 
strategies to deal with the cultural diversity (see Figure 12). As a result of these 
strategies, the other alliance members noted that the Dutch-American culture 
became more and more dominant in the AT&T-Unisource group. Non-Dutch 
employees used cultural strategies to adapt to this situation (see Figure 12). 
 The political processes of the shareholders caused a politicisation of the 
alliance and hindered the alliance from developing its own strong identity. The 
shareholders strong involvement in decision-making processes in the alliance 
and in reaching consensus before each final decision could be made led to costly 
time delays in a telecom market that demanded fast reactions. The Unisource 
parents earlier plans to give up their respective individual identities and merge 
into one alliance was thus abandoned. The decline of the AT&T-Unisource 
group was further stimulated by the change in the strategic objectives of the 
shareholder companies. These changes included: Telefónica’s decision to set up 
the strategic alliance MCI-BT, the focus of Telia on the Nordic countries, the 
departure of founding father Verwaaijen and AT&T’s announcement in July 
1998 of its plans to leave the alliance. These signs clearly indicated the 
imminent break up of the AT&T-Unisource group. The AT&T-Unisource 
alliance had been an important strategy in helping to strengthen KPN’s position 
in the international telecom market but this strategy has now totally been 
abandoned and the strategic alliance of KPN with American Qwest signified the 
end of the importance of Unisource for KPN. The factors for the decline in 
importance of the AT&T-Unisource group support the findings of Lorange and 
Roos (1995), Cauley de la Sierra (1995), Faulkner (1995) and Yoshino and 
Rangan (1995). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Strategies of Dutch Employees  Strategies of resistance of non-Dutch 
employees 
Using personal networks in KPN 
Bring along new Dutch KPN employees 
Showing interests in other cultures, 
learning languages 
Creating ‘Euro-English’ as common 
language 
Avoiding organisational politics 
Using the Swedish consensus culture 
to take important decisions back 
home an to reverse the Dutch 
initiative  
Non-Dutch employees learning to be 
more assertive, direct and open in 
order to be able to handle the Dutch 
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Sticking to Dutch management culture  
Exaggerating cultural differences with 
Swedish  
Seeking for information on corporate 
policy and strategies  
Committing to work, running 
Exaggerating cultural differences with 
Americans 
Doubting the success of the strategic 
alliance 
Doubting the point of being loyal to the 
alliance 
Learning about international colleagues 
Showing frustration and cynicism 
Showing anxiety 
Changing jobs within Unisource 
Learning Dutch and Dutch culture 
Using the Swedish neutrality as 
cultural inheritance 
Exaggerating cultural differences 
with the Dutch  
Telia is concentrating on northern 
Europe 
AT&T is bringing in consultants 
who propagate the American way 
AT&T is using opportunistic 
management style to overrule the 
Dutch 
 
Figure 12. Strategies of Dutch and non-Dutch employees to cope with cultural differences 
 In this chapter it has been noted that there is clearly a connection between 
the cultural distance between organisations and the struggle for power in an 
alliance. However, the exact relation between these two factors is not yet clear. 
Furthermore, in the case of AT&T-Unisource the relation was further 
complicated by the number of partners involved. It would therefore be 
interesting to investigate the experiences of KPN when operating alone in a new 
emerging telecom market. It could be expected that in such a case it would cost 
less energy, that cooperation between the shareholders would be more effective 
and that the decision-making processes would be less time consuming. 
Especially so when the new telecom market is a familiar one based on a long-
lasting cultural relationship that has already been established. It is therefore of 
interest to have a close look at the experiences of the organisation in the 
Netherlands Antilles and Indonesia, both ex-colonies of the Netherlands to 
examine if in such circumstances cross-cultural cooperation for KPN is as might 
be expected, more successful. 
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8 UNSUCCESSFUL CROSS-CULTURAL COOPERATION IN THE 
NETHERLANDS ANTILLES: UNBALANCED POWER 
RELATIONS 
 
World Level
Society Level
Organisational Level
Interactional Level
Individual Level
Case 3: Indonesia
Case 1: Unisource 
Case 2: The Netherlands Antilles
This chapter concentrates on the 
experiences of KPN in the 
Netherlands Antilles in the early 
nineties. KPN was at the time 
interested in participation in the 
Antillean PTOs and the Antillean 
government was in need of a foreign 
partner to help restructure the 
fragmented Antillean telecom sector.  
Although both KPN and the Antillean 
government saw the advantages in the 
cooperation, both had forgotten the 
difficulties in cultural cooperation experienced in the long term relationship 
between the European Dutch and Antilleans. Hence, the cultural differences 
between Dutch KPN employees and the Curaçaoan PTO employees are the 
point of interest and discussion here. Not only the differences in language, 
delivery of criticisms, perceptions of time, personal networks and mutual 
images are explored but also the strategies of European Dutch expatriates and 
Curaçaoan employees in coping with these differences. These strategies are 
referred to in the last chapter in the explanation as to why KPN failed to 
acquire a position at the telecom market on St. Maarten and Curaçao. 
 
 
8.1 The Antillean Telecom Market: KPN’s Stepping Stone to South-
America 
 
In sections 4.3.3 and 5.3.1 it has been described how KPN in its early stage of 
internationalisation explored the Netherlands Antilles as a possible stepping-
stone to the Latin American telecom market. The choice for the Netherlands 
Antilles was based upon the perception that the strong historical, economic and 
cultural ties with the Netherlands would facilitate the expansion.59 
The Netherlands Antilles were new for us, and yet partly Dutch. We have 
had ties there for a long time. That seems to us a good start to gain 
experience (interview with KPN manager). 
 Four years after the first initial contacts between the Government of the 
Netherlands Antilles and KPN in 1989 the cooperation was completely 
terminated. In those four years KPN had invested a great deal of time, energy, 
manpower and money in its effort to make its first international acquisition a 
success. Unfortunately, it was unable to achieve much and this acquisition, for 
                                                        
59 Other Dutch companies have also used this strategy. Dutch companies such as the ING Bank 
chose Curaçao for the administrative transactions with their Latin American outlets (Amigoe, 
February 22 1997). 
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the management of KPN, was a far-reaching experience in the process of 
internationalisation.  
When outgoing president Verwaaijen looks back on almost 10 years at PTT 
Telecom BV he says there is one episode that sticks firmly in his mind. 
Some years ago he travelled to a Caribbean island with the purpose of 
buying a local telecom company. However, he had not taken into account the 
loyalty of the islanders to their national carrier, and says he was amazed to 
be greeted by hundreds of banner-waving protesters, demanding he leave 
both the island and their beloved carrier alone – which he did. Verwaaijen 
said this experience taught him a great deal about cultural differences and 
showed him how important a national company can be for its own people 
(Communications Week, September 8, 1997).  
 What exactly happened in those four years? Why did the cooperation failed 
and to what extent did the historical, cultural and political relationship of the 
Netherlands Antilles and the Netherlands help or prevent KPN’s expansion of 
activities to the Antillean and Latin American telecom markets? These are the 
questions which are addressed in the following sections. 
 
8.1.1 The Dutch – Antillean Relationship: Sensitive, Unequal and 
Laborious 
The Netherlands Antilles consist of the Leeward Islands of Curaçao and Bonaire 
and the Windward Islands St. Eustatius, Saba and St. Maarten. The Leeward 
Islands are located just off the coast of Venezuela and the Windward Islands are 
located at a distance of 900 kilometers to the north-east. The Netherlands 
Antilles constitutes together with Aruba and the Netherlands, the Kingdom of 
the Netherlands. Aruba obtained a ‘status aparte’ in 1986 and is no longer part 
of the Netherlands Antilles. The Netherlands Antilles are politically autonomous 
except for in matters of defense and foreign affairs. The Antillean governmental 
system is based upon the Dutch political system. The council of the Netherlands 
Antilles, the central government, is seated in Curaçao and has 22 members 
hailing from the five islands. Curaçao is the largest of the Antillean islands with 
444 square kilometers and 151.448 inhabitants in 1996 (Centaal Bureau voor de 
Statistiek, Curaçao 1997). Apart from the central government every island has 
its own government that is headed by the island council. Apart from this, there 
is a ‘bestuurscollege’ on every island consisting of a head of authority and 
deputies which are not acquainted with the running of the other islands and do 
not have interests there. Thus, every island operates independently in terms of 
internal affairs. The Netherlands Antilles have their own airline company, a 
university, a parliament, a government and a court of justice. A minister of 
Antillean affairs represents the Netherlands Antilles in the Netherlands and The 
Netherlands are represented at the Netherlands Antilles by a governor. 
 Although the Netherlands Antilles and the Netherlands are officially equal 
partners in the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the relationship between the two 
members is unequal, difficult and sensitive. This tedious relationship is the 
result of three factors: (1) the colonial history, (2) the contemporary relation in 
the kingdom of the Netherlands and (3) the economic dependency.  
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 The colonial relationship with the Netherlands dominates the history of the 
Netherlands Antilles (Koot and Ringeling 1984). In the period from 1634 to 
1648 the West Indian Company conquered the islands which were then under 
Spanish rule. The West Indian Company used Curaçao primarily as a depot for 
the slave trade en route to the Caribbean and South American plantations and 
for its salt production. Other products such as wood and agriculture were of 
lesser importance because of the dry climate and poor soil on the islands. The 
plantations of Curaçao produced just enough food for the owner and his slaves. 
Scientists describe the plantation economy on Curaçao as a mild form of slavery 
because of the absence of a real plantation economy, the permanent presence of 
the owners at their estates and the smallness of the island (Hoetink 1958). The 
poor living conditions of the slaves resulted in various uprisings. Most famous 
of these is that of Tula in 1795. It was only in 1863 that slavery was finally 
banned in the Netherlands Antilles. As a result of the colonial history, the 
Netherlands Antilles are still sensitive to paternalistic behaviour, dominance and 
discrimination in their contemporary relationship with the Netherlands. 
 The second reason for the unequal relationship is the political interference of 
the Netherlands in the Netherlands Antilles. The ‘Statute of the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands’ of 1954, further modified in 1986, recognises the fundamental 
principle that the Netherlands Antilles is autonomous and equal to the 
Netherlands. The communal managing of affairs on the basis of equality is laid 
down in the constitution and the clause ‘Steunend op eigen kracht, doch met de 
wil elkander bij te staan’ [relying on their own resources, but with the intention 
to support each other] is frequently quoted. However, on an informal basis, the 
Netherlands is known to interfere in internal affairs such as those regarding the 
treatment of prisoners, the financial management of the government, corruption 
and drug trafficking. Hence, it is difficult to speak of an equal relationship.   
 The bad economic situation at Curaçao is the third factor further aggravating 
the already sensitive relationship between the Netherlands and the Netherlands 
Antilles. The contemporary economy of the Netherlands Antilles is largely 
dependent on financial support from the Netherlands and Dutch companies also 
dominate the economic activities on Curaçao. At the beginning of the 20th 
century, the establishing of Shell prompted a rapid increase in the economic 
situation of Curaçao. By the end of the 1970s the importance of the service 
industry such as tourism and banking grew. In 1985, Shell left Curaçao but 
other Dutch companies such as banks, insurance companies and retail shops 
opened their subsidiaries on Curaçao. Dutch capital was invested in the hotel 
and catering industry, apartments and other service industries. European Dutch 
citizens who made use of the penshonado agreement sometimes accompanied 
the flow of Dutch capital. Under this agreement European Dutch are allowed to 
live on the Netherlands Antilles when they bring in a certain amount of capital 
with them. For other European Dutch inhabitants, it is more difficult to take up 
residence on Curaçao.60 These restrictions have not however, prevented a strong 
                                                        
60 Even before the establishment of the Netherlands Antilles in 1954, the Dutch elite introduced a 
law to restrict the number of Dutch workmen. European Dutch are allowed to stay on the island up 
to a maximum of three months and can extend their stay for another three months. To obtain a 
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presence of European Dutch in the economy. A larger part of the Antilleans 
perceive this presence as a new Dutch colonisation. 
 In summary, the relationship between the Netherlands Antilles and the 
Netherlands was sensitive, unequal and fraught with difficulty due to historic, 
institutional and economic factors. Although Dutch KPN therefore could have 
expected to encounter difficulties when they entered the Antillean telecom 
market they did not anticipate any problems as they were in fact been invited by 
the government of the Antilles to help with the restructuring of the telecom 
market.  
 
8.1.2 The Restructuring of the Antillean Telecom Sector 
At the end of the 1980s a small group of Antillean telecom managers and 
politicians warned of the potential danger of the restructuring of the 
international telecom market for the Antillean PTOs. They pointed out that the 
efficiency and competitiveness of the fragmented Antillean telecom sector 
would come under the pressure of the international reforms furthermore, the 
small-scale telecom sector in the Netherlands Antilles was strongly 
decentralised and fragmented (see Figure 13).61 Since 1952, each island has a 
PTO for local telephone traffic: Setel N.V. (Curaçao), Telbo N.V. (Bonaire), 
Telem N.V. (St. Maarten), Satel N.V. (Saba) and Eutel N.V. (St. Eustatius). 
Antelecom N.V. handles the international traffic of all of these islands.62 Setel 
has privatised in 1989 and Antelecom in 1996.  
 The initiative to restructure the telecom sector was taken by the former 
minister of traffic and communication Mr. L.C. Gumbs. In 1988, the central 
government of the Netherlands Antilles intended to privatise Antelecom and 
then to divide its assets between each of the islands’ telephone administrations 
on whose islands’ these assets were located. This meant that the island 
telephone administrations had to merge their operations with Antelecom. This 
merging however, was very problematic. While the official telecom policy was 
in support of a close cooperation between local and national telecom operators 
this was rarely observed in actual daily practice.   
Instead of cooperation Antelecom and Setel in general work against each 
other. That is a process, which is bad for telecommunications on the island. 
Our new digital network ends at Antelecom with a Siemens machine that 
was installed almost before the Second World War. We arrived there with a 
C7 level, and the Northern Telecom machine can also handle C7, but that 
stupid Siemens machine can only handle C5. Those look like Second World 
War signals with two beeps, which delays the connection with the 
Netherlands enormously. I’ve already been trying for a year to get that 
                                                                                                                                  
working permit the Dutch have to meet at least one of three requirements. The first is that someone 
has to prove he or she has employ at the island, which is impossible for an Antillean inhabitant to 
fulfil. A second option is for Dutch entrepreneurs to start their own business. Lastly, Dutch citizens 
can make use of the penshonado agreement. 
61 These six PTOs operates 75.868 fixed telephone lines: 60.582 (Curaçao), 4.073 (Bonaire), 635 
(Saba), 773 (St. Eustatius) and 9.805 (St. Marten) (CBS, Statistical Orientation 1996). Together the 
PTOs employ around 800 people (Wawoe 1995). 
62 Landradiodienst N.A. privatised in 1996 and was renamed in Antelecom NV. To avoid 
misunderstandings, the name Antelecom is also used in the period before 1996.  
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Siemens machine out of there, but without any success. We could introduce 
new services and build a connection with the Netherlands in one second 
(interview with NCF consultant in Setel). 
 
  
 
Antelecom
N.V.
Outlet
St. Eustatius
Outlet
Saba
Outlet
Bonaire
Outlet
Curacao
Outlet
St. Maarten
TELBO N.V.
SATEL N.V.
EUTELN.V.TELEM N.V.
SETEL N.V.
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13. The PTOs of the Netherlands Antilles 
 The difficult cooperation between Antelecom and Setel stemmed largely 
from the insular attitude of the Antilleans.63 Antelecom’s identity is strongly 
intertwined with the country as a whole, while Setel’s identity is related to the 
island. The difference in identity, the long lasting struggle for power between 
Antelecom and Setel and the conflicts over the financial benefits of 
telecommunications between the central government and the island councils 
thus remains a never-ending source of conflicts. This has strongly influenced the 
restructuring of the Antillean telecom sector. Many attempts towards 
cooperation between Antelecom and Setel have been made but to now avail. 
Now that they are in fierce competition, a merger seems further away then ever 
before. Setel has ambitions to develop services on the Internet and international 
telephone traffic while Antelecom is interested in extending its services with the 
local telephony. Setel is seen as ambitious, technically and commercially 
advanced but also backwards in that its employees are not very highly educated. 
Antelecom on the other hand, is seen as internationally orientated, with highly 
                                                        
63 The islands identify themselves in the first place with their own island. In the same way local 
government employees identify with their island and oppose national government employees on 
Curaçao.  
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classified personnel but is non-commercial, inflexible and protective of its own 
interests. 
 This tension between the islands PTOs and Antelecom only serves to further 
sensitise the issue of restructuring. In 1988 distinct commissions were installed 
to advise the government on the decentralisation of Antelecom and cession of 
power to the island PTOs. This led to much unrest amongst the employees of the 
PTOs and consequently the restructuring for the employees of Antelecom and 
Setel had to be recorded in the so-called ‘bleu book’. The commission consisted 
of union leaders and personnel managers of Antelecom and Setel headed by a 
Board Member of KPN. In the ‘bleu book’ the commission recommended the of 
establishing new organisational structures and stipulated conditions of 
employment that should first be met before the transfer of the Antelecom 
employees to the island PTOs was undertaken.  
 Representatives of the Dutch PTO were invited to discuss the terms and 
possibilities for a partnership agreement. With their participation, the 
government of the Netherlands Antilles expected to acquire larger financial 
resources, a broadening of know-how, connections to international networks, 
better and more cost effective training, professional management and an 
increase of trust on the part of its employees, customers and the business sector 
(Nota Realisatie Decentralisatie Landsradiodienst 1991). Each of the islands 
prepared for the decentralisation of Antelecom and its integration into the local 
PTO. In St. Maarten KPN was asked to support the process of decentralisation. 
On Curaçao initiative was taken to establish a holding named: Curtel NV in 
which Setel and the Curaçaoan activities of Antelecom were included. The 
island government of Curaçao would own more than 50% of Curtel NV while 
the foreign operator would hold a minority share.  
 The Antillean autorities understood that the liberalisation of the international 
telecom market would have far-reaching implications for small markets such as 
the island of Curaçao. Telecom business is after all no longer purely a local 
concern and governments the world over constantly find themselves confronted 
by the decreasing cash flow from national PTOs. If 91% of the telecom market 
is being restructured and lowers their international telephone tariffs then the 
international competition will also affect the PTOs of non-participants. For 
these countries, most of them being developing countries, special attention must 
be given to the restructuring of their telecom markets.  The Caribbean PTOs are 
organised in the Caribbean Association of National Telecommunication 
Organisations (CANTO), of which the Antillean PTOs are member of, therefore 
states that there is an urgent need for institutional development of. 64 
 KPN recognised various advantages in participating in the Antillean telecom 
sector. The organisation had only begun to plan the expansion of their 
                                                        
64 CANTO is a co-operative organisation of telecommunication operators from the Caribbean and 
surrounding area. The objective of the organisation is to establish a forum through which 
Caribbean PTOs could facilitate the exchange of information and expertise. The mission has been 
to assist member in all aspects of developing telecommunications and to promote the integration of 
Caribbean telecommunications. CANTO was founded in 1985 and now has thirty-five members 
such as Mexico, Cuba, Venezuela, Suriname and Curaçao (CANTO Second Quarterly Magazine 
Volume 2, 1997). 
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international activities. The acquisition on St. Maarten and Curtel NV would in 
fact have been their first international joint venture. Furthermore, there was an 
increasing interest in the Dutch business sector, such as the banks and insurance 
companies in the Antillean economy. The Amsterdam Stock Exchange also had 
plans to open a subsidiary on Curaçao so they could extend their daily opening 
time to six extra business hours. And finally, a very important advantage was 
that; KPN would then be able to use Curaçao as a stepping stone to the South-
American telecom market.  
 
8.1.3 Competitive Advantages for Dutch KPN at the Antilles?  
In the initial start of the restructuring of the Antillean telecom sector, the 
participation of a foreign operator was perceived positively by initiators and 
makers of the telecom policy. Among interested international operators were 
telecom companies such as Cable and Wireless, France Telecom, British 
Telecom, MCI and KPN. There was a strong preference among Antillean 
telecom policy makers for KPN for a number of reasons. (1) It had made an 
interesting financial bid. (2) It is a Dutch telecom operator and Antillean 
telecom policy makers believed that a partnership with the Dutch would only be 
logical given their historical bonds with the Netherlands. (3) KPN possessed 
knowledge about the Antillean telecom sector, which could be very useful since 
Curaçaoan telecom laws are based upon Dutch laws. (4) A great number of 
Antillean technicians were familiar with the Dutch operator. For a long time 
there had already been close contacts with NCF. In fact, direct contacts had 
been already been earlier established between the Antillean PTOs and KPN. A 
larger part of the Antillean management had in fact been educated in the 
Netherlands and had either worked or been apprenticed to the Dutch operator. 
Dutch trainees and consultants were known to have long lasting relations with 
the Antilles and there were a number of Antilleans living in the Netherlands 
who worked with the Dutch organisation.  
We have been holding meetings with the Dutch PTT Telecom. The 
advantage of working with PTT Telecom is the Dutch language and Setel 
knows their methods. Many of their technicians have studied in Hollan. As a 
result you are familiar with the people (interview with ing. A. Kook, director 
Setel in Know How Magazine, no 12, 1994). 
 Apart from the official considerations the Antillean telecom policy makers 
also saw other advantages in a partnership with KPN: (1) The existing mutual 
knowledge of each other’s cultures. This was especially an advantage for the 
Antilleans who had themselves gained vast knowledge about the Dutch culture 
during the long lasting ex-colonial relationship with the Netherlands. Antilleans 
had thus learned how to cope with the Dutch and their culture in ways that 
would allow the Antilleans to exert influence on the balance of power. (2) The 
Constitution could provide an extra channel allowing further control over KPN. 
Antillean PTOs could use Curaçaoan politicians to exert influence on Dutch 
politics who in their turn could control the organisation. In this manner the 
Antillean PTOs would be assured of maximum influence.   
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We already know each other. We have almost the same laws. We can claim 
the Kingdom parliament. We have a representative in the Raad van State. So 
what more do you want? You can have influence in these ways (interview 
with employee Antelecom). 
 (3) KPN is a relatively small PTO. 
You could force KPN to give in at certain points. In that time, and still, I 
have the feeling that one can instinctively manoeuvre KPN into such a role 
that you would get much more out of them because of our partnership within 
the Kingdom. We would have a multi-layered effect, which is not to be taken 
lightly. (Interview with former CEO of Antelecom). 
 Thus it were the cultural, historical and economic ties with the Netherlands, 
the invitation of KPN by the Antillean government and KPN’s interest in the 
Antillean telecom market that led to the cooperation between the Netherlands 
Antilles and KPN. It is interesting to note that at the start of the cooperation 
neither of the partners involved recognised any potentially negative aspects in 
their relationship. On the contrary it was believed that the participation in the 
Antillean PTOs would be advantageous for all involved. If indeed both KPN 
and Antillean PTOs foresaw so many possibilities to gain from partnership this 
automatically brings us to question and explore why the cooperation was not at 
all successful. 
 
 
8.2 Individual Strategies of European Dutch and Curaçaoans in 
Dealing With Cultural Diversity in the Daily Business Life on 
Curaçao 
 
It has been observed that the majority of the Dutch companies in the 
Netherlands Antilles have problematic relationships with their Antillean 
counterparts. The Royal Dutch Shell left Curaçao in 1985 after long lasting 
conflicts (McCreedy 1996) and the joint activities of the airline companies, 
Royal Dutch Airlines (KLM) and the Antillean Airlines (ALM) are fraught with 
cultural misunderstandings and conflicts (Marcha and Verweel 1996). In 1997, 
the Dutch bank and insurance company ING cancelled their intended 
participation in the Curaçaoan insurance company Giro just before the final 
agreement was arranged because of resistance from the latter. Consultancy 
companies such as KPMG, Coopers and Lybrand and Arthur Andersen have 
also acknowledged encountering cultural difficulties in their dealings with the 
Antilleans (Heijes and Hollander 1996).  
One point is that the cooperation between a native and a Dutchman is not to 
be taken lightly, it must be carefully considered. Only a small part of the 
Dutch can adapt their ways, often they feel superior; this will cause problems 
in Curaçao and certainly at Setel. (Interview with ing. A. Kook, director 
Setel in Know How Magazine, no 12, 1994). 
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 In the light of these observations, reviewing the unsuccessful acquisition of a 
minority share in the Antillean PTOs in the wider context of the cultural 
cooperation between European Dutch and Antillean business partners helps to 
shed more light on why KPN’s attempts to participate ended in failure.  
 
8.2.1 Homogenus Dutch and Antillean Cultures   
For various reasons it is very difficult to perceive Dutch and Antilleans as two 
distinct homogenous cultural groups. In the first place Antilleans are Dutch by 
nationality. Secondly, the long historical relationship between the two diffuses 
the distinction between the European Dutch and Antilleans in the Netherlands 
Antilles and thirdly, it is difficult to speak of a general and shared cultural 
pattern of the Antillean culture (Römer 1974, Reinders 1990, Koot 1995). This 
has led Römer (1974) to questions regarding what the elements that define the 
Antillean identity in fact are. The complexity and segmentation of the Antillean 
society has resulted in a strong cultural diversity and the question of identity for 
a larger part of the Antilleans themselves is a complex one. (onderlinge 
afstand!!) 
 
Antillean union leader Eroll Cova wonders what the identity is of Antilleans: 
‘Are we Latin-American? Are we North-American? Are we Caribbean? Or 
are we just Dutch?’ (Seminar 2020, March 3, 1997, ITC, Curaçao).  
 
I have been born and grown up here on the island. Apart from my mother, a 
black Antillean ‘mamita’ has played an important role in my upbringing. My 
‘madrina’ and ‘padrina’ still have an important influence in my life. At the 
age of 14 we moved to the Netherlands. I have always missed the island. 
When I was working in the Netherlands as a nurse, my patients experienced 
me as warm, but I was non-Dutch in my emotions towards my colleagues. 
Physically I’m European Dutch, but I have a Curaçaoan hart, a black hart. So 
I wonder: Am I Dutch or Curaçaoan? What is my identity? (Interview with 
European Dutch). 
 
I do not want to think in Dutch-Antillean opposites. I myself have a 
fragmented identity that has more to do with class, ethnicity, gender and 
economical status than with cultural differences between European Dutch 
and Antilleans (discussion with black Antillian). 
 
 In accordance with Römer (1974) I have come to the conclusion that is 
indeed difficult to define ‘the’ Antillean identity or culture. Antilleans seem to 
first identify with being either Curaçaoan, Bonairian or Aruban. Even a person 
who has lived all his life in Curaçao ‘stays’ Bonairian. Römer (1974) wonders if 
Curaçaoans can themselves be seen as a cultural unity. Throughout history 
migration has resulted in a large cultural diversity of ethnic groups such as 
Venezuelans, Jews, Portuguese, Haitians, Chinese and Surinamians. Römer 
understands Curaçaoans to mean all of the people who call themselves ‘Nos yu 
  
 192 
di Korsow’.65 Although a great number of distinct groups such as Jews, old 
white Curaçaoan families and the ‘makamba pretu’ can be distinguished within 
the Curaçaoan society, in coperation with the European Dutch the commonly 
shared concept of ‘Yu di Korsow’ is dominant.66 In this way mutual cultural 
differences are bridged and one front is constructed against the Dutch. 
As soon as I write something on the Netherlands Antillean or Arubean 
identity than invariably I get in return a reaction, something like: ‘Another 
makamba again!’ (Prof. Dr. G. van Oostindie in Amigoe, February 1, 1997).  
 For the purpose of clarity, the distinction between European Dutch and 
Curaçaoans must be defined. Hence in this study, the term European Dutch 
refers specifically to Dutch citizens born and raised in the Netherlands who live 
temporarily on Curaçao. It is also very difficult to speak of the European Dutch 
as one homogeneous group since they consist of distinctly different groups such 
as tourists, contract labourers, medical employees, students, expatriates, 
missionaries, scientists, technical assistance, consultants, penshonados, teachers, 
Marines and ex-Shell employees. In contrast to this large diversity there is a 
surprising unity in European Dutch behaviour in relation to Curaçaoans. In 
section 2.2.2 it has been shown that ethnicity is a social construction which is 
determined by social interaction and interdependence. In the interaction of the 
wide diversity of people at Curaçao mutual images are narrowed and mutual 
stereotype images are constructed. Although there is a wide diversity of people 
in Curaçao the social interaction of these people can be classified under more or 
less two major groups: European Dutch and Curaçaoans. 
 In the interaction between the European Dutch and Curaçaoans cultural 
differences are constructed. To explore the different categories of these cultural 
differences a preliminary investigation has been executed (see annex II) and 
relevant literature has been studied (e.g. Romer 1974, Reinders 1990, Heijes and 
Hollander 1996). These have revealed that the following cultural categories can 
be distinguished: language, perceptions of time, work attitude, delivery of 
criticisms, perceptions of personal and public interests, informal relations, 
management style, equality and image. It is these categories that have been used 
for the in-depth field study (see annex II). In the following sections these 
cultural categories and the strategies of the European Dutch and Curaçaoans in 
coping with these differences are discussed.  
 
8.2.2 Papiamiento; the Soul of Antillean Identity  
It is 8 am when Niels leaves his new pink house in the residence La Privada and 
Biography Niels 
Niels is a 39-year-old European Dutch 
KPN employee. He studied electronics at 
the College of Technology in The 
Hague. Niels has been working with 
KPN for 9 years in different countries 
such as Indonesia, the Czech Republic 
and Russia. For the last three years he 
has been working for NCF on Curaçao. 
His hobbies are scuba diving and driving 
old cars. Niels is very sociable he likes 
to go to a bar or restaurant and to talk 
with people. Niels is married. He learned 
to know his Russian wife when he was 
working in Russia. They have no 
children.  
                                                        
65 The term ‘Yu di Korsow’ literally m ns ‘child of Curaçao’ and implies the inhabitants born on 
Curaçao. 83,5 percent of inhabitants of Curaçao have been born on the island, 4 % have been born 
on one of the other islands of the Netherlands Antilles, while 12,5 % come from outside the 
Antilles (CBS, 1994: 35). The term ‘Nos bon Yu di Korsow’ (the real children of Curaçao) is used 
to excl de the white Curaçaoan inhabitants (Römer 1974).  
66 Antilleans who behave like Dutch are called ‘makamba pretu’. These are Antilleans who have 
lived, studied or worked in the Netherlands, speak Dutch as their first language and have Dutch 
friends. These Antilleans are also nicknamed ‘black makamba’s’ or said to be ‘white inside and 
black outside’.  
  
 193 
gets into his white Toyota. Slowly he drives to the gate of La Privada and turns 
down Dr. Martin Luther King Boulevard in the direction of Willemstad. Niels 
turns his air-condition on because the morning temperature already exceeds 26 
degree Celsius. His radio is tuned in to the Dutch station Radio Hooyer II that 
broadcasts the Dutch news. Niels likes this route to work, along the seacoast of 
Curaçao, and he enjoys the living he has as a Dutch NCF consultant. In 
December 1995 he was based in Curaçao to support the development of telecom 
services. His international experience includes an earlier attachment with 
International Business in Eastern Europe. On returning to the headquarters in 
the Netherlands it was hard for him to find a new job. There were no other 
international vacancies with IB and thus he signed a contract with NCF.  
 As he drives over St. Anna Bay he observes the smoke of the oil-refinery 
being blown by the strong north-east wind in the same direction he is himself 
heading. He passes through the Dutch colonial styled Otrabanda and by the 
Curaçaon water and electricity plant and finally reaches his destination: the 
International Trade Centre (ITC) on the shore of the Caribbean Sea. He parks in 
the shade of a palm tree and opens the door. Immediately, a gulf of hot air slaps 
his face. It is only 60 meters to the entrance of the building, which also serves as 
a movie theatre in the weekends, but Niels already starts to sweat under his tie 
and thick jacket. He has to wear this because inside the building it is cool, very 
cool. 67 
 Today Niels doesn’t go to his office in the ITC but attends the seminar 
‘2020: Creating our Caribbean Future’. Antilleans from business, labour 
unions, government and universities have gathered to discuss the possible future 
developments for Curaçao. Among them are the union leader of the Kamera 
Sindical, the CEOs of Antelecom and Setel and Dr. Frank Martinus Arion. Niels 
has enjoyed Arion’s famous book‘Dubbelspel’ [Double Game] in which he 
analyses the Curaçaoan society and, which Niels has read before coming to the 
Antilles. Niels listens to Dr. Frank Martinus Arion who discusses, in English, 
the linguistic barriers of unification and how this might influence the 
development of the Netherlands Antilles in the future. He stresses the 
importance of Papiamiento as the language of instruction at the Curaçaoan 
schools.68  
 Niels has not learned Papiamiento before coming to Curaçao. He had 
conclusive arguments against having to learn Papiamiento: the language is used 
only in the Netherlands Antilles, one needs quite a large vocabulary and it is not 
necessary for his work. Dutch is understood by all of the Antilleans and English 
is used for international contracts. Niels forgets however, that a larger part of 
the Antilleans speak a different kind of Dutch. Although some of the higher 
                                                        
67 An interesting observation in the Curaçaoan business offices is that the more prestigious the 
building the colder the temperature.  
68 The official language at the Netherlands Antilles is Dutch. Papiamiento however is widely 
spoken. In 89 % of the households on Curaçao Papiamiento is spoken. The second most spoken 
language is Dutch (13 %) and English and Spanish (7 %). Many of the Antilleans speak more than 
one language (CBS 1994). This pidgin language comprises Spanish, Portuguese, English, Dutch, 
French and some African languages. Papiamiento is not a written language, which results in few 
textbooks and changing vocabulary. 
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educated Antillean professionals have a better understanding of the Dutch 
grammar than the Dutch expatriates, in general, Antilleans don’t have a 
thorough knowledge of the Dutch language. For Antillean employees who 
haven’t had secondary education or lived in the Netherlands, Dutch is even 
more difficult. European Dutch thus have the advantage of communicating in 
Dutch at a quicker pace, with more ease and precision than their Antillean 
colleagues.  
Dutch have much more tools to say what they want, talk faster and can use 
nuances. We regularly come across bold and unclear because we have to 
think about the language. We lack the knowledge and facility of nuances 
(interview with labour union leader). 
 There is a sensitive discussion in Curaçao regarding the use of Dutch as the 
language of instruction in schools where speaking Papiamiento was formerly 
forbidden. However, Papiamiento presently dominates the TV media, the 
newspapers and the work floors. According to the European Dutch, Curaçaoan 
respondents and the Curaçaoan newspapers, the consequence of this is that the 
knowledge of Dutch is decreasing amongst the Curaçaoan youth. The choice for 
another language of instruction is also a subject of great concern as it has 
implications for those seeking possibilities of further study in Venezuela, the 
USA, or the Netherlands.There is evidently much sentiment against the use of 
Dutch at schools because Dutch is the language of the former colonial power. 
Furthermore, the process of de-colonisation of the Antilles is still in process and 
Papiamiento is central to the identity of the Antilleans (Römer 1974: 57).  
If I use Dutch words or expressions when speaking Papiamiento my friends 
correct me. You have to use Spanish or English words. But what does it 
matter? English is also a foreign language (Interview with Curaçaoan 
journalist). 
 For a long time, it has been Dutch that was the standard language in 
telecommunications on Curaçao. The network books in which the telephone 
lines were written were in Dutch. Telecommunication courses in Setel and 
Antelecom were also conducted in Dutch by Dutch NCF consultants. With the 
coming of the new CEO in Setel the Dutch consultants were exchanged for 
Swedish consultants. As a result, the instructional language of courses for 
middle and higher personnel switched to English. The courses for lower 
technical personnel were given in Papiamiento. The procedures and handbook 
were also translated into English.69 The change from Dutch to Swedish 
consultants was made because of the absence of colonial history with the latter.  
I have never kept off the Dutch from an ideological point of view…… 
Swedish are more open to foreigners than Dutch are. I think this has to do 
with the absence of a colonial history (interview with former Setel CEO). 
                                                        
69  Mutations in the telephone network were written down in books. These books with the 
telephone network were thrown away by the Swedish to be replaced for modern English computer 
planning programs. Some of the older employees of Setel however saved the books from the 
rubbish bin and started to use it again after the Swedish had left the organisation agin years later.  
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 With the new CEO of Setel, consultants of NCF have slowly replaced the 
Swedish consultants. Courses are given in Dutch again and Papiamiento is now 
the company language. Official reports however, are in Dutch or English. For a 
larger part of the Curaçaoans multi-language education is already a fact. In daily 
use, people easily switch between English, Papiamiento, Dutch and Spanish. 
Setel however, offers language courses in Dutch, English and Spanish for their 
employees because the quality of the spoken and especially written languages is 
a problem in Antillean organisations. 
 European Dutch expatriates have followed different strategies to cope with 
the differences in languages. Some of the European Dutch expatriates say they 
regularly correct their colleagues in their written or spoken Dutch but a majority 
only correct their colleagues when asked to do so. By speaking slowly and using 
short sentences, repeating sentences, explaining terms and the meaning of some 
of the words European Dutch expatriates say they try to bridge the gap with the 
lower educated technicians within the PTOs. The majority of the European 
Dutch however, do not speak Papiamiento. A larger part of the European Dutch 
working in Antillean PTOs have followed a language course but are only able to 
understand very little Papiamiento. Few of them practice the language with their 
secretaries, friends, partners or housekeepers. As a consequence, a larger part of 
the European Dutch are unable to follow meetings held in Papiamiento. 
Sometimes the meetings are conducted in Dutch, which depends on the 
compounding of the group, the educational level of the participants, the number 
and the importance of the European Dutch present and the degree of importance 
of the subject   
I always say they can speak in Papiamiento because I can understand it. I say 
that I’m doing my best to understand it but that I don’t speak the language. 
And that I will intervene if I don’t understand the conversation (interview 
with European Dutch). 
 Curaçaoans have different strategies to cope with European Dutch 
expatriates with regard to language. Curaçaoans highly appreciate when the 
European Dutch make an effort to learn Papiamiento and perceive this as a sign 
of a willingness to integrate with Antillean society. If a European Dutch 
expatriate has not shown progress in learning Papiamiento within one or two 
years he is laughed at. Mostly, the European Dutch ignore these jokes however, 
sometimes Antilleans refuse to speak Dutch with their European Dutch 
colleagues or, switch to Papiamiento to exclude a European Dutchman. 
With Swedish we speak English, with the Venezuelans we speak Spanish, 
and with the Dutch we speak Dutch. That is maybe our handicap. We always 
try to adapt to ourselves but it is never the other way around. If I go to the 
Netherlands I can jump up and down but nobody speaks Papiamiento 
(interview with Curaçaoan Setel employee). 
 Hence the best way for the European Dutch to integrate in an Antillean 
organisation is by learning Papiamiento. People first laugh at the accent of the 
European Dutch colleagues and say that they ‘speak Papiamiento like the priests 
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do’ however, speaking Papiamiento is seen as a show of interest and respect for 
the Antillean culture. This makes the establishing of personal networks easier 
for a Dutch employee as it is highly appreciated by Curaçaoans although they 
do not stimulate this process. One explanation for this is that the language is 
strongly related to the identity of Antilleans and the European Dutch who 
master Papiamiento can no longer be easily excluded.   
By learning the language you can empathise with the society. I have learned 
that only then you understand how people think. You also become more 
sensitive the Dutch don’t think enough about that. Why do the things happen 
the way they happen? You can keep on fighting things the way they are 
going - I have done that for three years - but you have to experience that 
before understanding this is the way to do it (interview with European 
Dutch). 
 
8.2.3 Giving and Receiving Feedback  
The rendering of Feedback is a sensitive subject between European Dutch and 
Curaçaoan employees. In a majority of the cases the European Dutch are experts 
who are expected to support Antillean government or organisations. Although 
the European Dutchman is an expert he has to be very careful in displaying his 
expertise. The giving of suggestions, feedback or, the introduction of new 
working methods are very sensitive issues. The assertiveness and directness of 
European Dutch expatriates in their asking of questions, passing of criticism and 
suggesting improvements is perceived as very rude by Curaçaoans. ‘Als goede 
vrienden elkaar de waarheid zeggen’ [saying the truth to each other as close 
friends] is a Dutch saying which does not fit in the Curaçaoan cultural context. 
Curaçaoans camouflage their critical messages in a polite indirect manner so as 
not to harm their relationship, the public position and the interests of their close 
friends. The usual Dutch manner of starting directly with their purpose of visit 
or with making their own needs clear also offends Curaçaoan employees. An 
introductory conversation about daily matters or an informal discussion over 
family affairs is a more fitting approach.   
When I was in the Netherlands on holiday last year, I experienced the Dutch 
as very rude. They asked me everything - where I lived, what kind of study I 
did, if I had a boy-friend, what kind of house I was living in, they asked 
everything. And I didn’t even know these people. They want to know 
everything (interview with Curaçaoan). 
 For the Curaçaoans one of the most upsetting characteristics of the European 
Dutch is their show of arrogance. European Dutch expatriates come to Curaçao 
to support the government, the business sector or the educational system with 
their knowledge. Everybody knows that and to a certain degree Curaçaoans 
accept their need of experts. However, the European Dutch who pride 
themselves on their knowledge are not accepted. 
We had a Dutch manager who had a conflict with his employees. One of his 
employees said in a meeting; ‘We don’t like you’. The Dutchman said in 
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response; ‘I have not come here to be liked by you’. You only have to say 
that once and it is over with you. Then the union will be opposing you and 
then the staff. The Antilleans accept European Dutch only saying ‘bon dia’ 
[good morning] but they don’t accept arrogance. (Interview with Antillean 
Setel employee). 
If you are arrogant you can forget it. Even if you bring gold here, we will put 
you and the gold on an aeroplane and you can go back to the Netherlands 
because we are not interested. So what? Fuck you! That is the way we think. 
The difficulty for the Dutch is that we don’t always say this. We say, “yes, 
amen”, we talk with you, “nice, nice” but in the meantime we think; “who do 
you think you are?” We have a completely different body language 
(interview with Antillean manager). 
 The Curaçaoan counterparts do not directly show their irritation towards the 
arrogant European Dutchman. They stay friendly, have lunches together, discuss 
matters and agree to start new initiatives or introduce new working methods. 
However, the Curaçaoans distance themselves from the European Dutch 
manager which is also called a ‘Yes refusal’. Criticism is made in private 
settings and personal networks are used to obtain information on the personal 
life of the manager. This information is used to isolate the European Dutch 
manager and his new initiatives. The European Dutch expatriate in turn thinks 
his work went smoothly, that his Curaçaoan counterparts are in need of Dutch 
expertise and money and that everybody is heading towards the same goal. The 
European Dutch feels flattered, ‘put on a throne’ and, most importantly and 
loses his sharpness of judgement. It is usually only much later that he discovers 
that there was no commitment on the part of the Curaçaoan employees and that 
the throne was an illusion.  
At the start go along with them, but then create a frame where you have to 
stay within. Because the Dutch are harsh when money is involved. But they 
are willing to co-operate if you say; “well listen, without your help I can’t do 
it”. They feel flattered, and then you have them. Put them on a throne, pay 
them and then it is ok. A Dutchman never refuses me anything (interview 
with Curaçaoan manager). 
 European Dutch expatriates use different strategies to deal with this issue of 
feedback. Almost all of the interviewed European Dutch stress the point that 
giving feedback the typically Dutch way brings about quite the opposite of the 
desired result. A small number of the European Dutch expatriateskeep repeating 
their critisism in personal one-to one exchange and thus manage to construct a 
platform of people who come to support new ideas they might want to 
introduce. When the platform has grown large enough someone else picks up on 
these ideas which are then executed in the organisation. The majority of 
expatriates say they first try to build good personal relationships before giving 
feedback. Since work or content related criticisms are generally experienced by 
Curaçaoans as personal failings the passing of feedback or suggestions for 
improvement are possibly better received once a good relationship is 
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established. One expatriate gives feedback slowly and subtly but persists: ‘If it 
doesn’t work in this way I go to the executive manager, than it always works 
out’. Some European Dutch expatriates say they have to be very tactful: ‘You 
have to think first, make up your mind and than act, you have to be like a 
politician’. 
I try to come with examples and ask ‘What do you think of this? Can it be 
done different? What do you think of this or that way?’ I try to bring them 
on different thought of how to solve a problem. You have to support them in 
a friendly way, respect them, treat them on equal basis and not as a 
Dutchman who comes in with an attitude of: they are backward for ten or 
twenty years here, and we just improve this. With such an attitude you better 
take a plane and leave right away. Because than you come across a very 
thick wall (interview with European Dutch). 
 On the other hand, eliciting feedback is also a difficult issue for a European 
Dutch expatriate. Their colleagues give no direct feedback or suggestions for 
improvement. Antillean employees tend to listen very politely to the plans and 
points of improvement suggested by the expatriate, are very friendly, generally 
agree to most things and avoid conflict. Criticism or dissatisfaction is not 
expressed in a direct way and is reserved for informal settings, relayed through 
personal networks and by means of gossip. This behaviour is called ‘zweven’[to 
hover]. Consequently some European Dutch have learned that it is necessary to 
listen very carefully to indirect signals from their acquaintances. News from the 
newspapers, gossip, informal meetings and personal networks can also be used 
to obtain feedback on their own performance within the organisation and to 
gauge the commitment of their Curaçaoan employees.  
 
8.2.4 Flexibility and Work Attitude 
For many Dutch expatriates such as Niels, the initial experience of life in 
Curaçao is not so much a culture shock than it is of recognition of many things 
familiar. In Willemstad, typical 18th century, Dutch colonial, stepped-roofed 
houses are found, beautifully painted in the Caribbean colours of yellow, blue 
and red. The streets have Dutch names such as Nijlweg, Schottegatweg and 
Handelskade as do the villages, for example, St. Willibrordus, Julianadorp and 
Brievengat. Construction materials can be obtained at the Hubo and groceries 
are available at Albert Heijn, the Dutch supermarket chain and at the 
supermarket Suikertuintje. Banking and financial services are provided by 
Dutch ABN Amro and ING. During the weekends the visitor can have diving 
courses of Dutch dive instructors in the Jan Thiel bay or for a swim at the 
Seaquarium, where there is a white sand beach with palm trees, together with 
other Dutch tourists. In the evening Dutch visitors and employees can go to the 
café ‘De Tropen’, whith live music every Tuesday night, or to any of the other 
Dutch cafés such as Mambo Beach and ‘De Bastille’. A majority of the 
European Dutch customers drink locally produced Dutch Amstel beer. The Van 
Der Valk Hotel has even created a typical Dutch ambience where Dutch tourists 
who do not enjoy foreign food, foreign attendants and foreign languages can 
feel at home.  
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 It is thus not difficult to imagine that the Dutch expatriate who has just 
arrived on Curaçao usually thinks he is just in a tropical part of the Netherlands 
and thus, does not always recognise the cultural differences. Hence when Niels 
arrived on Curaçao he very much enjoyed his first months. Everybody at his 
new job was friendly and helpful and he was given a nice, spacious office. He 
could easily communicate in Dutch everywhere he went, read the daily Dutch 
newspaper ‘Het Algemene Dagblad’ which is published on Curaçao, listen to a 
Dutch radio station that informed him of the weather conditions in the 
Netherlands and every Tuesday evening, he could watch the football matches 
that had been played the week before in the Netherlands on the ‘Studio Sport’ 
broadcast on Channel One.  
 It is Friday night and Niels and his wife go with friends to ‘Landhuis 
Brievengat’, a dance club with an Antillean ambience where the ‘Happy 
Peanuts’ play Salsa, Meringue and Tumba. A Dutchman who employs only 
European Dutch students as attendants owns the club. Both European Dutch and 
Antilleans come here to dance. It clearly seems that Niels has had essentially 
nothing to worry about with regard to adjusting to his new situation. 
I‘m here now for five weeks and already, it is going like a bomb. I don’t 
really believe in cultural differences. Everything is successful, I am serious, 
every thing works. I have already got the key of the director’s office and I 
am here only five weeks, so I mean…(interview with Niels in January 1996). 
 However, soon after this pleasant introduction to life in Curaçaoa, Niels 
discovered that there was in fact no budget for the project. His project was 
meant to have been financed with money from the development budget of the 
Antillean government but the promised 3.5 million guilders still had not yet 
arrived. Niels thought that this might have resulted from the different perception 
of time on the part of his Curaçaoan counterparts. In the Netherlands Antilles 
time related issues are interpreted differently than as they are in the Netherlands. 
Meetings start 15 to 30 minutes later than the time planned and it is common 
that people sometimes show up half an hour too late for their appointments or 
not at all. Waiting can also have to do with status because waiting patiently is 
seen as a way of showing someone respect.  
On the average you wait for more than half an hour when you have an 
appointment with a Member of Parliament. I have also waited for more than 
two hours. Within those two hours all kinds of people enter and leave. And 
not only businessmen. Then you start wondering why… (interview with 
Dutch employee at Setel).  
 Niels himself has had to learn to be flexible, to reconfirm every appointment 
and to make clear agreements with regard to time. When making an 
appointment Niels now always asks whether the other party is referring to Dutch 
time (which is five minutes in advance of the agreed time) or Antillean time 
(which is 15 minutes later than the agree time). His strategy to cope is by 
coming on time to meetings and appointments while keeping in mind that others 
might come later. In a way Niels likes the Curaçaoans flexibility with regard to 
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time. Like a larger part of the European Dutch expatriates he enjoys the relaxed 
attitude of the people compared to the stress and fast-pace of Dutch society. On 
the other hand, this relaxed manner makes it more difficult to execute planned 
activities in the office. Curaçaoans do not excel in planning. In a majority of the 
Antillean companies Dutch employees are responsible for planning activities. 
There are always unexpected events such as employees being taken by sudden 
illness, the rendering of help to a friend in trouble and a visiting relative and 
these requests are given priority thus considerably slowing down the 
achievement of the long-term work goals. Consequently, deadlines are easily 
missed and postponed. In fact, activities can be postponed month after month. 
Reinders (1990: 533) speaks with admiration of the skills, the flexibility, the 
cleverness and the ‘creative unwillingness’ of the Curaçaoan politicians who 
trick the Dutch government and know how to wait and watch the conflict 
escalate. In the last hectic moments Antillean politicians are able to bring out 
unbelievably good results. 
The Curaçaoan society has always been a flexible society. From the start 
there has not been a rigid form of slavery in the plantation economy. We had 
a flexible interaction between master and slave. There was an understanding 
of mutual dependency. There were excesses and revolts, but there was 
certain flexibility also between the Jews and Protestants. It was all too small 
for that. People were living on top of one other. But that also resulted in, and 
we still suffer this, in certain hypocrisy (interview with Prof. Dr. Römer, the 
former Governor of the Netherlands Antilles). 
 Allowing time to lapse rather than being prompt and pro-active can solve 
problems in Curaçao. Waiting and letting things happens is a good Curaçaoan 
strategy to cope with demanding European Dutch managers such as Niels who 
want quick results. When one of Niels' initiatives are received positively by his 
Curaçaoan colleagues and counterparts this is for him is indication enough to 
start work and he begins to invest a lot of energy on the project. Not long after, 
he notices that he is completely misinterpreted the signals. His Curaçaoan 
colleagues have just been waiting to discover Niels' real intentions for coming 
to Curaçao. Curaçaoans suspect he might have a hidden agenda since the 
European Dutch always seem to do things only if it profits themselves. Niels 
thinks it is necessary to show his Antillean employees his displeasure every 
once in a while to force them to reach their targets and finish the work as 
promised. It is however, not wise for him to be too rigid with deadlines or to 
equate his future career to the success of his project. His Antillean colleagues do 
not get angry in return but neither will they forget his behaviour. Frequently 
deadlines can’t be met due to external factors and involved parties can use this 
failing to get rid of the European Dutch expatriate.    
 In Niels' view parallel planning, when different activities have to be planned 
at the same time, is even more difficult than sequential planning. In Amsterdam 
for instance, the McDonald’s employees call for their colleagues to help with 
the order. One fills the soft drinks, another prepares ice cream and another one 
brings the meal. In the Salinas Mac Donald in Willemstad, each employee 
handles the entire process of serving a customer on his or her own. Each takes 
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the order at the front desk himself/herself, then goes to collect the meal, to the 
ice-cream machine to prepare the ice cream before filling the mug with a soft 
drink and finally settling the bill. Although the employees work themselves into 
a sweat this process is inefficient in the eyes of the European Dutch. In 
Curaçaoan PTOs the same work method can be observed.  
It is difficult for them to manage different projects at the same time. Digging 
a trench, and in the meanwhile starting your logistic trajectory, placing 
orders on time, thinking how you will fill up the trench on time… all this is a 
disaster. It is unbelievable but if they have dug a trench then they start 
talking about the cable that has to be lowered down into the trench. And then 
the trench is open for a couple of weeks (interview with European Dutch). 
 None of Niels' colleagues have taken the initiative to discover why the 
project finances have not arrived. Römer (1993) explains this lack of initiative 
as the consequence of the Antillean children’s obedience to their parents. The 
lack of thorough knowledge of the Dutch language also results, according 
Römer, in a passive attitude. Niels is surprised by this lack of initiative because 
Curaçaoans are in fact very active and show a lot of initiative in own their 
private lives. People participate actively in clubs, sports, carnival activities and 
might even have second jobs.70 Having noticed this, Niels thus tries to 
implement a more action oriented work attitude in the organisation. However, 
Curaçaoan employees tend to feel suspicious about the motivations of their 
managers.  
Bosses are traditionally seen as exploiters. When you notice that the boss 
himself is also exploited people react with ‘Then he should watch better’. 
Curaçaoans think it is normal to do things for themselves during working 
time, making use of the companies facilities for private purposes (interview 
with European Dutch). 
 How do European Dutch expatriates cope with this work attitude and 
suspiciousness? A larger part of the of them want to give the good example by 
participating in the execution of the work, working hard, taking initiative and 
doing whatever they have promised to do. Cracking jokes is a way to open 
possibilities to discuss work-related issues. A large number of European Dutch 
expatriates said that they compliment employees when deadlines have been met 
or initiative is shown. One European Dutch expatriate told he asked his 
Curaçaoan employees to make checklists to ensure that he would not to forget 
anything. All of the European Dutch said that they take a quiet position during 
meetings to allow others to speak out. A larger part of the expatriates said that 
they had learnt to tolerate the slow work progress but not the loss of their own 
professionality. A few of the expatriates have held teambuilding sessions to 
inculcate a sense of responsibility amongst the employees and to stimulate 
                                                        
70 A jump up is a kind of ‘try out’ of the Curaçaoan carnival groups in advance of the carnival. A 
jump up consists of a large trailer with a Curaçaoan band and an enormous stereo amplifier which 
is ahead of a large parade of dancing people. Many people are watching the trailer passing the route 
in town. The jump up has a strong social character and has grown in importance in Curaçao during 
recent years. The large companies have their own jump up. 
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initiative. It should be noted that employees are not only suspicious of white 
bosses but also of coloured managers. The acceptance of the power held by 
coloured managers creates some tension for employees.  
Often there is no respect of Curaçaoan people for their own people. I have 
been harsh to my own people. I have always insisted, if Mister Kook had a 
white skin then you would have called me Mister Kook, I do not have a 
white skin but want to be called Mister Kook. I have said to my friends and 
relatives, “Until five o’clock I am Mister Kook, and after five you can call 
me whatever you want (interview with ex-director of Setel ing. Kook).  
 Personal benefits are the primary motivation for initiative on Curaçao. ‘The 
initiative to make this island better can only start if someone personally 
benefits’ says an Antillean telecom manager in an interview. The Curaçaoan 
writer Boeli van Leeuwen, in his book ‘Geniale Anerchie’, calls this ‘a shared 
feeling of anarchism for personal benefits’. A rich European Dutchman is 
therefore seen as an exploiter and a rich Antillean seen as ‘a smart guy’. If he 
owns three black BMW’s, everybody says; ‘Isn’t it something to have three 
BMW’s on your porch?!’. Reinders sees this form of behaviour as reflecting a 
need to compensate for the smallness of the island, as a psychological 
mechanism to balance the unequal relations between the Dutch and Antilleans 
(Reinders 1990: 530). This mechanism results in a ‘cosmetic society’ that is 
orientated towards outward appearances. The acquisition of luxury goods is 
valued highly. Since the opportunities to earn money are more or less limited 
Curaçaoan youth, the earning of ‘easy money’, money that can be earned fast 
and easily and in large quantities, has become fundamental in the acquisition of 
consumption goods. The trade in drugs fits seamlessly into the cosmetic 
society.71 The drugs industry has brought along with it a growing crime rate on 
Curaçao.  
Two weeks ago I walked at 8 o’clock in the evening from the house of a 
friend of mine to my home, which is 400m away. It is one of the best 
neighbourhoods on this island but I ran into a car with four guys who took of 
everything of mine. All of my friends have been robbed, with knives, guns. 
No, it is not funny anymore on this island (interview with European Dutch 
expatriate). 
 Personal benefits are also the impetus leading some of the Curaçaoan PTO 
employees to take on more than one job. Due to the shortage of computer and IT 
expertise in Curaçao there is a great demand for computer technicians and this 
has prompted some PTO employees to establish own telecom companies in 
                                                        
71 Traders from Colombia and Venezuela bring in packages of cocaine to the south coast of 
Curaçao at night and bring it on land. A kilo of cocaine costs 6000 to 9000 Naf in Willemstad and 
70.000 to 90.000 Naf in Amsterdam (1 Naf = 0,6 U$). A person can earn 15.000 Naf for the 
transport of one kilo to the Netherlands. The chance of being arrested at the Hato international 
airport is estimated at 10% by the Antillean police. For container transport to the harbour of 
Rotterdam the chance of getting caught are even lower. Not surprisingly young Antilleans try to 
earn money in this booming business.  
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addition to holding their official job. Electronic equipment is imported from 
Miami and professional networks are used to market the equipment.  
At a certain moment I noticed from the behaviour of my customers that there 
was another company active. I didn’t even know what kind of company that 
was. So I went to the Chamber of Commerce here, and found out that it was 
two of my own employees! Serious! That is incredible, it is…. I fired them 
both (interview with Dutch telecom manager). 
 A few months following the problems over financial support, Niels 
discovered it was not the different perceptions of time, neither was it the lack of 
initiative nor the weak planning that caused the delay in financing his project. It 
was the fact that the signature of the Minister of Traffic and Communication for 
the Muriel Bank to give the go ahead to transfer the necessary funds had not 
been obtained. This signature had in fact already been asked for months earlier 
but Niels was unable to discover why the contract had taken so long to be 
processed. This experience clearly taught Niels the importance of personal 
networks on Curaçao. 
 
8.2.5 Importance of Personal Networks 
In actual fact it took Niels several months more to discover he was not in 
contact with the right people who would have helped in his request for the 
signature of the Minister of Traffic and Communication. Being in the right 
personal network is of utmost importance when doing business in Curaçao 
(Heijes and Hollander, 1996). Prices and the quality of work are always subject 
to personal relationships. Curaçaoans grant each other orders as favours, based 
on personal relationships. These personal networks consist of family members, 
friends, relatives, friends of relatives and friends of friends. The networks 
consist of long-lasting family relations such as those within the old Protestant 
Curaçaoan families or the Jewish families. These networks are spread 
throughout Curaçaoan society, business, politics and reach as far out as the 
other Antillean islands, the USA and the Netherlands. It is common that 
Curaçaoans use personal networks to acquire orders, positions, political power 
and financial support.  Having the right relations within the government can also 
help speed up procedures such as the obtaining work permits. On Curaçao, it is 
always easier to use someone in your own network then to try to do it through 
formal channels. 
Everything on this island has to be imported. And that sometimes takes a lot 
of time. You want to have your order as fast as possible. So if you have a 
personal contact you can call and tell him to order the material: ‘I need the 
material’. He will get the official conformation later by fax (interview with 
Curaçaoan Setel employee). 
 Personal networks may have been forged in the aeroplane on the way to the 
Netherlands, when young Curaçaoans went to the Netherlands for study and 
where they lived in the same city, perhaps even shared the same student houses 
and attended the same Antillean parties. After returning to the Netherlands 
  
 204 
Antilles these bonds are further reinforced through the mutual exchange of 
information, jobs, orders, business dealings and also in the ‘paranda’ [free 
time]. Business friends phone each other during work hours and meet each other 
for drinks during ‘happy hour’, for a snack and a drink in a bar. Politicians and 
businessmen meet for a drink and a show at the Campo Alegre.72  
For the acquisition of orders personal networks is of utmost importance. So, 
when I don’t acquire an order, I don’t doubt about my quality. But I realise 
that other things, which I cannot see, have an impact. Is the person in your 
network? Is the person giving you the order your ‘happy hour buddy’? Trust 
is not so much based on the quality of your work but on the person fitting 
into the personal network (Curaçaoan employee of consultancy group).  
 The influence of the Latin American concept of patronage is also noticeable 
in Curaçaoan society.73 Klomp (1986) explains the development of patronage on 
Curaçao’s neighbouring island Bonaire form the expansion of the influence of 
the state. The distribution of external resources stimulates the creation of 
patronage relations. Patronage creates relations or ‘kinships’ with other people 
thereby allowing people to expand personal networks. These relations are of 
outmost importance for safeguarding interests and are used as a way to get 
ahead. Patronage relations are also important at Curaçao. 
Everybody is in one way or another family of each other. So it is difficult to 
handle business wise and take a decision that might affect someone. It can be 
used against you by means of others ways. Here, someone is your 
subordinate but in another setting this can be the other way around. There, 
your brother is the subordinate of his brother. People keep that at the back of 
their minds (interview with Dutch Setel employee). 
 European Dutch expatriates such as Niels realise they do not have these 
personal networks and realise it is very difficult for them to establish these. 
They try to enter these networks by gaining credit, using the personal networks 
of their immediate colleagues, counterpart organisations, Antillean friends or 
partners. A larger part of the Dutch expatriates never do establish networks 
within the Antillean society. Their participation is usually limited to drinking a 
beer or two with the employees of Setel on Friday afternoons. Or they join in 
when a drink is offered by Setel to celebrate the successful finishing of a 
project.   
By means of a good relationship with the Government Collector 
[Landsontvanger] and our shareholder, we have got the order to establish a 
small communication network for the three Leeward Antilles islands. We 
                                                        
72 Campo Alegre is a walled prostitution camp near the Hato airport. In the camp mainly 
Dominican, Venezuelan and Cuban girls offer their services in the camp. There are different bars, 
restaurants and entertainment facilities for the visitors. Member of the Campo Allegre can park 
their cars inside the camp.   
73 Patronage is a dyadic, asymmetrical relationship of considerable duration, which are entered in to 
for the purpose of exchanging goods and services, which usually are not all clearly specified 
(Klomp 1986: 155). The higher-ranking person is the patron and the person with the lower status is 
the client. The patron is of higher status and has greater power than the client. The relationship 
does not automatically flow from a bond, but has to be concealed.  
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first reconstructed the network and then we did the management of the 
network. That gave us a good name. When our customer wanted to have a 
new network we were automatically contacted. We don’t have to compete 
with others. Without a struggle: they asked how much is it and gave us the 
order (interview with European Dutch telecom manager). 
 Niels establishes his networks by first getting himself introduced to 
important Curaçaoans. The direct approach of the European Dutch does not 
really help to establish a Curaçaoan network. After the first meeting, a chance 
meeting at a reception or wedding party follows. There, the first appointment is 
made. Later on another invitation for a lunch or dinner follows. Slowly, the 
personal relationship grows and the exchange of information starts up. In this 
was Niels is tipped on whom he should talk to and with whom not to, with 
whom to do business, who is not to be trusted and where to go for this or for 
that. In return, he exchanges information he has obtained via his own Dutch 
networks. He sends his Antillean contacts articles or books difficult to get on 
Curaçao, helps them with installing of computers in their homes and writes them 
postcards or letters when he was in the Netherlands for business. Niels keeps 
investing in his network and when he doesn’t make any ‘mistakes’ information 
starts to flow. Niels notices that personal relationships with Curaçaoans are 
‘deeper’ and more personal than he is used to with colleagues in the 
Netherlands. Through the help of these personal networks Niels obtains 
valuable information for his business. 
 It was in fact by means of personal networks that Niels made acquaintance 
with people connected to the Minister of Traffic and Communication who could 
directly obtain his signature. Through these new contacts Niels learned to know 
more with the Minister. He learnt who he was connected with, what kind of 
family he came from and about his political connections. Different people told 
Niels what his chances with the Minister were and he learnt to drop names to 
show the importance of his personal network and his association with the 
political and social elite of Curaçao. It was not long before Niels realised that he 
had used his European Dutch business style too much in the initial phase of his 
work on the island. 
When my wife was asked for a position here on Curaçao her boss asked her 
if there was anything he could do to influence her decision of coming. Her 
boss, a professor, arranged a meeting with the Minister of 
Telecommunications. There was interest in me at Antelecom but at that time 
my temporary Antillean manager didn’t want me to come. I came on good 
terms with this manager because the internist of his wife was the ex-manager 
of the project my wife was working with. So I talked with the ex-manager 
who is also a professor and, brother of the governor. The professor talked 
with the wife of my manager and asked her to arrange a meeting. The 
professor told my manager to talk with me, because the following next week 
I would go back in the Netherlands. The same day the professor called me 
and in the afternoon I had an appointment with my manager (interview with 
European Dutch telecom manager). 
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 In summary, Niels learned that personal networks are of fundamental 
importance for conducting business on Curaçao. This section has also shown 
that it is not easy to establish personal networks with Antilleans that this takes a 
lot of time and energy and mistakes have to be avoided at all cost. It can thus be 
concluded that most newly arrived European Dutch expatriates usually have a 
difficult time at the start in integrating in the Curaçaoan society. This raises the 
question as to whether they are at all able to integrate. 
 
8.2.6 The “Amsterdam +” Feeling of European Dutch Expatriates 
It is apparent that the majority of the European Dutch expatriates are not aware 
of cultural differences in the Netherlands Antilles and find themeselves slowly 
absorbed into the European Dutch expatriate culture of Curacao. How did this 
happen? The new cultural context, at work and at home, has a strong impact on 
the personal lives of the European Dutch, especially those without any in-depth 
foreign experience. European Dutch who have just arrived are seen as ‘restless’ 
people because they have yet to ‘discover’ the island. They hire a jeep to 
explore the island, climb St. Christopher Mountain in the national park, go to 
watch the surfs in the ‘Boca Grande’, visit the north side of the island and swim 
all of the south coast playas from Westpunt to Barbara Beach. They get their 
PADI open water dive course in six lessons and are immediately off to explore 
the beautiful coral reef at depths of 30 meters. The ‘restless’ new comers find 
their way in Willemstad, lunch at the Avila Beach Hotel, walk along the 
Handelskade to Fort Amsterdam and pass Plaza Piar where Caribbean music 
comes down from the terrazzo of the Van Der Valk Plaza Hotel. A band plays in 
the night near the restaurants at the Waterfort. Over day the Eastern trade-winds 
cool the island to an average temperature of 27 degrees Celsius and this coupled 
with the palm trees, the Dutch colonial facades, the international cuisine and the 
warm tropical nights provide the perfect ambience for the European Dutch to 
experience the Antilles as a tropical part of the Netherlands. 
Two friends from Amsterdam were visiting me on Curaçao. The TV showed 
the top meeting of the French President Mitterand and the American 
President Bush at St. Maarten. The guys reacted spontaneously: “He, get off 
our island!” Our island?! Two men from Amsterdam. Our island! (Antillean 
consultant during a gathering). 
 Once these expatriate newcomers have explored the island they then have, 
according to Schneider and Barsoux (1997), three possible strategies to choose 
from to cope with the new cultural context: (1) The expatriate rejects the local 
culture and flees into an expatriate subculture which will mean his contact with 
local culture will remain minimal. (2) The expatriate ‘goes native’ and rejects 
the expatriate culture and in so doing maximises contact with the local culture. 
(3) The expatriate shows cultural empathy, shows interested in local culture and 
develops contact with both local and expatriate culture (Schneider and Barsoux 
1997: 162). 
 The majority of European Dutch expatriates tend to adapt the first strategy. 
They do not learn Papiamiento even if they remain on the island for many years, 
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live in expensive expatriate suburbs and do not mix with Antilleans. They shop 
in Dutch supermarkets, eat Dutch food, have only European Dutch friends and 
go out to Dutch hotels, bars and restaurants. The networks of these expatriates 
consist mainly of other European Dutch expatriates. In their initial  ‘restless’ 
period of adjustment many of the new people are introduced to European Dutch 
members of this group who give the newcomers advice on what to do and what 
not to do. Niels was warned against going to the floating Venezuelan market 
because it is unsafe to go there. He was also told that many of the cars on the 
island are stolen Behaviour that deviates from the norms of the group are not 
easily tolerated and to be accepted in the new group the newcomer will do 
everything to avoid being isolated within the small community.  
If you come here and you want to join as fast as possible the Kiwanies, the 
Lions, or the Rotary, or you want to have a boat at the Spanish Water, than 
you enter a circle of people which is not easy to escape from. Because you 
feel accepted and can move around at ease there is no need to explore the 
rest of the society. You will participate in that circle (interview with 
European Dutch expatriate Setel).   
 A small minority of European Dutch expatriates choose the second strategy. 
They do this because they are really interested in the Curaçaoan society and at 
the same time don’t like the European Dutch society on the island. Those who 
integrate are learning Papiamiento, live in Curaçaoan neighbourhoods, have 
Antillean friends and networks and have an Antillean partner. They adapt easily 
to the local culture and adopt the relaxed attitude towards time and life. These 
European Dutch don’t want to be identified as ‘makamba’s’ but rather seen as 
‘hulandes’. A small minority, around 10 %, of the European Dutch expatriates 
choose this ‘going native’ approach.74 
 The European Dutch who chose the third strategy do this because they are 
genuinely interested in the Curaçaoan society and at the same time do like to be 
involved in the European Dutch society on the island. These people speak 
Papiamiento, have a thorough knowledge of the society and have both 
Curaçaoan and European Dutch networks and remain essentially European 
Dutch in terms of their identity and values. This group also comprises a 
minority, around 10% of the European Dutch on Curaçao. It has been observed 
that around 80% of the European Dutch expatriates arriving at Curaçao are 
automatically absorbed into the European Dutch expatriate subculture of the 
first group and are thus not able to integrate into Curaçaoan society. 
 
8.2.7 Mutual Images of Curaçaoans and European Dutch 
Although Curaçaoans distinguish between different kinds of European Dutch 
such as tourists and contract labourers, medical employees, students, scientists, 
consultants, penshonados, teachers, Marines and ex-Shell employees, the 
Curaçaoans’ image of the European Dutch partly reflects the different strategies 
discussed in the last section. Curaçaoans distinguish three groups of European 
                                                        
74 The estimations of the percentages of European Dutch who chose for one of the strategies are 
based upon information from key informants  
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Dutch expatriates: (1) those who have just arrived, the ‘restless’, (2) those who 
do not integrate and (3) those who integrate. The people in the first group are 
considered as people who have not yet decided which of the other two groups 
they will fall into.  
 The Curaçaoan image of the European Dutch is on one hand, based on 
admiration for their efficiency, standard of living, quality of work, spirit of 
trade, the power to generate business and their career opportunities. On the other 
hand, there is a strong negative perception of the European Dutch life style 
particularly with regard to those of the first and second group mentioned above. 
Curaçaoans see these European Dutch as the ex-colonialists who occupied and 
exploited the Antilles. They are perceived as discriminators, who are not to be 
trusted and who are arrogant. They show no respect to the Antilleans and only 
do business if they can earn a lot of money. Furthermore, the European Dutch 
can’t dance, smoke a lot, drink a lot of coffee and they drink Amstel beer. They 
are malicious, stingy, parsimonious, dirty, unhygienic and they smell. This is 
why the European Dutch are also called ‘stinky makamba’ or ‘na ta hole 
mateka’ [they smell like rancid butter]. A process of segregation is already 
visible at secondary schools where only small groups of Curaçaoans and 
European Dutch mix and negative stereotypes of ‘makambas’ are confirmed 
(Houwing 1997). 
I was getting coffee at the University one day. I didn’t see a European Dutch 
teacher standing next to me but I smelt him - awful! I asked the boy behind 
the desk to help me quickly. They do not wash frequently enough, do not use 
deodorant, do not change their clothing frequently enough and do not notice 
that they smell. They are not used to sweat (Antillean UNA student).  
 Although European Dutch distinguish the different groups of Curaçaoans 
such as Jews, Haitians, Chinese, Surinamians, blacks and Protestants, in daily 
business practices two kinds of Curaçaoans are observed: (1) those who have 
been in the Netherlands and (2) those who haven’t been there. The first group 
has lived, studied or worked in the Netherlands. As a result they are perceived 
as having a more Dutch oriented working attitude and a better understanding of 
the Dutch language. The European Dutch like to work with Curaçaoans of this 
group and if they establish relations with Curaçaoans in general it is with people 
of this group. The latter are called ‘black makamba’ by Curaçaoans who haven’t 
been in the Netherlands. The second group of Curaçaoans is seen as 
individualistic, uncooperative at work, jealous, suspicious of Dutch initiatives 
and with low work motivation. They are perceived as spoilt children who cannot 
manage their own affairs properly and are always in need of the Netherlands to 
help them out of (financial) problems. On the other hand, Curaçaoans of the first 
group are perceived as socially very well developed, good-natured and with a 
good feeling for music.  
 
8.2.8 European Dutch are Dominating Again: According to Curaçaoans 
A very important date in recent history of the cooperation of the Netherlands 
and the Netherlands Antilles is May 30, 1969. That day a strike broke out at the 
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company Werkspoor BV, which was a subsidiary of Royal Shell Netherlands. 
Around 4000 people gathered at the gates of the Shell complex. The strikers 
moved to Otrabanda where the shopping centre was plundered and put on fire. 
A number of people were killed and many injured. The Antillean government 
asked for Dutch military assistance and the European Dutch Marines occupied 
Willemstad for a number of days to calm the revolt. 
 During the mid-eighties European Dutch tourists and investments were once 
again welcomed on Curaçao but the change in political relations between the 
Netherlands Antilles and the Netherlands and the increasing presence of 
European Dutch also changed the quality of cooperation. The number of Dutch 
living on Curaçao grew significantly from 3.1 % in 1981 to 3.9 % in 1994 
(Centraal Bureau Statistiek 1995). This growth of nearly 25% seems impressive 
at first sight but is not so in absolute numbers. Other sources give the much 
higher pecentage of 10% Dutch living on Curaçao (e.g. Marcha and Verweel 
1996: 42). Tourism has grown rapidly in Curaçao from 5960 tourists in 1984 to 
66.746 tourists in 1995. The percentage of Dutch tourists has grown even more 
dramatically from 4 % in 1984 to 30 % in 1995 (Centraal Bureau Statistiek 
1996). Although not shown in the statistics, the number of Dutch students who 
complete their training attachments and young Dutch people working in the 
Dutch hotel and catering industry has also grown. There is a preference for 
Dutch employees and young people like to work for a couple of months in this 
Caribbean paradise.75 In summary, more and more European Dutch come to the 
island. 
Where do all those Dutch are coming come from? Out of nowhere? It is 
enough to drive me mad. I do not feel like going back to the Netherlands. I 
become recalcitrant from this. Then they asked me; ‘Que va a hacer esta 
noche?’[what are you going to do tonight?]. I just told them: ‘Voy a dormir!’ 
[I’m going to sleep]. They had to grin sheepishly because I reconfirmed the 
image of a lazy Antillian. But I didn’t care for that moment (Antillean after 
joining his Spanish class). 
 Apart from the presence of European Dutch, the political control of the 
Netherlands has also changed. From 1990 onwards the financial control of the 
Netherlands over the Netherlands Antilles has been tightened. The relationship 
between the Netherlands and the Netherlands Antilles has strengthened after the 
referendum in November 1993 in which Antilleans chose to remain within the 
state of the Netherlands Antilles. The Government of the Netherlands 
interpreted this choice as a choice for further cooperation with the Netherlands. 
Investments from the Netherlands have grown rapidly since then. Not so much 
the quantity of European Dutch on Curaçao has grown as much as their 
financial and political domination. The increase of political interference by the 
Netherlands, the growing number of technical assistants, illegal workers in the 
                                                        
75 Rumours are told of the many illegal young European Dutch girls working as waitresses in Dutch 
hotels. These girls are said to wear bikinis under their working cloths so that in case of control by 
the Antillean Immigrant Service they can easily change clothes and act like European Dutch 
tourists.  
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Dutch tourist business, economic restrictions of the EC and new financial taxes 
for penshonados stimulates the feeling in Curaçaoans that the Netherlands are 
dominating again and rumours of the growth of anti-makamba tensions are 
heard from different segments of the society.   
 
I see the tension growing in the Antillean society. We are going to do it like 
Indonesia. But you feel it in every group in the society, the way the 
government now manage, you notice the Netherlands are dictating and the 
Antillean government just echoes it (interview with Curaçaoan union 
leader). 
 
If I’m at Suikertuintje I’m watched as if I’ve just descended from another 
planet. I don’t feel at home there anymore, although it is my own country. It 
is not that all of the European Dutch are wrong, but it is the way they behave 
themselves - arrogant. I myself have a European Dutch neighbour who 
speaks Papiamiento and we meet every week. So I try to teach my children 
that not all of the European Dutch are the same. I hope that when riots start 
not all of the European Dutch are generalised as one and the same (Interview 
with Curaçaoan employee of Historical Library).  
 
With the help of accomplices, who we, in many cases, bring ourselves in as 
the Trojan Horse, under the name of Technical Assistance or consultants. 
They get a good view of our kitchen, they study our ingredients and once 
back home, and the hangman’s rope is being pulled further without any 
sorrow. It seems like a killing stranglehold of a python that is executed 
slowly, painful but unremittingly (sent in letter of Antillean in Amigoe, 
January 17, 1997). 
 
 Some of the Curaçaoans compare the contemporary situation with the 
uprising of 30 May 1969. The 25th anniversary of the uprising inspired the 
Amsterdam based Antillean John Leerdam to make the documentary ‘Un grito 
di un pueblo’ which was premiered in the WTO February 1996. The 
documentary emphasised the colonial attitude of the European Dutch and ethnic 
struggle of the Curaçaoans in 1969.  
The colonial history has not been forgotten. The documentary is a proof that 
it is not forgotten and that we should not forget it. It is not a coincidence that 
this movie has come now. It is now silently existing. The timing of the 
movie is maybe not right because maybe it is better to let sleeping dogs lie. 
But the dogs are there. These feelings still live (interview with Curaçaoan 
telecom manager). 
 The documentary suggests the existence of contemporary ethnic tensions in 
the Antillean society. This time however, the tension is a pure contrast of poor 
versus rich. The change of the Curaçaoan society after 1969 brought a new 
coloured elite to power. As a result, wealth is not only determined by race or 
ethnicity. The coloured elite now also possesses estates, houses and business 
and is in a difficult position. On the one hand, they fear a possible uprising of 
the economic poor coloured underclass. With an outbreak of unrest their 
possessions will also be the target of violence. On the other hand, they are also 
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afraid of the growing domination of the European Dutch. They are afraid of 
their positions being taken up by the European Dutch and the Dutch financial 
control of the island. The Curaçaoan elite has to manage the growing social and 
economic inequality and the growing dominance of the European Dutch (see 
figure 14). 
 
Text with cartoon (see figure 14): Employee (left); 'Just imagine, racial riots 
on this island! What a nonsense! After everything we do to develop business 
here? Come on!' Employee (right): 'Absurd yes! They also benefit from our 
efforts'. 
That is the difference with 30 May 1969. Now, also, the middle management 
and high management is organised in unions. Because of world-wide 
changes and flexibility of work the threat is not limited to the workforce, but 
also confronts the executives. Formerly, those were anti-unionists who didn’t 
want to know anything about unions and were not on the union side in 1969. 
But now I have been asked to advise these executives. In contradiction with 
1969 the intellectuals now sympathise with us. Now you hear when a 
European Dutchman is nominated: again a European Dutchman! (Interview 
with Errol Cova of KS).  
 The growth of the number of European Dutch at Curaçao, the growing 
economic dominance of European Dutch and the growing political influence of 
the Netherlands over the Netherlands Antilles have stimulated the rise of ‘anti-
makamba’ strategies such as: slowing down of Dutch decision making 
processes, bogged down Dutch initiatives, ‘yes-refusals’ to Dutch politicians, 
threatening European Dutch and increasing complexity. Two examples can be 
given to illustrate this. The first one is the statement made by the chairwoman of 
the Antillean Staten. She was in the Netherlands during the fierce debate with 
the Dutch government on the Antillean rice export quota to the EC. The 
Antillean government was angry with the Dutch government because this 
limitation ended a lucrative trade. Through the Dutch media the chairwoman 
threatened that Curaçao was no longer safe for Dutch tourists. The other 
example is the round table conference on Curaçao where, with the former Dutch 
premier Ruud Lubbers as chairman, a conference was held on political relations 
between the Netherlands Antilles and the Netherlands. The Dutch politicians 
proposed a new relationship that needed reforms and re-structuring of the 
Antillean political system. The former Dutch premier is known to be a strong 
negotiator but during the conference he was totally confused by the Antillean 
negotiators. After three days he left the island disillusioned and without any 
results.  
 Interestingly enough a larger part of the interviewed European Dutch denied 
this growth of ethnic tensions and stressed the synergy of the European Dutch 
and Curaçaoan cooperation. A larger part of the interviewed Curaçaoans 
however, stressed the possibility of a new uprising and pictured tensions in the 
society. This was probably the result of the fear of Curaçaoan middle and upper 
class of being overruled by the European Dutch. 
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European Dutch always find something creative to exploit us for and to 
return to our island. I know aggressive people who think too many European 
Dutch are coming to our island. One of them is very aggressive and names it 
the ‘Dutch problem’. A good fire will help us to get rid of all those Dutch, 
except for the researchers of course (conversation with employees of UNA). 
 In summary, it has been learned that the growing European Dutch 
dominance on Curaçao stimulates ‘anti-makamba’ feelings among the 
Curaçaoan people. In previous sections it has been shown that European Dutch 
expatriates and Curaçaoans are segregated and that large cultural differences 
exist between European Dutch and Curaçaoan management practices. Worst of 
all, these developments are not recognised by a larger part of the European 
Dutch expatriates on Curaçao. This leads one to wonder what strategy KPN 
chose in their attempt to establish business at the Netherlands Antilles. 
 
Figure 14. Cartoon of European Dutch businessmen on Curaçao (source: Amigoe, May 15, 
1992) 
 
8.3 Corporate Strategies of KPN to Cope with Cultural Differences at 
the Netherlands Antilles 
 
In this section the cross-cultural strategies KPN used to get a foot into the 
Antillean telecom market in the early nineties and the strategies employed by 
Antilleans to cope with KPN are discussed. The experiences of the Dutch 
operator at the island of St. Maarten are presented, as this interesting case was 
the KPN’s first powerful confrontation with a totally different cultural context 
and because of its far-reaching consequences for its process of 
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internationalisation and its cross-cultural strategies. KPN intended to participate 
in the Antillean PTOs and the process of decentralisation of the activities of 
Antelecom, distribution of management to the individual islands and the 
integration of these activities in the island PTOs forced KPN to successively 
start negotiations at St. Maarten, Bonaire and Curaçao.  
 
8.3.1 The Power Behind the Throne at St. Maarten  
In November 1989, KPN and a few other international telecom operators were 
invited by the Government of the Netherlands Antilles to make a bid for 
participation of 49% of Telem’s shares. In the agreement the purchase price of 
the shares was fixed at seventeen million US dollars. Furthermore, the 
international partner would be responsible for the management of Telem for the 
first three years with the possibility of extension of another five years thereafter 
and endeavours to have the company run by Antilleans within the period of 
three to five years (Participation Agreement Telem, March 5, 1990). After 
studying the different bids the Antillean government selected KPN as the 
foreign partner for Telem.  
The Dutch PTT and France Telecom as companies in telecommunication 
have an edge over the other companies. A choice between these companies 
is rather complex. The language barrier is a problem for the French 
Company. Furthermore, the Dutch PTT has a slight edge over the French 
Company because of the positive technical assistance they provided in the 
past and due to the fact that all technical norms implemented have come 
from the Dutch organisation. (Nota Realisatie Decentralisatie 
Landsradiodienst, Bijlage 3, 1991). 
 The Antillean government and KPN had been very well prepared for the 
‘signing ceremony’ at St. Maarten on March 5, 1990. The ceremony was to be 
conducted with certain grandeur at the Maho Beach Hotel located just west of 
Juliana Airport. For KPN this was the first international acquisition and an 
important step in executing their international ambitions. For the Antillean 
Minister of Traffic and Communication, the agreement also signified financial 
injection for the improvement of the island’s telecom infrastructure as well as 
political success. Before being appointed Minister in June 1988, he had been 
head of the Antelecom department at St. Maarten. The Minister was the rising 
star of the Democratic Party and frequently named as the likely successor of the 
legendary Claude Wathey aslo called ‘The Ol’ Man’.76  
 On the day of the signing ceremony, the Minister of Traffic and 
Communication Mr. Gumbs invited The Ol Man and other St. Maarten 
                                                        
76 Wathey, The Ol’ Man, died in January 1998 in Phillipsburg at the age of 71 after being the 
political patron of St. Maarten for more then 40 years. He established the Democratic Party in 1951 
and dominated the political and economic scene and developed the island. He had established many 
patronage relations with clients all over the Netherlands Antilles. He said of himself: “I’m a 
dictator. But a generous one” (Amigoe, 9 April 1994). The instructions of The Ol’ Man never came 
directly but always subtle, something that the Minister of Traffic and Communication would only 
later found out about. “If there was a problem, the DP State member on Curaçao said to me that 
The Ol’ Man asked when I would come to St. Maarten again. Then I knew that he had a problem 
(Antillean politician in Amigoe April 9, 1994). 
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politicians to lunch with the KPN delegation. The board of directors, including 
the CEO Mr. Ben Verwaaijen, together with the Dutch Minister of Traffic and 
Public Works gathered on 4 March 1990 on the island of St. Maarten where the 
signing ceremony was to take place. They stayed at the Holland House at Front 
Street in Phillipsburg and went the following day to lunch. However, The Ol’ 
Man did not show up, which was not in itself unusual. Guests from Curaçao, St. 
Maarten arrived and the agreement was by five o’clock ready to be signed 
however,at the very last moment something went wrong.  
At four o’clock minister Gumbs visited me. He wanted to change the 
agreement. But the agreement had already been negotiated and was ready for 
signing. I went to Van Moorsel (manager KPN). He was just busy with 
preparing the fountain pen to sign the agreement. I told him what Gumbs had 
told me. Then he said, ’Ben [Verwaaijen] will never do that!’.  It is a fact 
that at five o’clock the signing should take place. I went downstairs and 
walked into Minster Gumbs who showed me a little note that told him that it 
was forbidden for him to sign. It was nothing more than a scrap of paper. 
The authorisation was supposed to be withdrawn. He could have signed, 
because of the mandate he had, or not sign. So he opted not to sign 
(interview with Antillean telecom manager). 
 The Minister of Traffic and Communication showed the European Dutch 
negotiator a little rumpled note from Wathey which indicated that the power of 
attorney had been withdrawn.77 The Ol’ Man would not give his permission for 
the agreement. Gumbs could have signed but he didn’t dare to neglect the 
instructions given by The Ol’ Man. By this action Claude Wathey blocked the 
rising political career of Gumbs who was a black Antillian. At the same time 
Wathey gained support from the people of St. Maarten whose support he needed 
to win the upcoming elections of March. Wathey called the agreement, which 
took six months of negotiations, worthless with absurd conditions (Amigoe, 
March 7, 1990). Wathey needed a victory because his political power was 
slowly vanishing and more and more criticism was being made with regards to 
his corruption and misuse of power. By blocking the participation of the Dutch 
operator he was able to mobilise anti-makamba feelings among the St. Maarten 
society, which was even more profound than on Curaçao.  
When I came back to St. Maarten after 14 days leave in the Netherlands the 
Personnel Manager greeted me with the words: ‘Are you still alive?’ and 
turned his back on me. I felt deeply insulted. The hatred against the Dutch is 
very perceptible (interview with European Dutch KPN employee).  
 By blocking the signing of the agreement The Ol’ Man also highlighted the 
political autonomy of St. Maarten. Nation building has always been a problem 
in the Netherlands Antilles. If necessary the Antilles forms a block against the 
influence of the Netherlands, but in internal affairs the politicians are hopelessly 
                                                        
77 Gumbs was empowered to negotiate with KPN by the Island Territory of St. Maarten, the only 
shareholder of the St. Maarten PTO. In a letter, dated 6 March 1989 (no. 940-89), they granted him 
the power of attorney (Participation agreement Telem, March 5, 1990). 
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divided.78 The decentralisation of the governmental system, the local political 
parties and the insularity are fundamental obstacles for any kind of unification 
of the islands. The telecommunication agreement of the central government of 
Curaçao was then used to highlight the importance of the politicians of St. 
Maarten. KPN had not fully realised the importance of analysing political 
processes on the island. In attempt to save the situation the management of KPN 
wanted to speak to Wathey himself, who at the time the agreement was to be 
signed was at the Barefoot Terrace bar. 
 The restaurant-bar Barefoot Terrace is located at the corner of the pier and 
Front Street in Philipsburg on the Cyrus Wathey Square. Visitors have a 
beautiful view of the Great Bay with Fort Amsterdam on the right and Bobby’s 
Marina to the left. That afternoon, four large cruise ships were anchored in the 
Great Bay. Barefoot Terrace was the favourite bar of Claude Wathey and he 
could usually be found there in the afternoons. Verwaaijen, Smit-Kroes and 
Gumbs went to meet him and when they met, Wathey was tipsy and could not 
be persuaded to change his opinion. He made references to the rumour that 
another foreign operator had offered 35 million dollars for the participation in 
Telem and remarked that KPN’s bid was too low and wanted to re-open the 
negotiations (Amigoe, March 7, 1990). Wathey knew that in general the 
European Dutch were usually willing to pay more money in the very last 
minutes of the negotiations. However, that was not the case with the stubborn 
businessman Verwaaijen. What exactly happened in the bar is not known, but 
all of the versions point towards a fierce clash.   
Verwaaijen was threatened in person and told that he and his family would 
have some thing done to them if they ever visited the island again. KPN and 
Verwaaijen came back from St. Maarten damaged. With Verwaaijen, St. 
Maarten still can’t be discussed. It was a traumatic experience for him 
(Interview with KPN manager).  
I don’t think Ben was physically threatened. Of course there was a lot of 
screaming and someone would have told him that he would kill him, but that 
is the way we are. From the Dutch point of view it looked like a threat, but it 
wasn’t. But we haven’t realised enough that Ben did himself feel threatened 
(interview with involved Antillian).  
 Meanwhile, in the Maho Beach Hotel, the reception had started, the band 
was playing and food and drinks were served. Only a few people knew of the 
problems that had arisen. At 5 pm CEO Mr Ben Verwaaijen made a speech in 
which he declared that St. Maarten has missed a chance and that he was very 
disappointed but invited everybody to continue with the party. This public loss 
of face made a deep impression on the CEO. It was his worst business 
experience during his nearly ten years with KPN. Conducting business with St. 
                                                        
78 It was also Wathey who was a fierce advocate of Antillean independence. However, 60% the 
inhabitants of St. Maarten chose to stay in the Dutch Kingdom. This choice was based upon the 
knowledge that it is better to deal with Willemstad than to deal with The Hague. This referendum 
finished the political career of Wathey. 
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Maarten was subsequently blocked for many years and the name of St. Maarten 
became a taboo in KPN.   
 
8.3.2 Supporters and Opponents of KPN on Curaçao 
After the loss of face at St. Maarten KPN carried on with negotiations for a 
participation in the PTOs of the other Antillean islands which at first appeared 
as if it would prove to be a more successful venture. In August 1990, KPN and 
the Island Territory of Bonaire signed a principle agreement over the 49% 
participation in Telbo. The ABVO (Antillean Union of Government Employees) 
was invited to the Netherlands for negotiations and in October 1990, KPN, the 
director of Telbo and the ABVO leaders signed a collective agreement. The two 
agreements would however, only be effectuated if the National Government of 
the Netherlands Antilles supported the restructuring. It was only later that KPN 
would find out that the local authorities wanted to use this agreement to become 
more independent of the central government at Curaçao who blocked this 
attempt.    
 In the meantime, on Curaçao, preparations were started for a participation in 
the holding company Curtel. A group of KPN employees received instructions 
to prepare the acquisition. To ensure that this first international participation 
would be successful the negotiators had to engage a Curaçaoan consultant to 
support the process of acquisition. The consultant was required to use his 
Antillean networks to convince the Antillean government to support the 
participation. This resulted in quick success. A Letter of Intent was prepared 
proposing 49% participation and the inclusion of a strong European Dutch 
management to restructure the organisation with the intention of handing over 
the management of Curtel to Antilleans within three to five years (Letter of 
Intent 1991). The agreement had to be signed by October 1991 because the 
delegation of KPN was working under time constraints.  
 The management of Antelecom did not however, agree to the restructuring 
of the organisation proposed by the Antillean government. When KPN attended 
the first meeting with the board of Antelecom in November 1991 only the CEO 
was present because he could use KPN to restructure the organisation. This 
CEO had been newly appointed by the Antillean government and did not have 
the support of the members of the board. He was not only at that point faced 
with having to restructure the organisation but was also confronted by a 
management team that opposed him and the government with a proposal to 
integrate the island PTOs in Antelecom (Lichtveld 1996). The entire board of 
Antelecom had their own personal arguments against the plan of 
decentralisation. Personal fears of losing power, losing positions, personal 
interests, political connections and economic connections played a role in the 
resistance. These fears stimulated the board of Antelecom to employ survival 
strategies to block the restructuring of Antelecom and the participation of KPN. 
The Government of the Netherlands Antilles fired one of the members of the 
Antelecom board who concludes many years later: 
The conclusion was justified that the minister’s arguments were not based on 
a policy plan mapped out in consultation with the island territories but that 
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they were the product of a small but influential group of lobbyists who, for 
whatever reason, clearly wanted to prevent the restructuring models 
(Lichtveld 1996). 
 Very interesting was the relationship of the board of Antelecom with the 
biggest audio-text operator in the world, Antillephone, which has a 75 million-
dollar business in Curaçao (Algemeen Dagblad, July 11, 1996).79 The company, 
which is located in Gibraltar, routes international telephone traffic from 
customers in America, Germany and Southern Europe who want to listen to the 
so-called “sex-lines” of Curaçao.80 The customer pays two dollars a minute, 
which is in many cases cheaper than local 06 numbers. The service provider 
Antillephone only pays the accounting rate for every minute of transatlantic 
telephone sex to Antelecom. Antelecom guarantees an exclusive and unlimited 
use of 500 million (!) lines for Antillephone. The accounting rate is 
Anrelecom’s profit. Hence, Antelecom does not want to lower the accounting 
rate, with the consequence that international tariffs remain high for all of the 
Antillean customers. KPN was interested in audio-text technology, the service-
added value and the income generated by Antillephone but stressed the 
importance of re-opening the contracts (Amigoe, January 23, 1992). CEO 
Verwaayen said in an interview that he did not agree with the distribution code 
of the profits of the Lipscomb Holding: ‘we demand another tariff structure’ 
(Elsevier, October 2, 1992). This led the Minister of Telecommunication to 
order NCF to study the value-added services such as Lipscomb on Curaçao. It is 
justified to conclude that the owners of Antillephone viewed the participation of 
KPN suspiciously and used their connections with the Antelecom management 
to guarantee the future of Antillephone.  
 The signing of the Letter of Intent also resulted in unrest amongst the other 
employees of Antelecom who received almost no information on the 
restructuring and did not participate in the negotiations. The employees feared a 
loss of jobs and the labour union of the Antelecom employees ABVO had, by 
then already agreed upon the participation of KPN in Bonaire and Curaçao. This 
prompted a group of 65 Antelecom employees to found a new labour union: the 
Sindikato di Trahadornan den Telekomunikashon Korsou (STTK) on 7 
February 1992. This was the start of a fierce struggle for power between STTK 
and ABVO. In this struggle STTK was supported by the Kamera Sindical (KS) 
and headed by Errol Cova who saw possibilities to strengthen his position in the 
telecom sector (see Figure 15). STTK established networks with telecom labour 
unions in Latin America and the Caribbean where participation of telecom 
operators resulted in the loss of jobs.  
 STTK mobilised the Curaçaoan society by claiming the cultural heritage of 
the telecom sector. The union informed the newspapers and media about the 
                                                        
79 Audiotext operators offer added value services based on text, which is transported by means of 
telephone lines. Different kinds of text are recorded at tapes and can be listened to by customers. 
The tapes contain texts on jokes, cooking recipes and most of all sex talks. 
80 Antillephone has competition from other countries such as Sao Tomé, Guyana, Colombia and 
Guinee-Bissau because the technology can be easily exported. The moneymaking contract of 
Antillephone therefore is thus temporary in nature. 
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lack of information supplied by the Curaçaoan government and KPN. Although 
in the report on the decentralisation of Antelecom it was acknowledged that 
different concerned parties needed to be kept informed, in reality not much 
action had been taken to ensure that this was done.  
There will be full 
attention given to the 
publicity with regards to 
the employees, the 
labour unions, the 
customers and the public 
in order that a good 
understanding emerge in 
the society of the 
necessity of the 
decentralisation, 
integration and 
participation of Dutch 
KPN (Nota Realisatie 
Decentralisatie 
Landsradiodienst, 1991). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15. Caricature of KS 
Union leader who is taking KPN down a peg or two (source: Independiente July 1993). 
 The political opposition such as MAN, Nos Patria and SI saw possibilities to 
block the current government and gain electoral profits. They joined the 
campaign against the participation. The opposition party MAN for instance, 
executed a survey among the Curaçaoans and concluded that 72,7% of the 
population was against the participation (Amigoe, April 29, 1992). The national 
opposition called for a nation-wide discussion on the future of 
telecommunications, another strategy to slow down the process of 
decentralisation. The opposition accused the government of slaughtering the 
‘chicken with the golden eggs’ (see Figure 16). 
Text with cartoon (see figure 16): PTT Telecom negotiator; 'Hurry, hurry! 
Dutch PTT Telecom cannot wait any longer! Hurry up! Frog (left); 'Why 
such a hurry?'. Frog (right); 'Are they hungry?' Chicken; 'Antelecom, chicken 
with the golden egg'. 
 The Curacaon business community supported the participation of KPN in the 
Antillean PTOs understanding that the quality of the telecom infrastructure is of 
strategic importance for the service oriented business industry on Curaçao. The 
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loss of the participation was therefore seen as a missed possibility for improving 
the quality of the telecom infrastructure on the island.  
Another missed chance is that of telecommunications. And just because a 
group of people thought telecommunication is our patrimonium. Our 
patrimonium! Can you imagine this in a time were borders are fading away? 
Recently we spoken to that Dutch telecom group. They told us coolly that 
they could have used Curaçao as a stepping stone to South America. But 
because of these negative events they don’t need us anymore. They have 
started an alliance and have in this way found their way into Latin America. 
(Interview with Voges, CEO of Curinc. In: Curoil & Gas Bullitin, 1996, 6e 
jr., no. 4). 
Figure 16. Cartoon of the KPN strategy on Curaçao (source: Amigoe, April 10, 1992). 
 In summary, the Government of the Netherlands Antilles, the labour Union 
ABVO and the CEO of Antelecom supported the participation in the new 
Curaçaoan PTO Curtel while the Board of Antelecom, Antillephone, the Union 
KS, the employees of Antelecom and the Curaçaoan political opposition were 
against it. How did the struggle for power between all parties concerned 
develop? 
 
 
 
 
8.3.3 Strategic Use of ‘Patrimonio Nashonal’ by the Opponents 
The IB director of KPN appointed a new negotiator. The new European Dutch 
negotiator was however, not a good choice. Although the appointed person, 
coming from outside KPN, had international experience he was firstly, 
European Dutch and thus displayed all of the earlier discussed cultural 
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characteristics of the non-integrated European Dutch on Curaçao. He opted for a 
hard line approach without establishing relations with Curaçaoans first. Promise 
after promise came from the Antillean government and the signing of the Letter 
of Intent was planned for February 1992. The government gave the impression 
that the agreement was almost settled. However, time was running out and the 
negotiation team was fed up with the Antilles. They had to be successful in this 
region in order to be eligible for promotion or to qualify for a bonus. Many 
obstacles had already been cleared away and now the negotiation team didn’t 
want to wait any longer.   
 
If they [STTK] do not want to co-operate with PTT Telecom they have to 
bring forward business-like arguments and not only emotional reasons (CEO 
Verwaaijen in Beurs en Nieuwsberichten, August 18, 1992). 
 
They wanted to belittle us. They wanted us to know that we have no say. We 
had the impression that they came here to knock us over in order to succeed 
as fast as possible (interview with STTK leader).   
 
I think that his style [the KPN negotiator] made no good impression. He 
contributed in the negative image of European Dutch. The person is 
European Dutch, he is arrogant - you take a dislike in him because he is 
European Dutch. Coincidentally he is in telecommunications so you have 
something against telecommunications (interview with Curaçaoan 
consultant). 
 
 One might ask why the Curaçaoan advisor did not warn of the cultural 
pitfalls. This was because he was caught between conflicting interests. Apart 
from KPN he also advised the Minister of Traffic and Communications in the 
sale of Telem at St. Maarten and was the chairman of the commission of 
privatisation of Telem. He was also the Minister’s campaign leader for the 
elections of March 1990 and April 1991 and contributed towards 72% of the 
campaign budget (National Criminal Intelligence Services number 92.05.424). 
Futhermore, KPN had reserved a large budget for this first international 
acquisition. From the Curaçaoan perspective this implied the possibility for 
large earnings. It was known that the European Dutch normally only invest 
money based on rational motives. Thus when KPN wanted to invest a large 
budget in the Netherlands Antilles, Antilleans and the Curaçaon advisor got the 
impression that telecommunications had to be a very lucrative business.81 The 
Curaçaoan advisor therefore, had distinct hidden agendas.  
We depended on one person over there and have given little account to other 
possible tracks. Therefore we discovered too late that we were at a dead 
                                                        
81 Antillean authorities and interested groups came with initiatives for cooperation and sponsorships 
such as football tournaments, social projects and educational projects. And not without success; for 
instance, to increase the level of technical telecommunication education KPN signed a 0.7 million 
dollar agreement with the University of the Netherlands Antilles (UNA). To guarantee a highly 
qualified technical support KPN also started a consultancy office on Curaçao together with 
Antillean participants. 
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track end. The situation was much more complex than we had thought it 
would be (interview with KPN manager).  
 The opposition, concentrated around the STTK, used the ‘typical European 
Dutch behaviour’ of KPN and anti-makamba sentiments as a catalyst agent of 
protest and Dutch KPN was thus portrayed as the possible destroyer of the 
‘Patrimonio Nashonal’. Although no clear definition emerged of ‘Patrimonio 
Nashonal’, the concept refers to the idea that the telecommunication sector is a 
public asset of the people of the Netherlands Antilles and as such, should remain 
in public ownership. The employees of Antelecom, the political opposition 
parties, the Antelecom management and worried Curaçaoans supported the 
STTK in their defence of the ‘Patrimonio Nashonal’.  
I have used the words ‘Nos Patrimonium’ because my grandparents taught 
me that you are always in need of some means of living. When you sell 
everything you have nothing anymore. If you do that, and you want to go for 
a swim with your children you might have to go to Aruba, because by then 
all of the bays are privately owned. Tourism, bays, houses, 
telecommunication - everything is sold so you don’t have anything anymore. 
Therefore the pronouncement was to make people aware that we receive a 
lot of money now, but will have nothing within a short time (interview with 
STTK union leader). 
 The protest march against the participation in which hundreds of people 
participated was organised by the STTK.82 The march, announced by the 
newspapers, was called the ‘death march’ because it was a silent march in which 
four female Antelecom employees carried a white muffin that symbolised 
Antelecom. From the Antelecom building at the Schouwburgweg hundreds of 
sympathisers walked to the ground-station at Vredenburg. Antelecom 
employees had different motivations in joining the strike; fear of loss of jobs, 
dissatisfaction with ABVO, political motives, strong feelings against 
privatisation, the transfer to Setel and the European Dutch dominance. Protests 
were also expressed in the media and newspapers.83  
It seems that the white threat has not yet disappeared from our coast. Like a 
white nervous shark, who swims in the harbour estuary and persists and who 
is hungrily waiting for the moment when the government of this country 
throws the virgin LRD for him to rape her. Like the mother who prostitutes 
her body, humiliates herself with the makamba in the sight of her children, 
that is the way our government wants to sell us (sent in letter of LRD 
employee with name, address and telephone number in Newspaper BALA, 
August 24, 1993). 
                                                        
82 The strike was announced because 150 employees of Antelecom had signed a letter of protest to 
the government to which they never received the reply. The reply of the government had in fact 
been sent to the ABVO instead of the STTK. Because the ABVO was not on good terms with the 
STTK the letter was withhold. The STTK did not know this and organised a demonstration. 
83 In the magazine ‘the Independiente’ a caricatures of Errol Cova, the KS union leader was drawn. 
He was ‘kita su scama’ [scratching the scales] of a fish. The fish with a potato head and wooden 
shoes symbolised Dutch KPN. The Papiamiento expression ‘kita su scama’ can be translated as 
‘taking someone down a peg or two’ (see figure 15). 
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 The most dramatic moment of the protest against the participation was the 
visit of CEO Mr Ben Verwaaijen on August 17, 1992. He intended to visit 
Curaçao to support the negotiation team and to speed up the negotiations. When 
he arrived at the Avila Beach Hotel around 50 demonstrators awaited him (De 
Beurs en Nieuwberichten August 18, 1992). 'Landsradio ta di nos’ was written 
on many banners of the STTK and protests songs were sung (see figure 17). 
 The demonstrations were not the only resistance KPN encountered. The 
Papiamiento magazine Independiente accused the Curaçaoan consultant of the 
KPN negotiation team of bribery (Independiente, Edition 31, March 1992). As a 
result of these accusations the Ministry of Justice of the Netherlands Antilles 
ordered an investigation of the financial relationship between the Minister of 
Traffic and Communication and the Antillean consultant. KPN was 
subsequently acquitted of bribery (De Volkskrant, September 10, 1992). But the 
organisation was irritated by the accusations and the lack of reforms in the 
telecom sector of Curaçao. Finally, in October 1993 it withdrew the Letter of 
Intent and phased out their commercial activities in the Netherlands Antilles. 
The experience had left a deep impression on the KPN management and was to 
dramatically change its strategy of internationalisation. When CEO Mr Ben 
Verwaaijen was asked of his greatest failure in his recent carreer he answered: 
That was all the energy we have put in the Netherlands Antilles. We haven’t 
been able to convers the 87 verbal agreements into real projects. That has 
been the most intens fealing of powerlessness I have experienced in recent 
years. There are possibilities, everybody says ‘yes’ and still you are not able 
to succeed. It just hasn’t been successful. That was it. (CEO Verwaaijen in 
Adformatie, January 26, 1995). 
 Although the Curaçaoan government and business representatives have 
recently tried to interest KPN, their interest in participation in an Antillean PTO 
is beyond retrieval. The loss of face and the loss of approximately ten million 
Dutch guilders have damaged their relations with the Netherlands Antilles 
(Amigoe, October 14, 1993). For a long time the management prefered not to 
look back on this period and turned its focus to Eastern Europe and Southeast 
Asia. With the failure of Unisoure, KPN no longer has commercial ties with the 
Latin American telecom market, which is now dominated by Telefónica, MCI 
and AT,&T. 
 
 
 
 
Dono di nos patrimonio Owner of our patrimonies 
 
No tin plaka na Mundu pa 
Kumpra nops patrimonio 
Pa nada di mundu ta 
bende nos patrimonio 
Kumprami, kumprabo 
For no money in the world 
Our patrimonies can be bought 
For nothing in the world 
We will sell our patrimonies  
Buy me, buy you 
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Kumpra nos patrimonio 
Bendemi, bendebo 
ora nos ta na soño 
PTT pafó 
STTK paden 
Lucha di STTK 
a kibra e matrimonio 
Pa futuro ta sigurá 
Kòrsou mester ta doño 
 
Buy our patrimonies 
Sell me, sell you 
Only in a dream 
PTT out 
STTK in 
The struggle of STTK 
Has broken the marriage 
For a ensured future 
Curaçao has to be the owner 
 
Figure 17. Protest song of STTK union against participation of KPN  
 
8.4 Conclusions 
 
Antelecom executive Lichtveld wondered if he would ever find out KPN’s real 
motives in starting business in the Netherlands Antilles: ‘We will probably 
never know’ (Lichtveld 1996). However, as can be seen from the clear 
description and an explanation of the KPN strategies presented here KPN’s 
decisions and actions were much less rational than Lichtveld and many 
Antilleans have thought. The international strategy was primarily based upon 
the need to gain international experience in foreign countries. KPN’s intended 
for its first international participation to be in the Netherlands Antilles because 
the management had assumed that there would be little cultural difference in 
business practices between the Netherlands and the Netherlands Antilles. 
Furthermore, it has been observed that this false assumption is also clearly 
reflected in the attitude of new European Dutch who arrive on Curaçao. The 
European Dutch negotiation team chose an ethnocentric strategy and ignored 
possible cultural differences and consequently, in the process of acquiring a 
participation in the Antillean PTOs KPN experienced many cultural problems. 
These differences manifested in the use of the Dutch language, the perception of 
time related issues, the delivery of criticism, how knowledge is transferred, the 
importance of personal networks for doing business and in the mutual images. 
The negotiation team was unable to identify and cope successfully with these 
cultural differences which fundamentally undermined the process of acquisition.  
 It was however, not so much the cultural differences as it was how the 
involved parties managed these cultural differences that finally blocked the 
participation. While KPN ignored cultural differences and perceived many 
cultural similarities, the involved Antillean counterparts did everything to stress 
their Antillean identity and to enlarge the cultural distance between KPN and 
the Antillean PTOs (see Figure 18). The Antillean counterparts perceived KPN 
as a dominant and powerful Dutch organisation with western management 
models, money, expertise, international experience and state-of-art technology. 
They themselves had knowledge of the Antillean telecom market and the 
culture. This unequal relationship show strong similarities with the unequal 
relationship between the Netherlands and the Netherlands Antilles For many of 
the involved Antillean parties the possible participation triggered fear of the loss 
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of acquired positions, economic interests, jobs and of the dominant European 
Dutch management.  
The three conditions that precede and lead to the onset of manifest 
ethicity, or ethnicising, were all present in this case (Baud et al. 1994: 129). 
Firstly, there was interaction between the European Dutch and Curaçaoans. 
Secondly, there were ethnic boundaries by which a sense of community could 
emerge. Thirdly, the autonomy of the Antelecom and Setel employees was 
under pressure by KPN. The Curaçaoan employees used ethnicising by pointing 
out shared cultural elements and by re-inventing non-existent cultural traditions. 
The labour union STTK for instance used the concept of ‘Patrimonio Nashonal’ 
to bring together the political opposition, the management of Antelecom, the 
labour union KS and employees of Antelecom. These groups used anti-
makamba sentiments among the Curaçaoan people to mobilise protest and 
public opinion against the selling of Antelecom and used the Papiamiento media 
and press to ventilate their opinions. The politician Claude Whathey also used 
the anti-makamba sentiments at St. Maarten to strengthen his political position.  
 What can be learned from these strategies? It seems evident that the short-
term individual survival strategies have prevailed over long-term development 
of the telecom sector of the Netherlands Antilles. In the mean time, the ‘golden 
eggs’ of the Curaçaoan chicken have turned into stones. Many of the informants 
acknowledge that Curaçao has missed the boat, but some Curaçaoans are still 
suspicious of the withdrawal. In the light of the volatile relationship between the 
European Dutch and the Antilleans it would appear wiser to start in future with 
very low profile small-scale projects, to keep the differences in power in 
balance, to create mutual trust and personal relations first and to later extend the 
venture once these has been successfully achieved.  
 Chapter 7 has concluded that the cross-cultural cooperation between KPN 
and PTOs in the strategic alliance Unisource was not successful because of the 
many partners involved. It was expected that the cross-cultural cooperation of 
KPN alone in an already known market would be more successful. This case has 
shown that not the number of involved partners but the relation between cultural 
distance and power struggle must be seen as the most important aspect of the 
failure of cooperation. Did KPN learn from these experiences in the Netherlands 
Antilles and change their cross-cultural strategy in their bid to acquire a position 
in the Indonesian telecom market? It can be rightly expected that the 
relationship between the Netherlands and Indonesia is also volatile.  
 
Strategies of Dutch KPN Employees  Strategies of resistance of Curaçaoans 
Enjoying the tropical life 
Showing arrogance 
Being direct 
Liking to be placed at a throne 
Stressing the cultural similarities 
Giving criticism in indirect ways 
Establishing European Dutch 
networks 
Using anti-macamba feelings of 
employees  
Stressing the importance of telecom for 
national identity 
Creating chaos 
Making vague what has been decided 
Using the ‘Yes-refusal’ 
Mobilising public opinion  
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Perceiving Curaçao as Dutch territory 
Going to European Dutch clubs, bars 
and restaurants 
Showing the desired work attitude 
Being prepared for uprisings 
Exploring the island 
Minimising contacts with Antilleans 
Showing interests in local culture 
Establishing personal networks in 
both Antillean and European Dutch 
communities 
Recognising cultural differences 
Speaking Papiamiento 
Establishing Antillean networks 
Rejecting the European Dutch 
expatriate culture 
Integrate within the Antillean society  
Adapting to local perception of time 
Politicising conflicts 
Isolating Dutch managers from 
information circuits 
Using personal networks to exert 
influence 
Putting the Dutch manager on a throne, 
flatter him and lull him to sleep so he 
looses sharpness 
Speaking Papiamiento 
Referring to colonial history 
Excluding Dutch from Antillean 
networks 
Telling the Dutch that ‘without your 
help I can’t do it’ 
Delaying decisions until the Dutch 
can’t wait any longer 
Stressing the ‘Yi du Korsow’ identity 
Letting the Dutch manager take the 
initiatives, agree and wait 
 
Figure 18. Strategies of KPN employees and Curaçaoans to cope with cultural differences 
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9 SUCCESSFUL CROSS-CULTURAL COOPERATION IN 
INDONESIA: A GOOD  BALANCE IN POWER 
 
World Level
Society Level
Organisational Level
Interactional Level
Individual Level
Case 3: Indonesia
Case 1: Unisource 
Case 2: The Netherlands Antilles
In the previous chapter it was seen 
how the acquisition and 
cooperation of KPN in the 
Netherlands Antilles was much 
influenced by cultural and 
historical relations between the 
Netherlands and the etherlands 
Antilles. Did the former colonial 
relationship of the Netherlands with 
Indonesia also negatively influence 
the introduction of KPN into the 
Indonesian telecom market? This chapter addresses the cross-cultural 
experiences of KPN in Indonesia in the period of 1992-1997. The cross-cultural 
differences that affected the cooperation between Dutch employees and 
Indonesian employees such as differences in language, perceptions of time, the 
influence of religion and ethnicity in daily business life, the importance of 
personal connections in business and the different management styles are 
discussed. These cases and practical examples of daily situations not only 
illustrate the cultural differences but also the way KPN and its employees deal 
with this diversity. The personal strategies of KPN employees in reaction to the 
new cultural context they are working in can be distinguished in three ways. 
Each of these are discussed and related to the corporate strategies of KPN. 
Finally, conclusions with regard to the success of KPN in Indonesia are 
discussed. 
 
9.1 KPN Captures the Indonesian Telecom Market  
 
Since 1990 KPN had been interested in commercial activities in Indonesia and 
its policy in Indonesia was based upon two objectives. The first objective was to 
become a first, second, or third local operator in Indonesia and the second 
objective was to find an Indonesian partner in telecommunications. The 
question then raised is: Which strategies did KPN used to reach these 
objectives? 
 
9.1.1 Useful Personal Networks of the NCF 
In 1990, the NCF General Manager in Jakarta initiated the commercial interests 
of KPN in the promising telecom market of Indonesia. The NCF had itself 
already been active in Indonesia since April 1975 under the name of PTT 
Consultancy Team when KPN and PT Telkom signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding on providing technical assistance and training programs for 
Indonesia’s telecom engineers and staff. During their stay in the Netherlands the 
Indonesian employees learned about KPN’s activities and organisation. These 
trained employees later became the management of PT Telkom and government 
telecom institutions. Apart from the participants of the training programs, 
Indonesian professionals, such as Dahoko, came into contact with the NCF. 
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 Dahoko, who now works for the KPN office in Jakarta, started his career in 
telecommunications more than ten years ago with the Netherlands Consultancy 
Foundation (NCF) after working for a Dutch cable company in Indonesia. 
Because of his Dutch primary school education he could still read and 
understand Dutch, which was an advantage when working with the Dutch 
engineers of the Dutch cable company and the NCF who were constructing a 
optical fibre transmission backbone between Jakarta and Surabaya. NCF’s main 
task has been to advise the national telecom operator PT Telecommunikasi 
Indonesia (PT Telkom) and PT Indonesia Satellite Corporation (PT Indosat) on 
technical matters and to strengthen the position of the Dutch industry in the 
Indonesian market. Consequently, more than 80% of the projects of NCF in 
Indonesia were focused on telecommunications and the Dutch Minister of 
Development Cooperation supported the majority of the activities of NCF in 
Indonesia.84 The NCF has been active in the fields of network planning, 
improving network operations, the construction of 160.000 telephone line units 
in Jakarta in the PRX switch and supervising the construction of new cable 
infrastructure such as the optical fibre backbone.  
Biography of Dahoko 
Dahoko is a 45 year old Indonesian 
employee of KPN in Jakarta. He is 
married, has two children and live south 
west of Jakarta. Dahoko is a devout 
Muslim. He attended a Dutch primary 
school St. Pascal in Suriname where his 
father was the Indonesian diplomatic 
envoy. He studied architecture in 
Jakarta and worked as architect for 
some years before he started with a 
Dutch cable company in Indonesia. 
From 1987 onwards he worked with 
NCF. With the take over of commercial 
activities by KPN, Dahoko was 
transferred from NCF to KPN in 1995.  
Because of its long 
lasting presence in Indonesia, the 
name NCF is well known. PT 
Telkom and the Indonesian 
government have a generally 
positive image of NCF; they are 
friendly people, technically 
experienced, low profile, co-
operative and freely offer their 
services. Dutch NCF has direct 
access to PT Telkom and the 
Ministry of Tourism, Post and 
Telecommunication (MTPT) at 
operational and executive level. 
The MTPT is the main policy-
making authority in the 
Indonesian telecom industry.85 
To support and help maintain 
these networks Indonesians with 
long term experience in the Indonesian telecom sector were also employed by 
NCF. The highly respected contemporary Business Development director of the 
KPN office in Jakarta joined the NCF in 1987, after retiring from PT Telkom 
                                                        
84 In 1990, the NCF had their office in Jakarta with eight Dutch experts and 25 Indonesian 
employees, and a subsidiary in Bandung where the headquarters of PT Telkom were situated.  
85 The Ministry of Tourism, Post and Telecommunication is known as Parpostel. In this thesis the 
formal abbreviation MTPT is used. Within the MTPT, the secretary-general formulates general 
telecom plans while the Directorate General of Posts and Telecommunications (DGPT) translates 
these into operational policies. The DGPT is responsible for policy implementation, licensing 
issues, equipment specifications, technical standards and frequency management. Tariffs are 
established through the Planning Bureau of the DGPT and regulations are established through the 
Law and Organisation Bureau. 
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and has been responsible for the development of a new telecommunications 
infrastructure in Indonesia since the early seventies. Aside from this, he was 
University lecturer at the famous Technical Institute of Bandung (ITB) where 
the contemporary leading management in the Indonesian telecom industry of 
today joined his classes. Other experienced employees included the ex-secretary 
of the PT Telkom General Manager and a former PT Telkom manager. When 
KPN opened their new office in Jakarta the manager, some of the employees of 
NCF in Jakarta were transferred there to run this new office.86 The personal 
networks of the ex-NCF employees and the reputation of NCF have been very 
useful in aiding KPN’s entry into the fast developing Indonesian telecom 
market.  
 
9.1.2 The Restructuring of the Indonesian Telecom Market 
Indonesia’s population of nearly 200 million people and its rapid economic 
growth that lasted till the autumn of 1997 spurred an enormous demand for 
telecom services. With a fixed-line penetration of 0,98% in 1993, Indonesia has 
one of the lowest telephone densities in Southeast Asia (PT Data Consult Inc. 
1995). Under Indonesia’s Repelita VI economic development plan, the 
government planned to raise the penetration to 4.56% in the five-year period 
ending March 1999.87 The Indonesian telecom sector structure was not able to 
meet this growing demand. Furthermore, the world wide ‘Telecom Revolution’, 
as discussed in chapter 4, forced the Indonesian government to encourage 
further growth and development of the telecommunications sector by 
deregulating the industry and allowing more private sector participation.  
 The MTPT delegated the task of restructuring the domestic and international 
telecommunications services sectors to the two primary PTOs PT Indosat and 
PT Telkom who had their initial public offerings in 1994 and 1995, respectively. 
The Indonesian Government controls the majority of PTOs. In June 1994, the 
Indonesian telecom industry was opened to direct foreign equity investment 
through the establishment of a joint venture.88 Foreign investment licenses were 
granted for an initial period of 30 years and private companies could obtain 
operating licenses in revenue sharing agreements under the ultimate control of 
PT Telkom.89 The most recent form of cooperation between PT Telkom and 
                                                        
86 Among the first commercial activities in Indonesia was the introduction of direct calls to the 
Netherlands to cater to the many Dutch companies and Dutch tourists.  
87 The Indonesian government introduced and implemented medium and long term development 
plans to stimulate the economy. The long-term plans cover 25 years. The medium term plans cover 
5 years and are called Rencana Pembanguan Lima Tahun (Repelita). Each Repelita assesses 
current economic progress and sets priorities and targets for the next five years of development. 
88 After it had been tied to close restrictions, Indonesia’s foreign investment regulations were 
changed dramatically in June 1994, to attract and maintain the levels of foreign investment 
necessary for the country’s continuing growth and development. Most areas of business are now 
open to foreign investment in Indonesia. 
89 Indonesia has always struggled with the tension of building a homogeneous infrastructure and 
the need of financial support. In the early seventies foreign capital was sought after with foreign 
governments such as the Netherlands to improve and expand the telecom infrastructure. The 
foreign governments required the use of their own national telecom industry. As a result, Indonesia 
constructed an infrastructure out of different telephone systems. Recently, Indonesia successfully 
attracts again international capital with the KSOs. 
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private companies is through Kerjasama Operasi (KSO) [joint operating 
schemes]. Five private consortia were selected to install and operate fixed-lines 
in five selected regions: Sumatra, West-Java, Central Java, Kalimantan and East 
Indonesia. Each consortium is made up of an experienced foreign operator such 
as Telstra, Singapore Telecom, NTT, US West, Cable & Wireless and an 
Indonesian company. Each consortium has to install a minimum number of 
fixed-lines and will operate all local lines in the assigned region for 15 years, 
including those originally installed by PT Telkom. PT Telkom will retain full 
operational control over the remaining two commercially important regions of 
Jakarta and East Java. To encourage Indonesia’s fast growing telecom sector 
President Soeharto declared 1997 the Telecommunication Year.  
 PT Telkom has been granted the exclusive right to provide local fixed and 
fixed wireless telecom services nation-wide for a minimum of 15 years. 
Domestic long-distance services will remain the domain of PT Telkom for a 
minimum of 10 years. International investors however, have more freedom in 
the cellular market.90 In June 1997, the government announced plans to award a 
total of 16 licenses for mobile communications, nation wide as well as regional, 
before the end of the year. There is freedom for cellular investors to enter into 
equity based joint ventures with partners and freedom for foreign operators to 
become strategic investors in cellular operating companies. Furthermore, there 
is freedom for the GSM operators to arrange for their infrastructure equipment. 
In contrast to the European telecom markets, the Indonesian PTOs still play a 
very strong role in the process of restructuring the telecom market. To ensure 
success in penetrating the Indonesian telecom market KPN therefore chose for a 
close cooperation with PT Telkom and PT Indosat. But has the Dutch-
Indonesian historical relationship helped or blocked KPN’s ambition to become 
a local operator in Indonesia? 
 
9.1.3 Competitive Advantage for Dutch KPN in Indonesia?  
In order to answer that question, the contemporary relationship of the 
Netherlands and Indonesia must first be discussed. The Netherlands have had a 
long relationship with Indonesia.91 The Dutch presence in Indonesia goes back 
to the end of the 16th century when Dutch troops conquered Spanish and 
Portuguese colonies in Asia. To break the Portuguese monopoly on spices the 
Dutch founded the Verenigde Oost Indische Companie (VOC). The VOC 
                                                        
90 A cellular radio network provides a communication service that uses mobile phones and radio 
waves as the transmission medium. A service provider’s equipment switches the radio frequencies 
as a caller moves from one cell to another.  
91 The largest country in Southeast Asia, both in area and population, is the Republic of Indonesia. 
It consists of 13,677 islands that cover 741,101 square miles of land along the equator between the 
Indian and Pacific oceans. With a population of 200 million, it ranks as the world’s fourth most 
populous country. The nation has a low standard of living, even though it has many valuable 
natural resources. These include large onshore and offshore petroleum and natural gas deposits, 
huge tracts of tropical hardwood forests and a variety of minerals, including tin, nickel and copper. 
However, only about 10 percent of the land can be used for raising crops. Despite the vast number 
of islands, five of them account for nearly 92 percent of the land area. These are Sumatra; Java; 
Celebes (Sulawesi); two thirds of Borneo (Kalimantan); and the western portion of New Guinea, 
Irian Jaya. Almost 95 percent of the people live on those main islands and more than 62 percent 
make their homes in Java.  
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acquired the total production and distribution of spices in the Indonesian 
archipelago and transformed from a trade company into a political power. The 
absence of central power and the dependency of the Indonesian elite on trading 
with the Dutch made it possible for the Dutch traders to become the rulers of the 
Indonesian archipelago (van Goor 1987). The Dutch colonial ideology was 
based upon western superiority, a minimal knowledge and fear of the 
Indonesian society and the assumption that development could only be achieved 
under Dutch rule (van Goor 1987: 154).  
 The 350 years of colonial occupation of the Netherlands have left cultural 
footprints that can be easily traced in contemporary Indonesia. The Indonesian 
legal system, for example, is based upon the Dutch legal system. Other more 
easily observed artefacts is the colonial architecture in the old town of Batavia, 
known today as Kota.92 Other examples are the Dutch words that can be found 
in the Bahasa Indonesia and the Indonesians that still speak Dutch.93 
Furthermore, quite a lot of Indonesians have relatives in the Netherlands.94 More 
than 200.000 Indonesian grandparents, uncles, nephews, nieces, cousins, second 
cousins, great grand nephews and great grand nieces live in the Netherlands. 
There is thus a lot of evidence tracing the Dutch – Indonesian relationship 
through time till the present day. 
 More than 50 years of development have passed since the independence of 
Indonesia was declared on 17th August 1945.95 Since then Indonesia has 
developed into a fast growing emerging market and the colonial history no 
longer plays an important role, if any at all, in contemporary Indonesian society. 
In fact, many of the young Indonesians do not even know much about the 
colonial history. Every August, Liberation Day is celebrated and end of the 
colonial occupation by the Dutch and subsequently by the Japanese is 
commemorated in the media. Today, Indonesia’s streets and public places bear 
the names of the heroes of the anti-Dutch wars such as Prince Diponegoro, 
Imam Bonjol, Teuku Umar and Udayana. Indonesia is trying to forget its 
colonial past however, hatred against the Dutch is not openly shown although 
relations between the Netherlands and Indonesia remain sensitive.  
A greater part of the Dutch think we hate them because of what has 
happened in history. But that is not the case, we have no hatred against 
                                                        
92 The cobble stone square of Taman Fatahillah once was the centre of old Batavia and the Kali 
Besar canal was once high-class residential area. Examples of the colonial architecture can also be 
found in Bandung were the administrative centre of the colonial Dutch government was situated. 
The headquarters of PT Telkom are in the former HB (Hoofdgebouw) PTT in Bandung 
93 People of the older generation such as president Soeharto and the Minister of Tourism, Post and 
Telecommunication have had a Dutch education. They have learned Dutch children songs and 
celebrated Sinterklaas on 5th December. Sinterklaas can still be seen in shopping malls on Java 
during the first week of December. 
94 The Indonesian government nationalised all Dutch assets and private owned companies without 
compensation in 1958. All Dutch nationals and their families were forced to leave overnight. With 
them many Indonesians sought refuge in the Netherlands.  
95 The armed conflict of the Republic of Indonesia and the Netherlands had taken from the 
declaration of Independence in 1945 until the withdrawal of West-Irian by the Netherlands in 1963. 
West-Irian, now called Irian Jaya, was the last colony of the Netherlands in East Asia. During the 
period of war all of the formal ties of Indonesia and the Netherlands were cut, Dutch properties 
were nationalised and almost all of the Dutch had been send home.  
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Dutch, we are forgiving, our religion also asks of us to forget that. We are 
trying to forget, but if you bring up the subject then we feel a pity. We feel a 
pity for things that have not been done. Why didn’t they do this? Why didn’t 
they do that? There is no thing as hatred for the Dutch (interview with 
Indonesian employee of KPN). 
 It is clear that Indonesia is making effort to put her colonial past behind her 
even in telecommunications. The CD-ROM presentation of PT Telkom makes a 
remarkable leap in time in the presentation of its history. It shows old pictures of 
colonial telecom buildings in 1886, 1903, 1926 and then the presentation moves 
forward to 1960. The telecom museum in Jakarta only displays old telephone 
equipment of the pre-independence era and does not mention the role of the 
Dutch.96 The Indonesian telecom history starts with a story about the importance 
of an old YBJ-6 radio transmitter in the struggle for independence against the 
Dutch and a larger part of the museum focuses on the enormous progress 
reached since the independence of Indonesia. 97 
 Apart from ex-colonial relations, the contemporary relationship between the 
Netherlands and Indonesia has a strong business component. The Netherlands is 
one of the major investors in Indonesia. With a total value of US$ 6.8 billion it 
occupies the sixth place, with investments in sectors such as the chemical sector, 
the food industry and the electronic manufacturing and the telecommunications 
sector (Smith 1994). 50% of the joint ventures were initiated after 1984, which 
confirmed the establishment of a renewed business relationship between the 
Netherlands and Indonesia. The end of the provision of development aid in 1992 
marked the transition to a more business orientated relation between the two 
countries.98  
 In 1993, PT Telkom sought for information on mobile communications 
systems. In response, KPN sent an expert to Jakarta to help PT Telkom with the 
construction of a small GSM network. The network was set up to beat 
Singaporean competitors on the islands of Bintam and Batam two small Islands 
located just south of Singapore. Indonesians have a negative image of 
Singaporeans thus an Indonesian mobile operator on the Indonesian islands 
                                                        
96 January 1929, a radio-telephone connection between the Netherlands and the colony of Dutch-
Indies was made. At that moment in time, it was the longest short-wave connection in the world. 
“Hallo Bandung, hier Den Haag” were the first words spoken by Queen Wilhelmina. The 
enormous receiver was installed in between two mountains in the Malabar gorge near Kewa Putih 
south of Bandung.  
97 When the Dutch invaded Jogjakarta in December 1948, the radiotelegraph connection between 
Indonesia and the rest of the world was completely cut off. The 160 Watt YBJ-6 transmitter was 
the only one that survived the bombing of the nationalists' headquarters in Bukit Tinggi by the 
Dutch. The YBJ-6 was the Indonesian nationalists' only means of communication with other 
nationalists in Aceh, Medan and the outside world. They transported the 750-kilo weighting YBJ-6 
transmitter over a large area in order to avoid the discovery by the Dutch occupiers. 
98 In 1992, the Dutch Minister of Development Cooperation, Mr. Pronk, was at that time also the 
head of the European Development Aid agency. He wanted to stress human rights violations in 
Indonesian by connecting European development funds to the progress made in the field of human 
rights. The Indonesian government in person of President Soeharto refused the aid because of the, 
in his eyes, colonial attitude of the Netherlands and stopped all Dutch development projects. Within 
a few months all of the Dutch development workers, as well as many Dutch expatriates with 
temporary visas had to leave the country.   
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would make good publicity in Indonesia. The Dutch expert, who was under 
contract with the NCF, played an important role in the success of the initiative 
of PT Telkom. This stimulated a positive relationship between KPN and PT 
Telkom. KPN is not among the international consortia in the KSO agreements 
but has a rather special position in the Indonesian telecom sector with its 
corporate agreement with PT Telkom. 
PT Telkom sees the KSO as a short cooperation. The connection of KPN is 
viewed more on corporate level. Because they see us as a more developed 
global player and we have a wider view on developments we are asked for 
our opinion by means of presentations. We give a lot of presentations, and 
from these presentations work results. It is a specific relationship between 
KPN and PT Telkom (Interview with Indonesian KPN employee). 
 In order to execute the KPN policy in Indonesia close contacts with PT 
Telkom and the regulatory body of the Indonesian government were necessary. 
As discussed earlier, the long-term personal and institutional relationship 
between NCF and the Indonesian telecom sector helped KPN management to 
establish business relations. By accentuating the cultural, historical and personal 
relations between the Netherlands and Indonesia new business relationships 
could be established.   
Mr. Joop Ave, Minister of MTPT tells me in the middle of a meeting held in 
the English language; Joh, weet je waar ik zin ik heb als ik de volgende keer 
naar Nederland kom? In griesmeelpudding met bessensap!99 [Do you know 
what I would like to eat next time I am in Holland? Semolina pudding with 
juice of berries!]. Everybody was laughing at that time. The next time he 
came he had eaten semolina pudding with juice of berries!  He was sitting at 
a different table, but he looked from a distance at me with a glance as if to 
say; you remembered it! (interview with CEO Asia of KPN). 
 Establishing a good relationship with the minister of MTPT was however, 
not an easy task. In various speeches the Minister had referred to the small size 
of the Netherlands and the ex-colonial relationship. He wanted the KPN 
negotiation team to know that the Indonesian-Dutch relations had changed. 
 We had a VIP room at the Bandung airport, but he refused to come there. 
He just passed the room without looking to the left or right and stopped at 
the exit of the arrival hall, with his face looking out. So we had to leave the 
room, walk around him and approach from the front. The ice was broken 
when Ben [CEO KPN] said: ‘Excellency, I have brought you something on 
behalf of my wife, can I give it to you?’ Then the Minister asked; ‘what is 
it’? Ben said; ‘semolina pudding with juice of berries!’. He really had it with 
him. I did not know that. But he had brought it from home - in those ready-
made packages - and given it to him. And then, the conflict was over 
(interview with CEO Asia of KPN).  
                                                        
99 Semolina pudding with juice of berries is a typical Dutch desert. 
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 KPN had learned from its experiences in the Netherlands Antilles where the 
press had created a very negative image of KPN, which obstructed its 
possibilities for participation in the PTOs. It was now aware that it had to 
carefully build a relationship with Indonesian journalists and thus invited them 
for a four-day visit to the Netherlands. Journalists of the Suara Karya 
Newspaper, SWA Sembada Magazine, Suara Pembaruan Newspaper, Bisnis 
Indonesia Newspaper, Media Indonesia Newspaper and the Jakarta Post 
Newspaper visited the telecom district of Rotterdam and the training centre of 
KPN for three days in October 1995. Furthermore, they attended meetings with 
Mr. Wim Dik, Chairman of the Executive Board of KPN and with other 
members of the Board of Management. The journalists were taken on a boat trip 
in Rotterdam, taken to watch the Phantom of the Opera and returned home with 
a lot of notes. During and after their visit the journalists published many articles 
on their experiences in the Netherlands. This resulted in a positive image of 
KPN in Jakarta.100 
 KPN beat 16 competitors for the acquisition in the mobile operator. The 
acquisition was carefully planned but it was only the night before the signing 
ceremony in the Shangri La hotel that Australian Telstra showed up as the new 
partner of PT Telkom. However, energetic lobbying and activating high ranked 
personal networks helped the negotiation team of KPN to steal the contract from 
right under Telstra’s nose. Apart from this strategic alliance, a strategic alliance 
with the Indonesian Bakrie group also was established.101   
 In summary, the networks of the NCF, the positive image of KPN, the 
historical and cultural relationship between both countries, the personal 
relationship with the minister of MTPT and an attractive business proposal all 
helped KPN to start up business in Indonesia and towards achieving its 
objectives. In the daily business practices in Indonesia, KPN and its employees 
are confronted with cultural diversity. The following section thus examines the 
kinds of cultural differences they encountered and how they cope with these 
differences. 
 
 
9.2 Individual and Corporate Strategies to Deal with Cultural 
Diversity 
 
                                                        
100 KPN also undertook other activities to support their image in Indonesia. KPN is an active 
member and donator of the Indonesian Telecommunications Society (MASTEL) that has close 
relations with telecom authorities. The Indonesian Telecommunications Society is an advisory 
board for the government. Furthermore, KPN also support projects in Indonesia such as a school in 
South Sulawesi with 60.000 US$ (Holland Horizon, Volume 7, number 1, 1995).  
101 KPN invested in April 1994 a 30% share in Bakrie Electronics Company (BEC). The 
development of new business in Indonesia and Southeast Asia, the installation of telephone lines 
and the joint venture Ratelindo were the main objectives of BEC. Ratelindo was Indonesia’s first 
private cellular digital radiotelephone operator; its mandate was to install wireless local loop access 
networks in the country. The company was established in 1993 as a joint venture between PT 
Telkom and PT Bakrie Electronics Company (BEC). In 1993, BEC held a 55% stake in Ratelindo, 
with Telkom owning the remainder. After an equity injection by BEC in June 1996, it increased its 
stake to 87% with Telkom holding the remaining 13%. Ratelindo was awarded a license to operate 
in Greater Jakarta and West Java and started operations in August 1995. 
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Biography of Leo 
Leo is a 41 year old KPN employee 
who has been working with the 
company for 8 years. He studied 
economy at the Erasmus University 
and worked in the Dutch army and 
with other companies before joining 
the KPN international department in 
1990. He is married to Frieda and they 
have three children. Frieda takes care 
of the children, the household and 
maintains many of their social 
networks. They have many friends and 
family in the Netherlands and are 
sociable people. Leo likes playing 
football.  
Leo and his wife Frieda only needed a few seconds to decide when Leo was 
offered a job in Indonesia in the spring of 1994. They had already previously 
discussed the possibility of working 
abroad for KPN and both felt 
positive about a being posted abroad 
for a period of three years. 
Possibilities to go to Kiev or to 
Eastern Europe were not attractive 
to them, as the climate or culture 
neither attracted them. Leo had 
temporarily worked in Jakarta on a 
project of KPN and was asked if he 
was interested in working in 
Indonesia. At that time he 
experienced Jakarta as a dirty and 
noisy city but a year later was 
informed by the general manager of 
the Jakarta office that they were still 
in need of someone. He was then 
offered the job with one of the joint 
ventures of KPN.  
 Things went very fast once the decision was made and a very busy period 
began. Their house in the Netherlands had to be hired out which meant Leo had 
to clean and paint the house and ship their household things to Indonesia. Leo 
and Frieda also had to fly to Jakarta to arrange their living conditions over there. 
They needed a new house in Jakarta and a school for their three children. They 
also had to make acquaintance with the new colleagues and other expatriates. 
On returning home, their cars were sold. In Indonesia Leo would have a 
company car. Subscriptions to newspapers, magazines and their telephone 
connection needed to be terminated as did the membership of the different 
associations, clubs and societies they each belonged to. Leo had to write more 
than 50 letters to all kinds of organisations. He wanted to do this properly so as 
to be able to pick up their normal life again when they returned home after three 
years. Because of the children they moved during the summer holiday month of 
August so the children would be able to start the new school year in their new 
classes. 
 Apart from arrangements for their departure preparations for Indonesia also 
had to be made. Special conditions were arranged with the human resource 
department for moving, housing, school and travelling. The number of possible 
visits to the Netherlands was a point of discussion with the human resource 
department. KPN forwarded information on Indonesia. A special training with 
the Dutch Koninklijke Instituut Tropen was planned to check whether his 
personality would fit with Indonesian culture and give him some extra 
information on the Indonesian culture and style of management. Although some 
of the experiences of employees who had since returned had been recorded, Leo 
could not find the time to go through these reports or to contact these colleagues 
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and listen to their stories, experiences and learn about their personal networks. 
His main source of information on Jakarta came via his personal network; one 
of his ex-colleagues who was then working at the office in Jakarta. 
 The whole family needed to be vaccinated against tropical diseases and visas 
had to be obtained. Frieda signed up for a language course in Bahasa Indonesia 
but Leo was too busy with his work to make time for the language course as he 
had to finish some of his projects and hand his job over to his successor. He 
decided he would learn the language on the job in Jakarta. The problem 
however, was that his successor has not yet been appointed. The many farewell 
parties at his work, with their family, friends and neighbours made the last 
couple of weeks rather hectic and did not leave much time to learn about the 
culture they were about to experience although Leo was interested in the 
country and had even bought some books on Indonesia.  
 Leo’s account of preparing for departure is similar to that of many of the 
KPN employees working in Indonesia. This has led the Jakarta office to give 
copies of the book ‘The culture of Business Indonesia’ to new KPN employees. 
Furthermore, the office asks experienced employees to share their personal 
experiences with their colleagues. Leo has been informed of the uniqueness of 
the Indonesian business culture. But what kind of cultural differences did he 
encounter in his new work situation and how did he deal with these differences?  
 To explore the significant cultural differences in the strategic alliances and 
the Indonesian business culture a preliminary investigation was carried out 
partly in the Netherlands and partly in Jakarta (see annex II). The results 
indicated six topics for the in-depth research: (1) the perception of time, (2) the 
language, (3) personal connections, (4) the ethnic diversity, (5) the religious 
diversity and (6) the Indonesian management practices. Western researchers 
also mention these topics when referring to Indonesian business culture (e.g. 
Hofstede 1982, Scott-Stevens 1986, Zijlstra 1994, Mann 1996, Brandt 1997). In 
order to get a good insight into the Indonesian business culture the daily 
activities of the Indonesian employee Dahoko are explored in next section. 
 
9.2.1 An Early Start for the Indonesian Employees 
Dahoko’s house is situated in a sub-urban area west of Jakarta. Since buying the 
house thirteen years ago he has been able to expand and improve it little by 
little. Returning home from the mosque, Dahoko enters the house with its 
veranda full of green plants. He takes off his shoes and enters the living room, 
its walls decorated with Islamic aphorisms. Next to the living room his wife 
runs a little shop where she also runs a photocopying service for customers. 
Their children, a boy of 15 and a girl of 17, prepare for school. That day they 
will sit for their examinations. After they have had breakfast, Dahoko’s driver 
arrives. The driver, who is paid partly by KPN, drives them to Jakarta at 5.20 
am in Dahoko’s Toyota Kijang. He arrives in Jakarta at 7.00 o’clock, drops the 
children off at their school and continues with Dahoko to the office.  
 The roads are by then already busy with heavy traffic. Every day four 
million workers travel to Jakarta by bus, car or train. The three major bus 
stations are a long way from the city centre and the city buses are crowded. The 
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car slows down at the ring road, the driver turns off and finds his way to Jakarta 
Selatan taking several short cuts. The paths in the kampungs are just wide 
enough for the becak, bikers, pedestrians and animals. But the driver manages to 
pass through them. At difficult crossings youngsters manage the traffic and in 
return receive a few rupiah. Finally, the Kijang arrives at Jakarta’s business 
area, also called the Golden Triangle. There are huge office-buildings on both 
sides of the Gatot Subroto. Within the last few years it seems the skyline of 
Jakarta has changed dramatically. Everywhere, tall buildings were erected and 
new shopping malls opened.  
 The driver heads for the Citra Graha building in the Kuningan 
neighbourhood where KPN has their office on the 11th floor. Opposite the 
building, the largest office in Jakarta with more than 30 floors is in the process 
of being constructed. The driver drops Dahoko off at the entrance where all of 
the company cars and taxis stop. It is 7.15 am when Dahoko takes the only 
elevator out of six that stops at the highest level of the building. He turns left 
towards the office of the operational department, opens the glass door, which is 
engraved with the PTT Telecom logo, and enters the office. The department 
space is divided into two large sections of four offices and is filled with 
workstations made from glass partitions. On the walls are posters of tulips, 
Javanese textile and modern painting. Dahoko is not the first to arrive at the 
Citra Graha office building. Other Indonesian office employees that also have to 
travel a fair distance from home have come in even earlier. Travelling time of 
up to two or three hours is quite normal given the density of the traffic in 
Jakarta. Small talk and casual conversation takes place at this early stage of the 
day before the Dutch employees have arrived. 
 
9.2.2 Dutch and Indonesian Office Hours at the KPN Jakarta Office 
Meanwhile, in Jakarta Selatan, the family of KPN employee Leo has also begun 
preparing for the day. They moved into their house three years before and very 
much enjoy the garden and the spaciousness of the house. The Indonesian 
housekeeper makes breakfast for Leo, his wife and their three children. The 
youngest child is still too young to go to school, but the other two attend the 
Netherlands International School (NIS) in which Leo is himself actively 
involved. The children have to be at the NIS at 7.30 am, which is located close 
by however, walking there is impossible due to the bad road conditions, the high 
temperature and the heavy traffic on the roads. Therefore, the driver drops the 
children off at school in the black Volvo 440 before sending Leo to his office. 
Of course Leo could have a second car and a second driver as the other 
expatriates do but he does not mind dropping the children off at school.102 
                                                        
102 The cars of the KPN Jakarta office are related to the status of the employees. The ordinary old 
Kijangs, difficult to drive and with a stiff suspension, are only used for messengers' services and 
the transport of low rank employees. The new black coloured Kijangs with air-conditioning and a 
smooth suspension are used for low rank Dutch visitors, for weekend trips and for expatriate 
managers who by accident have damaged cars. In the same category are Toyota Corollas and 
Toyota Sedans. The Opel Vectra in new metallic colours, with four doors and good air-
conditioning is intended for the Dutch consultants and project leaders of KPN and the NCF. The 
KPN management in Jakarta can select a black BMW 351 or a black Volvo 440. The black Volvo 
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 It is only ten kilometres to the office but it normally takes more than an hour 
to get there. The fastest but also most dangerous way to get to the office is by 
motorbike. The motorbikes weave through the queues of cars at high speed, 
leaving both the riders and pillion riders just enough space to keep their knees 
from being grazed. Meanwhile, inside the air-conditioned car, Leo reads the 
newspaper, a report or just observes the street sellers outside, the architectural 
styles of houses and the crowded street markets. They arrive around 9 am at the 
office. The sun is already high and the driver parks the car in the garage after 
letting Leo off at the entrance of the Citra Graha building. In the carpark, the 
driver talks with other drivers or reads a newspaper, waiting till his services are 
needed again. In the meantime Leo has passed through the automatic doors, 
through the air-conditioned hall and has entered the elevator. Here he meets his 
colleague Tom who normally arrives a little later. In general the Dutch 
employees of the KPN office start around or just after 9 am and work till 6 pm. 
They also work in the evening and at home on weekends. For them, being an 
expatriate employee means working 60 hours a week. Leo and Tom discuss the 
latest rumours with regard to the Indonesian economy. On the 11th floor they 
take the right door to the wing where the Dutch management is situated.  
 ‘Goedenmorgen’ they say to the beautiful Indonesian receptionist who greets 
them back in Dutch. Although she speaks English very well, in her spare time 
she learns Dutch from a textbook. A striking one third of the Indonesian 
employees in the Jakarta office do speak Dutch. In the office, out of the 33 
people that work there 24 are Indonesian employees. The 40 drivers are not 
included in this number. Apart from this, 25 Dutch employees work within the 
strategic alliances. Many of the Indonesian employees have some kind of a 
relationship with the Netherlands. Some of them have worked for Dutch 
companies before while others have lived in the Netherlands or have a Dutch 
parent or speak Dutch.  
 In Jakarta Leo has quickly learned about ‘jam karet’ (i.e. rubber time) which 
is a vague concept of time and is blamed for any delay whether it be late arrival 
at the workplace and meetings or the postponement of appointments. Leo has 
learned that it is usual that meetings start twenty to sixty minutes later than 
scheduled and that appointments need to be reconfirmed. There are three ways 
for KPN employees to adapt to the ‘jam karet’. Some people maintain ‘western’ 
punctuality but take a book, a notebook or some work with them in order to kill 
time while waiting. Then there are those who come five or ten minutes late at 
meetings or appointments. This group, comprising the majority of employees, 
does not mind the flexible concept of appointments as long as waiting does not 
exceed more than half an hour.  
What does it matter. I like it, not being always exactly on time. It is more 
relaxed (interview with Dutch KPN employee).  
 Thirdly, there is a small group of expatriates who have completely 
internalised the Indonesian concept of ‘jam karet’. Because other expatriates 
                                                                                                                                  
is very popular with the management. Finally, the silver coloured Mercedes is for the General 
Manger of the Jakarta office.  
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hold on to Dutch time standards the relationships between KPN expatriates have 
changed. 
When I first came here, I used to be punctual. But when I saw that people 
here are relaxed. I don’t want to work harder than I already do, so I don’t 
mind anymore if I show up half an hour too late. It is the same with our 
Dutch colleagues. That is a point. That is quite negative. The professional 
relationship you have with your Dutch colleagues, form who you aspect a 
Dutch working attitude, is also disintegrating (interview with Dutch 
employee). 
 Leo maintains the strategy of western punctuality because waiting sometimes 
might have to do with hierarchy. For example, it is quite usual to wait for a 
meeting with a high ranking Indonesian official even if he is late as a show of 
respect despite the fact that the time of the appointment had been fixed. In such 
an instance, waiting is thus not passive but active, a matter of being sensitive to 
the situation, sensing what is appropriate with regard to the time, context and 
status of the other party/parties involved and acting accordingly. Waiting 
therefore, is not just a delay but can be an important instrument in doing 
business in Indonesia. In one case, a Dutch manager was unable to keep an 
appointment with his Indonesian counterpart in PT Telkom. Without reason the 
Indonesian manager had cancelled prior meetings. The Dutch manager decided 
to sit in the waiting room of this manager and waited two hours till the 
Indonesian manager was able to receive him. Waiting in Indonesia indicates the 
nature of the relationship of the person waiting and the one he is waiting for.  
If you come too late you are a friend. Of a friend you can accept that he 
comes too late due to traffic or whatever. If you are in time, obviously you 
are no friend (Indonesian employee of joint venture). 
 While this amazes the Dutch KPN expatriates, in their opinion this is a 
vague Indonesian concept of time. The Indonesian employees on the other 
hands are in turn astonished by the flexible attitude of the expatriates towards 
working time. When Leo goes home early in the afternoon to write a report, the 
Indonesian employees think he stops working. For the Indonesian employees 
work is primarily done at the office and one has to be at the office during 
official working times. Dutch employees of the Jakarta office who have worked 
at home during the evening or even in the night and come in at the office some 
time later in the morning are seen as lazy.  
 The situation in the KPN joint ventures differs from the Jakarta office. 
Working time there is between 7.30 am and 9 pm. KPN expatriates in the joint 
ventures work for more than 60 hours a week, but many of the Indonesian 
employees work even more hours. Indonesian employees tend to stay till late in 
the evening. Some because of the traffic problems, others wait for their relatives 
to pick them up and others stay just to work. The working hours are not always 
effectively used since time is often spent sitting together chatting, watching TV, 
making and eating noodle soup and reading newspapers. For Indonesian 
employees the quality of time is an important issue. “We have time to sit with 
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colleagues and talk about small things”, says an Indonesian employee in an 
interview. The early mornings and the evenings are used for small talk, gossip 
and exchanging news. In those periods, the Dutch expatriates who speak Bahasa 
Indonesia can pick up information that is not passed through formal channels.  
 
9.2.3 Bahasa Indonesia: the Key for Doing Business? 
When he first arrived, Leo had especially wanted to learn Bahasa Indonesia in 
the first months after his arrival in Jakarta.103 He enrolled in a one-to-one 
individual language course but failed to find time and energy for learning the 
Indonesian words. When he first started, his job in Jakarta demanded so much 
time and energy that he came home late every night with just enough energy to 
read the newspaper. Presently, new Dutch employees and their partners are sent 
to Jogjakarta for a seven-day language course. Indonesian teachers who speak 
the Dutch language teach the employees Bahasa Indonesia and about the 
cultural aspects of Indonesia. After six days of theoretical training the 
employees get training in the ‘field’, which entails going to the market, buying 
things and visiting places. The training continues with weekends in Jogjakarta 
or private lessons in the Dutch cultural centre in Jakarta that also can be 
attended on Saturdays. Learning Bahasa Indonesia is an important corporate 
strategy of KPN in Indonesia and it invests time, money and energy in the 
training of its employees. 
 The KPN employees are mostly willing to learn Bahasa Indonesia but often 
do not persevere and keep up with lessons. There are also employees with prior 
experience in Indonesia or employees who have in fact grown up in Indonesia 
already speak some Bahasa Indonesia or Javanese.104 Some employees pick up 
the language quite easily within half a year, others work for three years without 
being able to speak the language too well. It is observed that the success of 
learning the language depends not only on the individual’s capacity and effort 
but also on the social context of the expatriate. A predominantly Indonesian 
social context stimulates the process of learning. Employees working in one of 
the joint ventures or employees having Indonesian friends tend to learn faster. 
Most of the Dutch expatriates practice the language with their drivers whom in 
general hardly speak English. The secretary also plays an important role in the 
translation and understanding of the local language. She translates letters, 
understands the formal Indonesian correspondence and is a source of 
information on cultural habits. 
 Most of the Indonesian executives with whom Leo works do speak English 
and the presence of foreign telecom operators in the KSOs has prompted 
Indonesian executives and young professionals of PT Telkom to learn English. 
                                                        
103 In the early twenties, Indonesian nationalists developed a unifying language to make the cultural 
varied Islands of Indonesia one nation. Bahasa Indonesia, which is based upon a Malay dialect, was 
introduced as the national language after the declaration of independence in 1945. Using the 
Roman alphabet, Bahasa Indonesia is a relatively easy language from a grammatical point of view. 
The vocabulary is enriched with words from Javanese, Sundanese, Madurese, Dutch and English 
and utterly extended. 
104 Javanese is spoken by some 80 million speakers in Central and East Java alone. Sundanese has 
22 million speakers in Java and about 8 million people speak Madurese on Madura (Brandt 1997). 
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English is widely used for international commerce in the business district in 
Jakarta and is popular among students of the Indonesian universities. To 
practice their passive knowledge of English groups of young Indonesian 
students seize the opportunity to speak with foreigners. Within PT Telkom, 
Bakrie & Brothers and the joint ventures of KPN, the quality of English varies 
enormously amongst the Indonesian employees. The older Indonesian managers 
hardly speak English, while the younger employees are sometimes fluent in 
English. PT Telkom therefore insists on using the English language for the 
training of their top 300 managers.  
 At the Jakarta office English is the official language for communication. Leo 
speaks Dutch most of the time because a larger part of his colleagues are Dutch. 
In meetings where Indonesian KPN employees participate English is used. Only 
when ambiguities have to be clarified, important points stressed, subjects kept 
confidential or when discussions heat up do Dutch participants switch to Dutch. 
It is naturally easier to speak in ones mother tongue, especially for those Dutch 
employees who might not speak English very well. Consequently, Indonesian 
employees sometimes miss the point of the discussion or the concluding results 
of an agreement. In turn, Indonesian employees explain or clarify things to each 
other in local languages such as Bahasa Javanese, Sundanese or Bekasi during 
these meetings. For these Indonesian employees being unable to speak and 
understand Dutch is very much felt as a disadvantage. Informal discussions in 
Dutch are impossible to follow even if some words are picked up and an 
interesting subject is being discussed. But it is not always easy to enter a 
discussion with the Dutch even when you know the participants are willing to 
switch to the English language. Internal reports are also sometimes first written 
in Dutch and then translated in English. When Dutch employees meet and the 
report is written in Dutch than it is impossible for the Indonesian employees to 
understand the content of the meeting and the consequences. This is done 
particularly for the sake of communication with the head office in the 
Netherlands. Apart from the International Business department a larger part of 
the mail from the Netherlands are in Dutch. 
 The official language in the joint ventures of KPN is Bahasa Indonesia. Only 
the financial reports are written in English because of the presence of Dutch 
experts. In meetings Bahasa Indonesia is spoken unless one of the participants 
does not understand the language. Effective communication is important and the 
poor knowledge of English makes it even more difficult for some Indonesian 
employees to express their points. But English-speaking Indonesians do not 
always appreciate the use of poor Bahasa Indonesia by Dutch employees 
because they experience this as an insult to their knowledge of the English 
language. Some Dutch employees are aware of the strategic use of language and 
use ‘kita’ (we, inclusive you) instead of the much used ‘kami’ (we, exclusive 
you) when addressing their group. Apart from a totally different language, the 
style in which the language is used also differs with who is using it. While the 
American consultants can be heard from across the Jakarta office, Indonesian 
employees tend to speak soft and in a low tone. The choice of the words and the 
tone of the conversation in Bahasa Indonesia have to be chosen carefully.  
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 For the Dutch who speak Bahasa Indonesia it is much easier to pick up news 
and establish informal relations with colleagues. The Dutch attitude to learn and 
speak Bahasa Indonesia wins admiration from the Indonesian colleagues even if 
they do speak with funny accents. Foreigners can easily be recognised in their 
frequent use of the word saya (I) which native speakers use sparingly. 
Indonesians tend to speak in a passive style or use the informal aku. With 
learning Bahasa Indonesia the Dutch expatriate demonstrates his empathy with 
the host culture and its people. This lays ground for building personal relations. 
By speaking Bahasa Indonesia more relations are made and as a result more 
networks are constructed in which the language is more easily learned. For 
instance, on the work floor one might come across a conversation between an 
Indonesian employee trying to improve his English while correcting the Bahasa 
Indonesia of his Dutch colleague. However, speaking about sensitive subjects or 
when one is emotional is easier to do in ones own language.   
The Director General makes his speech. He starts by thanking the high-
ranking guests and other dignitaries. Then he stops. He looks rather 
emotional. “Please,… allow me,’ he says, ’I would like to speak in my own 
language, because it is so emotional today. I will be disconnected with my 
soul if I would speak English. I would rather speak my own language. I will 
speak to you in het Nederlands, Ben”, and visibly relieved he continues his 
speech in Bahasa Indonesia. Later on in the speech he switched to English 
every once and while (Director General of Setdco Megasel in video of the 
signing ceremony in Shangri La Hotel, Jakarta, March 11 1996).  
 In summary, it can be concluded that the degree of necessity for learning 
Bahasa Indonesia depends on the working environment of the Dutch expatriate. 
The further away from Jakarta, the older the executives and the lower down the 
employee in the hierarchy of the organisation, the more the knowledge of 
language is needed. Bahasa Indonesia however, is the official language and 
local languages such as Bahasa Sundanese, Betawi and Javanese are spoken at 
the work floor. Nevertheless, KPN’s need for staff that can communicate in 
Bahasa Indonesia was and is essential for it to reach and maintain its objective 
of becoming a local operator. It is helpful in establishing informal relations 
since informal relations are ultimately the most important factor for successfully 
conducting business in Indonesia (Brandt 1997). The case of the Joint Training 
Service (JTS) presented in the following section clearly demonstrates the 
importance of personal networks. 
 
9.2.4 The Importance of Dutch Connections in Indonesia 
At 10 am, Dahoko travels to Bandung to the branch office of KPN. He is driven 
from the Jakarta office by car and arrives three hours later in the outskirts of 
Bandung. The KPN office is located in a villa in a green part of Bandung and 
can be recognised by the green logo. The house is divided into two wings. In the 
left wing a small ‘mushola’, a working room and the meeting room is located. In 
the right wing one can find the general administrator, the kitchen and the office 
boy. In the central part of the house two offices mark the presence of an NCF 
employee and the manager of the office. The Indonesian office manager who is 
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in charge of the contacts with PT Telkom welcomes Dahoko. He is a retired PT 
Telkom manager who still knows many of the PT Telkom managers. Together 
they discuss the misunderstandings that have risen between the training 
department of PT Telkom and the various other departments of KPN.  
 In 1994, PT Telkom and KPN established the joint venture JTS (Joint 
Training Service) with the objective of establishing an effective, efficient and 
profit making training infrastructure for PT Telkom. Furthermore, it would be 
the task of JTS to investigate business opportunities in Indonesia as well as in 
other countries in Asia and would develop a program for exchange of personnel. 
To meet these objectives KPN would participate in the management team and 
support with the development and provision of training. Both Indonesia and 
KPN were to profit from the 14 million-dollar contract. Two years after it had 
begun however, the program had almost come to a stand still. The training of 
Indonesian trainees in the Netherlands proved to have been a success however, 
there was almost no active participation within the management of JTS, there 
were no business opportunities in Indonesia or other Asian countries and the 
training program of the PT Telkom executives was almost finished. What could 
have been the reasons that had brought the cooperation near to its end? 
 In the first place the relationship of KPN and the management of the JTS 
joint venture was never smooth. The Dutch initiators of the agreement initially 
established good relationships with the JTS management but had thereafter 
themselves moved to other positions. Their successors could not establish a 
good relationship with the General Manager. The help of middlemen such as the 
manager of the Bandung office or Dahoko was not called upon and when the 
financial returns were not in keeping with the expectations of KPN and they 
sent a letter to urge the raising of tariffs, the General Manager was not pleased.  
 Secondly, there were complaints about the cultural aspects of the training 
given by Dutch trainers and specialists. For many of the Dutch trainers it was 
their first time in Indonesia and lacked knowledge of the Indonesian context. 
Some of the Indonesian complaints included the teachers under estimation of the 
level of participants, the late evening time schedule, the lack of respect shown 
and the experts’ lack of international experience. Indonesian trainers therefore, 
attended a debriefing about the difficulties they encountered and their 
recommendations for the changes that should be made by their Dutch 
colleagues. 
 Thirdly, the cooperation between the different departments of KPN was 
inadequate. Four different players can be distinguished: (1) the training 
department, (2) the International Business department, (3) the office Jakarta and 
(4) the NCF. The objectives of all of these players were clearly different and 
conflicting. (1) International Training was focused on the expansion of foreign 
training activities, acquiring international training experience and increasing 
profits. (2) IB and (3) the office Jakarta wanted to use the agreement to help 
strengthen both formal and informal relationships with PT Telkom. Finally (4), 
the NCF hoped to attract more projects with PT Telkom in Bandung and other 
parts of Indonesia. The inadequate cooperation between the KPN departments 
thus resulted in a rather fragmented group of Dutch KPN employees in Jakarta. 
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While Indonesians tend to see KPN as one organisation, the employees of the 
joint ventures view themselves as apart from the Jakarta office, employees of 
the office Jakarta in turn distinguish themselves from the NCF employees and 
the headquarters in the Netherlands. Co-ordination of the activities or 
communication between the different groups is in reality very limited.  
 Fourthly, IB and the Jakarta office however, had changed their policy in 
Indonesia.  
The relation with PT Telkom has changed during the autumn of 1997. We 
have tried to become a partner of PT Telkom. PT Telkom was our goal, to 
become a partner and have a possible participation in of 25% in PT Telkom. 
We have to conclude that that objective has cost a lot of money and resulted 
in nothing. Our objective has changed so we only conduct projects with PT 
Telkom that generate business. All of the non-profit projects are stopped 
(meeting of Jakarta office employees 21 November 1997). 
 It can thus be concluded that the internal cooperation within KPN in the JTS 
case is inadequate for a successful implementation but must also be acknowledged 
that personal relations are important for doing business. Without personal 
relationships it is extremely difficult to be successful in business in Indonesia. The 
question of whether KPN has learned from these experiences remains to be 
answered. 
 
9.2.5 The Importance of Indonesian Connections in Indonesia 
Many authors on Indonesian business culture stress the importance of having 
the right connections (e.g. Hofstede 1982, Elashmawhi and Harris 1993, Zijlstra 
1994, Mulder 1994, Mann 1996, Brandt 1997). Connections are important in 
business because of the Javanese tendency to avoid conflicts and friction 
(Brandt 1997). Connections that are backed by trust give the highest measure of 
security to a businessman. The building of connections needs time. Therefore, 
by far the most important connections are family ties. While in the Netherlands 
the concept of family is reduced to the nuclear family, in Indonesia the operative 
concept is still that of the extended family. Business opportunities and vacancies 
are first given to relatives, a practice that is not always plausible for the Dutch 
KPN employees.  
 
(eerste citaat weglaten)We take social relations into account when doing 
business. How can we win without the other party having to lose? Like this 
we can maintain our relationship. In modern western management this is 
called a win-win situation. So I compete with you without you losing your 
face. The relationship is more important than the final results. So you do not 
want to win at all costs and not at all when the costs are the severing of ties 
with a relative (interview with Indonesian employee of PT Telkom).  
 
 While connections are important for western companies who want to do 
business with Indonesian companies, connections for western companies such 
as KPN who conduct business with the Indonesian government are 
indispensable. As earlier discussed, the long-term presence of the NCF in 
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Indonesia made it possible for KPN to establish business contacts.105 Business 
deals are not established solely at the offices, but also at golf courses, clubs and 
parties. It is of importance for the executive management to continue to extend 
their Indonesian contacts, which is why the office in Jakarta is member of the 
Mercantile Club in Jakarta where rich businessmen gather for lunch, dinner, or 
party. Members celebrate their birthdays and wedding anniversaries at the club. 
Each Thursday the KPN executives have a meeting at the Mercantile Club 
penthouse at the Jala Jendral Sudirman for an informal discussion of business 
items. Afterwards they have dinner together and sometimes go out for a beer.  
 KPN created multicultural teams to help establish business relations with PT 
Telkom. A multicultural team consists of a Dutch employee and an experienced 
Indonesian employee. The Dutch employee would carefully prepare for the 
appointments that had been made, keeping the meeting efficient and effective 
and making concrete agreements. The Indonesian employee on the other hand, 
would conduct the introductory exchange, accentuate on elements in the 
personal relationship, correct the Dutch colleague’s behavioural errors in the 
Indonesian context and supply background information to his Dutch colleague. 
Using this strategy the Dutch operator was able to penetrate the Indonesian 
telecom market in the early nineties. 
 KPN has indeed learnt to invest both time and energy in acquiring the right 
connections in the Indonesian telecom sector however, this is not enough to 
achieve success. The networks of Indonesian connections have to be related to 
the source of power and it is very difficult for new Western managers to 
estimate the source of power or where the real power in an Indonesian company 
is located. It is virtually impossible to unravel the extremely people orientated 
networks and discover the individual shareholdings, the business relations, the 
cross-connections and the conglomerates. Most of the structures are beyond the 
eyes of outsiders. 
Regularly I have the feeling that this [the company; AvM] is a ‘wayang 
kulit’ where someone behind the curtain is playing the different puppets. The 
puppets are the General Manger, the Financial Director and the Director of 
operations for instance. The puppeteer remains invisible and imitates 
different voices. As a result you don’t know who really is behind it. And the 
puppets itself are also puppeteers playing smaller puppets. Like this you 
have a ‘wayang kulit’ within a ‘wayang kulit’ and you absolutely do not 
know who is behind what (interview with Dutch KPN employee). 
 In a country where having the right contacts is most essential for doing 
business it is necessary to know people who in turn know a diverse range of 
other people. These people are called ‘bangsa tengha’ or middlemen and have 
                                                        
105 Ericsson, the Swedish telecom equipment manufacturer, used its historical relation with 
Indonesia since 1907 as a marketing tool. In an article in the Jakarta Post the Swedish company 
stressed the 90 years of commitment by emphasising ‘this multinational company has never 
intended its establishment in a country for any immediate profit pursuit. Rather, it plays a 
significant role in long term telecommunications development of the local countries’ (The Jakarta 
Post, November 25, 1992). Other companies such as France Telecom and the Australian Telstra 
also stressed the historical ties with Indonesia in their marketing strategy. 
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an important role in Indonesia (Mulder 1994, Brandt 1997). The use of the 
middleman can be traced back to colonial times when the Dutch used the 
Javanese elite to control the Indonesian archipelago and the Chinese traders to 
carry out transactions (van Goor 1987). Nowadays the use of intermediaries is 
popular in the ‘pondok’ (temporary lodging) system. Migrants from the 
kampung migrate to the metropolis of Jakarta to a ‘pondok’ who is headed by 
someone from their own village. The latter serves as an intermediary between 
the new immigrant and the complex city, providing housing and helping the 
newcomer to find work (Bijlmer 1987). The process of mediating is thus 
generally accepted in Indonesian society and is especially important for foreign 
companies in the context of business with the Indonesian government.     
 The official middlemen spend part of their time on external relations and 
KPN employs specific middlemen for the distinctly different levels of external 
relations. The business development manager is responsible for relations with 
the executive levels of PT Telecom, PT Indosat and the MTPT. Dahoko is 
responsible for the relations with the lower management layer in these 
organisations. The manager of the Bandung office maintains relations with the 
PT Telkom management. In addition, there is a middleman at the Jakarta office 
who has connections with the government with regard to the arranging of visas 
and working permits for the expatriates. A female middleman is the formal 
intermediary between the expatriates and their household employees. Spouses of 
expatriates consult her with regard to questions on housing, drivers, servants, 
gardeners, shopping, travelling and other such things. Finally, the Dutch 
expatriates have their own ‘personal’ middlemen such as their secretaries and 
drivers. These persons can give him advice on cultural issues, help him learn the 
language and help him with their own personal networks.  
 (eerste zin weg) I have a perfect relationship with her. She advises me. She 
has helped me very well with a couple of cases. At a certain moment 
someone wanted to sign me a contract. She had been given information that 
it was not good. She told me to be careful with the contract (interview with 
Dutch KPN employee). 
 The network of middlemen can be used for getting important things done, 
such as making appointments with certain individuals who might be difficult to 
gain access to. It is for example, very difficult to meet members of the executive 
level of the ministry or PTO’s but with the help of friends, former secretaries, 
relatives, ex-colleagues and former students it can be more easily and quickly 
arranged. These personal networks are also used for signing contracts and 
agreements while formal procedures may cost a delay of many weeks. The use 
of middlemen therefore, saves a lot of energy, time and money. The middleman 
can also be used as a third party to help solve internal conflicts. He can use 
unofficial channels to smooth things out when a loss of face is at stake.   
My role as business development manager is to maintain the relations. 
Sometimes do a massage here then there. Some drops of oil between the 
cogwheels of the machine. That is my work. Putting out the fire if there are 
conflicts. To calm down everybody a bit, eh… I see my work as....well, you 
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got a machine with cogwheels, sometimes it runs tight and then I come with 
a can of oil adjusting some drops of oil every here and there (interview with 
Indonesian manager KPN office Jakarta).  
 Informal contacts, the right connections and the use of middlemen are of 
such importance in doing business in Indonesia but are of particular and utmost 
importance when a minority participation in a joint venture is at stake. A 
western shareholder that invests large amounts of money in an Indonesian joint 
venture wants to have influence in the decision process while a shareholder with 
minority participation does not have much formal power to influence the 
policies in the joint venture. 
 
There is a large difference in the influence that you think you have and the 
influence that you really have. An Indonesian loves foreign money but not 
foreigners, and not the Dutch in particular. Money, and the people they will 
tolerate. You don’t have to pretend we have the knowledge, they will do 
what they want (interview with KPN employee).  
 
One of the biggest mistakes of the Dutch is their arrogance. They have only 
17% of the investment. That is the daily power of KPN. Indonesians are 
holding 83%; you have to realise that. If KPN doesn’t do that, we will say: 
ok, you are arrogant, we will take the money and you don’t get management 
influence (interview with Indonesian). 
 
 For Indonesian partner organisations it is easy to lower the power of the 
western shareholder. A Dutch KPN manager with an excellent reputation in the 
Netherlands was selected to become CEO in the joint venture. He met his staff 
every day at 9 am to instruct them as to what they had to do each day and stayed 
in his office for the rest of the day. It was only at morning meetings that he 
would ask his managers how far they had progressed in carrying out his 
instructions from the previous day. He failed to establish personal connections 
with his managers and with the shareholders in the joint venture, was 
consequently isolated from valuable channels of informal information and thus, 
could no longer function. A Dutch manager, who does not engage in casual 
conversation over family affairs, will not socialise or engage in leisure activities 
with colleagues and staff should be warned that he must change his management 
strategy if he is to achieve success in his work. The danger of becoming isolated 
from the Indonesian context is a serious danger for the KPN employee. 
 In the struggle for formal power the Indonesians strategically use the 
sensitive Indonesian-Dutch relationship of the past. As soon as any behaviour 
that is classified as colonial is noted they will accentuate this behaviour and thus 
restore the balance of power because KPN employees are sensitive for the 
colonial accusations  
 
I like working with the Dutch because they cannot argue the issue of nation 
building. There is a history with the Dutch so if they argue or don’t agree, I 
will remind them about the history and about the colonial situation and then 
they back off (interview with Indonesian manager of KPN joint venture).  
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Personally, I tend to pipe down because of a colonial contriteness, which 
appears to be less evident with regards to the Netherlands Antilles. That is 
related to the fact that we have fought a real war in Indonesia (interview with 
KPN manager). 
 
 Dutch KPN employees are also strategically used by their Indonesian 
colleagues in cases of difficult issues such as the refusal of titipans.106 Titipans 
are offered to the strategic alliance for a job. Indonesian employees cannot 
refuse to employee these titipans, because of the strong interpersonal 
relationships. Dutch employees can also help their Indonesian colleagues with 
negotiations, addressing difficult issues or discussing sensitive-information. 
They can stress their Dutch identity and behave in ways that Indonesian 
colleagues are not allowed to thus creating other ways of obtaining goals.  
If we go to PT Telkom for instance I am being used as an innocent ‘orang 
buleh’. By means of informal channels I receive information that a sensitive 
issue will be discussed in a certain meeting. In the meeting my Indonesian 
manager will say that it is not of any interest to him, but the foreigner wants 
to know what the position on the issue is. Therefore, the curious foreigner is 
always guilty. I have no problem with this role as long as I know it in 
advance (Interview with KPN employee). 
 Confronted with the necessity of maintaining large personal networks and 
the Indonesian strategies in using these informal networks for business practices 
KPN experienced that without informal networks cooperation is very difficult. 
The absence of formal and informal power resulted in the withdrawal of KPN 
from their joint venture with Bakrie & Brothers. The joint venture that offered 
radiotelephone services had only been able to serve a few areas on the edge of 
the city of Jakarta. The operator was originally supposed to cut over service in 
Jakarta by the end of 1994, but technical and administrative delays hindered its 
progress. In September 1996, PT Telkom announced it had plans to sell its stake 
in the joint venture. KPN therefore decided to withdraw their stakes in 
December 1997 and start another joint venture with Bakrie & Brothers. KPN 
tried to get a majority share in this new joint venture in order to have control of 
management. This decision was supported by a trend that can be witnessed 
throughout Southeast Asia. Western telecom companies either give up their 
shares in the participation or want to obtain majority shares. 
 As a result of these experiences the KPN policy in Indonesia has slowly 
changed from a high profile dominance to a low profile informal presence. The 
organisation does not claim the top management positions but instead, occupies 
the second management level positions. The Dutch keep a low profile and yet 
are able to influence the decision making process. The absence of formal and 
informal power does however, frustrate the work of some of the KPN employees 
and managers.  
                                                        
106 Titipans are friends and family of high Indonesian politicians, government officers and 
executives. 
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 In summary, it seems evident that KPN has slowly learned that personal 
relationships are a prerequisite if success Indonesia is to be ensured and has in 
fact changed its business strategies accordingly. Personal relationships in 
Indonesia are related to ethnic origin. At this point, an interesting question to 
explore is how KPN deals with the different ethnic origins of Indonesians.   
 
9.2.6 Ethnic Diversity in the Organisations 
The ethnic diversity in the Indonesian archipelago is enormous. The people of 
highland Irian Jaya have little in common with the Western life style in Jakarta. 
Behaviour varies according to religion, regional tradition and ethnic origin. The 
heterogeneous compound of Indonesian people can also be traced in local and 
pan-Indonesian work organisations (Hofstede 1982). Within the KPN office 
Jakarta and the joint ventures ethnic diversity plays a role. Dutch expatriates 
prefer to work with Batak people. This ethnic minority from North-Sumatra has 
the image of being direct, open and spontaneously voicing their opinion (Mann 
1996). Employees of Ambon, Sulawesi and Sumatra are also known for their 
open behaviour. Javanese are perceived as more difficult to work with because 
of the complex Javanese code of etiquette and respect. The Javanese employees 
tend to maintain their inner peace and harmony through vague indirect and 
avoidance behaviour (Hofstede 1982, Mulder 1994, Mann 1996). Dutch KPN 
expatriates deal with these differences in culture by checking the cultural 
background of the person involved before having a meeting or discussing 
certain subjects.  
There are different kinds of Indonesians. I have for instance, ten employees 
in my group, with al kinds of ethnicity. And you have to tune into this 
different ethnicity. If I have to criticise people I will consider their ethnic 
background. How will they cope with it? It could be that if you criticise 
someone it could influence his work negatively for a long period of time 
(interview with Dutch KPN employee).  
 The choice of KPN for a partnership with Bakrie & Brothers was partly 
determined by the ethnic origin of the Indonesian conglomerate. Bakrie & 
Brothers originates from the Sumatra region of Padang where the Minangkabou 
minority lives. The Minangkabaou from West Sumatra are seen as strong 
politicians and keen tradesmen who travel a lot because of their traditional 
exogamous marriage system.107 Furthermore, Bakrie & Brothers is a ‘pribumi’ 
conglomerate and not a Chinese conglomerate.108 This is important for KPN 
because ethnic Chinese have a sensitive relationship with the Indonesian 
government. The government is traditionally and strongly dominated by 
Javanese, who form the largest ethnic group and represent more than half of the 
                                                        
107 Exogamy is the anthropologic term for a requirement for marriage outside a particular social 
group or range of kinship.  
108 Pribumi means literally ‘sons of the soil’. In general the term pribumi refers to companies 
owned by Indonesians. During colonial times the Dutch gave pribumis little chance to participate in 
the economy. The Dutch favoured ethnic Chinese. After independence Chinese tradesmen took 
over the private sector. Indonesia’s official policy was aimed at cutting back the power of the 
Chines by introducing a licensing system that was exclusively open to pribumis  
  
 249 
country’s people. Java has always played a significant political role in the 
archipelago. Javanese dominate the government, the cabinet, the civil service 
and the military. The ‘Pancasila’ is also based upon the Javanese philosophy of 
life.109 Not surprisingly, much of the cross-cultural literature on Indonesia is 
based upon the Javanese culture (Hofstede 1982, Scott-Stevens 1986, 
Elashmawi and Harris 1993, Zijlstra 1994, Mann 1996). The MTPT and the 
telecom operator PT Telkom are strongly dominated by Javanese and although 
different ethnic groups such as the Sundanese, the Bataks, the Balinese and the 
Madurese can also be encountered in the government linked organisations, no 
ethnic Chinese work there.  
 The ethnic Chinese control more than two-thirds of the private sector of the 
economy in Indonesia although they only make up 4% of the population. This 
situation is partly a result of lack of interest among Indonesians in profit-
orientated activities during the colonial days and partly because of the Dutch 
colonial trade policies. The Dutch used the services of the ethnic Chinese in 
Indonesia as intermediaries with the indigenous population. While ethnic 
Chinese of third or fourth generation, who are called peranakan, have 
extensively integrated into Indonesian society, the first generation of Chinese, 
who are called totok have preserved their culture.110 Both peranakan and totok 
are often described as non-pribumi. In post-colonial history the Chinese ethnic 
minority has been the object of discrimination and violence.111 For KPN it was 
clear that co-operating with an ethnic Chinese conglomerate would have 
blocked entrance to the MTPT. Therefore, they chose for the pribumi Bakrie & 
Brothers. Both Bakrie & Brothers and the Indonesian government do not 
employ Chinese. KPN therefore has to be careful with selecting Chinese 
employees for their joint ventures (Hofstede 1982).  
 The building of one nation with one language and a common culture 
comprising the diverse ethnic groups and religions has been the main 
preoccupation for the Indonesian government since independence. 
Telecommunication is an important instrument for the Indonesian government 
in the process of nation building. The lift-off of the Palapa telecom satellite for 
instance, was used to redeem a century old oath to unify the archipelago.112 In 
                                                        
109 Pancasila means ‘the principle of living’ and was introduced in 1945 as the principle on which 
the Indonesian constitution would be based. The Pancasila consists of five principles: (1) the belief 
in one God, (2) the mutual respect of people, (3) the national unity of distinct ethnic groups, (4) the 
making of decisions on the basis of collective consensus by means of open discussion and debate, 
(5) the protection of the weaker within society (Brandt 1997). 
110 Totok means literally ‘full-blooded’. 
111 In June 1998, an Indonesian KPN employee of Chinese ethnic Peranakan heritage called me 
from Jakarta to tell of his personally horrifying experiences during the riots in Jakarta. He was on 
his way home when is car was stopped at the ring road by a mass of people. He managed to get out 
of the car and escaped from the throng. He took refuge in a nearby kampung where he could shake 
off his pursuers. He knew a Chinese couple living there and fortunately they were at home and he 
stayed in the house of the couple for three full days until the unrest was over. His wife and children 
were unharmed, but a good friend of his had been killed in his car and a hysterical crowd had raped 
several Chinese friends of his wife.   
112. Indonesia was the third country using a satellite communication system, called the Palapa, after 
Canada and the USA. With the launching form cape Canaveral in July 1976 an old oath is 
redeemed. The name Palapa refers to a myth from the 13th century when a Prime Minister made 
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several public speeches the Minister of MTPT stressed the Indonesian identity 
of the joint ventures and warned KPN of the need to respect this. The opening of 
the Indonesian markets for foreign investments and the opening of the 
Indonesian society for foreign information have supported the fear among 
Indonesians that Western culture overrules the Indonesian values. ‘The unique 
and special culture of Asia has to be protected against too much influence from 
the West’, was the conclusion of an Indonesian panel during the AsiaPacific 
Telecom fair ’97. One of the guest speakers warned against a clash of cultures in 
which values beliefs and appropriate behaviour would conflict. The panel 
therefore encouraged a regional application for the Internet in the Asian context 
using the local language and establishing a characteristically Asian backbone. 
Diversity instead of one world culture was thus sought after.  
 This preoccupation with the Indonesian culture and identity has been an 
important factor for the success of KPN’s GSM joint venture. They have 
constructed a GSM telephone infrastructure that covers the 27 provinces of 
Indonesia. The marketing of the mobile telephones were supported with 
commercials with a strong accent on the cultural diversity of Indonesia and 
nation wide coverage of the infrastructure. An old popular Indonesian folk song 
‘from Aceh to Merauke’ served as a connection to the dream of one Indonesian 
nation.113 In each province, the daughter of the governor was asked to pose in 
traditional clothing for the cover of the telephone cards. The customers and 
government positively received this concept. The opening of a new branch 
office of the joint venture in Jakarta was also held in a completely Indonesian 
style. The Dutch General Manager of the office was even dressed in a traditional 
Batavia costume. This coaxed a compliment out of the Minister of MTPT who 
remarked on the positive support of some KPN employees in helping to 
strengthen the Indonesian identity of the joint venture.  
 In summary, KPN has been made aware of the ethnic diversity in Indonesia 
and the importance of telecommunication for the government as an instrument 
of nation building. In the search for an Indonesian telecom partner and in the 
optimal marketing mix for its GSM joint venture KPN has shown itself to be 
sensitive toward the ethnic diversity which in Indonesia is intertwined with 
religion (Brandt 1997). The next section examines how religious background 
influences the everyday business life of KPN in Indonesia  
 
9.2.7 Religion in Daily Business Life 
In Indonesia the global religions of Buddhism, Islam and Christianity blend with 
traditional forms of religious beliefs such as animism and adak.114 In Indonesia 
only 9% of the Indonesians are Christian while 88% of the 200 million 
Indonesians are Muslims (Brandt 1997). In his daily work, the five prayers are 
important rituals for Dahoko. At lunch time he goes down to the ground level of 
                                                                                                                                  
the oath not to rest before all of the Indonesian archipelago would be united. With the installation 
of the telecom satellite this oath has been redeemed.  
113 Aceh is located at the north-west tip of Sumatra and therefore the Western most city. Merauke is 
located in the south-east of Irian Jaya and therefore the most eastern city of Indonesia. 
114 Animism is a belief in dwelling spirits in natural objects and phenomena. Adat religions form a 
part of customary life and still wield great influence in Indonesia.  
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the Citra Graha building to pray in a mushola, a small prayer room, just big 
enough for twelve people. There he takes off his socks and shoes and rolls up 
the legs of his trousers. He puts on two bajeks (wooden slippers) from the rattan 
basket next to the door and goes to the nearby ‘janitor’ (bathroom for washing 
one’s feet). There he washes his feet, face and hands. In other office buildings 
one can see people washing their feet and faces in the toilets. Dahoko puts on 
the wooden slippers and walks to the prayer room. There he waits until there is 
enough room for him to pray. When he enters the mushola he leaves the slippers 
outside and walks in barefooted. The floor of the room is covered with sejadas 
(small rugs) that are used for praying. In the mosque women pray apart from the 
men, but in the small mushola women pray together with the men. In the corner 
of the room a young KPN secretary is praying. She has changed into her  
mukana (scarf) and sarong (long skirt) to be appropriately dressed for prayer. 
After the praying for ten to fifteen minutes, Dahoko returns to his office to have 
lunch.  
 The religious compound of the KPN office in Jakarta is not representative of 
Indonesian society. Apart from the drivers who are almost all Muslim only ten 
Indonesian KPN employees are Muslim. Among the fourteen Christian 
Indonesian employees are Catholics, Protestants and Seventh Day Adventists. 
The state philosophy of Indonesia, the Pancasila, requires the belief in one God 
with the guaranty of religious freedom.115 As a result it is impossible not to have 
a religion in Indonesia. A larger part of the thirty Dutch expatriates are not 
actively practising any religion and at most, might have a Christian background 
and are thus, in the eyes of Indonesians, considered, as Christians. 
Consequently, the KPN office in Jakarta is considered a Christian office. In 
contrast, its strategic partners such as Bakrie & Brothers and PT Telkom are 
almost exclusively Muslim. The religious compound of an office is important. 
Nothing is official, but there are unwritten rules. I think 10% of the 
employees are Christian here. Some people say that this share of 10% is too 
high. That too many Christians are working here (interview with Indonesian 
employee in GSM joint venture). 
 There is a rather peaceful coexistence of Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism and 
Christianity within Indonesia although quite a few Catholic churches were 
burned down during unrest in 1997. Religion in Indonesia is of much more 
importance than in the Netherlands. Religion is a social framework consisting of 
religious education, religious rituals, social life in churches and religious values 
and norms (Mulder 1980, Brandt 1997). This social framework is also extended 
to work. For instance, the Seventh Day Adventists are not allowed to leave their 
house on Saturdays except to attend mass. For them working overtime is 
impossible on Saturdays. Dutch expatriates however, keep Sunday as their day 
of rest. Although the Dutch management accepts their religious conviction, it is 
not practical to have a Seventh Day Adventist in a team that has to work during 
                                                        
115 The belief in one God is symbolised in the star on the weapon of the national Golden Garuda 
(eagle). It signifies the might and strength of the country and holds in his claws the national motto 
Bhinneka Tunggal Ika (Unity in Diversity). 
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the weekend. The aspect of religion is, for Dutch KPN expatriates, something to 
be aware of. 
One of our senior managers is Muslim. At one point he came to me and said: 
“I have been in a meeting all day and have not found time to pray yet. We 
don’t even have a proper place to pray here”. At that time we were in another 
building. “Well, you can pray here if you want”, I said to him. I was serious, 
but he got angry, walked away and reported it to the management. He 
thought I had said he could pray under my table. He felt offended by me. I 
apologised and with the help of some Indonesian friends and colleagues this 
was accepted (interview with Dutch expatriate).   
 The coexistence of different religions also results in a large number of 
holidays such as Christmas, the various New Year Holidays, various Hindu and 
Buddhism festivals and the Muslim fasting season of Ramadan.116 The 
management of the KPN office Jakarta is careful with the celebration of 
Christian holidays such as Christmas. It is aware of their Christian minority 
identity in a Muslim society and does not wish to over emphasise its religious 
background. If Christmas is celebrated at the office with a lunch then the 
Islamic employees will also ask for a lunch at Lebaran.117 Therefore, Christmas 
is celebrated together with the Islamic Lebaran in a year-end gathering in the 
Gondola Restaurant in the Citra Graha some time in the second half of 
December.  
 Religious sensitivity is also needed for the planning of activities in the JTS 
joint venture. When Dutch trainers are planning a training course in Indonesia it 
is wise not to start too late. Due to the early morning prayers, life starts early in 
the morning. Furthermore, extra time is needed at lunchtime for prayer and 
participants like to sleep early in the evening. Religious sensitivity is also 
needed for planning a meeting in the joint ventures or with one of the 
Indonesian telecom operators. In a meeting around noon, Muslim participants 
slip out to pray and come back again, or the meeting is stopped for fifteen 
minutes. On Fridays however, the Muslim participants leave meetings at 11.30 
am to attend the Sholat Dlohor in a mosque and return at 1.30 pm An 
Indonesian ‘rijst tafel’ lunch is served before the meeting resumes. In order to 
accommodate this, Dutch expatriates rather not plan their meetings on Fridays. 
Further more, the drivers are given time off to go to the mosque. Non-Muslim 
Indonesian employees and Dutch expatriates of the Jakarta office usually take 
this opportunity to go out for lunch together. 
 In the Ramadan period religion dominates daily business life (Brandt 1997). 
Working conditions are different for the Muslim employees at that time. 
Employees such as Dahoko rise at 2, 3, or 4 am to pray and to eat before 
sunrise. After 5 am he is not allowed to eat, to drink, or to use foul language, till 
                                                        
116 During the ninth month of the Islamic calendar, Muslims fast from sunrise to sunset (Brandt 
1997). 
117 The last days of the Ramadan are called Lebaran or Idul Fitri. These days are holidays in 
Indonesia and it is usual for Indonesians to pay successive visits to pay honour and respect to their 
families. Companies shut down during these days enabling employees to return to their hometowns 
together with some five million other people leaving Jakarta almost empty. 
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the breaking of the fast at about 6 pm in the evening. Sometimes the employees 
break their fast together at 6 pm in the KPN guesthouse. During the Ramadan 
drinking and eating at the office is not forbidden for non-Muslim employees 
but, Muslims appreciate others not eating and drinking openly. Some of the 
Dutch expatriates sympathise with their Muslim colleagues and only drink water 
and tea at the office. It has been observed that in this period work performance 
drop due to the fasting, especially towards the end of Ramadan. People are tired 
in the afternoon and generally much less effective. Work aside, Dutch 
expatriates also have to be sensitive to religion at home. In 1997 for example, 
Ramadan started on New Year’s Eve and all public celebrations were prohibited 
including the drinking of alcohol and use of fireworks. The Muslim maid cannot 
taste the food she has prepared, so it might be salty or tasteless. The Muslim 
driver is obliged by religion to stop 6 pm to drink some water or eat something 
before breaking fast. And finally, many expatriates take a holiday when the 
Leberan is celebrated because heavy traffic makes travel in Indonesia in this 
period impossible.  
 In addition, to the major religions animism is still influential. Animism and 
tribal religions have been in Indonesia much longer than the global religions and 
the traditional religious beliefs are part of adat or customary life (Mulder 1980, 
Brandt 1997). Although people rarely touch on the subject, these practices 
penetrate daily business life in Indonesia.  
I arrived at 5.15 am at the office that was, in that time, on the fourth floor 
when I saw the office boy sitting at the entrance of the office. He was 
trembling and crying. I thought he had quarrel with the other office boy, but 
he told me he had seen a lady. It was a tall white lady who glided though the 
corridor. He did not allow me to enter, but I had brought a lamp myself to 
enter the office in the morning because it was still dark then. I entered the 
office but did not see anything. The rumour went round and within no time 
everybody knew it. The girls made it more complicated by getting frighten of 
(getting startled by) every movement. This situation kept on for some days. 
Nobody was working anymore. Then the general manager thought it was 
enough and called all of the employees for a special meeting. He told 
everybody there was no such thing as a ghost and ghosts do not exist 
(interview with Indonesian employee of KPN Jakarta office). 
 A minority of the Dutch KPN employees discount the traditional religious 
beliefs as superstition while a majority do not discount the stories of mysticism 
and supernatural powers but refuse to be party to it. Some expatriates consult 
traditional healers, better known as dukun, in cases of illness. The dukun is 
believed to have great internal power and can acquire supernatural forces which 
enables him to heal illness and to provide advice to any kind of problem 
encountered in every day life (Brandt 1997). The dukun is also consulted by 
KPN and invited to conduct ritual celebrations for specific occasions.  
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In this office we have had an official and unofficial inauguration; a 
selamatan.118 The office building has cemeteries on the north and the west 
side. For Indonesians that is a bad situation. Therefore the building has to be 
consecrated. So, while construction was still on its way, we have consecrated 
the building together with the employees. We fetched an Imam. I understood 
that the building had to be cleared of negative energy as soon as possible. 
My secretary took the initiative (interview with Dutch KPN expatriate).    
 Although not very visible, the Muslim majority in the joint ventures keep the 
Christian KPN employees aware of the sensitivity of religion in daily business 
life in Indonesia. The Jakarta office does its best not to over emphasise its 
Christian identity and the Dutch expatriates try to show respect to religious 
differences. However, do Dutch managers also show respect to Indonesian 
management practices? 
 
9.2.8 Dutch and Indonesian Management Styles 
Leo was not satisfied with the quality of his department staff. He had noticed 
many errors in their work and the external accountants did still not approve the 
financial balance of last year. The Indonesian manager of the department had 
not reported these problems to him. Leo was angry about this because the door 
to his office is always open for employees to come in and report problems. He 
does not want to control the work of the department in detail nor to tell them 
exactly what they have to do but would rather that they manage the objectives 
and exercise self-responsibility. Leo had earlier asked for information about the 
quality of the department from his Dutch predecessor and found out that the 
quality of work had already been a problem for a long time. Thinking that the 
quality of the work would improve if a part of the work was to be transferred to 
an external professional office Leo then decided to dismiss the Indonesian 
manager and two of the Indonesian employees on the count of redundancy. He 
took full responsibility of the dismissal and even gave the employees the news 
himself instead of leaving it to the Indonesian HRM manager. Furthermore, in 
his earlier experience as manager in the Netherlands he had learned that bad 
news should be addressed directly at the start of the conversation. He therefore 
invited all of the affected employees one by one into his office and told them 
that they were to be retrenched carefully explaining the reasons for the decision 
and offering them support in finding another job in one of the KPN joint 
ventures in Indonesia. He felt genuinely sorry for them and did not enjoy being 
the harbinger of bad news. 
 The Indonesian employees at the KPN Jakarta office were shocked. For them 
the message came as a complete surprise. There had not been any form of 
discussion nor informal signals to indicate that such a decision would be made. 
                                                        
118 Selamatan means religious meal and is a widespread ritual in Indonesia for distinct occasions. It 
can be held to bring good fortune to its participants when launching a new product, opening a new 
house, or the construction of a new house. A selamatan has the objective to secure social peace and 
cosmic harmony. To ensure the harmony many people such as neighbours, business relations and 
employees are invited. The selamatan ceremony is led by and elder or a dukun [a traditional healer 
or ritual specialist]. Prayers are held and all participants enjoy a meal afterwards (Brandt 1997: 
150). 
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From their own perspective they had functioned very well because after all, they 
had been working for the company for more than six years and had never heard 
any direct complaints against themselves. In their perception there was nothing 
wrong with the quality of their work, if there were surely Leo would have given 
them other instructions. Their previous Dutch bosses sometimes came in for a 
short talk or to ask some questions but apart from that never controlled their 
work in detail. As a result mistakes might have slipped into their work but 
ultimately the boss was of course responsible.  
 The dismissal disturbed the harmony of the office however, shouting, 
showing anger, being rude and direct conflict are seen as undesirable social 
behaviour and are thus avoided at all costs since they can endanger harmony. As 
a result it is very difficult for the Dutch expatriates to touch on or discuss 
conflicting interests. The open nature of the dismissal conflicts with the 
Javanese concept of rukun or harmonious unity. The ideal of social behaviour at 
the work place is:  
To be in harmony, or as quiet and peaceful as possible. Like the ideal 
relationship of friendship, without quarrel and strife, friendly and united in 
purpose while mutually helping each other (Mulder 1980: 38). 
 The dismissed employees are also shocked of their superiors' behaviour. In 
their perception Leo and the General Manager are responsible for the social 
welfare of their employees. This traditional Indonesian management style is 
called bapakism and comes from the word bapak, which means father. A bapak 
is fully responsible for the organisation, can be very authoritarian but is also 
responsible for the welfare of his employees. Employees trust in and identify 
with the bapak. In the Javanese culture people are seen as being unequal. The 
unequal status in the society has to be expressed in hormat. Hormat is the 
respect and honour to which the other person is entitled (Mulder 1980: 40). This 
is why Leo’s open door policy failed to work. The Indonesian manager expects 
his boss to tell him what to do and to check his work for errors. Furthermore, the 
weak personal relationship and the location of Leo’s office in the Dutch 
management wing made it such that the Indonesian manager would not dare to 
walk in uninvited. He knows better than to walk to Leo’s office at the other end 
of the building and tell him there are problems. An Indonesian employee avoids 
breaking bad news and rather gives the boss good news. In Indonesia this is 
know as Asal Bapak Senang (ABS or ‘keep the boss happy’). It is important to 
keep the bapak in a good mood at all times and keep bad news and problems 
away from him (Hofstede 1982, Mann 1996, Brandt 1997).   
 Dismissal is not traditionally practised in Indonesia (Hofstede 1982: 29). 
Instead, transferring incapable employees to positions where they can not do 
any harm is a normal practice. Such employees while understanding that they 
are being punished would then suffer no loss of face in the eyes of the public. If 
mutual agreement is reached they are offered a ‘golden handshake’ and then 
find other jobs. As there is no Western social security system and the economic 
situation in Indonesia is in turmoil the bapak relation with the boss is of 
importance for employees. Leo’s offer to help the employees with finding a new 
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job is rejected because of the loss of trust in the management for if someone 
fires you just like that, how can you trust him to find a job for you?  
 The dismissal means the terrible ‘loss of face’ or ‘malu’ of the Indonesian 
employees. All other members of the Jakarta office, family, business networks 
and friends interpret the dismissal as a painful failure. The dismissal does not 
only mean a loss of work but a loss of social status and networks. To cause malu 
or bring someone into deep shame is a sensitive issue in Indonesia. The 
dismissed employees do not show emotions of anger and grief at the office but 
at home or in private meetings at the office or behind closed doors. Only half an 
hour after the dismissals, the news has already spread through the staff of the 
joint ventures. The news of the dismissals is the only subject of discussion in the 
department for days but underlying emotions are not outwardly shown. Because 
of the emotional aspects of malu Indonesians consider dismissal as dangerous 
not only for the employee but also for the company. The dismissed employee 
can injure the manager or can take him to court. The tangible repercussions of 
having caused someone a ‘loss of face’ are not always immediately observed. 
The dismissed employee can go to the newspapers, might be related to your 
business partner, with high-ranking persons or even with the family of the 
President. These networks can be used to take revenge and obstruct further 
business activities. 
 A ‘loss of face’ cannot be reversed. There is no second chance because the 
trust of the dismissed employee is scarred. How the dismissed employees react 
depends upon their social and ethnic background. In this case, the employees 
with Javanese background showed no emotion, accepted the dismissal and 
withdrew from office. The Batak employee however, did not stay silent but 
instead, wrote a letter to the Dutch General Manger to ask for an explanation of 
the dismissal. She demanded martabat (rehabilitation) and financial 
compensation. It was further discovered that she was the relative of a high-
ranking manager at one of the KPN joint ventures and her father was a retired 
officer of the Intelligence Service. The General manager asked the HRM 
manager for advice and he in turn consulted a lawyer. This caused a delay of 
two weeks, which the employee explains as Dutch arrogance. She then sent a 
fax to the CEO of KPN in the Netherlands to complain about this state of affairs 
and engaged a lawyer to assist her.  
 This conflict clearly illustrates the importance of having a good middleman. 
If a conflict cannot be avoided the middleman softens the impact of the conflict 
and initiates diplomatic exchange between the conflicting parties. The tension 
over the conflict at the office has by then grown. The employees of the ‘Dutch 
management’ wing think the dismissed employees react too emotionally. The 
Indonesian employees of the ‘local employees’ wing sympathise with their 
colleagues and think Leo has reacted too impulsively by dismissing the 
employees. He should have talked it over with them. The Dutch colleagues can 
understand Leo’s motivation but it is imperative to call upon the KPN 
middleman who normally deals with relations and conflicts to mediate and to 
find a solution to the problem between the parties concerned. With his help they 
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finally reach an agreement after three weeks. A typical afternoon of mediation 
through the middleman could look like this: 
⋅ 13.30;  Middleman talks with employee. 
⋅ 13.45;  Middleman talks with Dutch Human Resource manager. 
⋅ 14.10;  Middleman and Dutch HR manager talk with General Manager. 
⋅ 14.25;  Middleman talks with employee. 
⋅ 14.30;  Employee talks with middleman, Dutch HR manager and 
General Manager. 
⋅ 15.15;  Employee returns to her desk and discusses the solution with 
her colleagues. 
⋅ 16.00;  Middleman talks with Indonesian employee. 
⋅ 16.30;  Middleman and Indonesian HR manager talk with employee. 
⋅ 16.40;  Middleman and Indonesian HR manager discuss. 
⋅ 17.00;  Employee and HR anager discuss. 
⋅ 17.30;  Employee returns home to think the proposal over. 
 
 Although the conflict is solved, the public humiliation of the employees has 
negatively influenced the entire Jakarta office. The ‘Bapak’ feeling is fading and 
the motivation and feelings of security of the Indonesian colleagues are affected. 
The sense of insecurity frightens the Indonesian employees and prevents them 
from taking initiative and publicly making criticism. No emotions are directly 
expressed to the Dutch management but the incident will not be forgotten. Some 
of the Indonesian employees choose to accept other positions. 
I was confused. On what basis people are dismissed or promoted here? I also 
worried about my future because my wife is pregnant. Job security is 
important for me. Another company has offered me a better salary. That 
company offers me lifetime employment, a better salary and my prospective 
boss is of the same religion as I am (interview of Indonesian KPN Jakarta 
employee).  
 Leo’s dismissal of the three Indonesian employees has impressed upon him 
that the Dutch management style can conflict with Indonesian style of 
management. Zijlstra (1994) also concludes in his study that there is a dilemma 
in the role taking of the western expatriate. By choosing a role as Bapak, the 
expatriate is imprisoned by Indonesian culture and losses control of the 
organisation, yet he regains his moral authoritative position. In being an orang 
bule (foreigner) he assumes he is able to control and change the organisation but 
when he tries to assert control he instead loses his moral authority as well as 
control over the organisation. Leo has learned this dilemma the hard way: 
I wanted to do it myself, to give the bad news. And yes, you like to bring it 
right away. That is the way you have learned to do it in the Netherlands. In 
general I am a socially involved person. Sometimes too much so, my wife 
says. I think the decision itself is good but I did not think through the 
implementation of the decision. 
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 What then might the best management style for Dutch KPN managers to 
adopt? In order to find answer to that the different possible strategies for Dutch 
KPN expatriates in reaction to the new cultural context in Indonesia need to be 
discussed. 
 
9.2.9 Dutch Expatriate Circle in Jakarta 
Although Leo experienced a new cultural context in Jakarta, the business 
environment at the office and the daily work rituals of going to the office, 
having meetings, having lunch and returning home are quite similar to his 
routine back home in The Netherlands. For Kim however, the new cultural 
context in Jakarta is felt more intensely. She has to handle new conditions and 
adapt to her new role as a full time housewife. Because spouses of expatriates 
are forbidden to have a job in Indonesia she is now entirely focused on 
supporting her partner as a homemaker, raising the children and running the 
housekeeping. She starts managing the domestic helpers such as the cook, the 
‘pembantu’ and the housecleaner. She experiences a lack of privacy because of 
the constant presence of the domestic employees living in the house. Besides 
this, she has to find her way around Jakarta, to do the shopping, find good 
medical assistance, buy clothes for the children and basically orientates herself 
in the city. The move to their new accommodation in Jakarta, the change of 
climate, not having established any new friends yet, the lack of privacy and the 
managing of the Indonesian housekeepers leads to the conclusion that Frieda 
felt the new cultural context even more strongly than Leo in his professional 
environment. 
 The new cultural context at work and at home has a strong impact on the 
personal lives of the KPN employees and their families.119 This impact is also 
known as culture shock. Like most of the Dutch KPN expatriates, neither Leo 
nor his wife have any in-depth experience in Indonesia or for that matter of any 
other country besides their own. We have learned that Leo had almost no time 
for developing intercultural knowledge or learning Bahasa Indonesia. How then 
would he and his family cope with the new cultural context in Jakarta?  
 Leo and Frieda’s private life is centred on the Netherlands International 
School.120 Frieda accompanies the children to school in the mornings. She meets 
with other Dutch mothers and helps the children with computer lessons. This 
voluntary work helps her to establish new contacts with other people. The first 
time she came to NIS other expatriate spouses asked her with which company 
her husband was working in. She was told where to buy her food, how to 
                                                        
119 After my return to the Netherlands in January 1998 the tense political situation directly 
influenced the personal lives of KPN employees and their families. On May 17 1998, 75 KPN 
employees and their families fled from Jakarta after the outbreak of serious riots. During the riots 
1100 mostly ethnic Chinese were killed and foreigners were threatened with death. Three Dutch 
KPN employees stayed in Jakarta to take care of the possessions of KPN. Seven of the employees 
stayed in Singapore and returned one week later. With the start of the new school season in August 
1998 all of the families have returned in Jakarta. 
120 The modern NIS has more than 180 children and 17 Dutch teachers who work there for a five-
year’s contract. The school was established thirty years ago. The fee for each child amounts to US$ 
5000 each year. The parents of the children, the Dutch government, private companies like Shell 
and KPN subsidise the NIS. 
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manage her housekeepers, how to behave and where not to go. She was invited 
for dinner and was told stories of other Dutch expatriates in Jakarta. Sometimes 
it is a rather small world at NIS but Frieda is glad to do this voluntary work 
three mornings per week. She can also choose to work in the school’s library, at 
the swimming pool, or assist in the classes. She likes the atmosphere at the 
school and establishes friendships with the Dutch teachers and other Dutch 
spouses of expatriates.  
 Apart from (1) the mothers of school-going children at the NIS, there are 
three other groups of Dutch expatriate partners: (2) spouses without children, (3) 
women with older children studying or living in the Netherlands and (4) 
Indonesian women. Almost all of the Dutch KPN expatriates in Indonesia are 
male. For newly arrived women of the second and third group making contacts 
in Jakarta is more difficult than for women in the first group. They have neither 
the children nor jobs that would automatically bring them into contact with 
other people. A large part of the Dutch women have higher education and have 
given up their job or career to move with their partner to Indonesia. Because 
working for partners of expatriates is forbidden in Indonesia these women are in 
need of engaging in useful activities. Being able to identify with a job, with 
family or friends is impossible and identification with the role of full time 
housewife is in general not the ambition of the women of the second and third 
group.  
When I came here it cost me more than a year to get acclimatised in Jakarta. 
In the Netherlands I had a very busy job. Here the first contacts were 
difficult for me because I do not have children so I did not visit the NIS. 
Now I do speak Bahasa Indonesia, I have some Indonesian friends and I do 
voluntary work in the kampung with children (interview with spouse of KPN 
expatriate). 
 The situation for the spouses of KPN expatriates in Indonesia is not easy 
from an emotional point of view. They are expected to be strong and support 
their partners. Emotions such as boredom, homesickness and jealousy 
destabilise their relationships and are not discussed with other expatriates’ 
partners. Partners keep busy with housekeeping, raising children, voluntary 
work, visiting each other, playing bridge, playing tennis, swimming and 
shopping. Dutch expatriate partners regularly meet each other in three separate 
groups. Apart from the group of women centred on the NIS there is a group of 
women focused on the ‘coffee mornings’. These mornings are organised in one 
of the expatriates’ houses and sometimes a guest speaker is invited. The group 
varies in number but in general 15 to 20 women participate. A third group 
consists of women doing voluntary work for the ‘study group ’72’, an initiative 
of the Dutch embassy with the objective to support social cultural projects in 
Indonesia. The NIS group is separate from the ‘coffee mornings’ group, while 
the study group ’72 shows an overlap with the two earlier mentioned groups.  
Newly arrived partners such as Frieda are told who the best dentist is in 
Jakarta, what hospital can be trusted, how to manage the Indonesian 
housekeepers and where the shopping can be done. Shopping is done in the 
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luxury Pasaraya and Seibu shopping malls in the Block M area in Jakarta. In 
these malls many western quality products can be found. Shoes and clothing for 
tall people are however, difficult to find and have to be bought in the 
Netherlands. Information on living in Indonesia is one of the most valuable 
resources for Frieda in adapting to the new situation she has been placed in. She 
can check the website www.expat.ic.co that is entitled: Living in Indonesia: A 
Site for Expatriates which is accessed more then 100 times per day. This 
website provides a central meeting ground for acquiring and sharing information 
with other expatriates (The Jakarta Post, December 21, 1997). 
 Leo’s private network is built through the personal contacts of his wife. Leo 
gives his family first priority, limiting his contact with colleagues to business 
hours. He also enjoys meeting people other than his colleagues. The social life 
of Frieda at the NIS connects him to Dutch expatriates of other Dutch 
companies in Indonesia. In this was he has created his own network of personal 
contacts with Dutch executives of banks, insurance companies and oil 
companies. Leo also does some voluntary work for the NIS. He realises his 
private world consists mainly of contacts within the Dutch expatriate world and 
thinks this is a pity but with more than 2500 Dutch expatriates in Jakarta 
contacts are easier made with Dutch than with Indonesians. According to Leo 
assimilation into Indonesian society is just an illusion:  
We live here together with other Dutch expatriates in the same 
neighbourhood. We live in a golden cage. People ask me if I like living in 
Indonesia. Then I say yes, but life is not so much different from the 
Netherlands. Only here I have a white house with a swimming pool. 
 It is only in the NIS summer holidays that things are different. Over the 
Dutch summer school holidays Frieda, like many other Dutch expatriate wives, 
returns to the Netherlands with the children for two or three months to visit her 
family and friends. Leo joins his family for three weeks then has to return to 
Jakarta for work. When Frieda and the children are away from Jakarta the 
contacts with his colleagues are intensified. He works more hours at the office, 
has dinner with colleagues and sometimes goes out for a beer in a bar.   
 Playing sports together also creates informal relations among the KPN 
expatriates and provides the occasion for news and stories to be exchanged and 
personal relations to be developed. Many of the expatriates consider sports as a 
necessary activity. All of the expatriates have a car and a driver and only walk 
inside air-conditioned buildings. Dutch expatriates who are used to biking, 
skating, or running are restricted because of the heavy traffic and pollution in 
Jakarta. Leo has various possibilities of sport and exercise to choose from. He 
can play tennis with his KPN colleagues every Wednesday evening at the hot 
Chilandak tennis court from 7-9 pm or join the volleyball group in the gym of 
NIS where Dutch expatriates play from 8-10 pm on Monday evenings. It is 
organised by a teacher and the participants pay a small contribution for the hire 
the gym and the balls. Many KPN expatriates and their spouses join the group 
as well as Dutch students and other Dutch expatriates. 
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 The activity Leo likes most is soccer. Every Saturday Leo and some of his 
KPN colleagues play two 45-minute halves with the team of Fc Knudde in the 
hot tropical sun. There are actually two different and competitive teams of Fc 
Knudde: Orange and White. He likes the variety of Dutch people in the teams. 
Students, small business entrepreneurs, but also general managers and 
executives play soccer there. One of the highlights of the year is the Fc Knudde 
soccer tournament. A Japanese sports complex near the Bogor hills has been 
selected. Sixteen teams from different nations participate. Four teams represent 
the Dutch expatriates. The 12-minute games cost a lot of energy because of the 
hot climate. Many bottles of water and beer are consumed in the effort to cool 
down and there is plenty of time for informal talk about work related issues. 
 Because of the many contacts, Leo and Frieda are frequently invited to 
parties on weekends. Almost every Friday and Saturday there is a party, so they 
rather stay home on Sunday evening. To celebrate their partners’ birthdays 
Frieda and three of her friends arranged a surprise party. Frieda’s house and 
garden were beautifully decorated. All of the guests were asked to come in 
Hawaiian outfits. More than eighty guests showed up in shorts, Hawaiian 
blouses or other tropical clothing. Frieda and her friends had put a lot of energy, 
time and money in the preparation of the party. They looked like Hawaiian 
beauties with their black wigs and their Hawaiian flower dresses made 
especially for this party. Eight KPN colleagues and their partners received the 
invitation written in Dutch and came to the party. All the guests were Dutch.  
Image of the Dutch by PT Telkom 
management 
 
Too direct 
Blunt 
Sarcastic 
Want a direct yes or no 
Aggressive 
Not to be trusted 
Unfriendly 
Too absorbed with memories of the 
past 
Do not care about local politics 
 Leo’s contacts with Indonesians are limited to his work. In his private life he 
is totally involved in the Dutch expatriate circuit. As has been discussed when 
an expatriate is new in Jakarta it is very difficult not to get totally involved in 
the Dutch circuit and, for expatriates living in the Dutch circle it is difficult to 
establish contacts within the Indonesian society because of the Indonesians’ 
negative image of the Dutch expatriate circle. In 1996, in a multi cultural 
management workshop, managers of PT Telkom formulated a general image of 
the Dutch. The results of this workshop showed a rather negative image of 
Dutch (see Figure 19). According to the PT Telkom management the Dutch 
behave badly (too direct, blunt, not polite, aggressive and unfriendly) and are 
not very sensitive (unreliable, ethnocentric, not willing to understand and not 
caring for local politics). The 
difficulties faced in trying to 
establish relations with 
Indonesians and in learning the 
language coupled with the 
awareness that the residence in 
Jakarta is temporary makes it thus 
easier and more attractive for 
expatriates to invest in Dutch 
networks. Those who want to 
escape this dominant subculture 
have to make a conscious choice 
to do so. 
‘Do it my way’ thinking 
Don’t want to understand Indonesians 
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Figure 19. Image of the Dutch by PT Telkom management 
 
9.2.10 Totally Wrapped Up in Indonesian Culture 
On the other hand, there are some of the KPN employees who have fallen in 
love with the Indonesian culture, who are really interested, want to learn the 
language, get to know Indonesian friends, explore the countryside and even to 
adapt their life-style to the local culture. Soon after their arrival in Jakarta they 
experienced the difficulty of exploring Indonesian culture while participating in 
the Dutch expatriate circle. It is very difficult to establish personal relations in 
both the Dutch expatriate society and the Indonesian society at the same time.  
If I come to a party of one of my KPN colleagues they will ask me more than 
ten times if I am coming to play tennis, play hockey, soccer etc. Before you 
notice your complete week is filled up with the Dutch circle. But we have 
made as much Indonesian friends as possible. You have to choose if you are 
living here. Where do you belong? (interview with KPN employee).  
 These employees do not want to hide in the Dutch expatriate circle and 
choose to explore the Indonesian culture rather than the Dutch expatriate 
culture.  
It is difficult for me to live in two worlds at the same time. I live either in the 
Dutch world or in the world where I am working at that moment. That can be 
London, Czech Republic or Indonesia. But then I take the frame of reference 
of the host country. I understand how Dutch think, do and live, but it is not 
my world. I find it difficult to concentrate on that. I am completely focused 
on the Indonesian society, try to learn the language, develop cultural 
sensitivities, read Indonesian newspapers and keep at a distance from the 
Dutch expatriate society (interview with KPN employee).  
 Dutch expatriates who already have personal relations with Indonesia or 
male employees who have come without partners to Indonesia are most likely to 
adopt this strategy. Employees who have been born in Indonesia, have 
Indonesian parents or grandparents or, already have an Indonesian spouse who 
has family and friends in Jakarta spend part of their time with these relations 
and are therefore part of the Indonesian society. Some of the single employees 
are not particularly interested in participation in the Dutch circle but search for 
friends among Indonesians. The isolation from Dutch expatriate society is not 
always a matter of free choice but also a matter of personal interests and 
situation.  
Many of the Dutch say I am more Indonesian than Dutch. The people here at 
the office know that. It is not that I cut myself off completely from the Dutch 
expatriate culture. For me it is very logical - I am not with NIS, and many of 
the parties there are only couples. They can invite me for dinner but then I 
come alone. I can take an Indonesian friend, but she speaks English. The 
conversation has to be in English and that is not comfortable for the hosts. 
How do we have to treat an Indonesian guest?…- they are not used to that. I 
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have a good relationship with all of the Dutch at the office, I know them all 
(interview with KPN employee).  
 Because of their Indonesian networks and the knowledge of Bahasa 
Indonesia these employees get more information and pick up rumours more 
easily than the expatriates who employ the first strategy discussed. The problem 
for employees with this strategy however, is their loyalty towards their 
Indonesian networks and the exclusion from the Dutch circle. Information 
obtained from Indonesian sources is given on the basis of trust and the Dutch 
expatriate identifies with his Indonesian networks. The missing of personal 
networks within the Dutch circle prevents these Dutch expatriates from passing 
on valuable information to bridge the cultural gap between the Indonesian and 
Dutch management. The number of KPN employees who use this strategy is 
however, relatively low. 
 Another point that has to be discussed here is the relation between Dutch 
expatriates and Indonesian women. The different man-woman relationship in 
Indonesia confuses many male Western expatriates. The chance that a single 
expatriate who has adopted a going native strategy will have a relationship with 
an Indonesian woman is quite high. Indonesian women are beautiful, respectful 
towards their partner, are generally willing to marry an expatriate, like to learn 
Dutch and are supportive. Indonesian women have different reasons to prefer 
marriage with an orang asing rather than to wed an Indonesian husband. Apart 
from love, marriage with an orang asing is a social and economic upgrading for 
an Indonesian woman and her family. The better quality of a relationship with a 
foreigner can also be a motivational factor. 
I am already 23 years old. My mother worries about me that I am still not 
married. But I do not want to marry an Indonesian man. I have seen 
examples of my brothers and nephews. In the first year they are very friendly 
to their wife, but after that no longer. Then they become demanding and treat 
their wives badly. And now I am in love with an expatriate (interview with 
Indonesian female employee). 
 Indonesians, especially young males, negatively perceive the women who 
have a relationship with an expatriate.121 These women are called the ‘girls with 
the green eyes’ to point out that these women are motivated by the green bills, 
that is the money of the rich expatriate. These women run the risk of being 
excluded from some of their Indonesian networks. For the expatriate, their 
relationships with Indonesian women can put professional performance at the 
                                                        
121 Stories are told on the difficult relationship of Western men and Indonesian women. Kuntil anak 
is a very beautiful Indonesian woman with long hair but she has a hole in her back. She is a ghost. 
Every evening she washes herself in a stream. An orang asing had seen her washing and returned 
every evening to see her. He fell in love with her and wanted to have her. But she was a ghost. So 
he went to the dukun and asked him how he could poses this beautiful woman. The dukun told him 
to hammer a nail in her head. In this way she became a normal woman. They married and had two 
children, a boy and a girl. When the children had grown, the woman complained of a headache and 
asked her daughter to look at her head. The daughter said; mama, you have a nail in your head. Oh, 
can you get it out it? She asked. So the daughter took the nail out of the head and her mother 
transformed in a ghost again and flew away (story told by one of the Indonesian KPN employees).  
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office under pressure. In chapter 6, the conclusion was drawn that quite a 
number of employees already working with KPN for a long time would like to 
see the world. However, the new cultural context they found themselves in 
altered their perception of their own lives and marriage. This seems to be more 
so the case when their families do not move with them. There is a danger that 
the new cultural context influences the personal identity. For any expatriate, the 
attention he receives from beautiful Indonesian women feeds his self-esteem. 
This is the case in public life, at the office and especially so in nightlife. In 
café’s, discotheques, hotel bars and night-clubs such as Hard Rock Café, Asmat-
Asmat, Jamz, the Jaya Pub, Oriental and Tanamur professional bar girls 
‘operate’. There are expatriates who have the illusion that relationships can be 
kept secret and hidden from both the Dutch expatriate circle and Indonesian 
colleagues.  
He has a wife and three daughters in the Netherlands. But here he also has a 
girl friend. I do not understand that. Indonesians do not understand. I have 
tried to explain him that he have to keep it private, to keep it secret. But his 
girlfriend sometimes comes with him to office. That puts us in trouble 
(interview with Indonesian employee). 
 Up till now, two strategies have been presented: a Dutch KPN expatriate 
either adapts to the Dutch expatriate culture or stays completely out of it. Both 
strategies have proven not to be very successful in the cooperation between 
Dutch and Indonesian employees. And yet the cooperation between KPN with 
its Indonesian counterparts was earlier classified as successful. The key to 
successful cross-cultural cooperation is in fact based upon a small number of 
KPN employees who managed to establish and maintain personal relations with 
both Dutch expatriate and Indonesian society. 
 
9.2.11 The Narrow Path of the Cosmopolitans  
The Dutch KPN expatriates who are mentioned as being successful in their 
work by colleagues maintain equilibrium in their relations with the Dutch 
expatriate culture and the Indonesian culture. It is these employees that have 
been able to establish personal relations with Indonesian telecom professionals, 
who are highly appreciated by the Indonesian counterparts and who are used to 
channel sensitive information from the Indonesian side to KPN. Among these 
expatriates are employees with and without families, people with and without 
Indonesian backgrounds, internationally experienced and inexperienced 
employees and young and old. Apart from maintaining equilibrium, the 
similarities of successful expatriates are found in (1) interpersonal skills, (2) 
showing respect to other people, (3) flexibility, (4) cultural curiosity, (5) cultural 
empathy and (6) cross-cultural contacts.  
 (1) Interpersonal skills in entering into relationships with people and 
building trust are aspects of utmost importance to a successful expatriate in 
Indonesia. There is a need for people orientated managers for foreign 
participation. A remarkably large percentage of the successful KPN expatriates 
interviewed in Indonesia, the Czech Republic and the Netherlands appear to be 
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from the TNT Post Group. This company has a reputation of being people 
orientated and appears to be quite successful in their strategy of 
internationalisation. According to KPN standards the best employees in 
Indonesia are employees with an excellent track record of technical or 
professional abilities. These employees, who are selected for their aggressive 
style, focus on tasks and their will to achieve the objectives set by the corporate 
headquarters are however, not the most successful employees in Indonesia. This 
clearly indicates that other criteria for selection must be found.  
 (2) Successful Dutch KPN employees avoid arrogant behaviour and show 
respect to their Indonesian counterparts thus avoiding the earlier described 
emotional reaction of Indonesians. Arrogance and lack of respect have been 
shown to be two sensitive aspects in the relationship between Dutch expatriates 
and their Indonesian colleagues. While the need to show respect and not be 
arrogant may be the golden rule of international business familiar to all, it is the 
one most broken. 
 (3) Successful Dutch KPN employees have the ability to tolerate and to cope 
with uncertainty. Although a majority of the expatriates show a flexible attitude 
towards their Indonesian colleagues, from chapters 5 and 6 it is learned that 
KPN has in fact been traditionally a highly controlled organisation. The flexible 
implementation of the corporate objectives is therefore a point of attention in 
Indonesia.  
 (4) Cultural curiosity is needed to respect ideas and the behaviour of others. 
Successful employees show interest in the Indonesian style of management and 
make an effort to learn the language. In general, successful Dutch KPN 
employees show interest in the Indonesian culture. 
 (5) Cultural empathy helps the employee to understand the Indonesian 
culture. The management models and management practices of KPN in the 
Netherlands cannot be expected to work successfully in Indonesia.  
For Indonesians it is important that the room for the meeting is comfortable, 
that there is enough to eat and the atmosphere is harmonious, that the CEO is 
seated on the right chair etc. We Dutch fight each other during a meeting, we 
interrupt each other and we sometimes even curse. Our Indonesian 
counterparts think we want to kill each other. But that is the way we interact. 
Therefore, we decided not to fight during meetings but to do that after the 
meetings, if necessary outside. So now we say to each other; ‘sshtt, don’t say 
it now, listen. That is the message we give each other: listen! (interview with 
Dutch KPN employee). 
 (6) Cross-cultural contacts help to establish a balance in the relation between 
Indonesian and Dutch expatriate culture. This helps the successful expatriate to 
bridge the gap between the Dutch and Indonesian employees and helps in the 
link up with the national headquarters in The Hague.  
My parents live in the Netherlands, like my sister and brother, but the rest of 
my family is living here; my grandpa, uncles and aunts are all living here. 
We have family businesses over here. I learn to know my nephews and 
nieces much better…. In my spare time I spend 10-20% of my time with 
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Dutch expatriates, 30% with other International expatriates and 50% with 
my family and other Indonesian friends (interview with KPN employee). 
 
9.3 Conclusions 
 
This section explored the individual and corporate strategies in dealing with 
cultural differences in Indonesia such as language, time related issues, the 
importance of personal networks, ethnic diversity, religious diversity and 
management practices. At the individual level, it was been examined how 
employees of KPN working in Indonesia have found different strategies to cope 
with these cultural differences (see Figure 20) and how these strategies can be 
divided into three categories: (1) the rejection of the local culture, (2) the ‘going 
native’ strategy and (3) the strategy of maintaining personal networks in both 
the local and the expatriate culture. The large Dutch expatriate circle in Jakarta 
makes it very attractive for new Dutch KPN expatriates to choose the first 
strategy. For many of the employees it is not so much a rejection of local culture 
but rather that they are easily absorbed into the expatriate culture. Once in this 
culture, it is very difficult to make contact with Indonesian colleagues, to learn 
about the Indonesian culture and to practise Bahasa Indonesia. The expatriate 
circle almost does not participate in the Indonesian social-cultural society. 
Employees who want to establish Indonesian networks have to avoid expatriate 
culture and adopt the second strategy. This strategy of ‘going native’ has a 
disadvantage in that no information is relayed from the Indonesian employees to 
the Dutch management and visa versa. Hence, it is the KPN employees who 
keep the difficult balance of having networks in both cultures appear to be the 
most successful in cross-cultural cooperation. The personal skills and qualities 
that appear necessary in order for employees to succeed in cross-cultural 
cooperation are: linguistic ability, ability to tolerate and cope with uncertainty, 
patience and respect, optimism, cultural empathy, tolerance, a positive outlook, 
an interest in culture, acceptance, cross-cultural education and cross-cultural 
contacts.  
 At corporate level KPN has used different strategies to cope with the cultural 
diversity in Indonesia. In the start-up phase KPN used the historical and cultural 
relations of Indonesia and the Netherlands to acquire a position in the 
Indonesian telecom market by focusing on the long lasting personal networks 
between NCF employees and Indonesian telecom engineers and the positive 
image of KPN. Taking note of the fact that both Indonesian PTOs and the 
Indonesian government do not employ Chinese KPN has made it a point to 
choose an Indonesian pribumi as business partner. KPN stimulates and supports 
their Dutch employees in the learning of Bahasa Indonesia which, is necessary 
in order to bridge cultural differences, establish informal relations and to 
become a local operator. The organisation however, does not select their 
employees according to the above mentioned personal characteristics. More 
people-orientated employees instead of task-orientated employees are needed in 
Indonesia. The selection of people and the culture of KPN in the Netherlands 
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however, stimulates the selection of highly task-orientated employees. Success 
is completely determined by other factors that have been earlier discussed in this 
chapter. It can thus be concluded that one can be very Dutch and very successful 
in Indonesia if ones personal skills and attitudes are highly valued by 
Indonesian colleagues.  
 The organisation acknowledges the need for good personal relations in 
conducting business in the Indonesian telecom sector and uses distinct 
Indonesian middlemen to establish and maintain relations and for settling 
conflicts. Dutch and Indonesian KPN employees work together in small teams 
when doing business. The Dutch employee takes care of the content, the 
financial agreement and the planning while the Indonesian employee takes care 
of the introduction, the personal networks, the cultural ‘mistakes’ and the 
language ‘problems’. KPN stimulates the use of the Indonesian cultural identity 
in the strategic alliances for commercial purposes and is very careful in 
spreading the Christian identity of the KPN office Jakarta. Although the office 
has intentions of establishing a centre of knowledge for talented Southeast 
Asian employees, the Jakarta office is dominated by European Dutch 
management values.  
 Indonesian strategies to deal with cultural differences with the Dutch have 
also been discussed (see Figure 20). It has been noted that while KPN has the 
financial, managerial and technologic power to improve the Indonesian telecom 
sector, the Indonesian government and the Indonesian strategic partners stress 
upon the colonial history and use their knowledge of the Dutch culture in order 
to balance relations and distribution of power. Consequently, the guilt complex 
of the Dutch with regard to the colonial history of the Netherlands in Indonesia 
makes weak opponents of the KPN employees in negotiations and conflicts. 
Other strategies to hone down the dominant attitude of the Dutch minority 
shareholder include isolating the appointed Dutch executives from informal 
information, avoiding the establishing of informal relationships and to make 
situations more complex than they are. This leaves Dutch executives without 
insight into the extreme and complex networks of business relations, cross-
connections and power structures within Indonesian business. The Indonesian 
government has furthermore, stressed the relatively small size of the 
Netherlands compared with Indonesia. These Indonesian strategies have forced 
KPN to change their objectives from high profile dominance to a low profile 
informal presence. 
 As a result this section shows that cultural knowledge of the Indonesian 
cultural context alone is not enough for successful business. While in the case of 
the Netherlands Antilles a certain under estimation of the complexity could be 
concluded, in this case it is clear that the context has forced KPN to take 
differences in ethnicity, culture and power more seriously into account from the 
start. The different size and character of the Indonesian telecom market as well 
as the fact that it is a more powerful counterpart has made for a more equal 
balance in power. While the strategy of KPN is to bridge cultural differences, 
we see that the informal strategy of the Indonesians is to enlarge these cultural 
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differences and use them strategically to balance the distribution of power in its 
relationship with KPN.  
 
Strategies of Dutch KPN employees  Strategies of resistance of Indonesians 
Seeking information from other Dutch 
expatriates, easy absorption  
Establishing personal networks in 
Dutch expatriates circles and KPN 
Keeping western punctuality 
Establishing personal networks in both 
Dutch and Indonesian subculture 
Using middlemen for conflicts and 
maintaining connections 
Feeling guilty 
Using Dutch management styles 
Avoiding religious discussions 
Avoiding stressing ethnic differences 
Avoiding political discussions  
Establishing personal networks in both 
Indonesian and Dutch communities 
Distancing from Indonesian 
management style 
Internalising the Indonesian 
perception of time 
Speaking Bahasa Indonesia 
Using causal conversation to exchange 
information 
Establishing Indonesian personal 
networks 
Rejecting Dutch expatriate circle 
 
Stressing colonial history 
Stressing the smallness of the 
Netherlands 
Connecting cultural unity and identity 
to telecom business 
Isolating the Dutch managers from 
informal networks 
Not using formal channels of 
communication 
Not taking any initiatives 
Letting the Dutch manager wait 
Having no time for an appointment 
Speaking Dutch to stress the content of 
a speech 
Spreading gossip 
Using personal networks to block 
decisions 
Stressing of Muslim religion 
Using Dutch employees for difficult 
messages 
Working early in the morning and late 
in the evening at office 
Making vague who is in real  power  
Using personal networks to obtain 
information 
Creating a negative image of the 
Dutch 
 
Figure 20. Strategies of Dutch KPN employees and Indonesian employees to cope with 
cultural differences  
 
Kan deze figuur precies nog op even pagina? 
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10 CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS  
 
World Level
Society Level
Organisational Level
Interactional Level
Individual Level
Case 3: Indonesia
Case 1: Unisource 
Case 2: The Netherlands Antilles
This chapter presents an analysis of 
the findings of the study in relation to 
the research questions. The three 
cases of cross-cultural cooperation 
show that KPN employed mainly 
ethnocentric cross-cultural strategies 
in the period from 1989 up till and 
including 1997. These corporate 
strategies stimulated the resistance 
by the partner organisations to 
struggle against perceived 
dominance. The findings of this study have consequences for the existing 
theories on cross-cultural management. A new cross-cultural strategy, 
ethnicising, is introduced. The findings also indicate the factors that strongly 
influence the success of cross-cultural cooperation and areas of further 
research of further research that would help in the prediction of the onset of the 
ethnicising strategy are recommended. PTT Telecom, Like other PTOs, 
experienced adversity in its first stage of internationalisation (1989-1997) but 
succeeded in establishing large-scale international activities.  Organisation-
culture and -history played an important role in the learning process to become 
an international operator. To support the organisation in its international 
ambitions the empirical consequences of the findings are outlined in a 
workshop.  
 
(svp plaatje veranderen: niet levels, maar cases moeten worden 'ingekleurd') 
 
10.1 Introduction 
 
This last chapter reflects upon the results of the study on the cross-cultural 
cooperation of KPN in the period from 1989 up till and including 1997. The in-
depth and explorative study that has been presented has discussed three cases of 
cross-cultural cooperation in part III: the AT&T-Unisource group, the 
Netherlands Antilles and Indonesia. In this chapter, the results of the studied 
cases are compared and put into a wider perspective. The central objective of 
the study is to present an ethnography of the daily practices of cross-cultural 
cooperation in the telecom sector. Thus, in order to provide a clear 
understanding of cross-cultural cooperation the study has focused on the way 
employees deal with cultural diversity. The strategies used in coping with these 
differences are the central findings in this study. To fully understand these 
strategies it was first necessary to make clear the context of the cross-cultural 
cooperation in Part II. The data was presented by exploring five levels of the 
context of cross-cultural cooperation: the world level, the society level, the 
organisational level, the interactional level and the personal level. The three 
cases show that the connections made by means of Latour’s ‘sociologica’ 
method have covered all of these levels. In these cases it has been shown that 
distinct factors in the context have influenced the cross-cultural strategies of 
KPN and its employees. A short overview of factors will be given here.  
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 The causes of the telecom revolution in Part II clearly pointed out the 
dramatic change of the positions of the European PTOs at the telecom market. 
Insight in the world wide competition showed a chaotic market in which a 
diversity of new and old telecom operators established unstable strategic 
alliances. This information was necessary in order to understand the chaotic and 
political situation in which Hans, one of the key informants was working in the 
AT&T-Unisource group and how this uncertain setting influenced his daily 
cross-cultural behaviour. 
 KPN was no longer monopolist at its traditional home market but had to 
prepare for competition as a result of the restructuring of the Dutch telecom 
market. Competition has reduced its market shares, lowered international 
telephone tariffs and consequently raised pressure on the turnover and profits. 
To compensate for the expected decline of turnover KPN employed various 
strategies of survival such as introducing new product and services, expanding 
to related national industries, adopting aggressive business strategies, reducing 
costs and expanding its international activities. The discussion over these 
strategies in Part II was necessary in order for us to understand the pressure of 
the KPN management to be successful in the case of the Netherlands Antilles.  
 Till that point the organisation had no experience with international business 
as was explained in the history of KPN was explained. As a result, for Ad, 
Robert, Leo and Hans it was their first international experience. Only Niels had 
previous experience. An overview of KPN's history was needed to be provided 
in order to achieve a clear understanding of the organisation culture of KPN. 
KPN had to be transformed from a national PTO to an international operating 
service provider. In describing the typical day of IS employee Robert and the 
typical day of IB employee Ad explored the subcultures of KPN were explored 
and provided understanding as to why the cooperation between distinct KPN 
departments in Indonesia.  
 All of the three cases in Part III were ventures initiated as a part of the 
internationalisation strategy of KPN. At the start, this strategy was not very 
clear. Information on the old colonial bonds with the Netherlands Antilles and 
Indonesia was necessary to understand the ethnocentrically approach. The 
explanation of the international experience of NCF was necessary to understand 
Dahoko’s position in Indonesia and to understand the success of KPN in 
Indonesia.  
 In the next section the findings of the three cases are contemplated, 
compared and placed in theoretical and empirical perspective. Firstly the 
research questions are reflected upon.  
 
 
10.2 The Three Cases Compared: Reflections Upon the Research 
Questions 
 
The empirical data of this study have been presented in Part II and III in order to 
answer the central research questions that were formulated at the beginning of 
this study. The research questions were:  
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Which strategies of cross-cultural cooperation have been used by the Public 
Telecom Operator in reaction to the restructuring of the telecom market? 
How do employees deal with the used strategies at the individual level? How 
can these strategies be explained from an organisational cultural perspective?  
 In order to make a comparative analysis of the three cases there is a need to 
identify and discuss the differences and similarities of each in its historical, 
cultural and political-economical context. 
 It is clear that in terms of its historical context the AT&T-Unisource case 
strongly differs from the two other cases. The strategic alliance AT&T-
Unisource was a recent cooperation between PTOs which each wanted to 
establish a strong pan-European telecom operator. The cooperation of KPN in 
the Netherlands Antilles and Indonesia was preceded by a long colonial history, 
which had led both Antilleans and Indonesians to develop strategies to cope 
with the dominant European Dutch. For many years KPN, by means of NCF, 
was involved in non-profit advising for the development of telecommunications 
in both countries. The strategy to acquire positions in new international telecom 
markets transformed the relation of KPN and the Antillean and Indonesian 
PTOs to a more commercial relationship.  
 The cultural contexts of the three investigated cases are distinctly different in 
that each is situated in a different continent: Europe, The Caribbean and Asia. 
The AT&T-Unisource case and the case of the Netherlands Antilles however, 
show some similarities in the perceived small cultural distance between KPN 
and its partner organisation. In both cases this stimulated the start of 
cooperation. In the AT&T-Unisource case it was the small cultural distance 
between the Swedish and the Dutch society that initiated the establishing of the 
strategic alliance. In the case of the Netherlands Antilles it was KPN’s 
perception that the Antillean culture was part of the Dutch culture that 
stimulated KPN to make concrete plans to expand in that direction.  
 The political-economic environment of each of the three cases greatly differs 
from the others. Until the end of 1997, Indonesia possessed one of the fastest 
growing economic markets in the world. The large Indonesia telecom market 
was in need of capital but could choose out of many western investors. Hence, 
Indonesian President Soeharto could refuse capital that was restricted by 
political issues, such as Dutch development aid. The refusal stressed the 
growing self-esteem of independent Indonesia. The Netherlands Antilles in 
contrast, not only has a small and vulnerable economy but also is still largely 
dependent on the Netherlands. In the AT&T-Unisource case the political and 
economic integration of the EC countries supported the European cooperation 
between the four PTOs. The AT&T-Unisource case also differs from the other 
two cases in the number of involved Western partner organisations. In the other 
two cases KPN was involved with only one local PTO.  
 The description of the similarities and differences in the context makes it 
now possible to compare the cases in relation to the research questions.  
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10.2.1 Corporate Strategies of KPN to Deal with Cultural Differences 
The first central research question asked which strategies of cross-cultural 
cooperation KPN has used. Chapter 2 discussed three groups of possible 
strategies to deal with cultural differences (see Figure 2). For the discussion in 
this section the terms of Schneider and Barsoux (1997) are being used because 
these fits best. The three strategies are named: ignore, minimisation and 
utilisation of cultural differences. The cross-cultural strategies used in the three 
cases will be discussed next.  
 In the case of the AT&T-Unisource alliance cultural differences in cross-
cultural cooperation were seen as a source of problems in the alliance and KPN 
therefore chose to minimise. As such, the perceived cultural similarities of 
Swedish Telia and Dutch KPN stimulated the establishment of the strategic 
alliance Unisource. With the entry of Swiss Telecom, Telefónica and AT&T, 
the cultural complexity of the AT&T-Unisource group increased. As a result, 
cooperation was difficult and decision-making procedures were slow. The 
strong need for efficient and effective cooperation within the group led to the 
question of how to deal with cultural diversity. The shareholders of Unisource 
could give up their own identity and merge into Unisource or Unisource could 
become a truly independent joint venture with its own organisational culture. 
The second option has been chosen by the shareholders of Unisource. The pan-
European organisation sought a cultural compromise and wanted to utilise the 
cultural diversity to become more competitive in the European telecom market. 
KPN therefore changed its cultural compromise strategy to a more synergetic 
strategy (see Figure 21). The AT&T-Unisource employees learned to respond in 
accordance with other cultural values in the organisation. This was supported by 
developing a Unisource organisational culture, through training programs such 
as JMDP, by the One Telecom Country concept and by allowing more 
autonomy for the alliance.  
 In the case of the Netherlands Antilles KPN ignored the cultural differences. 
The historical, cultural and emotional relation of the Netherlands with the 
Netherlands Antilles resulted in the assumption that the Dutch way of 
conducting business would suit the Antilles and that cultural differences could 
be ignored. However, the case of the Netherlands Antilles shows that the 
Curaçaoan business culture differs fundamentally from that of the Dutch. 
Cultural differences were clearly evident in the way Dutch is spoken and used, 
the different perceptions of time related issues, the way criticism is made and 
feedback is given, the way knowledge is transferred and in the degree of 
importance assigned to personal networks. The Dutch negotiation team largely 
ignored these cultural differences. The Dutch cultural dominance at Curaçao 
added greatly to KPN’s underestimation of the Antillean complexity. Thus the 
Antillean refusal to sign the contract at St. Maarten and the resistance against 
the participation of KPN in the Curaçaoan PTO came as a complete surprise to 
the KPN management. The Curaçaoan resistance did not force KPN to use 
another cross-cultural strategy during the process of acquisition because of the 
unequal power balance. The small size of the Antillean telecom market, the 
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dependency of the Antillean economy and the need for technological expertise 
put the Antilleans in a weak position against KPN.   
 In contrast to the Netherlands Antilles, KPN changed their cross-cultural 
strategy during the process of acquisition in Indonesia. Consequently, in the 
start-up phase, the historical and emotional relations of Indonesia and the 
Netherlands helped KPN to establish business relations in the telecom sector. 
The size of the Indonesian telecom market and the strong Indonesian national 
identity further forced KPN to change its cross-cultural strategy. The Indonesian 
counterparts did not accept behaviour that expressed the cultural dominance of 
KPN and openly stressed the relatively smallness of the organisation. As a 
result, KPN was forced to change the strategy of cultural dominance in a 
strategy of cultural compromise (see Figure 21). The impact of the cultural 
differences was minimised by stimulating KPN employees to learn Bahasa 
Indonesia, to mask their Christian identity, to use Indonesian middlemen with 
the task of establishing and maintaining personal relations, to work in small 
intercultural teams and to choose a pribumi counterpart. With this cross-cultural 
strategy KPN was more successful. 
Time
Cultural
Dominance The Netherlands Antilles
Indonesia
AT&T-UnisourceCultural
Compromise
Cultural
Synergy
1990 1998
Figure 21. The cross-cultural strategies of KPN in the three cases 
 
 Based on the findings of this study it appears evident that KPN used mainly 
ethnocentric strategies to deal with cultural differences in its strategic alliances. 
However, with the passing of time and under influence of the partner 
organisations these strategies were modified (see Figure 21). The struggle for 
power with these partner organisations forced KPN to reflect upon its cross-
cultural strategies and to choose less ethnocentric strategies. This supports the 
statement made in chapter 2 on the idealistic character of the synergetic cross-
cultural strategies. In a struggle for power the ‘dominant’ partner organisation 
will stress the use a strategy of cultural synergy, while the ‘non-dominant’ 
partner organisation will use strategies of resistance. In the next section the 
strategies of the ‘non-dominant’ partner are more closely studied. 
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10.2.2 Cultural Strategies of Resistance and Exclusion  
In the previous section it was made clear that the cross-cultural strategy of KPN 
changed under influence of the partner organisation. Section 2.2.2 showed that 
cultural differences have to be understood as a social construction, as a result of 
interaction which can change over time and in situations (Cohen 1994, Barth 
1994). The so-called ‘weaker’ or ‘non-dominant’ partner organisation can 
therefore accentuate cultural differences and start a manifest form of ethnicity in 
the struggle for power with the so-called ‘strong’ or ‘dominant’ organisation 
(Baud et al. 1994, Barth 1994, Koot 1997). This section discusses the partner 
organisations’ cultural strategies of resistance and exclusion in cooperation with 
KPN. 
 The case of the Netherlands Antilles met the three conditions for the 
offspring of a manifest form of ethnicity (Baud et al. 1994: 129). Firstly, there 
was intense interaction between the Antilleans and the Dutch at Curaçao. 
Secondly, there was a clear sense of Antillean community feeling. Thirdly, the 
job security of the Antillean PTO employees and the profitable financial 
constructions were threatened by the possible participation of KPN. The 
Antilleans perceived KPN as a powerful counterpart with large financial 
resources, excellent technical expertise, highly-qualified managers and 
international relations. The ethnocentric cross-cultural strategy used by KPN 
stimulated Curaçaoan strategies of resistance and exclusion. By connecting the 
Curaçaoan telecommunication sector to the concept of ‘Patrimonium 
Nashional’ the labour union STTK could use this manifest form of ethnicity in 
its struggle to block the participation of KPN in the Antillean PTOs. STTK was 
thus able to bring together the Antillean political opposition, the management of 
Antelecom, the labour union SK, the Antelecom employees and sympathising 
Curaçaoans. This case shows that Curaçaoans are familiar with and experienced 
in dealing with the Dutch dominance as a result of the long colonial 
relationship. They have developed a high level of flexibility, a degree of 
independence and ways and means to acquire financial support. The involved 
Curaçaoan parties, such as the labour union STTK, the political opposition and 
the Antelecom management made use of different cultural strategies of 
resistance. The Netherlands Antilles could have benefited from the participation 
of KPN in terms of the restructuring and improvement of the Antillean telecom 
sector. These cultural strategies however, were short-term survival strategies 
and have not resulted in successful structural development (Koot and van 
Marrewijk 1999). 
 The Indonesian case also illustrates the use of cultural strategies of resistance 
and exclusion by the Indonesian counterpart in the struggle for power with 
KPN. Dutch KPN had the financial, managerial and technological power to 
improve the Indonesian telecom sector but the initial ethnocentric cross-cultural 
strategy of KPN in Indonesia met with strong resistance. The Indonesian 
government and the Indonesian partners adopted different cultural strategies of 
resistance to balance relations with KPN and to redress the dominant attitude of 
the Dutch minority shareholder. The Indonesian partner organisations and the 
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Indonesian government connected the telecom sector to the strong Indonesian 
cultural identity in order to counter KPN’s power. It can be said that these 
experiences forced KPN to change its objectives in Indonesia. A dominant 
presence was no longer aimed at. Instead KPN adopted a low profile strategy to 
support its partner organisations. The economic and political context forced 
KPN to treat cultural differences more seriously and the difference in size and 
character of the Indonesian telecom market as well as a more powerful 
counterpart made for a more equal balance in power.  
 From these two cases it can be concluded that dominant behaviour of a 
western PTO in sensitive ex-colonial relationship automatically generates 
resistance of the partner PTO. PTOs in developing countries therefore speak of 
‘new imperialism’. They stress upon the importance of maintaining its own 
cultural identity and exaggerate upon the negative effect of existing cultural 
differences as a strategy against the perceived dominant partner. The dominant 
partner in turn stresses the importance of synergy and of utilising cultural 
differences to its own benefit which leaves the ‘non-dominant’ partner feeling 
threatened. Cross-cultural cooperation therefore is difficult when there is a 
struggle for power in a strategic alliance.  
 This struggle for power can result from in-equalities in power but also from 
rivalry. This is shown in the AT&T-Unisource case where cultural strategies of 
resistance and exclusion have been used in the struggle for power between two 
equal partner companies. It was expected that the cooperation between Dutch 
KPN and Swedish Telia would be easy because of the cultural overlap of the 
shareholders but this apparently did not simplify cross-cultural cooperation. The 
cultural differences in Dutch and Swedish management styles have been 
exaggerated and used by both organisations in order to dominate the strategic 
alliance. From a strategic point of view it can be understand why KPN 
employees perceived cooperation with Swiss Telecom employees positively. 
The combination of the cautious Swiss Telecom employees and the dominant 
Dutch employees worked out well in daily cooperation. Swiss Telecom was not 
striving for power with KPN because the Swiss organisation is still in its initial 
phase of internationalisation and not many Swiss employees were involved in 
international activities. In the cooperation between Dutch and Spanish 
employees cultural differences between the partners did not play an important 
role, because the relationship had only just started.  
 The three cases show that a struggle for power and control in the strategic 
alliance has a strong influence on the success of cross-cultural cooperation. The 
struggle for power can result from a perceived dominance of the ‘dominant’ 
partner by the ‘non-dominant’ partner, such as in the cases of the Netherlands 
Antilles and Indonesia, or from rivalry, such as in the AT&T-Unisource case. 
The cases have also shown how that cultural strategies of resistance and 
exclusion have been used strategically in the struggle for power and control in 
the strategic alliances. However, the question of how individual employees cope 
with the cross-cultural strategies of KPN has not yet been discussed. 
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10.2.3 Individual Strategies of KPN Employees to Deal with Cultural 
Differences 
To understand the coping strategies the study has focused on the daily life 
behaviour of KPN employees, such as Robert (IS department), Ad (IB 
department), Hans (Unisource), Niels (the Netherlands Antilles) and Leo 
(Indonesia). The results presented in Part II and III show that the environment of 
KPN employees has changed since 1990. The restructuring of the telecom sector 
has forced KPN to carry out fundamental reorganisation in order to be more 
competitive. As a result, employees could no longer depend on lifetime 
employment and automatic promotion but have instead to be flexible and, under 
the threat of possible layoffs, look for new possibilities of employment within 
the organisation. For many of the employees these changes involved a lot of 
stress and fear. Work could no longer be done according to routine. New 
demands from the organisation required a more dynamic and commercial 
attitude of the employees. These new demands were taxing and sometimes 
drawing in excess upon the resources of the employees. To cope with these 
demands the IS and the IB employees have used a flexible set of coping 
strategies to solve problems and to regulate emotions that are adapted to the 
requirements of the situation.  
 Not only the IB and IS employees working in the KPN headquarters had to 
deal with a changed cultural environment but also the employees working in the 
foreign KPN offices and international strategic alliances. These employees 
worked in places such as Jakarta, Prague, Tokyo, Dublin and New York and in 
international strategic alliances such as Unisource and Worldpartners. The 
change of cultural environment also created feelings of tension, insecurity and 
fear in the expatriates. The cross-cultural experiences of KPN in the cases on the 
AT&T-Unisource, the Netherlands Antilles and Indonesia show that its 
employees have used different strategies to cope with the new cultural 
environment. From the coping strategies it can be concluded there are three 
primary major groups of employees using different strategies to cope with cross-
cultural differences in the international activities of KPN. The first group of 
employees identify themselves with their own organisational and national 
culture. They distance themselves from the host country cultural context 
choosing instead to alienate them within the home country subculture. 
Compromising more than approximately 80% of the KPN employees this is by 
far the largest group. The second group of employees identify themselves with 
the local cultural context and avoids the expatriate culture. This ‘going native’ 
approach is not so very popular and only an estimated 5 – 10 % of the 
employees choose this strategy. The third group of employees identify 
themselves with both their own national as well as the host country culture. 
These employees have networks in both cultures and therefore can serve as 
‘cultural connections’ and ‘interpreters’ for both home and host country culture. 
This third group consists of 10 – 15 % of the KPN employees. 
 Bourdieu (1990) and Strauss and Quinn (1994) stress the point that cultural 
schemes structure the employees’ strategies to cope with cultural changes in the 
environment. These regulated improvisations (Bourdieu 1990: 55) mediate the 
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behaviour and actions of the individual employees in their new cultural 
environment. The daily lives of Robert, Ad, Hans, Niels and Leo show that 
these individual schemes are learned by experiences in KPN and influence their 
behaviour. This brings us to the last part of the central research question of how 
these cross-cultural strategies can be explained from organisation cultural 
perspective.  
 
10.2.4 Cross-cultural Strategies Explained From an Organisation Cultural 
Perspective 
As discussed above, individual actions are mediated by learned schemes 
(Bourdieu 1990, Strauss and Quinn 1994). These schemes are, among others, 
learned by earlier experiences in the organisation. At the very start of its process 
of transformation, in the early 1990s, KPN and its employees had almost no 
commercial or international experience. The old national monopolist more and 
more felt the pressure to restructure and to reorganise the bureaucratic 
organisational culture in order to become a commercial operating telecom 
company. Part II shows that KPN has not been very successful in changing its 
organisational culture in the period from 1990 until 1997. Although the 
organisational image has changed dramatically in recent years and the company 
is no longer perceived as a musty bureaucratic department, a larger part of the 
cultural values are still prominent present and exerts influence on the cross-
cultural cooperation. The most important cultural values of KPN that were 
present in the organisational culture were that of: (1) having and maintaining 
control, (2) loyalty on the part of the employees, (3) avoiding deviancy, (4) 
avoiding the showing of vulnerability and (5) being politically orientated. These 
five central values in the organisational culture of KPN have influenced the 
process of international expansion.  
 It is not surprising that the first cultural value is that of having control over 
the organisation since the core business of the company has been that of 
controlling and operating telephone lines for more than a century. This central 
value makes it difficult to manage minority participation in international joint 
ventures because other participants do not accept control by domination. 
Therefore, the former monopolist has to cope with the surrender of control and 
has to accept better best ways of conducting business. The organisation has 
made large investments in new telecom markets but faces difficulties in 
generating financial return. It has been observed that the more control KPN had 
over their foreign partner the more successful the international cooperation was 
perceived. The opinion of the strategic foreign partner however, is not included 
in this definition of success. This can result in a struggle for power, which was 
central in the Unisource case. More and more the strategic alliance became a 
Dutch organisation. This tendency is also seen in other international strategic 
alliances, where the participation is increased to a majority share or reduced to 
zero. The three cases have shown that the more powerful the partner 
organisation is, the more the adopted cross-cultural strategies are focused on 
synergy.  
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 The bureaucratic and political character of the former monopolist resulted in 
a culture in which the employees perceived taking risks and being 
entrepreneurial as difficult. Employees did not easily criticise the management, 
nor air their views honestly and avoided entering conflicts. It is thus evident that 
the second central value of KPN was the loyalty of the employees to the 
organisation. For loyal employees it was necessary to stay in close contact with 
the centre of power in the organisation. As a consequence, employees working 
abroad experienced a low appreciation for international experience. This has 
created, what I have called, the ‘sending myth’. The myth was that an 
international position was bad for your career within KPN. On returning home 
the international employees had to acculturate and find a new position in the 
organisation that had changed in their absence. At most, on returning home, the 
internationally experienced employees were asked: ‘what have you done before 
you went abroad?’.  
 With the separation of international and national business it has become 
more difficult to temporarily hire a home-market specialist for an international 
project. Each of the national business units is responsible for its own results and 
not very co-operative in sharing already scarce technical experts with KPN 
International. Hence, other means of recruitment have to be developed such as 
the creation of a pool of experienced international experts, the offering of dual 
career possibilities, the positive valuation of international experience in careers, 
the supporting of returned employees in the reintroduction and the recruitment 
of non-Dutch employees. These can help to improve the efficiency and quality 
of foreign missions. 
 KPN employees avoid behaviour that denies the democratic and harmonious 
character of the organisation in which all employees are seen as equal, manifest 
deviant ambitions and expresses deviant opinions. Such behaviour is taboo and 
goes against the belief that employees must strive for harmony in the 
organisation. This third central value of avoiding deviancy in effect stimulates 
the use of ethnocentric cross-cultural strategies. 
 The fourth central value is to avoid the showing of vulnerability. By making 
decisions, taking risks, showing responsibility and starting projects without the 
prior approval of the boss an employee makes him/herself vulnerable for failing. 
When surrendering the control over a project, skipping procedures and asking 
for assistance or helping an employee runs the risk of being punished making it 
difficult to learn from others. International experiences are not shared and it is 
difficult to evaluate the process of internationalisation. As a consequence this 
process is observed to be determined more by the emotional disposition of 
parties involved rather than rational decisions.  
 The daily life of IS employee Robert and IB employee Ad show the political 
character KPN, the fifth central value. The political character can be explained 
from a historical perspective. During the organisation’s history, the KPN 
management had to adopt political strategies to cope with the Dutch 
governmental influence in order to manage the organisation properly. As a 
result the organisation has traditionally an internal orientation in which 
sensitivity to political aspects and personal networks are important for success. 
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 In summary, the change in the organisational culture was curbed by these 
five central values during the period of 1990 till and including 1997.   
  
 
10.3 Theoretical Implications on the Three Debates 
 
Up to this point, what are the things we already know? What implications do the 
findings of this study have upon the theoretical debates on intercultural 
management, organisational culture and globalisation? In order to answer these 
questions the theoretical implications of the results of the study for each of the 
debates will shortly be discussed. As a result of the discussions on intercultural 
management I propose to extend the existing cross-cultural strategies with a new 
strategy: the ethnicising strategy. 
 
10.3.1 Debate on Intercultural Management: Ethnicising, a New Strategy of 
Cross-cultural Cooperation  
The study presented in this thesis has contributed to the need of detailed 
empirical research on daily practices in cross-cultural cooperation (Schneider 
and Barsoux 1997). This study has given a better understanding of the wide and 
dynamic character of cross-cultural cooperation. The most important outcome of 
this study is the finding that in order to obtain an understanding of cross-cultural 
cooperation it is necessary not only to analyse cultural differences at national 
and organisational level, but also to understand the strategies that people use to 
cope with these cultural differences. Until now the success of cross-cultural 
cooperation has been related to the cultural distance between the corporate and 
national cultures of the involved companies. The traditional cultural models of 
Trompenaars (1993) and Hofstede (1991) have helped to give an indication of 
the cultural distance between the national cultures of KPN and its strategic 
partners. But what if these models were applied to the three cases presented in 
this study?  
 In the case of the strategic alliance of Unisource the results of the studies of 
Hofstede (1991) and Trompenaars (1993) were applied in chapter 7. The scores 
on the value dimensions of Hofstede and Trompenaars show that the cultural 
values of the Netherlands and Sweden show more similarities than between the 
Netherlands and Switzerland. We would have therefore expected a more 
difficult cooperation between the Swiss and the Dutch. The findings of the study 
presented in this thesis however, conclude otherwise, noting namely a 
problematic cooperation between the Dutch and the Swedish and a rather 
successful cooperation between the Swiss and the Dutch. Rivalry and a struggle 
for power in the alliance caused the difficult cooperation between Dutch KPN 
and Swedish Telia. Dutch KPN also experienced a difficult cooperation with the 
American AT&T. While the Dutch and American cultural dimensions show 
many similarities, in the daily practice cross-cultural cooperation was found to 
be difficult. 
 In the case of the Netherlands Antilles it is more difficult to apply the models 
because Trompenaars (1993) and Hofstede (1991) do not mention the 
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Netherlands Antilles in their studies. Sanders and Verton (1994) however, 
applied Hofstede’s value dimension on Curaçao and compared their findings 
with scores on Venezuela, Jamaica and the Netherlands (see Table 5).122 They 
came to the conclusion that Curaçao scored the same as the Netherlands on the 
dimension of power distance and both societies show more or less similar scores 
on the individualism value dimension. Curaçao is more masculine than the 
Netherlands while Curaçao had a higher score on the dimension of uncertainty 
avoidance than did the Netherlands. Finally, Curaçao is more oriented towards 
long term relations than the Netherlands is. On the basis of these outcomes it 
could have been expected that the cross-cultural cooperation between KPN with 
the Curaçaoan PTOs would not have been so much of a problem. The long-term 
orientation of Curaçaoan people, the similarities in the dimension of power 
distance and individualism would make cooperation between the Dutch and 
Curaçaoans easy.  
Value Dimension The Netherlands Curaçao 
Power distance 38  40 
Individuality 80  69 
Uncertainty avoidance 53  80 
Masculinity 14  27 
Table 5. Cultural distance between Dutch and Curaçaoan cultures (source: Sanders and 
Verton 1994) 
 However, in contrast to the findings of Sanders and Verton (1994) the results 
on the experiences of KPN on Curaçao give a totally different impression. KPN 
expected an easy cross-cultural cooperation with its Antillean partners but their 
dealings were instead fraught with difficulties. The opponents of the 
participation of KPN in the Antillean PTOs manifested ethnicity in order to 
combine protests and exaggerated the cultural differences between the Dutch 
and Curaçaoans to block the participation. 
 In the case of Indonesia both Hofstede and Trompenaars have data on the 
Indonesian national culture. Hofstede (1991) sees very large cultural differences 
between the Netherlands and Indonesia on all value dimensions except for the 
avoidance of uncertainty (see Table 6). From the results of Trompenaar’s (1993) 
study it can be concluded that Indonesian culture can be characterised by the 
particularistic, collectivist, ascriptive, diffusive and neutral dimensions. 
Indonesia and the Netherlands differ in four of these five dimensions. Based on 
these findings it would be justified to conclude that it would not be wise for 
KPN to conduct business in Indonesia because the cultural distance would be 
too large. 
 
Value Dimension The Netherlands Indonesia 
Power distance 38  78 
Individuality 80  14 
                                                        
122 The results of the study of Sanders and Verton (1994) have to be interpreted carefully because 
the study is not so much representative for the Curaçaoan population. They did a research among 
137 students of the University of the Netherlands Antilles.    
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Uncertainty avoidance 53  48 
Masculinity 14  46 
Table 6. Cultural distance between Dutch and Indonesian cultures (source: Hofstede 1991) 
 However, the findings presented in this thesis show a difficult but rather 
successful cooperation between KPN and its Indonesian partner organisations. 
The success of this cooperation was based upon the fact that NCF employees 
already had personal networks in Indonesia and KPN used these networks and 
the historic-cultural relation of the Netherlands and Indonesia to establish 
commercial relations. Although KPN was perceived as a powerful partner the 
Indonesian government and PT Telkom were able to exert influence on the 
Dutch. They stressed the cultural identity of Indonesia, enlarged cultural 
differences when necessary, used the colonial history and stressed the small size 
of the Netherlands in order to force KPN to change their strategy of cultural 
dominance into a strategy of cultural compromise. 
 In summary, the findings show that the cultural dimensions of Hofstede 
(1991) and Trompenaars (1993) give an indication of the cultural distance 
between the Netherlands and other countries but do not further our 
understanding of how people cope with these cultural distances. The strategies 
people use to cope with cultural differences have shown to be determined by 
contextual aspects. As discussed earlier, the cultural distance can be bridged 
when cultural synergy is sought after but it can also be enlarged. The findings 
have shown that enlarging cultural distance is used by partner organisations of 
KPN to resist dominance. Therefore there is a need to expand the cross-cultural 
strategies with a strategy which I would call ‘ethnicising’ when added to the 
three strategies of Adler (1986) or ‘enlarging or emphasising’ when added to the 
three strategies of Schneider and Barsoux (1997). We can speak of ethnicising 
when latent ethnicity is manifested in order to use it as an informal counter 
strategy in a cooperation between two or more parties or organisations. The 
opposite of ethnicising can be named ‘trivalising’, when manifested ethnicity is 
reduced to latent ethnicity.   
 What can be said about the success and failure of cross-cultural cooperation 
in strategic alliances? Which cultural factors exert influence on cross-cultural 
cooperation in strategic alliances? 
 
10.3.2 Factors of Successful Cross-cultural Cooperation 
The results of the empirical study indicate that the success of cross-cultural 
cooperation in a strategic alliance is influenced by at least four factors. (1) 
Cultural distance (national and organisational culture) between the involved 
organisations. (2) Balance of power between the involved organisations. (3) 
Historically developed inequality and latent ethnic tensions between the 
headquarters’ countries. (4) Formal and informal corporate and individual cross-
cultural strategies of the involved organisations.  
 With respect to the factor of cultural distance between the partner 
companies, findings have shown that the differences in organisational and 
national culture between KPN and its partner companies in the AT&T-
Unisource group, in the Netherlands Antilles and in Indonesia have complicated 
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and hindered successful cooperation. In accordance with Hofstede (1991) this 
factor is named the cultural distance of the partner companies. The cultural 
distance is an indication of the expected cultural difficulties in cooperation. 
Yoshino and Rangan (1995) name this the holistic relation of structure, 
organisational culture, national culture and strategy. Cauley de la Sierra (1995) 
speaks about coping with diverse management styles and cultural diversity and 
Faulkner (1995) calls it cultural incompatibility or cultural fit.  
 The balance of power between the partners in an international strategic 
alliance has influence on the success of cross-cultural cooperation. Power has to 
be understood here in a wide sense. Power is defined by the resources of the 
PTOs, such as the size of the company, the financial resources, the access to 
political power, the access to technical knowledge and the knowledge of the 
local market. As the cases have shown a struggle for power can result from 
inequality in the balance of power or from rivalry. The struggle for power 
between the Dutch and the Swedish and between the Dutch and the Americans 
in the AT&T-Unisource group was a result of rivalry and adversely affected the 
trust and cooperation in the group. Surrendering autonomy proved to be too 
difficult for all the partners involved. The complex structure of the AT&T-
Unisource group resulted in opposing interests and great tension. In these 
alliances the partners were of more or less same strength. Struggle for power can 
and does however, also occur between partners of unequal power, as was so in 
the case of the Netherlands Antilles. The Antillean counterparts perceived KPN 
as a dominant Dutch organisation with more powerful resources than the partner 
organisations and especially more powerful than those groups threatened by its 
participation. Lorange and Roos (1995) name this balance of power factor the 
giving up of autonomy and the politicisation of the alliance. Yoshino and 
Rangan (1995) associate this factor to ambivalent relationship and opposing 
interests of partners. Faulkner (1995) mentions different hidden agendas and 
Cauley de la Sierra (1995) stresses the incompatibility of strategic objectives.  
 The third factor affecting the success of cross-cultural cooperation in 
international strategic alliances are the historically developed inequality and 
latent ethnic tensions between the home-countries of the organisations. This can 
best be recognised in the cases of the Netherlands Antilles and Indonesia in 
which the Antilleans and the Indonesians have developed a rich tradition of 
resistance against the Dutch Europeans for more than 350 years. These societies 
have developed a thorough knowledge of Dutch society and Dutch culture and 
thus are generally familiar with and know how to cope with cultural differences. 
The case of the Netherlands Antilles clearly illustrates how a manifest form of 
ethnicity can and was used to block the participation of KPN in the Antillean 
PTOs. In the case of Indonesia the Indonesian government and the Indonesian 
PTOs stressed the importance of the Indonesian identity and national unity. In 
the studied cases the resistance is directed at the former colonial powers. 
Countries or regions occupied by other powers, for instance as was Eastern 
Europe by the former communistic Soviet Republic, have also developed a 
tradition of resistance strategies. A western PTO, which is co-operating with 
these kinds of countries, will almost certainly encounter these resistance 
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strategies. The lengthier and more intense the tradition of resistance has been, 
the more difficult cross-cultural cooperation can be. Although not mentioned by 
other researchers, based on the findings of this study the historically developed 
inequality and latent ethnic tensions is an important factor that very much 
influences cross-cultural cooperation in strategic alliances. 
 The fourth factor of influence is the used formal and informal corporate and 
individual cross-cultural strategy. The empirical study has shown that corporate 
strategies to cope with cultural differences are intertwined with the 
organisational culture and have therefore, to be understood in that context. From 
an organisational cultural perspective cross-cultural cooperation is part of the 
organisational culture and can therefore not easily be studied separately. 
Companies with cultural experiences in the country of their interest are more 
successful in establishing a joint venture than companies without experience 
(e.g. van Oudenhoven et al. 1998). The cases of Indonesia and the Netherlands 
Antilles show that using the experience and networks of NCF can be a decisive 
factor in acquiring a position in a foreign telecom market. The employees of 
NCF have experience in developing long lasting personal networks in foreign 
telecom markets. These experiences can be strategically used in new interesting 
telecom markets by a closer cooperation between the NCF and IB departments. 
The corporate and individual strategies to cope with cultural differences are 
therefore embedded in the organisational culture. This is what Faulkner (1995) 
calls lack of commitment, Cauley de la Sierra (1995) names it corporate 
leadership, Lorange and Roos (1996) and Yoshino and Rangan (1995) term it 
‘the slowing dying of alliance’ and internal orientation. 
 
10.3.3 Further Business-Anthropological Research: Predicting Ethnicising 
The ethnicising strategy is especially interesting for powerful Western PTOs 
who expand their international activities to the emerging markets of developing 
countries because this strategy can strongly hinder successful cooperation. It is 
however, also interesting for a Western PTO that purchases a smaller telecom 
company. Imagine, for instance, what might happen if Deutsche Telekom 
wanted to overtake KPN. Ethnicising can then be used as an informal counter 
strategy of Dutch employees against German dominance. It is therefore a factor 
that Western PTOs have to be more aware of. This study however, does not 
identify exactly when ethnicising occurs, under what kind of circumstances and 
who initiates it. The question as to which aspects exert influence on the onset of 
ethnicising strategies is therefore certainly of interest and requires further and 
more detailed research. To obtain more information, in-depth studies of 
corporate cases are necessary of corporate cases in which ethnicising strategies 
are central. In this section an attempt is made to explore the factors that start 
ethnicising. 
 The results of the empirical study show different factors that can trigger the 
onset of ethnicising. Firstly, interaction between the distinct ethnic groups is a 
factor that can start ethnicising. In the case of the Netherlands Antilles there was 
minimal informal but interaction between Dutch and Antilleans the island of 
Curaçao. Formally however, there are many interactions in businesses, 
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government, organisations and the tourist industry between Dutch and 
Curaçaoans. If there is no interaction at all between two or more ethnic groups, 
formal or informal, physical or virtual, there will be no ethnicising. Secondly, 
limitations of ethnic boundaries from which a sense of community feelings 
emerge can support ethnicising. Although it was difficult to speak of ‘the 
Curaçaoans’ in the case of the Netherlands Antilles there was enough sense of 
the Antillean identity to socially construct a clear border between the European 
Dutch and the Curaçaoans. Therefore the ethnic boundaries do not have to be 
very clear. Thirdly, the life security and/or the autonomy and/or the identity of 
one of the involved ethnic groups have to be under pressure of external forces 
such as foreign occupation. In the case of the Netherlands Antilles it was very 
clear that the STTK, the labour unions and the management of Antelecom had 
other interests apart from KPN. The participation of KPN in the local PTOs 
threatened the interests of these groups, such as profits, job security, control of 
management and political control. Fourthly, opposing interests, internal 
differences, conflicts and rivalry among interdependent organisations in a 
strategic alliance can stimulate the offspring of the strategy of ethnicising. 
Sixthly, dissatisfaction of one of the involved ethnic groups with its social-
economical position is another factor. As in the case of Indonesia it has been 
show that the dissatisfaction of pribumi Indonesians with the economic power 
of the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia have stimulated the strategy of ethnicising. 
Chinese employees are excluded from Indonesian government, while Chinese 
banks, shops and companies were victim of violence in the spring of 1998. 
Dissatisfaction with the social-economic position can also result from the sharp 
difference in salaries and living conditions between the foreign expatriates and 
local employees. While both are KPN employees, the daily life of Indonesian 
employee Dahoko shows a sharp contrast with Leo’s life, while both are KPN 
employees. Seventhly, leadership to concentrate ethnic energy and organise 
resistance can also be factor that stimulates the onset of ethnicising. In the case 
of the Netherlands Antilles it has been shown that the leadership of the STTK 
labour union leader Melvin Richard and the KS union leader Errol Cova 
concentrated ethnic resistance against the Dutch at Curaçao. Koot (1997) also 
mentioned leadership as an important factor to mobilise ethnic energy. The 
leader need a strong identification with the ethnic ideals and should be seen by 
the group as useful to realise the ethnic ambitions. Eighthly, the strategy of 
ethnicising can also be used by national subsidiaries against the headquarter 
offices under the precondition that these offices are dominated by different 
ethnic groups. The decline of the central power in an ethnic divers country, such 
as Indonesia, gives ethnic minorities possibilities to use ethnicising against the 
central power to strive for autonomy.  
 If more is know of these factors, their interaction and their conditions it 
would seem quite possible to make some calculated predictions with regard to 
the onset of ethnicising (e.g. Baud et al. 1994, Koot 1997). This can be helpful 
for organisations in managing cultural differences and cultural resistance for 
whom the question of how to manage local strategic alliances is still an 
important question for multinationals. Further investigation and more in-depth 
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anthropological corporate research of cross-cultural cooperation in which the 
onset of ethnicising is central is however, necessary. With contrast studies the 
importance and the connection of these mentioned factors will be more clearly 
understood.  
 
10.3.4 Debate on Organisational Culture: Evaluation of the Multi-Layer 
Model  
The findings of this study as presented in this thesis have contributed to the four 
central themes in the debate on organisational cultures. In the debate of single 
culture versus multiple cultures, the results shown in part II and part III show 
that the KPN culture consists of multiple sub-cultures with conflicting interests. 
Distinct subcultures such as the KPN headquarters, the districts, the NCF, the IS 
department and the IB department can be distinguished. These different 
subcultures have resulted in difficulties in internal cooperation and in the co-
ordination of international activities in for example, the JTS joint venture. The 
description of the daily activities of Ad and Robert clearly illustrate the 
importance of organisation politics in KPN. (Hieronder let op: stuk tekst is weg 
en vervangen door copy van text van pagina 330!!!!!!!).  
 In the debate of rigid versus malleable cultures, the findings of this study 
present a dual perspective. On one hand, the daily lives of Ad, Robert, Leo, 
Niels and Hans have shown that their behaviour is influenced by the 
organisational cultural system through the mediation of learned cultural 
schemes. These findings support the concept of an organisational culture with 
difficult to change core elements. In this perspective the organisational culture 
of KPN is still based on many traditional values. On the other hand, the 
strategies of Ad, Robert, Leo, Niels and Hans in coping with radical changes 
and cultural diversity have influenced their learned schemes and consequently 
the organisational culture of KPN. 
 In the debate of the distinctive versus the universal elements of culture, this 
study has been an example of a phenomenological study in which the daily life 
of employees has been presented through the eyes of the KPN employees Ad, 
Robert, Leo, Niels and Hans. By learning their goals, motivations, emotions and 
interaction we come to an understanding of the constructed social reality of 
these employees.  
 Finally, in the theme on the consensus versus dissensus character of 
organisational culture, the findings of this study stress the dynamic character of 
cultural identity. From the life stories of Robert and Dahoko and in the case of 
the Netherlands Antilles it is concluded that employees can have different 
cultural identities. Dahoko for instance, has an Indonesian nationality, has had a 
Dutch primary education, is Muslim religion, and is KPN employee. In varying 
circumstances he will emphasise either his Dutch background, his religious 
identity or one of the other cultural identities in order to be successful in his 
work.   
 The findings have also proven the value of a holistic approach. We now 
understand that cross-cultural strategies have to be understood in relation to the 
organisational culture. The changes that took place at world and society level 
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created a basic shift in the context of the organisation. By first exploring these 
shifts it allowed for a clear insight as to the motivations for internationalisation. 
Exploring the society and organisational level showed that the changes in the 
environment had consequences for the KPN structure and organisational culture. 
And finally exploring the interactional and individual level showed that this 
process of change brought along a new situation marked by uncertainty and 
demanding much more from employees and it was the uncertainty that 
stimulated some of the employees to accept a foreign career with KPN.   
 The method of free association was used to unravel the cross-cultural 
experience of the KPN employees Niels, Leo and Hans in the three distinct 
cases. This method helped in connecting the different levels of analyses and in 
putting the employees as the central object of study. As a consequence, the 
initial intentions of this study to portray the cross-cultural experiences in the 
daily life of the employees from a holistic perspective have been fulfilled. The 
method of free associations provided a deeper insight into the daily life rituals 
of international operating employees. This method of free associations allowed 
ambiguity, fragmentation and irrationality because actions and behaviour of 
people were related to the psychic frameworks from which they have sprung. 
The strategies people used to cope with new cultural environments could 
therefore be better understood. As only non-fiction could be used, there were 
limitations in the construction of ethnographic texts to describe the daily lives of 
the employees. It was thus not possible to construct non-existent but well 
imagined connections to link the distinct levels of analyses. Furthermore, it 
proved to be very difficult to unravel the social construction of technology as 
Latour (1994) suggested. The including of natural artefacts when following the 
actor’s network would have resulted in an even more bulky thesis.   
 The multi-level model can be used in ethnographic studies on cross-cultural 
cooperation and organisational complexity. Cross-cultural cooperation in 
complex organisational structures can be explored, described and analysed by 
means of this model. The method of free association helps to connect different 
levels of analyses by focusing on individual people crossing these levels. It 
guides the researcher to unravel the complexity level by level. The danger of 
using this model is in the enormous amount of information gathered on the 
context. The quantity of details on the organisational complexity therefore needs 
therefore to be selectively limited. The model can also be helpful in explaining 
the distinct factors that influence cross-cultural cooperation.  
 
10.3.5 Debate on Globalisation: Different Phases of KPN’s Expansion  
The study presented in this thesis covered three of the five different kinds of 
discussions on globalisation: the globalisation of (1) technology, (2) 
competition and (3) culture. Although Ruigrok and van Tulder (1995) state that 
these discussions are held separately, the cases presented in this thesis show that 
there is an interaction between these different kinds of globalisation processes. 
The globalisation of competition of companies and the need for fast, cheap and 
global telecom facilities are intertwined and were seen as one of the causes in 
the restructuring of the international telecom market. Furthermore, the 
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international expansion of Western PTOs stimulated local cultural identities and 
cultural resistance in less-developed countries. These findings support the need 
to integrate the different discussions on globalisation. 
 Mansell et al. (1995), Ruigrok and van Tulder (1995) and Mintzberg (1993) 
have all criticised the so-called ‘global’ character of international markets. The 
General Agreement on Trade and Services on the restructuring of the 
international telecom market suggested that all telecom companies access the 
global telecom market in free competition. The findings of this study support the 
view of Mansell et al. (1995) whom deny the possibility of a free market 
competition. Mansell’s strategic model is far more realistic for studying the 
internationalisation of telecom operators. Furthermore, findings have shown that 
the telecom market is not ‘global’ and that PTOs have concentrated on regions 
such as Eastern Europe and the South American continent. 
  The criticism of Ruigrok and van Tulder (1995) on the ‘global’ character of 
multinationals is supported by the findings that show that the PTOs were still 
very national in character. This is of course not very surprising because the 
process of internationalisation is on the one hand, a strategy of survival for the 
organisation. On the other hand, the larger freedom for the privatised company 
also signified a challenge to become an entrepreneurial company. Furthermore, 
the expansion of international activities has just only begun for many of the 
PTOs. KPN has only started in 1990 and in 1997 has been successful in 
acquiring markets shares in Eastern Europe and South East Asia.  
 The empirical study on the international expansion of KPN from 1990 to 
1997 furthermore, show that the phase-models of Adler and Ghadar (1993) and 
Bartlett and Ghoshal (1993) have to be explained as an evolutionary process. 
The cases presented in this thesis clearly indicate the difficult and slow process 
of transformation from a national PTO to an international operator. For KPN the 
first phase of internationalisation has dominated the period from 1990 to and 
including 1996. The ethnocentric cross-cultural strategy employed in the 
acquisition in the Netherlands Antilles fits into the phase where the organisation 
was largely orientated towards the home market. International activities were 
perceived as being of marginal importance and as incidental. At that time 
internationalisation was not yet a priority although formal policies indicated that 
30% of the revenues had to come from foreign investments. The managers who 
were sent abroad are seen as adventurers. They were selected because of their 
interest in and/or personal attachment to the region. In this phase the 
international experience of NCF was not fully recognised by the IB group due to 
sub-cultural differences. As a result an ethnocentric strategy was chosen to deal 
with cultural differences in telecom markets in the Netherlands Antilles and 
Indonesia. The experience in the Netherlands Antilles taught the KPN top 
management that conducting business in international telecom markets is 
culturally influenced. 
 Slowly the importance of international activities had grown to a more 
significant level. In the second phase, from 1997 onwards, new strategic 
alliances were found and foreign markets entered. KPN recognised the 
importance of developing a new organisational structure in which the 
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international activities were separated from national activities in 1997. The 
international activities of KPN International were embedded in international 
divisions. The failure of the strategic alliance AT&T-Unisource and the 
financial crisis in South East Asia let to a drop in the growth of international 
business at the end of 1997. Slowly the organisation came to realise that 
ethnocentric Dutch management models did not work abroad but polycentric 
cross-cultural strategies and host-country models had to be accepted. The 
importance and volume of international turn-over has grown ever since and PTT 
Telecom is now heading to the third phase of internationalisation in which 
international activities are now becoming dominant and taking over the 
importance of local activities.  
 The findings of this research on PTT Telecom are supported by a recent PhD 
study of Vermeulen (1999) on the organisational expansion of the 25 largest 
non-financial Dutch firms between 1966 and 1994. He concluded that the Dutch 
firms first had to learn from their failures caused by ethnocentric cross-cultural 
strategies which result in a temporary slow down of international activities 
(Vermeulen 1999: 155). Consequently, the management slowly comes to 
understand that they have to use a strategy of cultural compromise to cope with 
cultural diversity. The internationalisation of PTT Telecom therefore, perfectly 
fits into the learning process of organiational expansion in which foreing 
failures initially trigger an even higher rate of failures but the decrease in 
performance bottoms out and starts to increase when firms get more foreign 
experience. From the findings it can be concluded that PTT Telecom has 
learned from its failures and thus increased its success rate of new ventures.    
 Now that the theoretical contributions of the study preseted in this thesis 
have been discussed this leads us to the question of what the empirical 
implications of this study are for KPN.  
 
 
10.4 Empirical Implications for KPN: A Workshop  
 
As I approach the end of the research and writing up of this dissertation, it 
seems timely and fitting to prepare for a practical contribution in which the 
empirical implications of this study will be clustered and presented in the 
practical form of a workshop for managers, consultants, expatriates and project 
leaders of KPN who are selected to be sent abroad to one of the international 
strategic alliances. How do the results presented in this thesis contribute to 
KPN? Up till now, feedback on the results of the study haven been presented to 
KPN in the form of presentations, articles, lectures, recommendations and 
discussions with managers. 
 The objective of the two-day workshop is to prepare the participants for 
work abroad and to help them develop a cultural sensitivity needed in their field 
of work. In this interactive workshop a number of items will be discussed in 
interaction with the participants (see (let op inhoud figuur klopt niet!!! 
Figure 22). The majority of the participants will have been socialised in the 
Netherlands and within KPN and has thus, already have experienced cultural 
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diversity in professional cultures, organisational sub-cultures and organisation 
politics. However, in general, KPN employees rarely reflect on these 
experiences because they are commonly perceived as obstacles in the effective 
execution of work. Thus the objective of this workshop is to inculcate a sense of 
awareness in participants guiding them to recognise their own incompetence and 
to provide a tool kit for cultural analysis that will concretely help them to 
develop cultural sensitivity. The managers, consultants and project leaders who 
are sent abroad by KPN need in some ways to develop the sensibilities of the 
corporate anthropologist, their task being to understand other cultures, to reflect 
upon their own cultural behaviour and to operate successfully in the host 
culture. To guarantee a close interaction between theoretical and practical levels 
in this workshop actual experiences of participants will be used as case material 
for discussion and further reflection. In addition, participants will be supplied 
with a compilation of articles directly related to the subjects covered and of 
particular pertinence for employees preparing for positions overseas. 
 
Figure 22. Workshop contents 
 
10.4.1 Introduction, Evaluation and Organisational Culture 
In the introduction to the workshop the participants will be invited to step out of 
their daily routines. They will be asked to answer three questions: (1) to which 
country would you immigrate to if you had the chance? (2) What would you ask 
the CEO if you were stuck with him in the elevator? (3) You have just won 25 
million Dutch guilders in the lottery and don’t have to work anymore. What will 
you do now? The answers to these questions are written down on three different 
cards and the participant’s card remains visible so they can read each other's 
answer. Participants discuss their answers in pairs, changing partners every five 
minutes. This activity is meant to enable participants to discuss their work with 
ease and from a totally different perspective. Following this, a brief case of a 
technological project that failed due to cultural differences is shared and 
discussed. Since the participants should have a fairly clear understanding of the 
cross-cultural cooperation should be wide the multi-level model, as developed 
in this thesis, will be used to structure the workshop.  
 The strategy of internationalisation of KPN will be explained to the 
participants. Due to the fact that the internationalisation of KPN only began in 
1989 not many employees actually know much about its objectives, strategies, 
history and experiences. In this section the context of the telecom business will 
be explored based on the model of Estabrooks (1995). Questions regarding the 
most important trends in technology, national and international telecom markets, 
competition and opportunities will be addressed. 
 The hectic and fast changing environment of the telecom market inevitably 
forces KPN to look ahead instead of looking back, leaving almost no time for 
reflection or evaluation. Consequently till now, KPN has not spent much time or 
energy on the evaluation of their cross-cultural strategies. However, cultural 
competitiveness has become an important aspect for international operating 
PTOs. If it is to survive the fierce competition of the international telecom 
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market it is necessary for KPN to become more internationally orientated by 
learning from earlier experiences. Hence, the use of the findings presented in 
this thesis in the workshop will be of immediate relevance and value. 
 The history of internationalisation of KPN will briefly be discussed with the 
participants. In the period from 1989 till 1996 the international activities in KPN 
were marginal. The home market was the main orientation and international 
activities were only incidental. From 1997, the importance of international 
activities slowly grew and new alliances in Central Europe and South East Asia 
were established. The splitting of national and international telecom activities of 
KPN in December 1997 marks a new step towards the building of an 
international company. KPN International is responsible for the international 
activities, which are organised in regional divisions. These structural changes 
reflect the recognition of a different status and growing importance of 
international business. Participants of the workshop will thus be invited to 
discuss the level of awareness within the company, the attitudes and overall 
mentality with regard to international business.  
 The strategy of internationalisation is linked to the organisational culture of 
KPN. Therefore a brief history is given of the organisation including the 
formation of the central values during the course of nearly 100 years of 
government ownership will be presented. As the participants' perception of the 
organisational culture of KPN is required Morgan's different metaphors 
representing the different perspectives of the organisation will be used (Morgan 
1987). Metaphors help to discover unconscious perceptions about the 
organisation and its context. According to Morgan (1987) organisations can be 
perceived as machines, organisms, brains, culture, political systems, psychic 
prisons, flux and instruments of suppression. Following a brief explanation of 
this, participants will be given ten minutes to draw their own colourful metaphor 
of KPN in relation to the international telecom market. The drawings are 
collected, hung on the wall and discussed in order to give participants the 
opportunity to understand the different perceptions of the participants and to 
further discuss the organisational culture of KPN and their personal experiences. 
The cultural professional diversity at the workplace, the subcultures of the 
different departments, the irrationality of decision-making processes and the 
political character of the organisation will all be thoroughly discussed. 
 
10.4.2 Creating Awareness of National Cultural Differences  
The personal experiences of participants with cultural diversity in professional 
cultures, organisational sub-cultures, organisation politics and earlier 
international experience will help the participants of the workshop to become 
aware of cultural differences at national level. Their personal experiences with 
national cultural differences will be related to literature on cultural differences 
(e.g. Hofstede 1991, Trompenaars 1993, Cauley de la Sierra 1995, Schneider 
and Barsoux 1997). The case of the Netherlands Antilles will be used to explain 
the dynamics of cross-cultural cooperation and the importance of avoiding 
cultural stereotypes. Developing cultural awareness involves undermining and 
questioning stereotypes and not reproducing them. To be able to analyse their 
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own work situation participants learn to use different instruments. In addition, 
participants will be provided with a list of recommended readings and literature 
on the history of the country, novels on the host society and for literature on 
cultural diversity. 
 The three different strategies employees use to cope with cultural differences 
will be discussed. (1) Keeping strictly within the home country culture and 
rejecting the host country’s culture. (2) Getting thoroughly involved in the host 
country culture and rejecting the home country’s culture. (3) Establishing 
personal relations in both host and home country culture. Attention will be paid 
to the necessary preparation for and the initial period of adjustment in the host 
country. The pitfalls for newly arrived expatriates who end up in an expatriate 
sub-culture are discussed. 
 Attention is also be paid to the connection between recruitment, selection, 
preparation, support, the return of expatriates and the bearing and effect of each 
of these areas upon each other. It is in fact the needs for specific and potential 
candidates that should be of primary importance when recruiting employees for 
overseas attachments and not the supply and availability of employees interested 
in international positions. Failing to realise this will result in the continued trend 
of too many employees whose careers and/or personal lives have been left 
stranded holding international positions instead of employees of high potential. 
In the selection of qualified employees for international positions much 
attention has been given to technical and professional qualifications. From the 
study it can be concluded that just as much if not more attention should be given 
to selecting employees with sensitivity to cultural and political processes, 
people with a ‘cultural antenna’ who are orientated towards making connections 
with and between people. Interestingly enough, this is the very aspect in which 
PTT Post employees who perform well in foreign positions are noted to have 
and put to good use.  
 By this time in the workshop, the participants should have reached an 
awareness of both corporate and personal cultural backgrounds and will realise 
that success of cross-cultural cooperation in a joint venture is strongly 
influenced by four factors: (1) cultural distance (national and organisational 
culture) between the involved organisations, (2) balance of power between the 
involved organisations, (3) historically developed inequality and latent ethnic 
tensions between the headquarters’ countries and (4) formal and informal 
corporate and individual cross-cultural strategies of the involved organisations. 
At this point, the focus of the workshop will shift specifically to KPN and its 
employees, the partner organisations and their employees.  
  
10.4.3 Local Management Practices  
Many of the participants of the workshop have been recruited to help with the 
transformation of a PTO into a World Class Operator. In general, this 
transformation includes the expansion of the number of telephone lines, 
digitalisation of the telephone backbone, expansion of the services and changing 
of organisation structure and culture. In this transformation process western-
based models of managing and organisation structure are implemented in order 
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to make the PTO more efficient and effective. However, the findings of this 
study clearly warn against starting a transformation process based on an 
ethnocentric perspective. In both the cases from the Netherlands Antilles and 
Indonesia as well as experiences in Prague, it has been witnessed that the local 
PTO does not take kindly to the ethnocentric behaviour of the western partner 
organisation and that in such cases, counter strategies will undoubtedly be used 
in attempt to balance the power relationship. Therefore, in this section of the 
workshop therefore, the local management practices will be central to the 
discussion and different models of management, such as Latin American and 
Asian models will be reviewed. The different expectations and perceptions of 
leadership will then be discussed based on the Indonesian case and the question 
as to what the best Dutch KPN style of management might be is briefly debated.  
 Managing international joint ventures demands cultural sensitivity and the 
ethnocentric concept of western control is difficult to execute in a foreign joint 
venture. In the first place KPN only has a minority share, which in effect means 
a minority influence in the joint venture. In the second place, the percentage of 
participation is not equal to the percentage of influence. Both the Indonesian 
and the Netherlands Antilles cases show that personal networks are of utmost 
importance if one is to have influence in a foreign joint venture. Without 
diplomacy, the maintaining of personal networks, respect and cultural 
sensitivity, influence in a foreign joint venture is very limited. When a majority 
share is acquired in a foreign joint venture, then cultural differences play even 
an even more important role in the management. The two cases show that the 
powerful partner in the alliance stresses cultural similarities, synergy, 
encourages their employees in learning languages, cross-cultural training and 
actively promotes the benefits of cooperation. The powerful partner wants to 
bridge cultural differences and gain control over the joint venture. On the other 
hand, the weak partner in the alliance benefits by stressing cultural differences, 
its own styles of management and the importance of national identity. Strategies 
of resistance, such as ethnicising, can be used to restore the balance of power in 
the joint venture. The participants will therefore be asked what they would do if 
Deutsche Telekom would take a share in KPN and want to replace Dutch for 
German procedures? The strategies are written down on paper and with the 
participants then discus on how to deal with these strategies of resistance.   
Finally, a number of practical recommendations are given for successful cross-
cultural cooperation: 
⋅ Start the cooperation with a new partner organisation with small projects.  
⋅ Choose output driven projects in the lower levels of the organisation.  
⋅ Do not attract attention but isolate these projects from the power game 
between the partners to prevent tension or conflicts.  
⋅ Keep power balance in the project equal by selecting a limited number of 
people orientated managers and technical experts.  
⋅ Be aware of historically developed inequality and latent ethnical tensions.  
⋅ Extend the projects when proven to be successful.  
⋅ Be not only aware of cultural differences but also of how people cope with 
these differences.  
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⋅ Develop a cultural and political ‘antenna’ in order to analyse the political-
cultural environment of the project before extending it to a larger scale. 
 
10.5 Final Remarks  
 
At this point it is time to reflect upon the initial aims of this study. The intention 
of this study was to present a detailed case description of the daily practices in 
cross-cultural cooperation from an inside perspective. The inside perspective 
and description of the cross-cultural experiences of KPN was indeed presented 
through the accounts of the experiences of its employees Ad, Robert, Niels, Leo 
and Hans. An ethnographic style was used to picture their motives, 
backgrounds, activities and strategies in coping with their respective changing 
environments. This has allowed an inside understanding of KPN’s process of 
internationalisation. 
 The study also intended to uncover the cultural complexity of the cross-
cultural cooperation of KPN by means of a multi-level model. The successful 
application of this model in the telecom sector helped to fully understand the 
influences of the factors in the context for the corporate and individual cross-
cultural strategies. The multi-level model is a very useful methodological 
approach to study cultural complexity in contemporary organisations. 
 At the start, this study did not pretend to falsify fundamental theories or to 
develop complete new theories on cross-cultural management. The results 
presented in this study however, make good theoretical improvements possible. 
The expansion of the cross-cultural strategies with the ethnicising strategy is a 
good example of such theoretical improvement. This new cross-cultural strategy 
stresses the importance of including the behaviour of the partner organisation(s) 
in studying intercultural management. Furthermore, this study leads to the 
understanding that the study of cross-cultural cooperation needs a much wider 
perspective than has until recently been taken. For successful cross-cultural 
cooperation in a strategic alliance not only the cultural distance at national and 
corporate levels have to be taken into account, but also the balance of power, 
the possible historically developed inequality and the formal and informal 
corporate and individual cross-cultural strategies. These findings once again 
stress the need to study cross-cultural cooperation from a dynamic and holistic 
perspective.  
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 Annex I 
 
In the contract the duration of the study, the office facilities, the financial allowance 
and the conditions for termination of the contract are laid out. Every year, the head 
of the department of International Support evaluates the contract. Two agreements 
in the contract need to be further examined because they can exert influence on the 
results. The first agreement is on the benefits of the study for KPN. These benefits 
are distinguished in three major categories of activities: 
1. Activities to execute the research and to answer the research questions. Relevant 
scientific and organisational results will be published in articles.   
2. Activities to support the company’s transformation into a competitive 
international telecom operator. These activities consists of giving feedback of 
the outcomes of the study, advising on the improvement of the strategies of 
internationalisation and answering questions in the field of cross-cultural 
cooperation. In addition, discussions with top management and opinion leaders 
are held. 
3. Activities to support the professionalism of the International Support employees. 
These activities comprised the feedback of scientific and practical knowledge 
on the subject of globalisation, cross-cultural management and organisational 
culture by means of presentations and publications. In addition, the preparation 
and coaching of expatriates as well as the exchange of experiences with 
international operating employees would be supported. 
 
Permission for publishing will be withheld: 
1. If the publications contain confidential information that can damage KPN, it’s 
subsidiaries or it’s partner organisations.  
2. If information is included, which KPN has defined in advance as not to be used 
in the PhD thesis.  
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Annex II 
 
Step I 
Objective 
To explore the international telecom market. 
 
Research questions 
⋅ What are the causes of the restructuring of the international telecom market?  
⋅ What are the consequences of the restructuring of the telecom market? 
⋅ Is there a ‘global’ telecom market? 
⋅ Are there ‘global players’ at the telecom market? 
⋅ Which strategies do European PTOs use in reaction?  
⋅ Which strategies of internationalisation do the European PTOs use? 
⋅ To which telecom markets do European PTOs expand their activities?  
 
Objects of research 
Studies, events, literature and meanings of KPN employees. The telecom market 
was first approached from a historical dimension by investigating the historical 
causes of the turbulence. It was next approached from a social dimension by 
creating network relations within KPN and checking access possibilities. In this first 
step there were two lists of topics to be studied: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Causes of the turbulence at the telecom 
market: 
Consequences of the turbulence at 
the telecom market for the PTOs: 
⋅ International telecom policy ⋅ Competition at national markets 
⋅ International telecom needs ⋅ Telephone tariffs 
 Technological revolutions ⋅ Turn over of PTOs 
⋅ Convergence of technology  ⋅ National and international 
⋅ European Economic Community  lliances 
 (EEC) telecom policy ⋅ Employment 
⋅ Local government telecom policy  ⋅ Global telecom market 
 ⋅ Strategies of survival 
⋅ Strategies of internationalisation 
⋅ New regional telecom markets
Time and place of data collection 
Data on these topics were collected between June 1995 and December 1996 by 
means of triangulation. During this period, I studied literature on the changing 
telecom market and attended lectures on the convergence of technology and culture 
at the University of Maastricht. Up to date articles on the subject in newspapers, 
telecom magazines and various other documents that provided the necessary and 
relevant corporate information. In addition to the earlier mentioned preliminary 
investigation opinions were gathered in 25 interviews with internationally orientated 
employees of KPN. From the findings at the first level, it was concluded that that it 
is impossible to investigate more than one PTO. 
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Step II 
Objective 
Exploring the Dutch telecom market and KPN. 
 
Research question  
⋅ Which strategies does KPN use in reaction to the restructuring of the 
Dutch telecom market?  
⋅ Who are the new competitors at the Dutch telecom market? 
⋅ What kind of strategy of internationalisation does KPN use?  
⋅ In which phase of internationalisation is KPN?  
⋅ What cross-cultural strategies does KPN use? 
⋅ Which international human resource policies have been used? 
⋅ What is the organisational culture of KPN? 
 
Objects of research 
Opinions and documents. KPN was first approached from a spatial dimension by 
visiting the head offices in The Hague. Following which the organisation was 
approached from a social-cultural dimension by means of building personal 
networks and learning about the cross-cultural strategies and human resource 
department and the international departments in the period from January 1996 till 
October 1996. Two lists of topics were used for the research at this level. 
 
 Strategies of KPN: International Human Resource 
Management of KPN:  ⋅ Corporate goals of KPN 
 ⋅ Acquisition ⋅ Corporate strategies  
 ⋅ Selection ⋅ History of KPN 
 ⋅ Preparation ⋅ Reorganisations 
 ⋅ Coaching ⋅ Strategies of internationalisation 
 ⋅ Return ⋅ Phase of internationalisation  ⋅ Cross-cultural strategies 
Time and place of datacollection 
Data were collected by means of the method of triangulation. Theoretical 
triangulation was used by means of the combination of different perspectives at 
macro- meso- and micro-level. The researcher’s combination of an anthropological 
perspective with an economic/technical perspective also contributes to this method 
of theoretical triangulation. The triangulation of data was also used for the analysing 
of observations, interviews as well as documents. Extra attention has been paid to 
the methodological triangulation by using different instruments: 25 interviews were 
conducted in which the above mentioned lists of topics were focused on. Participant 
observation at the head office in The Hague and studying documents were also used. 
 
Documents  
KPN Nieuwsblad. Employee magazine of KPN. From 1995 till 1998 
De Voorkrant. Employee magazine of KPN. 
KPN Knipselkrant. News on developments in the telecom market KPN. 
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Analysis of internal publications of KPN: 
1995  Van nationale operator naar internationale dienstverlener.  
1994 – 1998  New Years speeches of the CEO, Mr Wim Dik. Internal publication. 
1995  Corporate Strategy KPN. IEB, KPN The Hague. 
1993 – 1998  Annual Reports of KPN. 
Studies on the history and culture of the organisation. 
Scientific publications on the international telecom market found in: 
Marketing-Support Literature References, KPN Research BIDATA, Groningen. 
IT-Support Literature References, KPN Research BIDATA, Groningen 
Management-Support Literature References, KPN Research BIDATA, Groningen. 
 
Step III 
Objective 
Exploring the International Departments  
 
Research questions  
⋅ What kind of individual coping strategies do the employees of KPN use?  
⋅ Do employees have international experiences? 
⋅ What happens with the international experiences of employees? 
⋅ How are employees trained and prepared for international posts? 
⋅ What are the experiences with the international human resource policy? 
 
Objects of study 
Meanings of KPN employees, behaviour and events. The International Support and 
International Business departments have been selected for futher research. Although 
the Netherlands Consultancy Foundation (NCF) has a great deal of international 
experiences, this department was not selected because it was not officially 
considered as part of the PTT Telecom in that period and was in fact still part of the 
KPN company. A second reason not to include this department was the low status of 
the department within the KPN organisation. Although a very congenial department, 
I was aware from my own work experience with PTT Telecom of the tension 
between this department and KPN. Hence, choosing this department as ‘home base’ 
would have made access to the field of research rather problematic. The two 
departments were approached from a social-cultural dimension through active 
participation in the concerns of the departments. The individual employees were 
approached from a psychological dimension in which their personal strategies of 
coping were studied. The department of International Support was studied from 
Individual strategies of KPN employees: World of living of KPN employees: 
⋅ Problem solving coping strategies ⋅ Subcultures organisation 
⋅ Emotion regulation coping  ⋅ Daily activities 
 strategies? ⋅ Taboos 
⋅ International experiences ⋅ Language 
⋅ Training ⋅ Rituals 
 ⋅ Informal networks 
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December 1995 till December 1997. 21 interviews and numerous observations were 
carried out in this department. In addition, some of the department’s employees 
were accompanied and observed in their posts in Eastern Europe in April 1997. Less 
intensively, the department of International Business was studied from October till 
December 1996. Approximately 15 interviews were conducted in this department 
(see Table 7). In the third phase two lists of topics have been selected for the data 
collection: 
 
Time and place of data collection 
Data on these topics were collected through the method of participant observation. 
From January 1996 I was located at the department of International Support for two 
days a week which gave me direct access to information on the specified topics of 
study. In order to gain an insider’s view, I actively participated in the business of 
both departments as much as possible. A more biographical approach whereby I 
could immerse myself into the daily lives of the three employees selected for study 
was adopted. I used the method of personal experience narratives to gain insight into 
the daily world of these employees and their coping strategies (Denzin 1991: 43, 
1997). For the method of participant observation I chose a role as 
researcher/consultant within the department of International Support where I 
worked two to three days a week during the period of research, apart from the time 
spent on travels abroad. 
 
Departments Interviews 
International Business 21 
Other departments  20 
International  Support 15 
Total interviews 56 
 Table 7. The spread of interviews in KPN 
 
Step IV 
Objective 
Exploring three cases of cross-cultural cooperation selected were the AT&T-
Unisource group, the failed alliance at the Netherlands Antilles and the strategic 
alliances in Indonesia.  
 
Step IVa 
⋅ Research questions 
⋅ What is the history of Unisource? 
⋅ What cross-cultural experiences do the KPN employees have with their 
international colleagues in the AT&T-Unisource group? 
⋅ What are the cross-cultural experiences of the non-Dutch employees? 
⋅ What is the influence of the political-cultural context on the cooperation within 
the AT&T-Unisource group? 
Object of study 
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A preliminary investigation in the summer of 1996 was necessary to get an idea of 
the field of study. The strategic alliance was first approached from a spatial 
dimension by focusing on the head office in Hoofddorp. In the preliminary 
investigation the history of Unisource, the cultural diversity of the organisation and 
its relations with KPN was focused on. Findings from the preliminary investigation 
supported the idea that this strategic alliance could be best approached from a 
social-cultural dimension. The research objects here were opinions and behaviour of 
Unisource international employees. The following topics formed the basis of the 
field research: 
 How do Dutch employees deal with 
differences? 
Cultural diversity at organisational 
level:    ⋅ Language ⋅ Human resource  ⋅ Time ⋅ Intercultural training  ⋅ Working attitude ⋅ History of Unisource  ⋅ Intimacy ⋅ Organisation-political context  ⋅ Mutual images ⋅ International employees 
 
Time and place of data collection 
Three months in the period of May till September 1997 were spent with the AT&T-
Unisource group for an in-depth field study. Dutch ex-KPN employees and non-
Dutch Unisource employees were selected for interviews. 
 
Databases 
The archives of the KPN, documents of the AT&T-Unisource group.  
Annual Reports of Unisource 1995 and 1996  
Gateway, the employees magazine. Nr. 1,2,3 and 4. 
 
Other research methods  
Participant observation in the AT&T-Unisource group 
Participation with the Summer Event, 30 August 1997 
Interviews with 9 Dutch and 9 Non-Dutch employees of AT&T-Unisource. 
Interviews with KPN employees working with shareholder companies.  
 
Step IVb 
⋅ Research questions 
⋅ Why has the strategic alliance of KPN with the Antillean PTOs failed? 
⋅ How can this be explained?  
⋅ What are the cross cultural experiences of KPN in the Netherlands Antilles? 
⋅ What cross-cultural experiences do Antillean PTOs have with KPN? 
⋅ What is the influence of the political-cultural context on the cooperation? 
 
Objects of study 
Also in this case a preliminary investigation was necessary to get an idea of the field 
of study. The field of study was first approached from a spatial dimension by 
focusing on the island of Curaçao, the biggest island and political centre of the 
Netherlands Antilles, where the lion’s share of opposition against KPN was centred. 
The preliminary investigation in February 1996 focused on the history of relations 
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between the Netherlands Antilles and the Netherlands, the differences in business, 
culture and telecom policies and, the telecom market in the Netherlands Antilles 
The preliminary investigation revealed that this case had to be approached from a 
historical dimension because there are no direct activities of KPN in the Netherlands 
Antilles. Thus the main objects of study here consisted of opinions and historical 
products such as newspaper articles. Employees of Antelecom, Setel, KPN 
employees, Dutch expatriates, politicians, members of the labour unions, journalists 
and scientists were interviewed to reconstruct the history of this case. The long-term 
and sensitive Dutch – Antillean relations form an important aspect in the 
reconstruction. The case could best be approached from a social-cultural dimension. 
Therefore, contemporary differences in business culture between Dutch and 
Antillean companies were studied. An in-depth field study of three months took 
place from January till April 1997. As a result of the preliminary investigation the 
following topics were selected: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Time and place of data collection 
The archives of the daily newspapers Beurs and Amigoe 
Documents of the KPN,  
Documents of Antelecom and Setel,  
Reports on the government policies on telecom.  
 
Methods of datacollection  
Participant observation in telecom seminars,  
Observations and participant observation in Antelecom and Setel   
Participant observation of everyday life of expatriates in Jakarta   
Participant observation in the normal everyday life on the island of Curaçao.  
67 interviews have been done with employees of Antelecom, Setel, KPN 
employees, Dutch expatriates, politicians, members of the labour unions, 
 journalists and scientists (see Table 8).  
Discussions with Dutch and Antillean social scientists have placed the results in a 
broad framework of scientific studies on Antillean culture. I had one key 
informant of the Dutch expatriate culture at Curaçao and several key informants 
on the Antillean culture.  
 
Organisation Antillean 
employees 
Dutch employees 
General 18   6 
How do Dutch and Antilleans deal with 
differences in: 
Social-cultural context 
⋅ History of colonial 
relations  ⋅ Language 
⋅ Time ⋅ History of the acquisition 
⋅ Working attitude ⋅ Strategies of resistance 
 ⋅ Intimacy 
 ⋅ Receiving critics 
⋅ Formal versus informality 
⋅ Mutual images 
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TELEM  3   0 
SETEL  8   8 
ANTELECOM  6    2 
KPN  0 10 
Scientists  6   1 
Total interviews 41 27 
 Table 8. The interview representation in the Netherlands Antilles case  
 
Step IVc 
Research questions  
⋅ How do employees of KPN deal with cultural differences in their strategic 
alliances in Indonesia?  
⋅ What cross-cultural experiences do the Indonesian employees have with their 
Dutch colleagues in Indonesia? 
⋅ What is the history of KPN in Indonesia? 
⋅ What is the influence of the political-cultural context on cooperation? 
 
Objects of study  
In this case were mainly behaviour and events. The activities of KPN in Indonesia 
were first approached from a spatial dimension. I focused on the city of Jakarta 
because it is the political and commercial centre of Indonesia and because KPN has 
their office and two of their alliances there. There was not been an opportunity to 
conduct a preliminary research in Indonesia itself in 1996. Therefore the preliminary 
research was partly carried out in the Netherlands and partly after arriving in Jakarta 
on September 1997. The topics selected for the preliminary investigation were the 
history of the cooperation with Indonesian companies, the significance of cultural 
differences in the strategic alliances and the Indonesian business culture. 
 The preliminary investigation shows that the strategic alliances would have to be 
approached form a social-cultural dimension. The way in which the Dutch 
employees deal with the differences in business culture were thus studied in 
different settings. The strategic alliance Telkomsel was selected because the 
majority of Dutch employees are involved here. The JTS joint venture was included 
on request of the KPN Jakarta office. Furthermore, the Jakarta office of KPN itself 
seemed to be an interesting case because of the cross-cultural cooperation between 
Dutch and Indonesian KPN employees. For the in-depth field study I lived in 
Jakarta from 22 September 1997 till January 4, 1998. The following topics were 
selected for the in-depth research: 
 
 
 
 
 
Time and place of datacollection 
Archives and documents of the KPN 
Document of the strategic alliance Mobile 
Documents of the Indonesian PTO PT Telkom  
Reports on the government policies on telecom in Indonesia 
How do KPN employees deal with 
differences? 
Social cultural context 
⋅ History of acquisition 
⋅ Language ⋅ History of KPN presence 
⋅ Time ⋅ Relationship with head-office  
⋅ Working attitude  KPN 
⋅ Critics  ⋅ Social-political context  
 Indonesia ⋅ Hierarchy 
⋅ Working relations and connections 
⋅ Religion 
⋅ Ethnicity
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The newspaper Jakarta Post 
 
Research methods 
Participation in AsiaPacific Telecom ’97, 1 - 6 December 1997  
Participant observation in KPN office Jakarta 
Participant observation of everyday life of expatriates in Jakarta   
43 interviews with (see Table 9).  
 
 KPN 
Employees 
Indonesian 
Employees 
Telkomsel           8               8 
JTS           7                6 
PTT office Jakarta           7               7 
Total interviews          22             21 
Table 9. The interview representation in the Indonesian case 
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 Samenvatting 
 
Internationalisering, samenwerking en etniciteit in de telecom sector.  
Een etnografisch onderzoek naar de interculturele samenwerking van PTT 
Telecom in Unisource, de Nederlandse Antillen en Indonesië. 
 
 
Hoofdstuk 1.  Introductie 
De internationale telecom markt is sinds het einde van de jaren ‘80 
fundamenteel veranderd. De nationale PTT’s zijn in veel landen geprivatiseerd 
en hebben niet langer een monopolie positie op de nationale telecom markt. 
Door de komst van concurrentie zijn de voormalige nationale PTT’s gedwongen 
in korte tijd een substantieel deel van de omzet in buitenlandse telecom markten 
te genereren. Hiertoe hebben zij moeten opereren op onbekende markten in 
samenwerking met andere internationale telecom bedrijven. Het succes van deze 
internationaliserings-strategie hangt deels af van succesvolle interculturele 
samenwerking. Daarom staan in deze studie de volgende onderzoeksvragen 
centraal:  
Welke strategieën van interculturele samenwerking zijn gebruikt door de 
nationale PTT in reactie op de herstructurering van de telecom markt? Hoe 
gaan werknemers om met deze strategieën op individueel niveau? En hoe 
kunnen deze bedrijfs- en individuele strategieën worden verklaard vanuit 
een organisatiecultureel perspectief? 
 
Voor de beantwoording van deze onderzoeksvragen zijn de interculturele 
ervaringen in de periode van 1989 tot en met 1997 van het nederlandse telecom 
bedrijf PTT Telecom onderzocht. De organisatie heeft in die periode  haar 
activiteiten uitgebreid naar telecom markten in West en Oost Europa en Zuid-
Oost Azië.Voor het onderzoek is gekozen voor een exploratieve onderzoeks-
methodologie. Het kwalitatieve onderzoek in deze studie is gericht op het 
verkrijgen van gedetailleerde onderzoeksgegevens over interculturele 
samenwerking. Er is gekozen voor een diepgaande exploratie van slechts één 
PTT omdat culturele processen niet kunnen worden begrepen zonder uitgebreid 
kennis te nemen van de context waarin deze processen plaatsvinden Het 
onderzoek concentreert zich op de dagelijks praktijk van interculturele 
samenwerking vanuit het perspectief van de werknemers. Hierbij wordt 
langdurige participerende observatie als onderzoeksmethode toegepast. 
 Als onderzoeksontwerp is voor een gefaseerde analyse benadering gekozen 
Deze benadering bestaat uit een viertal fases. De onderzoeksresultaten 
afkomstig uit iedere fase worden gebruikt om op theoretische gronden nieuwe 
cases te kiezen voor een volgende fase. In de eerste fase wordt de vraag gesteld 
wat de oorzaken en gevolgen van de herstructurering van de telecom markt zijn. 
Na deze stap wordt PTT Telecom geselecteerd als onderzoekseenheid en de 
vraag gesteld welke internationaliseringsstrategieën de organisatie heeft 
gebruikt in de periode van 1989 tot en met 1997 in reactie op de 
herstructurering van de telecom markt. Op basis van de uitkomst op deze vraag 
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wordt een tweetal afdelingen geselecteerd voor de derde fase. Hierin wordt de 
vraag gesteld welke individuele strategieën de KPN werknemers hebben 
gebruikt in reactie op de herstructurering. De vierde en laatste fase bestaat uit de 
vraag wat de interculturele ervaring van KPN en haar werknemers is met haar 
alliantiepartners. Hiertoe zijn een drietal cases geselecteerd: de strategische 
alliantie AT&T-Unisource, de Nederlandse Antillen en Indonesië.  
 
Deel I  De Theorie 
 
Hoofdstuk 2. Intercultureel management, organisatie cultuur en globalisering 
In dit hoofdstuk wordt het theoretisch raamwerk geconstrueerd waarmee de 
interculturele samenwerking in een business sector kan worden onderzocht, 
geanalyseerd en beschreven. Het theoretisch raamwerk wordt geconstrueerd uit 
een drietal wetenschappelijke debatten: het debat over intercultureel 
management, het debat over organisatie cultuur en het debat over globalisering.   
 Het debat over intercultureel management wordt grotendeels gevoerd vanuit 
een enkelvoudig en statisch perspectief op cultuurverschillen. Er lijkt weinig 
aandacht voor de dynamiek van cultuur en het situationele karakter van 
interculturele strategieën. Dat is vreemd omdat ethnische grenzen sociaal 
geconstrueerd worden en daardoor strategisch kunnen worden gebruikt. Het 
manifest maken van latent aanwezige ethnische kenmerken kan worden gebruikt 
in een samenwerkingsrelatie tussen twee of meerdere organisaties. Om deze 
dynamiek te onderzoeken wordt in deze studie de individuele werknemer als 
centraal uitgangspunt genomen.  
 Het debat over organisatie cultuur laat zien dat er verschillende 
perspectieven bestaan op organisatiecultuur. Deze studie gaat uit van een 
organisatie-anthropologisch perspectief op organisatiecultuur waarin 
subculturen, diversiteit, ambiguïteit, machtstrijd en organisatie politiek een rol 
spelen.  
 Het debat over globalisering tenslotte, laat zien dat alhoewel er sprake is van 
een zekere globalisering van financieel verkeer, technologie, economische 
markten en multinationals, kritische kantekeningen geplaatst moeten worden bij 
het wereldwijde karakter van globalisering. Multinationals blijken nog steeds 
zeer stevig nationaal verankerd te zijn en economische markten zijn vooral 
regionaal geconcentreerd. Bedrijven die willen internationaliseren kunnen 
zelfstandig de internationale markt betreden of hiertoe strategische allianties 
vormen met andere bedrijven. Ondanks de grote populariteit bij bedrijven van 
strategische allianties is de kans op mislukken van een alliantie groot.  
 Commerciële bedrijven hebben grotendeels dezelfde ervaringen met het 
internationaliseringsproces. In de eerste fase van internationalisering hebben 
bedrijven weinig internationale ervaring en worden voornamelijk etnocentrische 
strategieën gebruikt om om te gaan met culturele diversiteit. Deze strategieën 
hebben veel mislukkingen en een tijdelijke teruggang van internationale 
activiteiten tot gevolg. Het management ervaart dan de noodzaak van het 
gebruik van polycentrische strategieën om succesvol te zijn in een andere 
culturele context. Hierdoor neemt het aantal succesvolle activiteiten in het 
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buitenland toe. Internationale mislukkingen zijn dus voor bedrijven nodig om de 
juiste ervaring op te doen en deze te gebruiken voor een succesvolle expansie. 
 De drie debatten dragen bij aan de constructie van een gelaagd model welke 
nodig is voor het bestuderen van interculturele samenwerking. Omdat deze 
studie tot doel heeft inzicht te geven in de complexiteit van alledaagse 
interculturele samenwerking, wordt de historische, politieke, culturele en 
economische context gebruikt in dit model. Het model onderscheidt daarom een 
vijftal niveaus waarop de context de interculturele samenwerking kan 
beïnvloeden: het wereld-, samenlevings-, organisatie-, interactie- en individueel-
niveau. Dit gelaagd model wordt gebruikt voor de bestudering van de sociaal, 
politieke, economische en culturele context van interculturele samenwerking. 
Om een case van interculturele samenwerking te onderzoeken worden 
verbindingen aangebracht tussen de verschillende niveaus door individuele 
werknemers te volgen in hun alledaagse leefwereld.  
 
Hoofdstuk 3. Methodologische reflecties 
In dit hoofdstuk worden de centrale onderzoeksvragen geoperationaliseerd en de 
methodologische consequenties van de gekozen onderzoeksstrategie besproken. 
De onderzoeksvragen worden stapsgewijs geoperationaliseerd aan de hand van 
het, in het vorig hoofdstuk ontwikkelde, gelaagde model. De consequenties van 
de gekozen methodologie hebben betrekking op de wijze waarop het 
ethnografische onderzoeksmateriaal in deze studie wordt geproduceerd en in de 
vorm van ethnografische verhalen wordt gepresenteerd. Te vaak worden de 
resultaten van organisatie onderzoek gepresenteerd zonder inzicht te krijgen in 
de rol, de professionele achtergrond, de motivatie en de betrokkenheid van de 
onderzoeker. Daarom is in dit hoofdstuk aandacht gegeven persoonlijke 
motivatie en professionele achtergrond. 
 Het is eigenlijk vreemd dat niet veel meer antropologen op de zelfde wijze 
onderzoek doen in westerse organisaties als in niet-westerse samenlevingen. Het 
lijkt erop dat antropologen bang zijn onderzoek te doen in grote westerse 
organisaties en commerciële bedrijven. Dit kan grotendeels worden verklaard 
uit de moeilijke toegankelijkheid tot het onderzoeksveld, de moeilijke rol keuze 
en de angst zich te moeten profileren. Een mogelijke oplossing voor een 
antropoloog zou de combinatie van de rol als organisatie-adviseur en als 
onderzoeker zijn. Daardoor krijgt de antropoloog toegang tot het 
onderzoeksveld en kan uitstekend gebruik maken van de methode van 
participerende observatie. De antropoloog als organisatie-adviseiur kenmerkt 
zich door: meer symphatie voor de werkvloer dan voor het management, 
langdurig participerend onderzoek en presentatie van empirisch materiaal in de 
vorm  van ethnografische verhalen.   
 xxxxxxxx 
 
 
Deel II  De Context 
 
Hoofdstuk 4. De herstructurering van de telecom markt: oorzaken en gevolgen 
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In dit hoofdstuk wordt de context van interculturele samenwerking in de 
telecom sector op wereld- en samenlevings-niveau onderzocht. Door het 
fundamentele karakter van de herstructurering van de internationale telecom 
markt, kan er worden gesproken van een wereldwijde ‘telecom revolutie’. De 
telecom revolutie heeft een drietal oorzaken. Ten eerste door technologische 
innovaties welke op hun beurt hebben geleid tot een convergentie van 
technieken. Ten tweede door een sterke toename van het aantal internationaal 
opererende organisaties welke een grote behoefte hadden aan goede en 
goedkope telecom infrastructuur. Ten derde  is de telecom revolutie veroorzaakt 
door een wereldwijde liberaliserings politiek van nationale overheden ten 
aanzien van de telecom markten. Als gevolg van deze telecom revolutie kregen 
nationale telecom bedrijven concurrentie op de thuismarkten en zagen ze hun 
winsten op internationale telefoonverkeer sterk dalen. 
 De Europese PTT’s werden hierdoor gedwongen hun activiteiten uit te 
breiden naar internationale markten. Hiertoe hebben ze zelfstandig kantoren in 
buitenlandse markten geopend en/of andere PTT’s als alliantie partners gezocht. 
Om de Europese telecom markt te bedienen richtte KPN samen met het 
Zweedse Telia, het Zwitserse Telecom en het Spaanse Telefónica de 
strategische allianties Unisource op. Naast de Europese markten werden ook de 
niet-westerse markten door Europese PTT’s betreden. Opvallend was hierbij dat 
voor deze eerste internationale ervaringen vooral ex-koloniale gebieden werden 
gezocht. Culturele, economische, technologische en financiële banden tussen de 
samenlevingen van de Europese PTT’s en de ex-koloniale samenlevingen 
hebben hiertoe bijgedragen.  
 
Hoofdstuk 5. De Nederlandse KPN steekt grenzen over 
In dit hoofdstuk wordt de context van interculturele samenwerking in de 
telecom sector op samenlevings- en organisatie-niveau onderzocht. De gevolgen 
van de telecom revolutie voor de Nederlandse telecom markt en voor KPN 
worden nader besproken. Daartoe wordt inzicht gegeven in de 150 jarige 
geschiedenis van de Nederlandse telecommunicatie. Tot haar privatisering in 
1989 was KPN een overheidsbedrijf dat, om het staatsbedrijf enigzinds als een 
bedrijf te runnen, de politiek op afstand moest houden. De overheid heeft na 
1990 de Nederlandse telecom markt geliberaliseerd en toegankelijk gemaakt 
voor concurrentie. Hierdoor heeft KPN concurrentie gekregen, zijn de winsten 
op internationale telefoonverkeer gedaald en kwam de omzet onder druk te 
staan.       
 De directie van KPN heeft begin jaren '90 gekozen voor een ambitieuze 
groei-strategie om de nieuwe omstandigheden het hoofd te kunnen bieden. 
Groei moest worden bereikt door kostenverlaging, een betere relatie met de 
klant en omzet in buitenlandse telecom markten. Hiertoe zijn ingrijpende 
organisatie veranderingen doorgevoerd. De cultuurverandering van een 
bureaucratisch georganiseerde overheidsorganisatie, naar een commercieel 
bedrijf was een langzaam en moeizaam proces.  
 De organisatie heeft verschillende manieren gezocht en gevonden om haar 
activiteiten uit te breiden naar het buitenland. Grofweg zijn hierbij een drietal 
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strategieën gegevolgd: het oprichten van de strategische alliante Unisource, het 
betreden van opkomende Europese telecommarkten samen met Unisource 
partners en het expanderen van de activiteiten naar Zuid-Oost Azië. KPN is 
gericht op een lange termijn relatie met haar lokale partners in nieuwe telecom 
markten. In het algemeen heeft de organisatie minderheidsdeelnemingen in deze 
lokale partners samen met andere telecom bedrijven. De organisatie heeft als 
doelstelling de deelnemingen niet alleen als een financiële investering te zien 
maar ook om de lokale partners te helpen om een efficient georganiseerde 
telecom operator te worden.  
 Binnen KPN houdt de afdeling International Business zich vanaf het begin 
van de jaren ’90 bezig met het uitvoeren van de internationaliseringsstrategieën. 
De contacten welke zijn opgebouwd door de afdeling Netherlands Consultancy 
Foundation (NCF) worden gebruikt voor het opstarten van lokale commericiële 
activiteiten. NCF is reeds jaren internationaal actief op het gebied van 
telecommunicatie in ontwikkelingslanden Ter ondersteuning van de 
internationale bedrijfsvoering wordt de afdeling International Support ingezet. 
 
Hoofdstuk 6. De individuele strategieën van KPN werknemers in het omgaan 
met ingrijpende organisatie veranderingen 
Hoofdstuk 6 behandelt het interactie- en persoonlijk-niveau van de context van 
de interculturele samenwerking in de telecom sector. De veranderingen zoals 
beschreven in de hoofdstukken 4 en 5 hebben voor de werknemers van KPN 
grote veranderingen gebracht. De werknemers waren niet langer in 
overheidsdienst en de zekerheid van standplaats en positie werd minder 
vanzelfsprekend. Om inzichtelijk te maken hoe KPN werknemers zijn 
omgegaan met deze structurele veranderingen in hun werkomgeving werden 
twee werknemers één werkdag gevolgd. Deze zogenaamde doorsnee werkdag 
werd in beeld gebracht voor Robert, werknemer bij de International Support 
afdeling, en voor Ad, werknemer van de International Business afdeling.  
 We leerden Robert kennen als iemand die de veranderingen bij KPN heeft 
aangegrepen om bij de joint venture van KPN in Praag te gaan werken. Robert 
werkte op werkdagen in Praag en keert ieder weekend terug naar Nederland. 
Robert en zijn IS collega’s hebben verschillende strategieën gevonden om om te 
gaan met de nieuwe situatie bij KPN. Deze strategieën zijn te onderscheiden in 
emotie regulerende strategieën en probleem oplossende strategieën. Van deze 
laatste strategieën waren het snel verwisselen van banen, eigen projecten 
opstarten en leuker werk kiezen het meest populair. De strategieën om emoties 
te reguleren waren minder makkelijk zichtbaar maar uitten zich in het bestaan 
van taboes, in het afwachten tot de nieuwe reorganisatie over waait, in het zich 
onzichtbaar maken in de organisatie en in het aanwenden van persoonlijke 
relaties voor de bescherming van de eigen positie.  
 Ad leerden we kennen als iemand die de veranderingen bij KPN als 
mogelijkheid ziet om zijn ondernemingslust te kunnen botvieren. Ad 
acquireerde nieuwe projecten, initieerde initiatieven, zocht nieuwe markten af 
en begeleidde nieuwe investeringsmogelijkheden. Ad en zijn collega’s hebben 
verschillende emotie regulerende en probleem oplossende strategieën gevonden 
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om met de nieuwe internationale omstandigheden om te gaan. Ook hier werd 
veelvuldig van baan gewisseld en werd de politieke lobby actief ingezet voor 
het succesvol afronden van een acquisitie traject. De strategieën om emoties te 
reguleren waren meer gericht op het uiten van frustraties, flexibiliteit en het 
indekken tegen risico’s van eventuele mislukkingen. 
 
 
Deel III  De Cases 
 
Hoofdstuk 7. Moeizame interculturele samenwerking binnen de AT&T-
Unisource groep: strijden om de macht 
In hoofdstuk 7 wordt de eerste van een drietal cases behandeld waarin de 
interculturele ervaringen van KPN worden beschreven. Deze eerste case 
beschrijft de interculturele samenwerking binnen de strategische alliantie 
Unisource. Van 1992 tot en met 1997 zag het KPN management Unisource als 
het belangrijkste strategische instrument voor het realiseren van de 
internationaliseringsdoelstellingen. Toen KPN in de begin jaren ’90 op zoek 
ging naar internationale partners om gezamenlijk de Europese telecom markt te 
bedienen, leek het een logische keuze van het top-management van KPN en het 
Zweedse Telia om samen te gaan werken. De contacten tussen beide 
organisaties bestonden al langer, het top-management kon goed met elkaar 
overweg, en de Zweedse en Nederlandse nationale cultuur ontliepen elkaar niet 
zoveel. Binnen de strategische alliantie Unisource echter, bleek de 
samenwerking met het Zweedse Telia in de alledaagse praktijk veel minder 
gemakkelijk te verlopen. Een onderlinge rivaliteit droeg ertoe bij dat grote 
verschillen in cultuur werden ervaren door de Nederlandse Unisource 
werknemers op het gebied van beslissingsprocessen en samenwerking.   
 Door de toetreding van het Spaanse Telefónica en het Zwitserse Swiss 
Telecom werd de culturele diversiteit binnen Unisource vergroot. De 
samenwerking van Unisource met het Amerikaanse AT&T introduceerde nog 
een vijfde partner. Het management in de AT&T-Unisource alliantie wilde deze 
culturele diversiteit aanwenden om een competatieve organisatiecultuur te 
creëren. Hiertoe werden de Unisource partners gestimuleerd in uitwisseling van 
kennis en personeel en werden de werknemers van de AT&T-Unisource group 
getraind in het werken in een multi-culturele omgeving. Bovendien werd een 
actief personeelsaannamebeleid gevoerd om de culturele diversiteit in balans te 
houden. 
 Echter, de culturele diversiteit in de AT&T-Unisource alliantie in combinatie 
met strategische verschillen en onderlinge rivaliteit, resulteerde in een uiterst 
moeizame samenwerking. De dagelijkse praktijk in de AT&T-Unisource 
alliantie leerden we kennen door de ogen van Hans, een ex-KPN medewerker. 
Hans vond het werken in een multi-culturele omgeving erg leuk, maar was 
minder gecharmeerd van de moeizame samenwerking tussen de partner 
organisaties. Deze moeizame samenwerking resulteerde in een trage 
besluitvorming en een verlies van het vertrouwen dat de alliantie het juiste 
strategische instrument was om de internationaliseringsdoelstellingen te halen. 
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 De andere partners percipieerden een culturele dominantie van de 
Amerikaanse en Nederlandse partners in de alliantie. Hiervoor zijn een aantal 
faktoren verantwoordelijk. Doordat het hoofdkantoor in Nederland was 
gevestigd traden relatief veel Nederlanders en ex-KPN’ers in dienst. In het 
kielzog van deze ex-KPN’ers kwamen ook weer nieuwe KPN’ers in de alliantie. 
Van de andere partners had alleen AT&T veel werknemers in de alliantie 
werken, en bovendien werkten er veel Amerikaanse telecom consultants. Deze 
gepercipieerde Amerikaans-Nederlandse dominantie in het hoofdkantoor heeft 
er onder andere toe geleid dat het vertrouwen in de alliantie door de andere 
partners onder druk kwam te staan. Het gebrek aan vertrouwen van het Spaanse 
Telefónica was onder andere een oorzaak voor een strategische breuk met de 
Unisource alliantie. Telefónica wilde zich alleen nog maar op de 
Latijnsamerikaanse markt concentreren en koos daarvoor niet AT&T, maar BT-
MCI als partner. Het vertrek van Telefónica resulteerde in een afnemende 
interesse van AT&T voor de Unisource alliantie. In 1998 kondigde AT&T haar 
vertrek uit de AT&T-Unisource groep aan. Hiermee kwam tevens een einde aan 
het belang van de strategische alliantie Unisource voor KPN.   
 
Hoofdstuk 8. Mislukte Interculturele Samenwerking op de Nederlandse Antillen: 
Machtsbalans niet in Evenwicht 
In hoofdstuk 8 wordt de tweede case van interculturele samenwerking van KPN 
behandeld, welke heeft plaatsgevonden aan het begin van de jaren ’90 op de 
Nederlandse Antillen. KPN wilde deelnemen in de Antilliaanse PTTs en de 
Antillen gebruiken als regionale uitvalsbasis naar de Latijnsamerikaanse 
telecom markt. Deze deelname zou de eerste grote internationale alliantie van 
KPN geweest zijn, maar mislukte na intensief onderhandelen tot grote frustratie 
van het topmanagement.Hierbij hebben culturele factoren een heel belangrijke 
rol gespeeld. Hoe heeft dit zo kunnen gebeuren? 
 Om de interculturele samenwerking tussen KPN en haar Antilliaanse 
partners in het begin van de jaren ’90 te begrijpen is het nodig inzicht te 
verkrijgen in de context van deze samenwerking. De koloniale geschiedenis, de 
staatsrechterlijke verhouding in het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden en de 
Antilliaanse economische afhankelijkheid van Nederland veroorzaakten 
namelijk een moeizame samenwerking tussen Nederland en de Nederlandse 
Antillen. De eilanden welke deel uitmaken van Nederlandse Antillen zijn 
bovendien onderling verdeeld. Deze verdeeldheid uitte zich ook in de 
Antilliaanse telecom sector. Elk van de Antilliaanse eilanden had een lokale 
telefoonmaatschappij, en voor al het Antilliaanse internationale telefoonverkeer 
was er een internationale telefoonmaatschappij, Antelecom genaamd. 
 Veel van de Nederlanders die op Curaçao aankomen verwachten een 
tropisch deel van Nederland aan te treffen en mengen zich niet in de Curaçaose 
samenleving. De samenwerking met de Antillanen blijkt echter veel complexer 
te zijn als verwacht. KPN’ers die op Curaçao werkten ervaarden op velerlei 
gebieden culturele verschillen met hun Curaçaoase collega’s: de taal, het geven 
en ontvangen van kritiek, de werkhouding en het gebruik van informele 
persoonlijke netwerken. Bij Curaçaoënaren bestaat een negatief beeld van de 
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makamba’s (Nederlanders) (schuin) welke gezien worden als arrogant, 
dominant, ex-kolonialisten, bemoeizuchtig, onbetrouwbaar en handelaars. Door 
een toename van het aantal Nederlandse toeristen, de intensivering van de 
controle door de Nederlandse overheid en de toename van de omvang van de 
Nederlandse investeringen groeiden aan het einde van de jaren ’80 bij 
Curaçaoënaren de irritaties over de Nederlandse dominantie. 
 Op dat moment kwam KPN naar de Nederlandse Antillen om voor 49% deel 
te nemen in de nieuw te vormen Antilliaanse telefoonmaatschappijen. Als eerste 
gingen alle officiële partijen op St.Maarten accoord met ondertekening van het 
contract. Op 5 maart 1990 kwamen vanuit Curaçao en Nederland grote 
delegaties officiële genodigden om aanwezig te zijn bij de ondertekening van de 
eerste internationale alliantie van KPN. Deze ondertekening ging echter op het 
allerlaatste moment niet door omdat de informele leider van St. Maarten niet 
accoord ging. Hij won daarmee de steun van de bevolking welke hij nodig had 
voor de naderende verkiezingen, hij blokkeerde tevens de opkomende macht 
van een partijgenoot en benadrukte de onafhankelijke positie van het eiland ten 
opzichte van Curaçao.  
 De onderhandelingen op Curaçao leken in eerste instantie soepel te verlopen. 
De overheid, de telefoonmaatschappij Setel, de vakbond ABVO, het 
bedrijfsleven en de directeur van Antelecom waren voorstander van de 
deelneming. De tegenstanders waren te vinden in het management en 
werknemers van Antelecom en het management van een audiotext bedrijf welke 
gebruik maakte van een voordelig contract. De dreiging van grote 
reorganisaties, van nieuw Nederlands management, van een samenvoeging met 
Setel en van mogelijk ontslag waren aanleiding tot het oprichten van een nieuwe 
vakbond, STTK genaamd. De STTK werd gesteund door de overkoepelende 
vakbond KS die mogelijkheden zag de macht van de ABVO in de telecom 
sector over te nemen. Ook kwam er steun van de politieke oppositie die kansen 
zagen de Curaçaose regering te dwarsbomen. De STTK mobiliseerde het 
Curaçaose verzet tegen KPN door de telecom sector te verbinden aan de het 
Curaçaose patrimonio nashonal (cultureel erfgoed). Door het benadrukken van 
de Curaçaose culturele identiteit van de telecom sector was STTK in staat de 
aanwezige anti-makamba sentimenten te gebruiken om KPN buiten de deur te 
houden. Na drie jaar intensieve onderhandelingen trok KPN zich in oktober 
1993 zich geheel terug uit de Nederlandse Antillen. 
 In hoofdstuk 7 werd de conclusie getrokken dat de interculturele 
samenwerking tussen KPN en haar partners in de AT&T-Unisource alliantie 
niet succesvol was omdat er teveel partners bij betrokken waren. Het was de 
verwachting dat de interculturele samenwerking tussen KPN en slechts één 
partner in een reeds bekende markt succesvoller zou zijn. Hoofdstuk 8 heeft 
bewezen dat niet zozeer het aantal betrokken partners maar de gekozen 
interculturele strategie in relatie met de gepercipieerde machtverschillen moeten 
worden gezien als belangrijke factoren bij het mislukken van de samenwerking. 
Heeft KPN geleerd van deze ervaringen toen getracht werd een plaats op de 
Indonesische telecom markt te veroveren? 
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Hoofdstuk 9. Geslaagde interculturele samenwerking in Indonesië: een goed 
machts evenwicht   
In hoofdstuk 9 wordt de derde en laatste case van interculturele samenwerking 
van KPN onderzocht. In het begin van de jaren ’90 was KPN geïnteresseerd om, 
in samenwerking met Indonesische partners, als operator actief te worden op de 
Indonesische telecom markt. KPN slaagde erin een deelneming te verkrijgen in 
een mobiele operator, een samenwerkingsovereenkomst te sluiten met het 
Indonesische PT Telkom en een Indonesische partner te vinden. Indonesië werd 
daarbij gebruikt als regionale uitvalsbasis voor de Zuidoost Aziatische telecom 
markt. Waarom is KPN in Indonesië wel geslaagd om voet aan de grond te 
krijgen? 
 Evenals bij Nederlandse Antillen heeft Nederland een koloniale geschiedenis 
met Indonesië, is het Nederlandse bedrijfsleven een grote investeerder aldaar en 
is er een bijzondere band tussen de twee landen. Ook de Indonesische regering 
herstructureerde de Indonesische telecom markt, gunde de Indonesische PTTs 
hun monopoliepositie en selecteerde diverse westerse telefoonmaatschappijen 
om kapitaal te investeren in de aanleg van een hoogwaardige telecom 
infrastructuur in Indonesië. Tot zover lijken de twee cases op elkaar. Indonesië 
is echter al vijftig jaar onafhankelijk, heeft tot 1998 een enorme economische 
groei doorgemaakt, trok veel internationale investeerders aan en had een 
groeiend nationaal zelfbewustzijn. In tegenstelling tot de acquisitie op de 
Nederlandse Antillen gebruikte KPN daarom de bestaande relaties tussen NCF 
en de Indonesische telefoonmaatschappijen om in contact met de overheid te 
komen. Door de historische, culturele en economische banden tussen Nederland 
en Indonesië te benadrukken slaagde KPN erin een positie op te bouwen in 
Indonesië. Hoe is deze samenwerking met de Indonesische partners verlopen?  
 Om de samenwerking in beeld te brengen is onderzocht hoe KPN 
werknemers en Indonesiërs omgaan met cultuurverschillen. KPN’ers die in 
Indonesië werkten ervaarden op veel terreinen culturele verschillen met hun 
Indonesische collega’s: de taal, de werktijden op kantoor, het geven en 
ontvangen van kritiek, het belang van informele netwerken, de ethnische 
diversiteit, de religie en de management stijl. KPN werknemers gebruikten een 
drietal strategieën om om te gaan met de culturele diversiteit in Indonesië: (1) 
het aansluiten bij de expatriate subcultuur, (2) het verwerpen van de expatriate 
subcultuur en (3) het opbouwen van persoonlijke netwerken in zowel expatriate 
kringen als Indonesische samenleving. 
 De technologische kennis, de financiële middelen, de ervaring met 
veranderingsprocessen en de westerse management modellen maakten KPN tot 
een sterke partner in de perceptie van de Indonesiërs. De Indonesische overheid 
en de samenwerkingspartners benadrukten hun Indonesische ethniciteit en de 
koloniale geschiedenis. Het Nederlandse schuldcomplex ten aanzien van de 
geschiedenis verzwakte KPN’ers in conflicten. Bovendien werd een tè 
dominante houding van Nederlandse managers bestreden door deze sociaal te 
isoleren, te onthouden van informele informatie, uit te sluiten van informele 
netwerken en door situaties complexer maken dan ze zijn. Daarom kregen 
Nederlandse managers geen inzicht in de extreem complexe netwerken van 
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zakenrelaties, familie relaties en machtsstructuren in de Indonesische 
zakenwereld. Deze Indonesische strategieën hebben KPN gedwongen de 
aanvankelijk gekozen ethnocentrische strategie te veranderen in een 
polycentrische strategie om commercieel actief te kunnen worden in Indonesië.  
 
 
Deel IV  De Conclusies 
 
Hoofdstuk 10. Conclusies en suggesties 
In het laatste hoofdstuk worden de resultaten van het onderzoek naar de 
interculturele ervaringen van KPN in de periode van 1990 tot en met 1997 met 
elkaar vergeleken, geanalyseerd en teruggekoppeld naar het theoretisch kader. 
Allereerst zijn de drie cases met elkaar vergeleken om de overeenkomsten en 
verschillen duidelijk te krijgen. Hieruit komt naar voren dat in de cases van de 
Nederlandse Antillen en Indonesië, KPN etnocentrische strategieën heeft 
gekozen om samen te werken met de nationale PTT’s. In beide landen werd er 
verzet geboden tegen deze etnocentrische strategie, maar in de Nederlandse 
Antillen leidde dit tot een breuk, terwijl in Indonesië deze strategie langzaam 
omgebogen werd naar een polycentrische strategie. In de AT&T-Unisource case 
werd direct al uitgegaan van een polycentrische strategie, die onder druk van 
een moeizame samenwerking steeds meer op synergy gericht werd. De drie 
cases hebben laten zien dat ongeveer 80% van de KPN werknemers werden 
opgenomen in expatriate kringen en zich min of meer afsloten van de lokale 
samenleving, 5% tot 10% van de werknemers zich helemaal identificeerde met 
de lokale cultuur, en 10% tot 15% een balans wisten te vinden door netwerken 
op te bouwen in zowel de expatriate kringen als in de lokale samenleving. 
 Wat zijn de consequenties van de gevonden resultaten voor bestaande 
theorieën over intercultureel management? In het debat over intercultural 
management moeten de bestaande interculturele strategieën worden uitgebreid 
met een nieuwe strategie, welke de ‘etniserings-strategie’ is genoemd. De reeds 
bestaande strategieën geven alleen het perspectief weer van de dominante 
partner in een samenwerkingsrelatie. Deze strategiën zijn gericht op het 
overbruggen, respecteren of negeren van culturele verschillen. De culturele 
strategieeën van de niet-dominante partner daarentegen, is gericht op het 
vergroten van cultuurverschillen en het strategisch gebruik maken van 
ethniciteit ten einde deze aan te wenden als machtsmiddel. Nog niet duidelijk is 
geworden onder welke omstandigheden exact etniserings-strategieën ontstaan. 
 Uit het onderzoek is naar voren gekomen dat het proces van 
internationalisering bij PTT Telecom ongeveer hetzelfde patroon laat zien als bij 
andere bedrijven. In de eerste fase van internationalisering (1989-1996) heeft 
PTT Telecom veelal etnocentrische strategieën toegepast welke niet altijd tot het 
gewenste resultaat hebben geleid. De mislukte acquisitie op de Nederlandse 
Antillen en de succesvolle acquisitie in Indonesië leerden het management van 
PTT Telecom over de valkuilen van het internationaal zaken doen. Het 
moeizame opstarten en het uiteenvallen van de strategische alliantie AT&T-
Unisource en de financiële crisis in Azië leidden in eerste instantie tot een 
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verminderde groei van de internationale activiteiten. Door echter te leren van 
deze ervaringen nam het percentage geslaagde deelnemingen toe en groeide 
langzaam de omvang van de internationale activiteiten. De overgang naar de 
tweede fase van internationalisering (vanaf 1997) kenmerkte zich door een 
splitsing van internationale en nationale activiteiten. Het proces van 
internationalisering past daarom precies in het leerproces van internationale 
bedrijven waarbij na aanvankelijke successen, de buitenlandse activiteiten niet 
erg succesvol blijken te zijn en zelfs het bedrijfsresultaat kunnen drukken. Door 
te leren van deze niet-succesvolle ervaringen slagen deze bedrijven erin het 
percentage geslaagde nieuwe buitenlandse ondernemingen te verhogen.  
  Het proefschrift heeft inzicht gegeven in de succesfactoren van interculturele 
samenwerking in strategische allianties. Succes wordt bepaald door (1) de 
afstand in nationale en organisatie culturen tussen de partners, (2) de 
machtsbalans tussen de partners, (3) de historisch ontwikkelde ongelijkheid en 
latent aanwezige ethnische spanningen tussen de landen van beiden organisaties 
en (4) formele en informele bedrijfs- en individuele strategieën om om te gaan 
met cultuurverschillen. Tenslotte worden de empirische consequenties voor 
KPN teruggekoppeld in de vorm van een workshop. In deze workshop worden 
de werknemers bewust gemaakt van culturele diversiteit, het dynamische 
karakter van nationale cultuurverschillen, het strategisch gebruik van ethniciteit 
en wordt hen geleerd hiermee om te gaan. 
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